2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include <openssl/evp.h>
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include "record_locl.h"
20 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
21 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
24 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
25 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
26 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
27 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
29 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
30 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
33 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
36 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
37 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
40 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
44 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
46 /* Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
47 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
52 rl->packet_length = 0;
54 memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
55 rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
56 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
57 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
63 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
64 for (pipes = 0; pipes < rl->numwpipes; pipes++)
65 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->wbuf[pipes]);
68 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
70 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
71 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
74 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
77 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
79 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
80 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
81 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
82 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
83 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
86 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
88 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
91 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
93 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
94 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes-1]) != 0;
97 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
99 rl->packet_length = len;
101 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
102 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
103 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s))
107 rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
108 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len);
113 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
115 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
118 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
120 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
123 int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
128 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
131 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
132 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
133 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
135 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
141 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
143 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
146 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
148 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
151 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
153 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
154 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
155 return "read header";
156 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
158 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
165 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
167 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
168 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
170 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
172 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
179 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend, int clearold)
182 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
183 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
184 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
185 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
186 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
187 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
188 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
198 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
200 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
204 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
205 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
206 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
210 /* start with empty packet ... */
213 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
215 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
218 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
219 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
220 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
222 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
223 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
224 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
225 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
226 * overrun can be triggered.
228 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
232 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
233 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
234 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
238 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
239 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
242 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
243 if (left == 0 && extend)
245 if (left > 0 && n > left)
249 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
251 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
257 /* else we need to read more data */
259 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
260 pkt = rb->buf + align;
262 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
263 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
265 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) { /* len > 0 */
266 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
267 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
268 rb->offset = len + align;
271 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
276 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
277 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
278 /* ignore max parameter */
283 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
284 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
289 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
290 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
295 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
296 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
297 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
305 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
307 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
312 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
313 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
314 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
316 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
318 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
322 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
325 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
326 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
332 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
333 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
335 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
337 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
339 unsigned int n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
340 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
341 unsigned int max_send_fragment, nw;
342 unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
344 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
352 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
353 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
355 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
356 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
357 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
358 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
359 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
360 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
361 * report the error in a way the user will notice
363 if ((unsigned int)len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
371 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
372 i = s->handshake_func(s);
376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
382 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
383 * will happen with non blocking IO
386 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot);
388 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
389 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
392 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
394 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
396 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
397 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
398 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
399 * compromise is considered worthy.
401 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
402 u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
403 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
404 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
405 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
406 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
407 unsigned char aad[13];
408 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
411 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
412 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
413 max_send_fragment -= 512;
415 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
416 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
418 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
419 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
420 max_send_fragment, NULL);
422 if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
427 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
431 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
432 /* free jumbo buffer */
433 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
439 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
440 /* free jumbo buffer */
441 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
445 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
446 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
448 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
453 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
454 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
456 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
458 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
460 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
461 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
468 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
469 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
470 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
472 if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
473 /* free jumbo buffer */
474 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
478 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
479 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
482 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
483 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
484 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
487 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
488 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
490 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
496 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
497 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
498 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
499 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
501 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
503 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
504 /* free jumbo buffer */
505 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
507 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
511 /* free jumbo buffer */
512 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
520 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
521 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
522 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
529 split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
531 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
532 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
533 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
536 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
537 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
539 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
546 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
547 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
548 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
549 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
551 if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
552 || split_send_fragment == 0) {
554 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
555 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
562 unsigned int pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
563 unsigned int numpipes, j;
568 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
569 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
572 if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
574 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
577 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
578 pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
581 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
582 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
583 remain = n % numpipes;
584 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
585 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
591 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0);
593 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
594 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
599 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
600 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
602 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
603 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
605 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
607 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
609 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
619 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
620 unsigned int *pipelens, unsigned int numpipes,
621 int create_empty_fragment)
623 unsigned char *outbuf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], *plen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
624 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
625 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
631 unsigned int totlen = 0;
634 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
635 totlen += pipelens[j];
637 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
638 * will happen with non blocking IO
640 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
641 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen));
643 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
644 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
645 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
648 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
651 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
652 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
655 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
660 if ((sess == NULL) ||
661 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
662 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
663 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
666 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
672 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
674 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
676 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
677 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
680 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
682 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
683 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
684 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
687 unsigned int tmppipelen = 0;
689 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1);
694 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
696 /* insufficient space */
697 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
702 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
705 if (create_empty_fragment) {
706 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
707 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
709 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
710 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
711 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
713 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
714 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
716 outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
717 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
718 } else if (prefix_len) {
719 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
720 outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
723 for (j=0; j < numpipes; j++) {
724 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
725 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
726 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
727 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
729 outbuf[j] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
730 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
734 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
735 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
736 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
737 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
738 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
742 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
743 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
744 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
745 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
746 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
754 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
755 memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
756 for (j=0; j < numpipes; j++) {
757 /* write the header */
758 *(outbuf[j]++) = type & 0xff;
759 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type);
761 *(outbuf[j]++) = (s->version >> 8);
763 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
764 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
766 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
767 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
768 *(outbuf[j]++) = 0x1;
770 *(outbuf[j]++) = s->version & 0xff;
772 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
776 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
777 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j] + eivlen);
778 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr[j], (int)pipelens[j]);
779 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr[j], (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
780 totlen += pipelens[j];
783 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
786 /* first we compress */
787 if (s->compress != NULL) {
788 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr[j])) {
789 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
793 memcpy(wr[j].data, wr[j].input, wr[j].length);
794 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
798 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
799 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
803 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
804 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
805 &(outbuf[j][wr[j].length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
807 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
811 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j]);
812 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
816 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
818 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], eivlen);
822 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
825 for (j=0; j < numpipes; j++) {
826 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
827 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
828 outbuf[j] + wr[j].length, 1) < 0)
830 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
833 /* record length after mac and block padding */
834 s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]), plen[j]);
837 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen[j] - 5, 5, s,
838 s->msg_callback_arg);
841 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
844 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); /* not needed but helps for debugging */
845 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
847 if (create_empty_fragment) {
849 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
853 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
854 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
857 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr);
860 /* now let's set up wb */
861 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
862 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]));
868 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
871 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
872 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
873 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
874 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
876 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
877 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen);
882 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
883 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
887 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
888 unsigned int currbuf = 0;
891 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > (int)len)
892 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
893 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
894 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
900 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
901 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
902 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
907 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
908 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
909 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
910 (char *)&(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])[
911 SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
912 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
917 if (i == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
918 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
919 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i);
920 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
922 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
923 return (s->rlayer.wpend_ret);
925 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
927 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
928 * using a datagram service
930 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
934 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i);
935 SSL3_BUFFER_add_left(&wb[currbuf], -i);
940 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
941 * 'type' is one of the following:
943 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
944 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
945 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
947 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
948 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
950 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
951 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
952 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
953 * argument is non NULL.
