2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118 #include <openssl/rand.h>
120 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
121 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
124 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
125 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
126 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
128 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
130 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
131 * packet by another n bytes.
132 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
133 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
134 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
135 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
142 if (n <= 0) return n;
146 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
150 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
151 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
152 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
157 /* start with empty packet ... */
160 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
162 /* check if next packet length is large
163 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
164 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
165 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
166 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
168 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
169 * and its length field is insane, we can
170 * only be led to wrong decision about
171 * whether memmove will occur or not.
172 * Header values has no effect on memmove
173 * arguments and therefore no buffer
174 * overrun can be triggered. */
175 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
179 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
180 s->packet_length = 0;
181 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
184 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
185 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
186 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
189 if (left > 0 && n > left)
193 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
202 /* else we need to read more data */
204 len = s->packet_length;
206 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
207 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
208 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
209 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
211 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
213 rb->offset = len + align;
216 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
223 /* ignore max parameter */
229 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
230 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
235 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
236 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
237 * len+max if possible) */
242 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
243 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
254 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
257 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
261 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
262 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
263 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
267 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
271 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
274 s->packet_length += n;
275 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
279 /* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will
280 * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker
281 * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause
282 * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */
283 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
285 /* Call this to get a new input record.
286 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
287 * or non-blocking IO.
288 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
289 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
290 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
291 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
293 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
294 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
296 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
297 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
301 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
305 unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
310 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
311 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
314 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
316 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
317 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
323 /* check if we have the header */
324 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
325 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
327 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
328 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
329 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
333 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
335 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
339 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
342 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
345 /* Lets check version */
346 if (!s->first_packet)
348 if (version != s->version)
350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
351 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
352 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
353 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
354 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
359 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
365 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
367 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
372 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
375 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
377 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
379 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
381 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
382 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
383 /* now n == rr->length,
384 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
387 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
389 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
390 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
392 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
394 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
395 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
396 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
397 * the decryption or by the decompression
398 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
399 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
401 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
402 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
404 /* check is not needed I believe */
405 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
407 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
412 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
414 rr->orig_len=rr->length;
415 /* If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record.
416 * All the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
418 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash)
421 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
422 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
423 if (rr->length < mac_size)
425 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
429 rr->length -= mac_size;
430 mac = rr->data + rr->length;
431 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
432 if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
434 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
440 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
442 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
443 * 1: if the padding is valid
444 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
447 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
453 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
454 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
458 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
459 if ((sess != NULL) &&
460 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
461 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s))
463 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
464 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
465 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
466 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
467 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
469 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
470 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
471 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
472 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
474 if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
475 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
476 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
477 rr->orig_len < mac_size+1))
479 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
484 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
486 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
487 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
488 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
489 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
492 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
493 rr->length -= mac_size;
497 /* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len|
498 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
499 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
500 rr->length -= mac_size;
501 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
504 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
505 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
507 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
513 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
514 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
515 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
516 * we should not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this
517 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
518 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
523 /* r->length is now just compressed */
524 if (s->expand != NULL)
526 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
528 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
532 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
534 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
535 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
540 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
542 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
548 /* So at this point the following is true
549 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
550 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
551 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
552 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
556 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
559 /* just read a 0 length packet */
562 empty_record_count++;
563 if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS)
565 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_TOO_MANY_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS);
573 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
579 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
584 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
590 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
591 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
592 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
602 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
604 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
608 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
609 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
610 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
611 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
622 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
623 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
625 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
627 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
628 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
631 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
635 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
637 i=s->handshake_func(s);
638 if (i < 0) return(i);
641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
649 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
650 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
654 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
657 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
663 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
664 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
666 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
667 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
668 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
670 if ((i==(int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
672 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
682 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
683 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
685 unsigned char *p,*plen;
686 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
691 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
695 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
698 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
699 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
701 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
703 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
704 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
706 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
709 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
712 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
718 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
719 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
720 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
723 clear=s->enc_write_ctx?0:1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
731 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
736 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
737 if (type==SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && s->compress==NULL &&
738 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && /*!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) &&*/
739 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)
741 unsigned char aad[13];
742 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param = {NULL,aad,sizeof(aad),0};
745 memcpy(aad,s->s3->write_sequence,8);
747 aad[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
748 aad[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
749 aad[11]=(unsigned char)(len>>8);
750 aad[12]=(unsigned char)len;
751 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
752 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
753 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
755 if (packlen==0 || packlen > wb->len) break;
757 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
760 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
761 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
762 sizeof(mb_param),&mb_param);
764 s->s3->write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
765 if (s->s3->write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave)
768 while (j>=0 && (++s->s3->write_sequence[j--])==0) ;
774 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
775 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
776 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
777 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
778 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
780 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
781 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
785 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
786 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
788 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
789 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
791 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
793 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
794 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
795 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
796 * together with the actual payload) */
797 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
802 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
804 /* insufficient space */
805 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
810 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
813 if (create_empty_fragment)
815 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
816 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
817 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
818 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
819 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
820 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
821 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
828 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
832 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
833 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
834 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
840 /* write the header */
845 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
846 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
847 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
849 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
851 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
854 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
856 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
859 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
860 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
862 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
863 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
865 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
869 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
870 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
871 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
878 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
881 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
883 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
886 /* first we compress */
887 if (s->compress != NULL)
889 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
897 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
901 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
902 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
903 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
905 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0)
907 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
909 wr->length+=mac_size;
917 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
