2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include "record_locl.h"
21 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
22 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
23 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
24 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
26 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
27 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
30 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
33 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
34 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
37 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
39 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
42 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
43 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
48 rl->packet_length = 0;
50 memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
51 rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
52 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
53 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
59 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
60 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
62 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
64 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
65 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
68 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
71 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
73 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
74 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
75 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
76 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
77 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
80 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
81 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
83 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
86 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
87 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
89 size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl);
90 const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec;
92 while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]))
95 return curr_rec < num_recs;
98 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
100 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
101 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
104 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
106 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
109 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
111 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
114 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
118 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
121 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
122 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
123 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
125 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
131 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
133 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
136 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
138 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
141 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
143 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
144 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
145 return "read header";
146 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
148 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
155 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
157 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
158 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
160 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
162 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
170 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
172 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
176 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
177 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
178 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
179 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
180 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
181 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
182 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
184 size_t len, left, align = 0;
191 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
193 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
197 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
198 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
199 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
203 /* start with empty packet ... */
206 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
208 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
211 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
212 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
213 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
215 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
216 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
217 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
218 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
219 * overrun can be triggered.
221 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
225 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
226 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
227 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
230 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
231 pkt = rb->buf + align;
233 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
234 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
236 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
237 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
238 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
239 rb->offset = len + align;
243 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
244 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
247 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
248 if (left == 0 && extend)
250 if (left > 0 && n > left)
254 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
256 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
263 /* else we need to read more data */
265 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { /* does not happen */
266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
270 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
271 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
272 /* ignore max parameter */
277 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
278 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
286 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
287 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
292 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
293 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
294 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
295 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
305 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
307 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
312 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
313 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
314 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
316 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
318 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
322 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
325 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
326 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
332 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
333 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
335 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
338 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
340 size_t n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
341 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
342 size_t max_send_fragment, nw;
344 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
348 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
349 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
351 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
352 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
353 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
354 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
355 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
356 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
357 * report the error in a way the user will notice
359 if (len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
364 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
365 && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, NULL))
371 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
372 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
375 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
376 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
377 i = s->handshake_func(s);
381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
387 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
388 * will happen with non blocking IO
391 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
394 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
395 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
398 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
400 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
402 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
403 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
404 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
405 * compromise is considered worthy.
407 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
408 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
409 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
410 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
411 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
412 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
413 unsigned char aad[13];
414 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
418 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
419 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
420 max_send_fragment -= 512;
422 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
423 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
425 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
426 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
427 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
429 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
434 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
438 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
439 /* free jumbo buffer */
440 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
447 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
448 /* free jumbo buffer */
449 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
453 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
454 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
456 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
461 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
462 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
464 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
466 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
468 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
469 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
476 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
477 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
478 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
479 packlen = (size_t)packleni;
480 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
481 /* free jumbo buffer */
482 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
486 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
487 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
490 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
491 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
492 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
495 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
496 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
498 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
504 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
505 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
506 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
507 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
509 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
511 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
512 /* free jumbo buffer */
513 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
515 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
519 /* free jumbo buffer */
520 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
521 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
529 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
530 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
531 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
539 split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
541 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
542 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
543 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
546 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
547 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
549 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
556 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
557 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
558 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
559 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
561 if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
562 || split_send_fragment == 0) {
564 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
565 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
572 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
578 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
579 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
582 if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
584 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
587 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
588 pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
591 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
592 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
593 remain = n % numpipes;
594 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
595 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
601 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
604 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
605 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
610 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
611 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
613 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
614 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
616 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
618 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
620 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
622 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
631 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
632 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
633 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
635 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
636 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
639 unsigned char *recordstart;
640 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
641 size_t prefix_len = 0;
646 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
649 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
650 totlen += pipelens[j];
652 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
653 * will happen with non blocking IO
655 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
656 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
658 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
659 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
660 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
663 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
666 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
667 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
670 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
675 if ((sess == NULL) ||
676 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
677 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
680 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
681 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
687 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
689 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
691 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
692 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
695 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
697 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
698 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
699 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
702 size_t tmppipelen = 0;
705 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
710 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
711 /* insufficient space */
712 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
717 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
720 if (create_empty_fragment) {
721 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
722 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
724 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
725 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
726 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
728 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
729 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
731 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
732 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
733 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
734 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
735 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
739 } else if (prefix_len) {
740 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
741 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
742 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
743 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
744 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
745 + prefix_len, NULL)) {
746 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
751 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
754 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
755 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
756 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
757 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
759 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
760 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
761 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
762 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
763 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
770 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
771 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) {
772 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
773 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
774 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
775 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
778 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
779 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
780 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
781 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
782 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
787 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
788 memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
789 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
790 unsigned int version = SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_VERSION : s->version;
791 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
793 unsigned int rectype;
798 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type);
800 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
803 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
804 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
808 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
809 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
811 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
812 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
813 version = TLS1_VERSION;
815 maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
816 if (s->compress != NULL)
817 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
819 /* write the header */
820 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
821 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
822 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
824 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
826 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
828 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
832 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
833 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
834 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
835 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
836 totlen += pipelens[j];
839 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
843 /* first we compress */
844 if (s->compress != NULL) {
846 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we prevent compression!!!
