3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
125 /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
126 static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2)
129 if (sizeof(long) == 8) do
130 { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1};
133 if (is_endian.little) break;
134 /* not reached on little-endians */
135 /* following test is redundant, because input is
136 * always aligned, but I take no chances... */
137 if (((size_t)v1|(size_t)v2)&0x7) break;
141 if (l>128) return 128;
142 else if (l<-128) return -128;
146 ret = (int)v1[7]-(int)v2[7];
148 brw = ret>>8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
151 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
158 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
163 brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
165 if (sat&0xff) return brw | 0x80;
166 else return brw + (ret&0xFF);
169 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
171 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
172 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
173 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
174 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
176 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
177 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
179 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
180 unsigned char *priority);
181 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
183 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
185 dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
187 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
189 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
191 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
192 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
194 s->packet = rdata->packet;
195 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
196 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
197 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
199 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
200 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
207 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
209 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
212 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
213 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
216 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
217 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
218 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
220 if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
221 if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
223 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
227 rdata->packet = s->packet;
228 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
229 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
230 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
235 /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
236 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
237 (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) {
238 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
243 s->packet_length = 0;
244 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
245 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
247 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
249 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
250 if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
251 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
257 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
258 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
260 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
261 if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
262 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
273 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
277 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
280 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
282 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
292 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
294 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
295 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
296 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
298 /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
299 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
300 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
301 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
304 dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
308 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
311 /* Check if epoch is current. */
312 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
313 return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
315 /* Process all the records. */
316 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
318 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
319 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
321 if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
322 s->s3->rrec.seq_num)<0)
327 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
328 * have been processed */
329 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
330 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
339 dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
343 (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
344 ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
346 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
351 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
352 if (item && item->priority == priority)
354 /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be
355 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
357 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
358 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
359 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
361 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
362 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
364 s->packet = rdata->packet;
365 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
366 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
367 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
369 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
372 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
382 dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
388 unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
389 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
394 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
395 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
397 rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
399 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
400 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
401 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
402 * the decryption or by the decompression
403 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
404 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
406 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
407 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
409 /* check is not needed I believe */
410 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
412 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
413 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
417 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
420 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
423 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
424 * 1: if the padding is valid
425 * -1: if the padding is invalid
429 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
431 s->packet_length = 0;
436 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
437 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
441 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
442 if ((sess != NULL) &&
443 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
444 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
446 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
447 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
448 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
449 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
450 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
452 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
453 orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
455 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
456 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
457 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
458 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
460 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
461 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
462 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
463 orig_len < mac_size+1))
465 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
466 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
470 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
472 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
473 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
474 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
475 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
478 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
479 rr->length -= mac_size;
483 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
484 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
485 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
486 rr->length -= mac_size;
487 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
490 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
491 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
493 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
499 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
501 s->packet_length = 0;
505 /* r->length is now just compressed */
506 if (s->expand != NULL)
508 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
510 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
511 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
514 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
516 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
517 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
522 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
524 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
525 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
531 * So at this point the following is true
532 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
533 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
534 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
535 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
539 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
544 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
551 * Call this to get a new input record.
552 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
553 * or non-blocking IO.
554 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
555 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
556 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
557 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
559 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
560 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
562 int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
565 unsigned char *p = NULL;
566 unsigned short version;
567 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
568 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
572 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
573 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
574 if(dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)<0)
577 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
578 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
581 /* get something from the wire */
583 /* check if we have the header */
584 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
585 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
587 n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
588 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
589 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
591 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
592 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
594 s->packet_length = 0;
598 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
603 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
605 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
609 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
611 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
614 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
619 /* Lets check version */
620 if (!s->first_packet)
622 if (version != s->version)
624 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
626 s->packet_length = 0;
631 if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
633 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
635 s->packet_length = 0;
639 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
641 /* record too long, silently discard it */
643 s->packet_length = 0;
647 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
650 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
652 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
654 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
656 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
657 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
661 s->packet_length = 0;
665 /* now n == rr->length,
666 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
668 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
670 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
671 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
675 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
676 goto again; /* get another record */
679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
680 /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
681 if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
684 /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
685 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
686 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
687 * since they arrive from different connections and
688 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
690 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
691 s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
692 s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
693 !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
696 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
697 goto again; /* get another record */
699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
703 /* just read a 0 length packet */
704 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
706 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
707 * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
708 * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
709 * anything while listening.
713 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
715 if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num)<0)
717 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);/* Mark receipt of record. */
720 s->packet_length = 0;
724 if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
727 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
728 goto again; /* get another record */
730 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);/* Mark receipt of record. */
737 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
738 * 'type' is one of the following:
740 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
741 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
742 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
744 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
745 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
747 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
748 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
749 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
750 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
751 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
752 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
753 * Change cipher spec protocol
754 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
756 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
758 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
759 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
760 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
761 * Application data protocol
762 * none of our business
764 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
769 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
771 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
772 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
775 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
776 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
777 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
778 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
780 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
784 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
785 if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
788 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
790 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
791 /* Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read
792 * app data with SCTP.
794 if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
795 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
796 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK) &&
797 s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
799 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
802 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
803 i=s->handshake_func(s);
804 if (i < 0) return(i);
807 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
813 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
816 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
817 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
818 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
819 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
823 /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
824 * so process data buffered during the last handshake
825 * in advance, if any.
