2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include <openssl/evp.h>
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include "record_locl.h"
20 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
21 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
24 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
25 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
26 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
27 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
29 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
30 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
33 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
36 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
37 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
40 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
42 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
45 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
46 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
51 rl->packet_length = 0;
53 memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
54 rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
55 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
56 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
62 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
63 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
65 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
67 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
68 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
71 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
74 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
76 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
77 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
78 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
79 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
80 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
83 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
85 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
88 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
90 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
91 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
94 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf,
97 rl->packet_length = len;
99 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
100 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
101 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s))
105 rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
106 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len);
111 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
113 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
116 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
118 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
121 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
125 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
128 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
129 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
130 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
132 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
138 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
140 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
143 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
145 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
148 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
150 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
151 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
152 return "read header";
153 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
155 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
162 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
164 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
165 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
167 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
169 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
177 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
179 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
183 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
184 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
185 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
186 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
187 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
188 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
189 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
191 size_t len, left, align = 0;
198 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
200 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
204 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
205 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
206 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
210 /* start with empty packet ... */
213 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
215 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
218 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
219 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
220 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
222 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
223 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
224 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
225 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
226 * overrun can be triggered.
228 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
232 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
233 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
234 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
237 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
238 pkt = rb->buf + align;
240 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
241 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
243 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
244 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
245 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
246 rb->offset = len + align;
250 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
251 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
254 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
255 if (left == 0 && extend)
257 if (left > 0 && n > left)
261 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
263 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
270 /* else we need to read more data */
272 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { /* does not happen */
273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
277 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
278 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
279 /* ignore max parameter */
284 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
285 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
293 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
294 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
299 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
300 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
301 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
302 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
312 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
314 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
319 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
320 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
321 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
323 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
325 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
329 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
332 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
333 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
339 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
340 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
342 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
345 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
347 size_t n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
348 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
349 size_t max_send_fragment, nw;
351 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
355 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
356 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
358 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
359 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
360 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
361 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
362 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
363 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
364 * report the error in a way the user will notice
366 if (len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
373 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
374 i = s->handshake_func(s);
378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
384 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
385 * will happen with non blocking IO
388 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
391 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
392 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
395 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
397 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
399 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
400 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
401 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
402 * compromise is considered worthy.
404 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
405 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
406 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
407 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
408 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
409 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
410 unsigned char aad[13];
411 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
415 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
416 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
417 max_send_fragment -= 512;
419 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
420 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
422 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
423 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
424 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
426 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
431 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
435 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
436 /* free jumbo buffer */
437 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
444 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
445 /* free jumbo buffer */
446 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
450 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
451 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
453 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
458 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
459 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
461 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
463 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
465 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
466 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
473 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
474 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
475 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
476 packlen = (size_t)packleni;
477 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
478 /* free jumbo buffer */
479 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
483 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
484 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
487 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
488 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
489 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
492 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
493 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
495 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
501 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
502 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
503 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
504 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
506 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
508 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
509 /* free jumbo buffer */
510 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
512 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
516 /* free jumbo buffer */
517 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
518 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
526 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
527 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
528 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
536 split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
538 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
539 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
540 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
543 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
544 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
546 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
553 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
554 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
555 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
556 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
558 if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
559 || split_send_fragment == 0) {
561 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
562 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
569 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
575 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
576 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
579 if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
581 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
584 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
585 pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
588 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
589 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
590 remain = n % numpipes;
591 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
592 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
598 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
601 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
602 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
607 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
608 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
610 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
611 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
613 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
615 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
617 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
619 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
628 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
629 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
630 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
632 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
633 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
636 unsigned char *recordstart;
637 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
638 size_t prefix_len = 0;
643 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
646 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
647 totlen += pipelens[j];
649 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
650 * will happen with non blocking IO
652 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
653 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
655 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
656 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
657 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
660 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
663 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
664 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
667 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
672 if ((sess == NULL) ||
673 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
674 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
677 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
678 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
684 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
686 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
688 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
689 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
692 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
694 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
695 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
696 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
699 size_t tmppipelen = 0;
702 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
707 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
708 /* insufficient space */
709 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
714 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
717 if (create_empty_fragment) {
718 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
719 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
721 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
722 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
723 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
725 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
726 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
728 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
729 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
730 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
731 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
736 } else if (prefix_len) {
737 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
738 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
739 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
740 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
741 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
742 + prefix_len, NULL)) {
743 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
748 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
751 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
752 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
753 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
754 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
756 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
757 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
758 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
759 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
760 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
767 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
768 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
769 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
770 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
771 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
772 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
775 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
776 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
777 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
778 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
779 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
784 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
785 memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
786 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
787 unsigned int version = s->version;
788 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
790 unsigned int rectype;
795 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type);
797 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
800 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
801 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
805 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
806 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
808 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
809 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
810 version = TLS1_VERSION;
812 maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
813 if (s->compress != NULL)
814 pipelens[j] += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
816 /* write the header */
817 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
818 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
819 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
821 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
823 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
825 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
829 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
830 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
831 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
832 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
833 totlen += pipelens[j];
836 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
840 /* first we compress */
841 if (s->compress != NULL) {
843 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we prevent compression!!!
845 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
846 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
847 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
851 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
852 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
855 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
858 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
859 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
860 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
863 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
865 * TODO(TLS1.3): Padding goes here. Do we need an API to add this?
