2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
135 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
136 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
137 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
139 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
142 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
143 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
144 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
145 * s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
146 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
158 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
162 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
163 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
164 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
168 /* start with empty packet ... */
171 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
173 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
176 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
177 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
178 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
180 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
181 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
182 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
183 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
184 * overrun can be triggered.
186 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
190 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
191 s->packet_length = 0;
192 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
196 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
197 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
200 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
201 if (left == 0 && extend)
203 if (left > 0 && n > left)
207 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
209 s->packet_length += n;
215 /* else we need to read more data */
217 len = s->packet_length;
218 pkt = rb->buf + align;
220 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
221 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
223 if (s->packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */
224 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left);
226 rb->offset = len + align;
229 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
234 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
235 if (!s->read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
236 /* ignore max parameter */
241 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
242 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
247 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
248 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
253 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
254 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
255 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
263 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
265 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
270 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
271 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
272 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
274 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
276 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
280 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
283 s->packet_length += n;
284 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
289 * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
290 * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
291 * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
292 * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
294 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
297 * Call this to get a new input record.
298 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
299 * or non-blocking IO.
300 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
301 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
302 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
303 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
305 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
306 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
308 int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
309 int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
313 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
317 unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
322 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
323 extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
326 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) {
328 * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after
329 * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done
331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
336 /* check if we have the header */
337 if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
338 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
339 n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
341 return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
342 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
346 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
347 s->msg_callback_arg);
349 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
353 version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
356 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
359 /* Lets check version */
360 if (!s->first_packet) {
361 if (version != s->version) {
362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
363 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
364 && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
366 * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
368 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
369 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
374 if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
379 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
380 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
385 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
388 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
390 if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
391 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
393 n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
395 return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */
397 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
402 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
405 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
406 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
408 rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
411 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
412 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
413 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
414 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
418 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
419 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
422 /* check is not needed I believe */
423 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) {
424 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
425 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
429 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
430 rr->data = rr->input;
431 rr->orig_len = rr->length;
433 * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All
434 * the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
436 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
438 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
439 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
440 if (rr->length < mac_size) {
441 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
445 rr->length -= mac_size;
446 mac = rr->data + rr->length;
447 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
448 if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) {
449 al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
451 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
456 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
459 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
460 * 1: if the padding is valid
461 * -1: if the padding is invalid
464 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
465 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
469 printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
472 for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
473 printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
478 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
479 if ((sess != NULL) &&
480 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
481 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s)) {
482 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
483 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
484 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
485 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
486 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
489 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
490 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
491 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
492 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
494 if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
495 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
496 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
497 rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
498 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
503 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
505 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
506 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
507 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
508 * contents of the padding bytes.
511 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
512 rr->length -= mac_size;
515 * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
516 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
519 rr->length -= mac_size;
520 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
523 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
524 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
525 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
527 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size)
533 * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
534 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
535 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
536 * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become
537 * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
539 al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
541 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
545 /* r->length is now just compressed */
546 if (s->expand != NULL) {
547 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) {
548 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
552 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
553 al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
559 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) {
560 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
567 * So at this point the following is true
568 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
569 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
570 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
571 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
575 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
576 s->packet_length = 0;
578 /* just read a 0 length packet */
579 if (rr->length == 0) {
580 empty_record_count++;
581 if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
582 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
589 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type,
596 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
601 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
607 rr = &(ssl->s3->rrec);
608 i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
609 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data,
620 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
626 wr = &(ssl->s3->wrec);
627 i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
628 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
629 wr->input, (int)wr->length);
635 wr->input = wr->data;
641 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
642 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
644 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
646 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
649 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
650 unsigned int max_send_fragment;
652 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
654 unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
661 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
662 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
666 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
667 i = s->handshake_func(s);
671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
677 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
678 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
679 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
680 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
681 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
682 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
683 * report the error in a way the user will notice
686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
691 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
692 * will happen with non blocking IO
695 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->s3->wpend_tot);
697 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
701 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
703 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
705 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
706 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
707 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
708 * compromise is considered worthy.
