1 /* ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c */
3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
124 #include "record_locl.h"
126 int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
128 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
130 if ((d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d))) == NULL)
136 d->unprocessed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
137 d->processed_rcds.q = pqueue_new();
138 d->buffered_app_data.q = pqueue_new();
140 if (!d->unprocessed_rcds.q || !d->processed_rcds.q
141 || !d->buffered_app_data.q) {
142 pqueue_free(d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
143 pqueue_free(d->processed_rcds.q);
144 pqueue_free(d->buffered_app_data.q);
153 void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
155 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
156 pqueue_free(rl->d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
157 pqueue_free(rl->d->processed_rcds.q);
158 pqueue_free(rl->d->buffered_app_data.q);
163 void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
165 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
167 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
168 pqueue unprocessed_rcds;
169 pqueue processed_rcds;
170 pqueue buffered_app_data;
174 while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
175 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
176 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
177 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
181 while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->processed_rcds.q)) != NULL) {
182 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
183 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
184 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
188 while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL) {
189 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
190 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
191 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
195 unprocessed_rcds = d->unprocessed_rcds.q;
196 processed_rcds = d->processed_rcds.q;
197 buffered_app_data = d->buffered_app_data.q;
198 memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d));
199 d->unprocessed_rcds.q = unprocessed_rcds;
200 d->processed_rcds.q = processed_rcds;
201 d->buffered_app_data.q = buffered_app_data;
204 void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_saved_w_epoch(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned short e)
206 if (e == rl->d->w_epoch - 1) {
207 memcpy(rl->d->curr_write_sequence,
209 sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
210 memcpy(rl->write_sequence,
211 rl->d->last_write_sequence,
212 sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
213 } else if (e == rl->d->w_epoch + 1) {
214 memcpy(rl->d->last_write_sequence,
216 sizeof(unsigned char[8]));
217 memcpy(rl->write_sequence,
218 rl->d->curr_write_sequence,
219 sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
224 void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_resync_write(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
226 memcpy(rl->write_sequence, rl->read_sequence, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
230 void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, unsigned char *seq)
232 memcpy(rl->write_sequence, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
235 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
238 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
239 static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
241 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
243 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
245 SSL3_BUFFER_release(&s->rlayer.rbuf);
247 s->rlayer.packet = rdata->packet;
248 s->rlayer.packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
249 memcpy(&s->rlayer.rbuf, &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
250 memcpy(&s->rlayer.rrec, &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
252 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
253 memcpy(&(s->rlayer.read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
258 int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
260 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
263 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
264 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
267 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rdata));
268 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
269 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) {
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
276 rdata->packet = s->rlayer.packet;
277 rdata->packet_length = s->rlayer.packet_length;
278 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &s->rlayer.rbuf, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
279 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &s->rlayer.rrec, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
284 /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
285 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
286 (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
287 || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) {
288 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO,
289 sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
293 s->rlayer.packet = NULL;
294 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
295 memset(&s->rlayer.rbuf, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rbuf));
296 memset(&s->rlayer.rrec, 0, sizeof(s->rlayer.rrec));
298 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
299 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
300 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
306 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
307 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) {
308 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
309 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
318 int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
322 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
324 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
326 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
336 * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not
339 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
340 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
341 &((s)->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds))
344 int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
348 item = pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q);
350 /* Check if epoch is current. */
351 if (s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
352 return (1); /* Nothing to do. */
354 /* Process all the records. */
355 while (pqueue_peek(s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
356 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
357 if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
359 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
360 SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(&s->rlayer.rrec)) < 0)
366 * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been
369 s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch;
370 s->rlayer.d->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1;
377 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
378 * 'type' is one of the following:
380 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
381 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
382 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
384 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
385 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
387 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
388 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
389 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
390 * argument is non NULL.