866 * For now, use no padding
871 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
872 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
876 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
879 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
880 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
887 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
888 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
889 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
891 if(!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
894 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
897 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
898 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
902 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
903 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
905 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
906 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
907 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
910 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
913 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
919 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
920 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
921 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
922 || origlen > thiswr->length
923 || (thiswr->length > origlen
924 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
925 thiswr->length - origlen, NULL))) {
926 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
929 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
932 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
933 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
934 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
937 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
940 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
941 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
942 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
946 if (s->msg_callback) {
947 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
948 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
949 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
950 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
951 s->msg_callback_arg);
954 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
955 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
960 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
961 * is thiswr->length long
963 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
965 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
967 if (create_empty_fragment) {
969 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
973 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
977 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
981 /* now let's set up wb */
982 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
983 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
987 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
990 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
991 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
992 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
993 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
995 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
996 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
998 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
999 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
1003 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1005 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1007 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
1011 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
1015 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
1016 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
1017 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1018 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
1019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1024 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1025 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1026 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1031 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1032 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1033 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1034 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
1035 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
1036 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1037 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1044 if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1045 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1046 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1047 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1049 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1050 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
1052 } else if (i <= 0) {
1053 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1055 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1056 * using a datagram service
1058 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1062 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1063 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1068 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1069 * 'type' is one of the following:
1071 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1072 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1073 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1075 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1076 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1078 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1079 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1080 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1081 * argument is non NULL.
1082 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1083 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1084 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1085 * Change cipher spec protocol
1086 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1088 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1089 * Handshake protocol
1090 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1091 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1092 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1093 * Application data protocol
1094 * none of our business
1096 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1097 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
1100 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
1103 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1105 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
1107 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1108 /* Not initialized yet */
1109 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1113 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1114 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1116 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1121 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1122 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1124 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1125 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1130 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1133 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1136 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1137 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1138 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1140 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1141 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1148 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1151 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1152 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1153 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1162 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1165 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1166 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1167 * rr[i].data, - data
1168 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1169 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1171 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1172 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1175 /* get new records if necessary */
1176 if (num_recs == 0) {
1177 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1180 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1181 if (num_recs == 0) {
1182 /* Shouldn't happen */
1183 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1188 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1190 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1192 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1193 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1197 } while (num_recs == 0);
1201 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1202 * record that isn't an alert.
1204 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1205 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1206 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1208 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1210 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1211 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1212 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1213 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1219 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1222 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1223 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1224 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1228 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1229 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1230 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
1232 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1233 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1234 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1237 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1238 * doing a handshake for the first time
1240 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1241 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1242 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1247 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1248 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1249 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1250 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1255 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1256 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1263 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1264 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1266 n = len - totalbytes;
1268 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1271 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1272 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1273 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1275 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1276 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1277 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1278 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1279 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1280 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1283 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1284 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1289 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1290 && totalbytes < len);
1291 if (totalbytes == 0) {
1292 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1295 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1296 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1297 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1298 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1299 *readbytes = totalbytes;
1304 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1305 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1306 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1310 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1312 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1314 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1315 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1316 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1317 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1319 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1324 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1325 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1327 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1328 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1329 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1330 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1332 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1333 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1339 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1340 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1343 size_t dest_maxlen = 0;
1344 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1345 size_t *dest_len = NULL;
1347 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1348 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1349 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1350 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1351 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1352 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1353 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1354 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1357 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1358 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1359 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1360 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1362 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1364 dest[(*dest_len)++] =
1365 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
1366 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
1367 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
1370 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) {
1371 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1372 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1378 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1379 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1380 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1383 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1385 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1386 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1387 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1388 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1390 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1391 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1392 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1393 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1398 if (s->msg_callback)
1399 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1400 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1401 s->msg_callback_arg);
1403 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1404 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1405 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1406 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1407 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1408 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1416 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1417 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1418 /* no read-ahead left? */
1421 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1422 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1423 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1424 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1426 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1427 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1428 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1429 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1436 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1437 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1442 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1443 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1444 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1447 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1448 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1449 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1450 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1451 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1452 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1453 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1454 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1455 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1456 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1459 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1460 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1461 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1463 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1465 if (s->msg_callback)
1466 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1467 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1468 s->msg_callback_arg);
1470 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1471 cb = s->info_callback;
1472 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1473 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1476 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1477 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1480 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1481 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1482 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1484 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1485 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1486 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1491 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1492 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1496 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1497 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1498 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1499 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1500 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1501 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1503 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1504 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1508 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1509 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1512 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1515 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1516 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1518 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1519 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1520 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1521 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1522 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1525 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1533 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1535 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1536 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1537 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1541 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1542 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1548 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1550 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1551 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1552 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1553 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1554 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1558 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1566 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1567 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1568 /* no read-ahead left? */
1571 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1572 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1573 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1574 * problems in the blocking world
1576 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1577 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1578 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1579 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1586 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1589 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1590 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1591 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1592 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1593 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1595 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1598 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1600 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1602 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1603 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1604 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1606 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1609 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1611 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1612 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1613 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1614 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1615 * started), we will indulge it.
1617 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1618 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1621 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1629 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1633 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1637 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1645 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1646 * format and false otherwise.
1648 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1650 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1654 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1656 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1658 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);