2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include <openssl/evp.h>
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include "record_locl.h"
20 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
21 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
24 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
25 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
26 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
27 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
29 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
30 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
33 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
36 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
39 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
43 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
45 /* Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
46 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
51 rl->packet_length = 0;
53 memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
54 rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
55 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
56 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
62 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
63 for(pipes = 0; pipes < rl->numwpipes; pipes++)
64 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->wbuf[pipes]);
66 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
68 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
69 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
72 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
75 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
77 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
78 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
79 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
80 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
81 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
84 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
86 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
89 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
91 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
92 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes-1]) != 0;
95 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
97 rl->packet_length = len;
99 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
100 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
101 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s))
105 rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
106 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len);
111 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
113 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
116 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
118 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
121 int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
126 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
129 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
130 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
131 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
133 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
139 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
141 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
144 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
146 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
149 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
151 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
152 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
153 return "read header";
154 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
156 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
163 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
165 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
166 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
168 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
170 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
177 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend, int clearold)
180 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
181 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
182 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
183 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
184 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
185 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
186 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
196 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
198 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
202 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
203 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
204 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
208 /* start with empty packet ... */
211 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
213 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
216 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
217 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
218 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
220 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
221 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
222 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
223 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
224 * overrun can be triggered.
226 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
230 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
231 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
232 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
236 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
237 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
240 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
241 if (left == 0 && extend)
243 if (left > 0 && n > left)
247 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
249 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
255 /* else we need to read more data */
257 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
258 pkt = rb->buf + align;
260 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
261 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
263 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) { /* len > 0 */
264 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
265 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
266 rb->offset = len + align;
269 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
274 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
275 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
276 /* ignore max parameter */
281 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
282 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
287 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
288 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
293 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
294 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
295 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
303 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
305 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
310 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
311 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
312 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
314 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
316 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
320 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
323 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
324 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
330 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
331 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
333 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
335 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
337 unsigned int n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
338 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
339 unsigned int max_send_fragment, nw;
340 unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
342 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
350 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
351 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
353 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
354 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
355 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
356 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
357 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
358 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
359 * report the error in a way the user will notice
361 if ((unsigned int)len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
369 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
370 i = s->handshake_func(s);
374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
380 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
381 * will happen with non blocking IO
384 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot);
386 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
387 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
390 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
392 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
394 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
395 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
396 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
397 * compromise is considered worthy.
399 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
400 u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
401 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
402 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
403 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
404 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
405 unsigned char aad[13];
406 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
409 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
410 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
411 max_send_fragment -= 512;
413 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
414 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
416 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
417 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
418 max_send_fragment, NULL);
420 if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
425 wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
426 if (wb->buf == NULL) {
427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
431 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
432 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
439 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
440 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
445 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
446 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
448 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
453 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
454 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
456 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
458 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
460 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
461 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
468 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
469 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
470 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
472 if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
473 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
478 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
479 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
482 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
483 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
484 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
487 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
488 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
490 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
496 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
497 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
498 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
499 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
501 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
503 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
504 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
507 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
511 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
520 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
521 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
522 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
529 split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
531 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
532 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
533 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
536 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
537 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
539 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
546 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
547 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
548 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
549 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
551 if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
552 || split_send_fragment == 0) {
554 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
555 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
562 unsigned int pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
563 unsigned int numpipes, j;
568 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
569 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
572 if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
574 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
577 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
578 pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
581 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
582 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
583 remain = n % numpipes;
584 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
585 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
591 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0);
593 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
594 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
599 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
600 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
602 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
603 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
605 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
607 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
609 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
619 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
620 unsigned int *pipelens, unsigned int numpipes,
621 int create_empty_fragment)
623 unsigned char *outbuf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], *plen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
624 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
625 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
631 unsigned int totlen = 0;
634 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
635 totlen += pipelens[j];
637 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
638 * will happen with non blocking IO
640 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
641 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen));
643 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
644 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
645 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
648 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
651 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
652 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes))
655 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
660 if ((sess == NULL) ||
661 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
662 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
663 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
666 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
672 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
674 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
676 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
677 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
680 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
682 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
683 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
684 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
687 unsigned int tmppipelen = 0;
689 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1);
694 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
696 /* insufficient space */
697 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
702 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
705 if (create_empty_fragment) {
706 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
707 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
709 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
710 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
711 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
713 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
714 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
716 outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
717 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
718 } else if (prefix_len) {
719 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
720 outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
723 for (j=0; j < numpipes; j++) {
724 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
725 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
726 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
727 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
729 outbuf[j] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
730 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
734 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
735 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
736 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
737 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
738 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
742 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
743 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
744 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
745 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
746 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
754 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
755 memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
756 for (j=0; j < numpipes; j++) {
757 /* write the header */
758 *(outbuf[j]++) = type & 0xff;
759 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type);
761 *(outbuf[j]++) = (s->version >> 8);
763 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
764 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
766 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
767 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
768 *(outbuf[j]++) = 0x1;
770 *(outbuf[j]++) = s->version & 0xff;
772 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
776 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
777 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j] + eivlen);
778 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr[j], (int)pipelens[j]);
779 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr[j], (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
780 totlen += pipelens[j];
783 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
786 /* first we compress */
787 if (s->compress != NULL) {
788 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr[j])) {
789 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
793 memcpy(wr[j].data, wr[j].input, wr[j].length);
794 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
798 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
799 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
803 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
804 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
805 &(outbuf[j][wr[j].length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
807 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
811 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j]);
812 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
816 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
818 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], eivlen);
822 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
825 for (j=0; j < numpipes; j++) {
826 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
827 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
828 outbuf[j] + wr[j].length, 1) < 0)
830 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
833 /* record length after mac and block padding */
834 s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]), plen[j]);
837 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen[j] - 5, 5, s,
838 s->msg_callback_arg);
841 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
844 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); /* not needed but helps for debugging */
845 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
847 if (create_empty_fragment) {
849 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
853 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
854 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
857 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr);
860 /* now let's set up wb */
861 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
862 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]));
868 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
871 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
872 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
873 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
874 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
876 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
877 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen);
882 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
883 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
887 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
888 unsigned int currbuf = 0;
891 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > (int)len)
892 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
893 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
894 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
900 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
901 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
902 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
907 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
908 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
909 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
910 (char *)&(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])[
911 SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
912 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
917 if (i == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
918 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
919 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i);
920 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
922 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
923 return (s->rlayer.wpend_ret);
925 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
927 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
928 * using a datagram service
930 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
934 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i);
935 SSL3_BUFFER_add_left(&wb[currbuf], -i);
940 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
941 * 'type' is one of the following:
943 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
944 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
945 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
947 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
948 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
950 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
951 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
952 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
953 * argument is non NULL.