391 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
392 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
393 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
394 * Change cipher spec protocol
395 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
397 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
399 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
400 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
401 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
402 * Application data protocol
403 * none of our business
405 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
411 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
413 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) {
414 /* Not initialized yet */
415 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
419 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
420 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
421 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
422 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
427 * check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting
429 if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
433 * Now s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if
434 * type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
439 * Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read app data with
442 if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
443 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
444 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
445 || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)
446 && s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
448 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
451 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
452 i = s->handshake_func(s);
456 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
462 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
465 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
466 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
467 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
468 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
470 rr = &s->rlayer.rrec;
473 * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
474 * during the last handshake in advance, if any.
476 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
478 item = pqueue_pop(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q);
480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
481 /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
482 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
483 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
484 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO,
485 sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
489 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
491 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
496 /* Check for timeout */
497 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
500 /* get new packet if necessary */
501 if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
502 || (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
503 ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
505 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
506 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
514 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
516 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
517 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
518 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
520 * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely
521 * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application
522 * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection.
524 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data),
525 SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(rr)) < 0) {
526 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
529 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
534 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
537 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
538 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
539 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
543 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
544 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
545 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
547 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
548 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
549 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
552 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
553 * doing a handshake for the first time
555 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
556 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
557 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
558 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
562 if (recvd_type != NULL)
563 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
568 if ((unsigned int)len > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
569 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
571 n = (unsigned int)len;
573 memcpy(buf, &(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)]), n);
575 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -n);
576 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
577 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
578 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
579 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
584 * We were about to renegotiate but had to read belated application
585 * data first, so retry.
587 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
588 SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
589 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
590 || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)) {
591 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
592 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
593 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
597 * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered
598 * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read
599 * anymore, finally set shutdown.
601 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
602 s->d1->shutdown_received
603 && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
604 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
612 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
613 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
617 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
618 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
621 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
622 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
623 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
625 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
626 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment;
627 dest = s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment;
628 dest_len = &s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len;
629 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
630 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment);
631 dest = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment;
632 dest_len = &s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len;
634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
635 else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
636 /* We allow a 0 return */
637 if (dtls1_process_heartbeat(s, SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr),
638 SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) < 0) {
641 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
642 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
643 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
644 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
645 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
649 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
650 else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
652 * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again
655 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
657 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
658 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
659 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
660 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
661 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
665 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
666 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
667 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
671 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
673 * XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello may be
674 * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes
676 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < dest_maxlen) {
677 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
679 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
680 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
681 * non-existing alert...
685 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
686 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
690 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
691 for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) {
692 dest[k] = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
693 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
694 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
696 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
701 * s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
702 * s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
703 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
706 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
708 (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
709 (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
710 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
711 s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
713 if ((s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
714 (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
715 (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
716 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
717 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
722 * no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages
726 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
727 s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
728 s->msg_callback_arg);
730 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
731 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
732 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
733 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
736 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
737 i = s->handshake_func(s);
741 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
742 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
746 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
747 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
748 /* no read-ahead left? */
751 * In the case where we try to read application data,
752 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
753 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
754 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
756 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
757 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
758 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
759 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
766 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
767 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
772 if (s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) {
773 int alert_level = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[0];
774 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[1];
776 s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment_len = 0;
779 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
780 s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment, 2, s,
781 s->msg_callback_arg);
783 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
784 cb = s->info_callback;
785 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
786 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
789 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
790 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
793 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
794 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
795 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
796 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
798 * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
799 * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so
800 * that nothing gets discarded.
802 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
803 BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
804 s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
805 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
806 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
807 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
811 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
815 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
816 /* now check if it's a missing record */
817 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
819 unsigned int frag_off;
820 unsigned char *p = &(s->rlayer.d->alert_fragment[2]);
825 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
826 dtls1_get_queue_priority
827 (frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off,
829 if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) {
831 * fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s));
834 * requested a message not yet sent, send an alert
837 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
838 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
842 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
845 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
846 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
847 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
848 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
849 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
850 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
851 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
852 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
855 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
856 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
863 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
865 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
866 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
870 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
872 * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages
873 * are still missing, so just drop it.
