3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
125 /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
126 static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2)
129 if (sizeof(long) == 8) do
130 { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1};
133 if (is_endian.little) break;
134 /* not reached on little-endians */
135 /* following test is redundant, because input is
136 * always aligned, but I take no chances... */
137 if (((size_t)v1|(size_t)v2)&0x7) break;
141 if (l>128) return 128;
142 else if (l<-128) return -128;
146 ret = (int)v1[7]-(int)v2[7];
148 brw = ret>>8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
151 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
158 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
163 brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
165 if (sat&0xff) return brw | 0x80;
166 else return brw + (ret&0xFF);
169 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
171 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
172 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
173 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
174 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
176 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
177 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
179 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
180 unsigned char *priority);
181 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
182 static void dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s);
184 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
186 dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
188 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
190 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
192 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
193 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
195 s->packet = rdata->packet;
196 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
197 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
198 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
200 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
201 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
208 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
210 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
213 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
214 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
217 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
218 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
219 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
221 if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
222 if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
224 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
228 rdata->packet = s->packet;
229 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
230 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
231 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
235 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
236 /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
237 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
238 (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) {
239 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
243 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
244 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
252 s->packet_length = 0;
253 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
254 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
256 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
258 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
269 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
273 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
276 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
278 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
288 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
290 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
291 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
292 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
294 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
295 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
296 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
297 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
300 dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
304 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
307 /* Check if epoch is current. */
308 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
309 return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
311 /* Process all the records. */
312 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
314 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
315 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
317 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
318 s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
322 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
323 * have been processed */
324 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
325 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
334 dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
338 (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
339 ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
341 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
346 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
347 if (item && item->priority == priority)
349 /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be
350 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
352 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
353 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
354 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
356 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
357 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
359 s->packet = rdata->packet;
360 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
361 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
362 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
364 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
367 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
377 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
384 unsigned int mac_size;
385 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
386 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
392 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
393 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
395 rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
397 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
398 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
399 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
400 * the decryption or by the decompression
401 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
402 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
404 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
405 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
407 /* check is not needed I believe */
408 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
410 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
411 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
415 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
418 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
421 /* To minimize information leaked via timing, we will always
422 * perform all computations before discarding the message.
424 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
428 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
429 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
433 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
434 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
435 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
436 (s->read_hash == NULL))
441 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
443 t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
444 OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
447 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
449 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
450 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
451 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
454 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
457 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
458 if (rr->length < mac_size)
460 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
461 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
462 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
465 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
468 rr->length-=mac_size;
469 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
470 if (i < 0 || memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
472 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
476 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
478 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
480 s->packet_length = 0;
484 /* r->length is now just compressed */
485 if (s->expand != NULL)
487 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
489 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
490 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
493 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
495 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
496 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
501 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
503 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
504 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
509 /* So at this point the following is true
510 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
511 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
512 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
513 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
517 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
519 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
523 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
529 /* Call this to get a new input record.
530 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
531 * or non-blocking IO.
532 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
533 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
534 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
535 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
537 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
538 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
540 int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
543 unsigned char *p = NULL;
544 unsigned short version;
545 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
546 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
550 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
551 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
552 dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
554 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
555 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
558 /* get something from the wire */
560 /* check if we have the header */
561 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
562 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
564 n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
565 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
566 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
568 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
569 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
571 s->packet_length = 0;
575 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
579 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
583 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
585 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
588 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
593 /* Lets check version */
594 if (!s->first_packet)
596 if (version != s->version)
598 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
600 s->packet_length = 0;
605 if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
607 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
609 s->packet_length = 0;
613 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
615 /* record too long, silently discard it */
617 s->packet_length = 0;
621 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
624 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
626 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
628 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
630 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
631 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
633 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
637 s->packet_length = 0;
641 /* now n == rr->length,
642 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
644 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
646 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
647 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
651 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
652 goto again; /* get another record */
655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
656 /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
657 if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
660 /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
661 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
662 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
663 * since they arrive from different connections and
664 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
666 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
667 *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
668 !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
671 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
672 goto again; /* get another record */
674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
678 /* just read a 0 length packet */
679 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
681 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
682 * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
683 * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
684 * anything while listening.