954 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
955 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
956 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
957 * Change cipher spec protocol
958 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
960 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
962 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
963 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
964 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
965 * Application data protocol
966 * none of our business
968 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
972 unsigned int n, curr_rec, num_recs, read_bytes;
975 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
977 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
979 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
980 /* Not initialized yet */
981 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
985 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
986 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
988 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
993 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
994 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
996 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
997 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1002 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1005 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1008 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1009 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1010 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1012 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1013 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1019 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1022 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1023 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1024 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1033 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1036 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1037 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1038 * rr[i].data, - data
1039 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1040 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1042 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1043 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1046 /* get new records if necessary */
1047 if (num_recs == 0) {
1048 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1051 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1052 if (num_recs == 0) {
1053 /* Shouldn't happen */
1054 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1059 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1061 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1063 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1064 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1068 } while (num_recs == 0);
1071 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1073 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1074 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1075 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1076 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1082 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1085 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1086 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1087 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1091 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1092 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1093 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
1095 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1096 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1097 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1100 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1101 * doing a handshake for the first time
1103 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1104 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1105 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1110 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1111 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1112 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1113 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1118 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1119 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1126 if ((unsigned int)len - read_bytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1127 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1129 n = (unsigned int)len - read_bytes;
1131 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1134 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1135 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1136 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1137 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1138 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1139 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1142 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1143 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1148 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1149 && read_bytes < (unsigned int)len);
1150 if (read_bytes == 0) {
1151 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1154 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1155 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1156 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1157 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1162 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1163 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1164 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1167 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1168 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1174 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1176 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1178 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1179 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1180 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1181 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1183 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1188 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1189 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1191 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1192 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1193 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1194 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1196 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1197 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1203 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1204 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1207 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1208 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1209 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1211 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1212 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1213 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1214 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1215 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1216 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1217 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1218 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1221 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1222 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1223 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1224 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1226 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1228 dest[(*dest_len)++] =
1229 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
1230 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
1231 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
1234 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) {
1235 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1236 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1242 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1243 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1244 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1247 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1249 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1250 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1251 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1252 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1254 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1255 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1256 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1257 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1262 if (s->msg_callback)
1263 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1264 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1265 s->msg_callback_arg);
1267 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1268 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1269 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1270 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1271 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1272 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1277 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1281 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1282 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1283 /* no read-ahead left? */
1286 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1287 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1288 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1289 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1291 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1292 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1293 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1294 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1301 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1302 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1307 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1308 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1309 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1312 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1313 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1314 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1315 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1316 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1317 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1318 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1319 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1320 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1321 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1324 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1325 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1326 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1328 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1330 if (s->msg_callback)
1331 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1332 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1333 s->msg_callback_arg);
1335 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1336 cb = s->info_callback;
1337 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1338 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1341 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1342 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1345 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1346 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1347 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1348 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1349 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1353 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1354 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1355 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1356 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1357 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1358 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1360 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1361 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1365 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1366 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1369 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1372 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1373 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1375 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1376 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1377 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1378 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1379 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1382 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1390 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1392 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1393 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1394 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1398 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1399 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1405 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1407 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1408 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1409 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1410 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1411 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1415 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1423 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1424 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1425 /* no read-ahead left? */
1428 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1429 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1430 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1431 * problems in the blocking world
1433 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1434 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1435 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1436 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1443 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1446 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1447 * an unexpected message alert.
1449 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1450 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1451 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1454 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1457 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1459 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1461 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1462 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1463 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1465 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1468 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1470 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1471 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1472 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1473 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1474 * started), we will indulge it.
1476 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1477 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1480 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1481 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1488 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1492 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1496 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1504 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1505 * format and false otherwise.
1507 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1509 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1513 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1515 unsigned int RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1517 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);