875 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
880 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
882 if ((s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
884 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
886 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
887 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
888 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_epoch(rr) != s->rlayer.d->r_epoch) {
889 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
894 * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client
895 * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
897 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
898 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
901 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
902 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
906 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
907 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
908 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
912 i = s->handshake_func(s);
916 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
920 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
921 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
922 /* no read-ahead left? */
925 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
926 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
927 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
928 * problems in the blocking world
930 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
931 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
932 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
933 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
940 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
942 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
943 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
944 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
947 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
950 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
952 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
954 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
955 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
956 * happen when type != rr->type
958 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
961 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
963 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
964 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
965 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
966 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
967 * started), we will indulge it.
969 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
970 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
971 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
972 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
973 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
974 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
975 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
976 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
979 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
982 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
983 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
990 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
996 * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
999 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1003 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1004 && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1005 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1007 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment;
1008 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1013 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1016 s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len--;
1019 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1020 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1021 s->rlayer.d->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1029 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
1030 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1032 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1036 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1037 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1038 i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
1042 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1043 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1045 unsigned char *p, *pseq;
1046 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
1053 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf;
1056 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
1057 * will happen with non blocking IO
1059 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb) != 0) {
1060 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1061 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
1064 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1065 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
1066 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1069 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1072 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1075 wr = &s->rlayer.wrec;
1078 if ((sess == NULL) ||
1079 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
1085 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
1090 p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + prefix_len;
1092 /* write the header */
1094 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
1095 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(wr, type);
1097 * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
1098 * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0
1099 * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
1101 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1102 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
1103 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
1105 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1106 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1109 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1113 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
1114 if (s->enc_write_ctx) {
1115 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
1116 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
1117 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
1121 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
1122 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
1123 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1124 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
1125 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1131 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1132 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(wr, p + eivlen); /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1133 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(wr, (int)len);
1134 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(wr, (unsigned char *)buf);
1137 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
1140 /* first we compress */
1141 if (s->compress != NULL) {
1142 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1147 memcpy(SSL3_RECORD_get_data(wr), SSL3_RECORD_get_input(wr),
1148 SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr));
1149 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(wr);
1153 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
1154 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
1158 if (mac_size != 0) {
1159 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,
1160 &(p[SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr) + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
1162 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr, mac_size);
1165 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1166 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(wr, p);
1167 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(wr);
1170 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr, eivlen);
1172 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
1175 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1177 * if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && !
1181 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1183 s2n(s->rlayer.d->w_epoch, pseq);
1187 * else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq);
1190 memcpy(pseq, &(s->rlayer.write_sequence[2]), 6);
1192 s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr), pseq);
1194 if (s->msg_callback)
1195 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
1196 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1199 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1202 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(wr, type); /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1203 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
1205 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->rlayer.write_sequence[0]));
1207 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1209 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1215 /* now let's set up wb */
1216 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb, prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr));
1217 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, 0);
1220 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1223 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = len;
1224 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
1225 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
1226 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = len;
1228 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1229 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
1234 DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
1235 unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1240 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1241 if (rr->epoch == s->rlayer.d->r_epoch)
1242 return &s->rlayer.d->bitmap;
1244 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1245 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->rlayer.d->r_epoch + 1) &&
1246 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1248 return &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap;
1254 void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1257 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->rlayer.read_sequence);
1259 if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) {
1260 seq = s->rlayer.read_sequence;
1261 s->rlayer.d->r_epoch++;
1262 memcpy(&s->rlayer.d->bitmap, &s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap,
1263 sizeof(s->rlayer.d->bitmap));
1264 memset(&s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap, 0,
1265 sizeof(s->rlayer.d->next_bitmap));
1267 seq = s->rlayer.write_sequence;
1268 memcpy(s->rlayer.d->last_write_sequence, seq,
1269 sizeof(s->rlayer.write_sequence));
1270 s->rlayer.d->w_epoch++;
1273 memset(seq, 0, seq_bytes);