688 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
690 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
693 s->packet_length = 0;
697 if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
700 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
701 goto again; /* get another record */
704 dtls1_clear_timeouts(s); /* done waiting */
709 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
710 * 'type' is one of the following:
712 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
713 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
714 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
716 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
717 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
719 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
720 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
721 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
722 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
723 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
724 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
725 * Change cipher spec protocol
726 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
728 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
730 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
731 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
732 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
733 * Application data protocol
734 * none of our business
736 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
741 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
743 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
744 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
747 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
748 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
749 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
750 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
752 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
756 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
757 if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
760 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
763 /* Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read
764 * app data with SCTP.
766 if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
767 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
768 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK) &&
769 s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
771 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
774 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
775 i=s->handshake_func(s);
776 if (i < 0) return(i);
779 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
785 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
787 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
788 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
789 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
790 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
793 /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
794 * so process data buffered during the last handshake
795 * in advance, if any.
797 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
800 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
804 /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
805 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
807 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
808 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
812 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
814 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
819 /* Check for timeout */
820 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
823 /* get new packet if necessary */
824 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
826 ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
829 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
830 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
838 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
840 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
841 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
842 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
844 /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
845 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
846 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
847 * than dropping the connection.
849 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num);
854 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
855 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
856 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
859 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
864 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
866 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
867 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
868 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
869 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
871 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
876 if (len <= 0) return(len);
878 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
881 n = (unsigned int)len;
883 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
890 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
896 /* We were about to renegotiate but had to read
897 * belated application data first, so retry.
899 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
900 rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
901 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK))
903 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
904 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
905 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
908 /* We might had to delay a close_notify alert because
909 * of reordered app data. If there was an alert and there
910 * is no message to read anymore, finally set shutdown.
912 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
913 s->d1->shutdown_received && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
915 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
923 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
924 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
926 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
927 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
930 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
931 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
932 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
934 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
936 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
937 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
938 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
940 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
942 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
943 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
944 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
947 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
949 dtls1_process_heartbeat(s);
951 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
953 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
954 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
955 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
959 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
960 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
962 /* Application data while renegotiating
963 * is allowed. Try again reading.
965 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
968 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
970 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
971 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
972 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
976 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
977 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
978 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
984 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
985 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
986 if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
988 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
990 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
991 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
992 * non-existing alert...
996 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1001 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1002 for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
1004 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1007 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
1011 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1012 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1013 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1015 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1017 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1018 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1019 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1021 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1023 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1024 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1025 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1027 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1032 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
1034 if (s->msg_callback)
1035 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1036 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1038 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1039 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1040 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1043 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1044 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1046 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1047 if (i < 0) return(i);
1050 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1054 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1056 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1059 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1060 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1061 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1062 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1063 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1064 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1065 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1066 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1072 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1073 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1077 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
1079 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
1080 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
1082 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1084 if (s->msg_callback)
1085 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1086 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1088 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1089 cb=s->info_callback;
1090 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1091 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1095 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1096 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1099 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1101 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1102 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1105 /* With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
1106 * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this
1107 * first so that nothing gets discarded.
1109 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
1110 BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
1112 s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
1113 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1114 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1115 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1119 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1123 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1124 /* now check if it's a missing record */
1125 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1128 unsigned int frag_off;
1129 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1134 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1135 dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
1137 if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
1139 /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
1140 /* requested a message not yet sent,
1141 send an alert ourselves */
1142 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1143 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1148 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1152 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1153 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1155 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1156 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1157 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1158 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1163 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1171 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1173 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1178 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1180 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1181 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1183 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1185 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1188 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1189 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1190 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1191 if ( (rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
1192 (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1194 i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1201 if (s->msg_callback)
1202 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1203 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1205 /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
1206 * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
1208 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
1213 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1215 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1216 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1219 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1220 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1222 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1223 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1226 /* Remember that a CCS has been received,
1227 * so that an old key of SCTP-Auth can be
1228 * deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored
1229 * if no SCTP is used
1231 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
1237 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1238 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1241 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1243 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1244 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1245 if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
1251 /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
1252 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1254 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1256 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1261 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1262 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1264 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1265 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1266 * protocol violations): */
1267 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1271 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1276 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1277 if (i < 0) return(i);
1280 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1284 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1286 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1289 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1290 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1291 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1292 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1293 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1294 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1295 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1296 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1307 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1308 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1314 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1317 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1319 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1320 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1321 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1322 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1323 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1324 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1326 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1327 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1328 * but have application data. If the library was
1329 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1330 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1331 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1332 * we will indulge it.