954 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
955 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
956 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
957 * Change cipher spec protocol
958 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
960 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
962 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
963 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
964 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
965 * Application data protocol
966 * none of our business
968 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
972 unsigned int n, curr_rec, num_recs, read_bytes;
975 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
977 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
979 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
980 /* Not initialized yet */
981 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
985 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
986 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
988 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
993 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
994 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
996 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
997 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1002 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1005 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1008 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1009 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1010 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1012 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1013 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1019 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1022 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1023 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1024 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1033 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1036 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1037 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1038 * rr[i].data, - data
1039 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1040 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1042 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1043 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1046 /* get new records if necessary */
1047 if (num_recs == 0) {
1048 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1051 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1052 if (num_recs == 0) {
1053 /* Shouldn't happen */
1054 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1059 /* Skip over any records we have already used or are zero in length */
1061 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rr[curr_rec]) == 0;
1063 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1064 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1068 } while (num_recs == 0);
1071 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1073 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1074 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1075 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1076 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1082 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1085 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1086 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1087 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1091 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1092 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1093 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
1095 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1096 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1097 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1100 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1101 * doing a handshake for the first time
1103 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1104 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1105 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1110 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1111 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1112 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1113 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1118 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1119 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1126 if ((unsigned int)len - read_bytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1127 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1129 n = (unsigned int)len - read_bytes;
1131 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1134 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1135 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1136 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1137 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1138 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1141 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1142 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1147 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1148 && read_bytes < (unsigned int)len);
1149 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1150 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1151 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1152 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1157 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1158 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1159 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1162 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1163 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1169 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1171 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1173 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1174 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1175 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1176 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1178 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1183 if(s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1184 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1186 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1187 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1188 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1189 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1191 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1192 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1198 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1199 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1202 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1203 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1204 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1206 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1207 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1208 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1209 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1210 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1211 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1212 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1213 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1216 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1217 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1218 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1219 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1221 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1223 dest[(*dest_len)++] =
1224 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
1225 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
1226 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
1229 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1230 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1235 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1236 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1237 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1240 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1242 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1243 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1244 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1245 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1247 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1248 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1249 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1250 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1255 if (s->msg_callback)
1256 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1257 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1258 s->msg_callback_arg);
1260 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1261 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1262 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1263 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1264 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1265 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1270 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1274 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1275 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1276 /* no read-ahead left? */
1279 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1280 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1281 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1282 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1284 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1285 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1286 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1287 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1294 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1295 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1300 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1301 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1302 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1305 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1306 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1307 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1308 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1309 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1310 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1311 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1312 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1313 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1316 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1317 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1318 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1320 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1322 if (s->msg_callback)
1323 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1324 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1325 s->msg_callback_arg);
1327 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1328 cb = s->info_callback;
1329 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1330 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1333 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1334 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1337 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1338 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1339 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1340 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1344 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1345 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1346 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1347 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1348 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1349 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1351 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1352 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1356 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1357 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1360 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1363 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1364 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1366 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1367 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1368 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1369 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1372 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1380 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1382 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1383 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1387 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1388 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1394 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1396 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1397 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1398 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1399 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1400 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1404 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1412 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1413 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1414 /* no read-ahead left? */
1417 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1418 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1419 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1420 * problems in the blocking world
1422 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1423 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1424 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1425 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1432 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1435 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1436 * an unexpected message alert.
1438 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1439 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1442 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1445 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1447 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1449 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1450 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1451 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1453 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1456 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1458 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1459 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1460 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1461 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1462 * started), we will indulge it.
1464 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1465 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1468 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1476 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1480 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1484 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1492 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1493 * format and false otherwise.
1495 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1497 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1501 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1503 unsigned int RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1505 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);