2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
135 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
136 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
138 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
141 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
142 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
143 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
144 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
145 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
155 rb = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
157 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
161 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
162 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
163 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
167 /* start with empty packet ... */
170 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
172 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
175 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
176 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
177 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
179 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
180 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
181 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
182 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
183 * overrun can be triggered.
185 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
189 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
190 s->packet_length = 0;
191 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
195 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
196 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
199 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
200 if (left == 0 && extend)
202 if (left > 0 && n > left)
206 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
208 s->packet_length += n;
214 /* else we need to read more data */
216 len = s->packet_length;
217 pkt = rb->buf + align;
219 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
220 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
222 if (s->packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */
223 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left);
225 rb->offset = len + align;
228 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
233 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
234 if (!RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&s->rlayer) && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
235 /* ignore max parameter */
240 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
241 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
246 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
247 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
252 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
253 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
254 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
262 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
264 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
269 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
270 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
271 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
273 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
275 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
279 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
282 s->packet_length += n;
283 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
289 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
290 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
292 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
294 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
297 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
298 unsigned int max_send_fragment;
300 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer);
302 unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
309 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
310 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
314 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
315 i = s->handshake_func(s);
319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
325 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
326 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
327 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
328 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
329 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
330 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
331 * report the error in a way the user will notice
334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
339 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
340 * will happen with non blocking IO
343 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->s3->wpend_tot);
345 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
349 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
351 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
353 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
354 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
355 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
356 * compromise is considered worthy.
358 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
359 u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
360 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
361 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
362 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) &
363 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
364 unsigned char aad[13];
365 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
368 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
369 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
370 max_send_fragment -= 512;
372 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
373 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
375 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
376 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
377 max_send_fragment, NULL);
379 if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
384 wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
390 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
391 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
398 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
399 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
404 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
405 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
412 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
413 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
415 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
417 memcpy(aad, s->s3->write_sequence, 8);
419 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
420 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
427 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
428 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
429 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
431 if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
432 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
437 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
438 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
441 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
442 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
443 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
446 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
447 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
449 while (j >= 0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
455 s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
456 s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
457 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
458 s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
460 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
462 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
463 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
470 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
479 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
480 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
481 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
488 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
489 nw = s->max_send_fragment;
493 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
495 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
501 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
502 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
504 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
505 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
507 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
509 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
511 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
521 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
522 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
524 unsigned char *p, *plen;
525 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
530 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer);
534 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
535 * will happen with non blocking IO
538 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
540 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
541 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
542 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
545 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
549 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
552 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
555 wr = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&s->rlayer);
558 if ((sess == NULL) ||
559 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
560 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
561 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
564 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
570 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
572 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
574 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
575 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
578 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
580 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
581 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
582 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
585 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
590 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
592 /* insufficient space */
593 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
598 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
601 if (create_empty_fragment) {
602 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
604 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
605 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
606 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
608 align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
609 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
613 } else if (prefix_len) {
614 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
616 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
617 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
618 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
624 /* write the header */
626 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
629 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
631 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
632 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
634 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
635 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
638 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
640 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
643 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
644 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
645 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
646 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
647 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
651 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
652 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
653 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
659 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
660 wr->data = p + eivlen;
661 wr->length = (int)len;
662 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
665 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
668 /* first we compress */
669 if (s->compress != NULL) {
670 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
671 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
675 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
676 wr->input = wr->data;
680 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
681 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
685 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
686 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
688 wr->length += mac_size;
696 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
698 wr->length += eivlen;
701 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
704 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
705 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, p + wr->length, 1) < 0)
707 wr->length += mac_size;
710 /* record length after mac and block padding */
711 s2n(wr->length, plen);
714 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s,
715 s->msg_callback_arg);
718 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
721 wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
722 wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
724 if (create_empty_fragment) {
726 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
732 /* now let's set up wb */
733 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
736 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
739 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
740 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
741 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
742 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
744 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
745 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
750 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
751 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
755 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer);
758 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
759 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
760 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
761 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
762 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
768 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
769 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
770 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
771 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
772 (unsigned int)wb->left);
774 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
780 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
781 return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
783 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
785 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
786 * using a datagram service
798 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
799 * 'type' is one of the following:
801 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
802 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
803 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
805 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
806 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
808 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
809 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
810 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
811 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
812 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
813 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
814 * Change cipher spec protocol
815 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
817 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
819 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
820 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