1334 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1335 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1337 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1338 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1339 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1341 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1342 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1343 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1347 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1352 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1360 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1366 dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1371 /* Check if we have to continue an interrupted handshake
1372 * for reading belated app data with SCTP.
1374 if ((SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) ||
1375 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
1376 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)))
1378 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1381 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1382 if (i < 0) return(i);
1385 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1390 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1396 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1401 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1404 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1408 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1409 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1411 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1412 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1417 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1420 len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1423 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1424 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1425 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1435 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1436 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1438 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1442 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1443 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1444 i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
1448 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1450 unsigned char *p,*pseq;
1451 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
1458 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1459 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1460 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
1462 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1463 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
1466 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1467 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
1469 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1472 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1475 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1482 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
1483 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
1484 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
1491 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
1496 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1498 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
1499 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1500 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1502 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
1503 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1506 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1508 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
1509 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
1510 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
1511 * together with the actual payload) */
1512 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1513 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1516 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
1518 /* insufficient space */
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1524 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1527 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1529 /* write the header */
1534 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
1535 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1537 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1541 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1543 /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
1544 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
1546 if ( s->enc_write_ctx &&
1547 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
1548 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
1552 wr->data=p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1553 wr->length=(int)len;
1554 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1556 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1559 /* first we compress */
1560 if (s->compress != NULL)
1562 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1570 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1574 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1575 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1576 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1580 if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1) < 0)
1582 wr->length+=mac_size;
1585 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1590 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1591 if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
1593 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs);
1594 /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
1595 * the rest of randomness */
1599 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1601 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1602 /* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1603 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1605 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1607 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1611 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
1613 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1615 s2n(wr->length,pseq);
1617 /* we should now have
1618 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1619 * wr->length long */
1620 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1621 wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1623 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1624 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1625 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1626 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1627 *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1630 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1632 if (create_empty_fragment)
1634 /* we are in a recursive call;
1635 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1640 /* now let's set up wb */
1641 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1644 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1645 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1646 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1647 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1648 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1650 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1651 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1658 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1662 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1664 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1667 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1668 return 1; /* this record in new */
1671 if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1672 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1673 else if (bitmap->map & (1UL<<shift))
1674 return 0; /* record previously received */
1676 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1681 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1685 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1687 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1691 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1692 bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
1695 memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num,seq,8);
1699 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1700 bitmap->map |= 1UL<<shift;
1705 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1708 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1709 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1710 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1712 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1714 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1715 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1716 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1718 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1719 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1721 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1723 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg */
1726 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1730 fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1732 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1736 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1739 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1740 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1744 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1745 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1746 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1749 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1751 if (s->msg_callback)
1752 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1753 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1755 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1756 cb=s->info_callback;
1757 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1758 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1762 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1763 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1770 static DTLS1_BITMAP *
1771 dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1776 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1777 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1778 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1780 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1781 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1782 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1783 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
1786 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1794 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority,
1795 unsigned long *offset)
1798 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1799 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1800 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1803 /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
1804 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
1806 if ( SSL_in_init(s))
1808 unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1809 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1810 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1811 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1813 unsigned short seq_num;
1814 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1815 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1817 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1819 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1820 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1821 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1825 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1826 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1830 /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
1831 * retransmit of something we happened to previously
1832 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
1833 if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1835 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1836 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1837 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1839 else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1840 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1841 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1845 *priority = seq_num;
1849 else /* unknown record type */
1858 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1861 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1863 if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
1865 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1867 memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1868 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1872 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1873 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1877 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
1882 dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s)
1884 memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0x00, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st));