919 wr->length += eivlen;
922 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
923 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
925 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0)
927 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,p + wr->length,1) < 0)
929 wr->length+=mac_size;
932 /* record length after mac and block padding */
933 s2n(wr->length,plen);
936 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
938 /* we should now have
939 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
941 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
942 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
944 if (create_empty_fragment)
946 /* we are in a recursive call;
947 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
952 /* now let's set up wb */
953 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
955 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
956 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
957 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
958 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
959 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
961 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
962 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
967 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
968 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
972 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
975 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
976 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
977 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
978 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
989 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
991 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
992 (unsigned int)wb->left);
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1003 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1004 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
1007 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
1008 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
1009 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
1010 point in using a datagram service */
1020 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1021 * 'type' is one of the following:
1023 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1024 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1025 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1027 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1028 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1030 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1031 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
1032 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
1033 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1034 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1035 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1036 * Change cipher spec protocol
1037 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1039 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1040 * Handshake protocol
1041 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1042 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1043 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1044 * Application data protocol
1045 * none of our business
1047 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
1052 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
1054 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
1055 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1058 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
1059 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1065 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1066 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1068 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1069 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1074 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1077 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
1080 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1081 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1082 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1086 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
1088 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
1090 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1091 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1092 if (i < 0) return(i);
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1100 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1102 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1103 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1104 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1105 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
1106 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
1108 /* get new packet if necessary */
1109 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
1111 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
1112 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
1115 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1117 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1118 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1119 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
1121 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1126 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1127 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1128 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1131 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1136 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1138 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1139 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1140 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1141 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1143 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1148 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1150 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1153 n = (unsigned int)len;
1155 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1160 if (rr->length == 0)
1162 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1164 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1165 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1172 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1173 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1175 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1176 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1179 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1180 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1181 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1183 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1185 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1186 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1187 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1189 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1191 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1192 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1193 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1196 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
1198 tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1200 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1202 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1203 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1204 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1209 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1211 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1213 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1215 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1218 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1222 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1223 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1227 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1228 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1229 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1231 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1233 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1234 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1235 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1237 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1239 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1240 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1241 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1243 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1248 if (s->msg_callback)
1249 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1251 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1252 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1253 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1255 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1256 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1258 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1259 if (i < 0) return(i);
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1266 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1268 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1271 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1272 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1273 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1274 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1275 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1276 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1277 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1278 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1284 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1285 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1288 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1289 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1290 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1293 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1294 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1295 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1296 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1297 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1298 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1299 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1302 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1304 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1307 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1309 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1310 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1312 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1314 if (s->msg_callback)
1315 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1317 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1318 cb=s->info_callback;
1319 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1320 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1324 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1325 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1328 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1330 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1331 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1333 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1336 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1337 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1338 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1339 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1340 * expects it to succeed.
1342 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1343 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1345 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1347 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1351 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1352 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1356 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1360 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1361 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1363 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1364 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1365 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1366 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1371 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1379 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1381 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1386 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1388 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1389 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1390 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1391 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1393 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1398 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1399 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1401 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1402 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1408 if (s->msg_callback)
1409 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1411 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1412 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1418 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1419 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1421 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1422 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1424 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1425 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1426 * protocol violations): */
1427 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1431 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1436 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1437 if (i < 0) return(i);
1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1444 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1446 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1449 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1450 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1451 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1452 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1453 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1454 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1455 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1456 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1467 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1468 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1470 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
1476 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1479 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1481 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1482 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1483 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1484 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1485 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1488 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1489 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1490 * but have application data. If the library was
1491 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1492 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1493 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1494 * we will indulge it.
1496 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1497 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1499 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1500 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1501 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1503 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1504 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1505 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1509 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1514 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1522 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1527 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1533 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1534 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1536 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1538 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1540 if (s->session == NULL)
1542 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1547 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1548 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1551 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1554 /* we have to record the message digest at
1555 * this point so we can get it before we read
1556 * the finished message */
1557 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1559 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1560 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1564 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1565 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1568 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1569 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1575 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1580 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1582 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1583 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1584 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1585 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1586 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1587 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1588 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1589 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1591 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1592 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1593 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1594 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1595 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1596 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1597 * some time in the future */
1601 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1604 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1606 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1607 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1610 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1614 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1615 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1616 * we will not worry too much. */
1617 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1618 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1620 if (s->msg_callback)
1621 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1623 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1624 cb=s->info_callback;
1625 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1626 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1630 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1631 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);