710 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
711 u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
712 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
713 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
714 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) &
715 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
716 unsigned char aad[13];
717 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
720 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
721 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
722 max_send_fragment -= 512;
724 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
725 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
727 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
728 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
729 max_send_fragment, NULL);
731 if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
736 wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
738 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
739 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
746 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
747 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
752 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
753 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
760 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
761 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
763 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
765 memcpy(aad, s->s3->write_sequence, 8);
767 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
768 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
775 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
776 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
777 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
779 if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
780 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
785 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
786 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
789 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
790 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
791 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
794 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
795 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
797 while (j >= 0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
803 s->s3->wpend_tot = nw;
804 s->s3->wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
805 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
806 s->s3->wpend_ret = nw;
808 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
811 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
818 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
827 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
828 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
829 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
836 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
837 nw = s->max_send_fragment;
841 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
843 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
849 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
850 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
852 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
853 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
855 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
857 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
859 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
869 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
870 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
872 unsigned char *p, *plen;
873 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
878 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
882 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
883 * will happen with non blocking IO
886 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
888 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
889 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
890 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
893 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
897 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
900 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
906 if ((sess == NULL) ||
907 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
908 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
909 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
912 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
917 #if 0 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
918 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && s->compress == NULL &&
919 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
920 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) &
921 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)
923 unsigned char aad[13];
924 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param =
925 { NULL, aad, sizeof(aad), 0 };
928 memcpy(aad, s->s3->write_sequence, 8);
930 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
931 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
932 aad[11] = (unsigned char)(len >> 8);
933 aad[12] = (unsigned char)len;
934 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
935 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
936 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
938 if (packlen == 0 || packlen > wb->len)
941 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
944 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
945 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
946 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
948 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
949 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
951 while (j >= 0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
958 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad
959 * write retries later
961 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
962 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
963 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
964 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
966 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
967 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
972 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
974 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
976 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
977 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
980 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
982 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
983 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
984 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
987 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
992 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
994 /* insufficient space */
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1000 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1003 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1004 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
1006 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
1007 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
1008 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
1010 align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1011 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
1013 p = wb->buf + align;
1015 } else if (prefix_len) {
1016 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
1018 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
1019 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1020 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
1022 p = wb->buf + align;
1026 /* write the header */
1028 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
1031 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
1033 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
1034 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
1036 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
1037 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
1040 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1042 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
1045 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
1046 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
1047 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
1048 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
1049 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
1053 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
1054 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
1055 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1061 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1062 wr->data = p + eivlen;
1063 wr->length = (int)len;
1064 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
1067 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
1070 /* first we compress */
1071 if (s->compress != NULL) {
1072 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1077 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
1078 wr->input = wr->data;
1082 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
1083 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
1087 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
1088 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
1090 wr->length += mac_size;
1098 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
1100 wr->length += eivlen;
1103 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
1106 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
1107 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, p + wr->length, 1) < 0)
1109 wr->length += mac_size;
1112 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1113 s2n(wr->length, plen);
1115 if (s->msg_callback)
1116 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s,
1117 s->msg_callback_arg);
1120 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1123 wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1124 wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1126 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1128 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1134 /* now let's set up wb */
1135 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1138 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1141 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
1142 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
1143 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
1144 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
1146 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1147 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
1152 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
1153 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1157 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
1160 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
1161 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
1162 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1163 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1170 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1171 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1172 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
1173 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
1174 (unsigned int)wb->left);
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1179 if (i == wb->left) {
1182 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1183 return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
1184 } else if (i <= 0) {
1185 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1187 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1188 * using a datagram service
1200 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1201 * 'type' is one of the following:
1203 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1204 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1205 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1207 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1208 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1210 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1211 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1212 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1213 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1214 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1215 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1216 * Change cipher spec protocol
1217 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1219 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1220 * Handshake protocol
1221 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1222 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1223 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1224 * Application data protocol
1225 * none of our business
1227 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
1232 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1234 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
1235 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1238 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1239 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1241 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1246 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1247 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1249 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1250 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1255 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1258 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
1261 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1262 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1263 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1268 * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1271 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1272 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1273 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1282 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1285 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1286 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1287 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1288 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
1290 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1292 /* get new packet if necessary */
1293 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