848 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
849 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
850 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
854 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
855 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
858 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
861 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
862 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
863 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
866 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
868 * TODO(TLS1.3): Padding goes here. Do we need an API to add this?
869 * For now, use no padding
874 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
875 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
879 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
882 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
883 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
884 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
890 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
891 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
892 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
894 if(!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
897 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
900 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
901 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
905 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
906 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
908 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
909 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
910 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
913 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
914 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY) {
916 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
917 * send early data - so we need to use the the tls13enc function.
919 if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
922 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
926 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
932 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
933 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
934 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
935 || origlen > thiswr->length
936 || (thiswr->length > origlen
937 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
938 thiswr->length - origlen, NULL))) {
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
942 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
945 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
946 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
950 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
953 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
954 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
955 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
959 if (s->msg_callback) {
960 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
961 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
962 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
963 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
964 s->msg_callback_arg);
967 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
968 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
973 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
974 * is thiswr->length long
976 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
978 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
980 if (create_empty_fragment) {
982 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
986 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
990 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
994 /* now let's set up wb */
995 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
996 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
1000 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1003 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
1004 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
1005 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
1006 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
1008 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1009 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
1011 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
1012 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
1016 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1018 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1020 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
1024 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
1028 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
1029 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
1030 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1031 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1037 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1038 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1039 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1044 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1045 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1046 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1047 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
1048 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
1049 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1050 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1057 if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1058 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1059 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1060 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1062 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1063 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
1065 } else if (i <= 0) {
1066 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1068 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1069 * using a datagram service
1071 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1075 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1076 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1081 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1082 * 'type' is one of the following:
1084 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1085 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1086 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1088 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1089 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1091 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1092 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1093 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1094 * argument is non NULL.
1095 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1096 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1097 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1098 * Change cipher spec protocol
1099 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1101 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1102 * Handshake protocol
1103 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1104 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1105 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1106 * Application data protocol
1107 * none of our business
1109 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1110 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
1113 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
1116 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1118 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
1120 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1121 /* Not initialized yet */
1122 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1126 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1127 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1129 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1134 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1135 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1137 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1138 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1143 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1146 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1149 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1150 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1151 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1153 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1154 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1161 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1164 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1165 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1166 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1175 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1178 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1179 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1180 * rr[i].data, - data
1181 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1182 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1184 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1185 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1188 /* get new records if necessary */
1189 if (num_recs == 0) {
1190 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1193 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1194 if (num_recs == 0) {
1195 /* Shouldn't happen */
1196 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1201 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1203 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1205 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1206 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1210 } while (num_recs == 0);
1214 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1215 * record that isn't an alert.
1217 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1218 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1219 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1221 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1223 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1224 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1225 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1226 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1232 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1235 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1236 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1237 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1241 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1242 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1243 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
1244 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1246 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1247 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1248 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1251 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1252 * doing a handshake for the first time
1254 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1255 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1256 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1261 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1262 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1263 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1264 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1269 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1270 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1277 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1278 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1280 n = len - totalbytes;
1282 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1285 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1286 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1287 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1289 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1290 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1291 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1292 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1293 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1294 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1297 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1298 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1303 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1304 && totalbytes < len);
1305 if (totalbytes == 0) {
1306 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1309 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1310 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1311 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1312 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1313 *readbytes = totalbytes;
1318 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1319 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1320 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1324 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1326 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1328 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1329 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1330 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1331 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1333 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1339 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1341 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1342 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1343 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1344 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1346 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1347 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1353 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1354 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1357 size_t dest_maxlen = 0;
1358 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1359 size_t *dest_len = NULL;
1361 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1362 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1363 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1364 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1365 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1366 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1367 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1368 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1371 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1372 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1373 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1374 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1376 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1377 memcpy(dest + *dest_len,
1378 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n);
1379 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1380 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -n);
1382 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1383 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1385 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1386 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1391 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1392 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1393 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1397 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1398 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1399 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1402 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1403 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1404 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1406 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1407 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1408 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1409 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1410 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1411 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1412 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1415 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1416 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1417 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1419 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1421 if (s->msg_callback)
1422 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1423 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1424 s->msg_callback_arg);
1426 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1427 cb = s->info_callback;
1428 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1429 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1432 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1433 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1436 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1437 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1438 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1440 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1441 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1442 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1447 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1448 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1452 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1453 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1454 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1455 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1456 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1457 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1459 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1460 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1464 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1467 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1468 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1470 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1471 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1472 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1473 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1474 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1477 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1485 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1487 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1488 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1489 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1493 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1494 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1500 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1501 * protocol violation)
1503 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1504 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1505 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING);
1507 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1508 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1510 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1519 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1520 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1521 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1526 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1527 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1528 /* no read-ahead left? */
1531 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1532 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1533 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1534 * problems in the blocking world
1536 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1537 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1538 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1539 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1546 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1549 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1550 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1551 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1552 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1553 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1555 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1558 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1560 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1562 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1563 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1564 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1566 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1569 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1571 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1572 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1573 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1574 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1575 * started), we will indulge it.
1577 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1578 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1580 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
1582 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1583 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1584 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1585 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1586 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1587 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1590 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
1591 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, &al))
1593 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1596 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1604 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1608 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1612 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1620 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1621 * format and false otherwise.
1623 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1625 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1629 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1631 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1633 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);