2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include "record_locl.h"
21 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
22 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
23 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
24 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
26 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
27 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
30 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
33 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
34 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
37 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
39 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
42 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
43 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
48 rl->packet_length = 0;
50 memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
51 rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
52 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
53 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
59 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
60 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
62 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
64 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
65 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
68 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
71 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
73 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
74 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
75 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
76 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
77 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
80 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
82 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
85 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
87 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
88 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
91 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
93 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
96 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
98 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
101 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
105 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
108 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
109 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
110 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
112 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
118 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
120 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
123 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
125 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
128 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
130 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
131 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
132 return "read header";
133 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
135 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
142 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
144 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
145 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
147 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
149 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
157 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
159 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
163 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
164 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
165 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
166 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
167 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
168 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
169 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
171 size_t len, left, align = 0;
178 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
180 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
184 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
185 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
186 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
190 /* start with empty packet ... */
193 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
195 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
198 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
199 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
200 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
202 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
203 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
204 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
205 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
206 * overrun can be triggered.
208 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
212 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
213 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
214 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
217 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
218 pkt = rb->buf + align;
220 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
221 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
223 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
224 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
225 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
226 rb->offset = len + align;
230 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
231 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
234 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
235 if (left == 0 && extend)
237 if (left > 0 && n > left)
241 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
243 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
250 /* else we need to read more data */
252 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { /* does not happen */
253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
257 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
258 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
259 /* ignore max parameter */
264 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
265 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
273 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
274 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
279 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
280 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
281 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
282 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
292 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
294 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
299 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
300 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
301 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
303 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
305 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
309 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
312 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
313 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
319 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
320 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
322 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
325 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
327 size_t n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
328 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
329 size_t max_send_fragment, nw;
331 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
335 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
336 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
338 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
339 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
340 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
341 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
342 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
343 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
344 * report the error in a way the user will notice
346 if (len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
353 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
354 i = s->handshake_func(s);
358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
364 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
365 * will happen with non blocking IO
368 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
371 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
372 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
375 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
377 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
379 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
380 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
381 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
382 * compromise is considered worthy.
384 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
385 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
386 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
387 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
388 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
389 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
390 unsigned char aad[13];
391 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
395 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
396 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
397 max_send_fragment -= 512;
399 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
400 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
402 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
403 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
404 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
406 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
411 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
415 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
416 /* free jumbo buffer */
417 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
424 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
425 /* free jumbo buffer */
426 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
430 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
431 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
433 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
438 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
439 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
441 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
443 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
445 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
446 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
453 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
454 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
455 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
456 packlen = (size_t)packleni;
457 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
458 /* free jumbo buffer */
459 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
463 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
464 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
467 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
468 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
469 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
472 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
473 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
475 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
481 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
482 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
483 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
484 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
486 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
488 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
489 /* free jumbo buffer */
490 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
492 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
496 /* free jumbo buffer */
497 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
498 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
506 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
507 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
508 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
516 split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
518 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
519 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
520 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
523 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
524 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
526 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
533 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
534 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
535 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
536 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
538 if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
539 || split_send_fragment == 0) {
541 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
542 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
549 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
555 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
556 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
559 if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
561 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
564 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
565 pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
568 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
569 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
570 remain = n % numpipes;
571 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
572 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
578 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
581 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
582 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
587 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
588 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
590 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
591 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
593 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
595 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
597 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
599 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
608 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
609 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
610 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
612 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
613 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
616 unsigned char *recordstart;
617 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
618 size_t prefix_len = 0;
623 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
626 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
627 totlen += pipelens[j];
629 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
630 * will happen with non blocking IO
632 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
633 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
635 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
636 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
637 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
640 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
643 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
644 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
647 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
652 if ((sess == NULL) ||
653 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
654 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
657 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
658 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
664 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
666 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
668 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
669 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
672 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
674 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
675 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
676 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
679 size_t tmppipelen = 0;
682 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
687 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
688 /* insufficient space */
689 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
694 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
697 if (create_empty_fragment) {
698 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
699 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
701 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
702 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
703 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
705 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
706 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
708 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
709 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
710 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
711 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
712 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
716 } else if (prefix_len) {
717 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
718 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
719 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
720 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
721 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
722 + prefix_len, NULL)) {
723 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
728 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
731 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
732 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
733 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
734 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
736 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
737 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
738 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
739 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
740 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
747 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
748 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
749 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
750 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
751 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
752 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
755 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
756 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
757 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
758 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
759 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
764 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
765 memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
766 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
767 unsigned int version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_VERSION : s->version;
768 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
770 unsigned int rectype;
775 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type);
777 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
780 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
781 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
785 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
786 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
788 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
789 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
790 version = TLS1_VERSION;
792 maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
793 if (s->compress != NULL)
794 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
796 /* write the header */
797 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
798 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
799 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
801 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
803 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
805 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
809 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
810 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
811 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
812 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
813 totlen += pipelens[j];
816 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
820 /* first we compress */
821 if (s->compress != NULL) {
823 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we prevent compression!!!
825 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
826 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
827 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
831 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
832 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
835 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
838 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
839 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
843 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
845 * TODO(TLS1.3): Padding goes here. Do we need an API to add this?