1294 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1299 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1301 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1302 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1303 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1304 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1310 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1313 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1315 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1319 if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1320 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1322 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1323 * doing a handshake for the first time
1325 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1326 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1327 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1335 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1338 n = (unsigned int)len;
1340 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1344 if (rr->length == 0) {
1345 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1347 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
1348 && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1349 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1356 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1357 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
1361 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1362 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1365 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1366 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1367 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1369 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1370 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1371 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1372 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1373 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1374 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1375 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1376 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1379 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
1380 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1382 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1384 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1385 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1386 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1391 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1392 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1394 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1396 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1398 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1402 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1403 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1408 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1409 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1410 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1413 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1415 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1416 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1417 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1418 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1420 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1421 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1422 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1423 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1428 if (s->msg_callback)
1429 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1430 s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1431 s->msg_callback_arg);
1433 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1434 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1435 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1436 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1437 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1438 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1443 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1447 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1448 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1451 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1452 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1453 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1454 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1456 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1457 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1458 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1459 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1466 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1467 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1472 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1473 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1474 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1477 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1478 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1479 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1480 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1481 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1482 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1483 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1485 * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1488 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1491 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1492 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1493 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1495 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1497 if (s->msg_callback)
1498 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1499 s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1501 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1502 cb = s->info_callback;
1503 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1504 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1507 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1508 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1511 if (alert_level == 1) { /* warning */
1512 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1513 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1514 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1518 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1519 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1520 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1521 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1522 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1523 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1525 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1526 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1530 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1531 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1534 } else if (alert_level == 2) { /* fatal */
1537 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1538 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1539 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1540 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1541 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1542 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1543 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1546 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1554 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1556 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1561 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1563 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1564 * what the record payload has to look like
1566 if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1567 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1568 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1573 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1574 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
1575 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1580 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) {
1581 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1582 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1586 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1590 if (s->msg_callback)
1591 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1592 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1594 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1595 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1602 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1604 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) {
1605 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1606 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1607 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences
1608 * are not as expected (and because this is
1609 * not really needed for clients except for
1610 * detecting protocol violations): */
1611 s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server)
1612 ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1614 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1619 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1627 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1628 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1631 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1632 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1633 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1634 * problems in the blocking world
1636 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1637 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1638 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1639 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1649 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1650 * an unexpected message alert.
1652 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1656 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1659 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1661 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1663 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1664 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1665 * happen when type != rr->type
1667 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1668 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1670 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1672 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1673 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1674 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1675 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1676 * started), we will indulge it.
1678 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1679 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1680 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1681 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1682 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1683 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1684 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1685 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1688 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1691 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1699 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1704 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1710 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1711 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1713 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1715 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) {
1716 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
1717 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1719 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1723 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1724 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
1728 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i))
1732 * we have to record the message digest at this point so we can get it
1733 * before we read the finished message
1735 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
1736 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1737 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1739 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1740 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1743 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1745 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1750 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1755 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1757 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1758 desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1759 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1760 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have
1761 * protocol_version alerts */
1764 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1765 if ((level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) && (s->session != NULL))
1766 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1768 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1769 s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
1770 s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
1771 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1772 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1774 * else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in
1780 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1783 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1785 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1786 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1788 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1791 * Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the
1792 * message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not
1795 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1796 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1798 if (s->msg_callback)
1799 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1800 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1802 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1803 cb = s->info_callback;
1804 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1805 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1808 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
1809 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);