821 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
822 * Application data protocol
823 * none of our business
825 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
830 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
832 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer))) {
833 /* Not initialized yet */
834 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
838 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
839 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
841 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
846 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
847 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
849 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
850 unsigned char *dst = buf;
855 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
858 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
861 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
862 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
863 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
868 * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
871 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
872 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
873 i = s->handshake_func(s);
877 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
882 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
885 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
886 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
887 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
888 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
890 rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
892 /* get new packet if necessary */
893 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
894 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
899 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
901 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
902 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
903 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
904 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
910 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
913 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
915 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
919 if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
920 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
922 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
923 * doing a handshake for the first time
925 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
926 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
927 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
935 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
938 n = (unsigned int)len;
940 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
944 if (rr->length == 0) {
945 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
947 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
948 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(
949 RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)) == 0)
950 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
957 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
958 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
962 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
963 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
966 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
967 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
968 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
970 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
971 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
972 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
973 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
974 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
975 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
976 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
977 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
979 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
980 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
981 /* We can ignore 0 return values */
982 if(tls1_process_heartbeat(s) < 0) {
986 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
988 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
989 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
990 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
995 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
996 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
998 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1000 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1002 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1006 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1007 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1012 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1013 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1014 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1017 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1019 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1020 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1021 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1022 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1024 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1025 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1026 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1027 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1032 if (s->msg_callback)
1033 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1034 s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1035 s->msg_callback_arg);
1037 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1038 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1039 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1040 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1041 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1042 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1046 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1047 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1051 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1052 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(
1053 RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)) == 0) {
1054 /* no read-ahead left? */
1057 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1058 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1059 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1060 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1062 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1063 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1064 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1065 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1072 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1073 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1078 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1079 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1080 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1083 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1084 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1085 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1086 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1087 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1088 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1089 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1091 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1094 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1097 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1098 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1099 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1101 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1103 if (s->msg_callback)
1104 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1105 s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1107 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1108 cb = s->info_callback;
1109 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1110 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1113 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1114 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1117 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1118 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1119 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1120 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1124 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1125 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1126 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1127 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1128 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1129 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1131 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1132 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1136 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1137 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1140 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1143 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1144 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1146 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1147 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1148 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1149 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1152 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1160 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1162 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1167 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1169 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1170 * what the record payload has to look like
1172 if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1173 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1174 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1179 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1180 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
1181 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1186 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) {
1187 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1192 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1196 if (s->msg_callback)
1197 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1198 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1200 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1201 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1208 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1210 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) {
1211 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1212 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1213 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1217 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1225 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1226 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)) == 0) {
1227 /* no read-ahead left? */
1230 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1231 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1232 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1233 * problems in the blocking world
1235 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1236 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1237 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1238 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1248 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1249 * an unexpected message alert.
1251 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1255 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1258 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1260 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1262 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1263 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1264 * happen when type != rr->type
1266 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1269 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1271 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1272 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1273 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1274 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1275 * started), we will indulge it.
1277 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1278 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1279 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1280 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1281 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1282 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1283 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1284 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1287 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1290 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1298 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1303 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1309 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1310 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1312 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1314 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) {
1315 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
1316 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1318 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1322 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1323 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
1327 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i))
1331 * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it
1332 * before we read the finished message
1334 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
1335 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1336 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1338 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1339 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1342 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1344 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1349 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1354 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1356 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1357 desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1358 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1359 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have
1360 * protocol_version alerts */
1363 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1364 if ((level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) && (s->session != NULL))
1365 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1367 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1368 s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
1369 s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
1370 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(RECORD_LAYER_get_wbuf(&s->rlayer)) == 0) {
1371 /* data still being written out? */
1372 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1375 * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in
1381 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1384 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1386 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1387 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1389 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1392 * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the
1393 * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not
1396 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1397 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1399 if (s->msg_callback)
1400 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1401 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1403 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1404 cb = s->info_callback;
1405 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1406 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1409 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
1410 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);