846 * For now, use no padding
851 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
852 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
856 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
859 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
860 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
861 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
867 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
868 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
869 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
871 if(!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
874 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
877 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
882 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
883 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
885 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
886 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
887 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
890 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
893 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
899 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
900 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
901 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
902 || origlen > thiswr->length
903 || (thiswr->length > origlen
904 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
905 thiswr->length - origlen, NULL))) {
906 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
909 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
912 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
913 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
917 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
920 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
921 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
926 if (s->msg_callback) {
927 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
928 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
929 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
930 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
931 s->msg_callback_arg);
934 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
940 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
941 * is thiswr->length long
943 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
945 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
947 if (create_empty_fragment) {
949 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
953 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
954 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
957 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
961 /* now let's set up wb */
962 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
963 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
967 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
970 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
971 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
972 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
973 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
975 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
976 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
978 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
979 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
983 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
985 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
987 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
991 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
995 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
996 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
997 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
998 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1004 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1005 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1006 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1011 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1012 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1013 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1014 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
1015 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
1016 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1017 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1024 if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1025 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1026 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1027 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1029 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1030 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
1032 } else if (i <= 0) {
1033 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1035 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1036 * using a datagram service
1038 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1042 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1043 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1048 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1049 * 'type' is one of the following:
1051 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1052 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1053 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1055 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1056 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1058 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1059 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1060 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1061 * argument is non NULL.
1062 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1063 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1064 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1065 * Change cipher spec protocol
1066 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1068 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1069 * Handshake protocol
1070 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1071 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1072 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1073 * Application data protocol
1074 * none of our business
1076 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1077 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
1080 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
1083 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1085 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
1087 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1088 /* Not initialized yet */
1089 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1093 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1094 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1096 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1101 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1102 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1104 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1105 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1110 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1113 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1116 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1117 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1118 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1120 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1121 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1128 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1131 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1132 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1133 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1142 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1145 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1146 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1147 * rr[i].data, - data
1148 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1149 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1151 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1152 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1155 /* get new records if necessary */
1156 if (num_recs == 0) {
1157 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1160 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1161 if (num_recs == 0) {
1162 /* Shouldn't happen */
1163 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1168 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1170 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1172 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1173 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1177 } while (num_recs == 0);
1181 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1182 * record that isn't an alert.
1184 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1185 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1186 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1188 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1190 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1191 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1192 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1193 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1199 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1202 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1203 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1204 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1208 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1209 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1210 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
1211 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1213 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1214 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1215 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1218 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1219 * doing a handshake for the first time
1221 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1222 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1223 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1228 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1229 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1230 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1231 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1236 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1237 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1244 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1245 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1247 n = len - totalbytes;
1249 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1252 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1253 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1254 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1256 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1257 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1258 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1259 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1260 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1261 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1264 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1265 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1270 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1271 && totalbytes < len);
1272 if (totalbytes == 0) {
1273 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1276 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1277 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1278 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1279 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1280 *readbytes = totalbytes;
1285 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1286 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1287 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1291 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1293 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1295 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1296 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1297 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1298 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1300 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1305 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1306 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1308 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1309 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1310 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1311 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1313 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1314 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1320 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1321 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1324 size_t dest_maxlen = 0;
1325 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1326 size_t *dest_len = NULL;
1328 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1329 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1330 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1331 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1332 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1333 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1334 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1335 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1338 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1339 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1340 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1341 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1343 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1345 dest[(*dest_len)++] =
1346 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
1347 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
1348 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
1351 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) {
1352 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1353 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1359 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1360 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1361 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1365 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1366 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1367 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1370 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1371 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1372 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1374 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1375 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1376 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1377 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1378 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1379 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1380 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1383 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1384 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1385 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1387 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1389 if (s->msg_callback)
1390 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1391 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1392 s->msg_callback_arg);
1394 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1395 cb = s->info_callback;
1396 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1397 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1400 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1401 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1404 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1405 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1406 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1408 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1409 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1410 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1415 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1416 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1420 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1421 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1422 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1423 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1424 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1425 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1427 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1428 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1432 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1435 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1436 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1438 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1439 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1440 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1441 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1442 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1445 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1453 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1455 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1456 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1457 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1461 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1462 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1468 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1469 * protocol violation)
1471 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1472 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1474 * To get here we must be trying to read app data but found handshake
1475 * data. But if we're trying to read app data, and we're not in init
1476 * (which is tested for at the top of this function) then init must be
1479 assert(SSL_is_init_finished(s));
1480 if (!SSL_is_init_finished(s)) {
1481 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1486 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1487 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1489 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1497 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1498 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1499 /* no read-ahead left? */
1502 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1503 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1504 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1505 * problems in the blocking world
1507 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1508 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1509 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1510 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1517 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1520 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1521 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1522 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1523 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1524 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1526 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1529 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1531 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1533 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1534 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1535 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1537 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1540 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1542 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1543 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1544 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1545 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1546 * started), we will indulge it.
1548 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1549 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1552 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1560 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1564 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1568 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1576 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1577 * format and false otherwise.
1579 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1581 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1585 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1587 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1589 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);