827 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
830 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
834 /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
835 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
837 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
838 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
842 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
844 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
849 /* Check for timeout */
850 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
853 /* get new packet if necessary */
854 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
856 ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
859 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
860 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
868 if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
874 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
876 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
877 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
878 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
880 /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
881 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
882 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
883 * than dropping the connection.
885 if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num)<0)
887 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
894 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
895 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
896 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
899 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
904 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
906 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
907 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
908 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
909 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
911 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
912 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
916 if (len <= 0) return(len);
918 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
921 n = (unsigned int)len;
923 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
930 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
935 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
936 /* We were about to renegotiate but had to read
937 * belated application data first, so retry.
939 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
940 rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
941 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK))
943 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
944 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
945 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
948 /* We might had to delay a close_notify alert because
949 * of reordered app data. If there was an alert and there
950 * is no message to read anymore, finally set shutdown.
952 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
953 s->d1->shutdown_received && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
955 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
963 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
964 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
966 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
967 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
970 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
971 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
972 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
974 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
976 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
977 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
978 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
980 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
982 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
983 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
984 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
987 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
989 dtls1_process_heartbeat(s);
991 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
993 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
994 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
995 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
999 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
1000 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1002 /* Application data while renegotiating
1003 * is allowed. Try again reading.
1005 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1008 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1009 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1010 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1011 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1012 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1016 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
1017 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1018 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1022 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1024 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
1025 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
1026 if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
1028 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1030 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
1031 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
1032 * non-existing alert...
1036 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1041 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1042 for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
1044 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1047 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
1052 * s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1053 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1054 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1057 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1059 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1060 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1061 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1063 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1065 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1066 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1067 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1069 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1070 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1074 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
1076 if (s->msg_callback)
1077 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1078 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1080 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1081 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1082 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1084 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1086 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1087 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1089 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1090 if (i < 0) return(i);
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1097 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1099 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1102 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1103 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1104 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1105 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1106 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1107 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1108 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1109 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1115 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1116 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1120 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
1122 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
1123 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
1125 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1127 if (s->msg_callback)
1128 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1129 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1131 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1132 cb=s->info_callback;
1133 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1134 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1138 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1139 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1142 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1144 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1145 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1148 /* With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
1149 * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this
1150 * first so that nothing gets discarded.
1152 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
1153 BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
1155 s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
1156 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1157 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1158 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1162 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1166 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1167 /* now check if it's a missing record */
1168 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1171 unsigned int frag_off;
1172 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1177 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1178 dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
1180 if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
1182 /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
1183 /* requested a message not yet sent,
1184 send an alert ourselves */
1185 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1186 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1191 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1195 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1196 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1198 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1199 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1200 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1201 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1206 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1214 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1216 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1221 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1223 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1224 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1226 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1228 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1231 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1232 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1233 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1234 if ( (rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
1235 (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1237 i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1244 if (s->msg_callback)
1245 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1246 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1248 /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
1249 * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
1251 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
1256 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1258 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1259 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1262 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1263 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1265 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1266 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1268 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1269 /* Remember that a CCS has been received,
1270 * so that an old key of SCTP-Auth can be
1271 * deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored
1272 * if no SCTP is used
1274 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
1280 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1281 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1284 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1286 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1287 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1288 if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
1294 /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
1295 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1297 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1299 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
1302 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1307 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1308 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1310 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1311 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1312 * protocol violations): */
1313 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1317 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1322 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1323 if (i < 0) return(i);
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1330 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1332 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1335 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1336 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1337 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1338 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1339 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1340 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1341 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1342 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1353 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1354 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1360 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1361 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1363 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1365 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1366 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1367 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1368 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1369 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1372 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1373 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1374 * but have application data. If the library was
1375 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1376 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1377 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1378 * we will indulge it.
1380 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1381 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1383 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1384 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1385 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1387 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1388 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1389 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1393 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1398 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1406 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1412 dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1417 /* Check if we have to continue an interrupted handshake
1418 * for reading belated app data with SCTP.
1420 if ((SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) ||
1421 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
1422 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)))
1424 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1427 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1428 if (i < 0) return(i);
1431 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1436 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1438 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1442 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1447 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1450 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1454 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1455 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1457 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1458 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1463 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1466 len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1469 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1470 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1471 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1481 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1482 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1484 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1488 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1489 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1490 i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
1494 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1496 unsigned char *p,*pseq;
1497 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
1504 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1505 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1506 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
1508 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1509 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
1512 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1513 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
1515 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1518 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1521 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1528 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
1529 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
1530 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
1537 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
1542 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1544 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
1545 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1546 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1548 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
1549 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1552 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1554 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
1555 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
1556 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
1557 * together with the actual payload) */
1558 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1559 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1562 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
1564 /* insufficient space */
1565 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1570 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1573 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1575 /* write the header */
1579 /* Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and
1580 * we haven't decided which version to use yet send back using
1581 * version 1.0 header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
1583 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
1585 *(p++)=DTLS1_VERSION>>8;
1586 *(p++)=DTLS1_VERSION&0xff;
1590 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1591 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1594 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1598 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
1599 if (s->enc_write_ctx)
1601 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
1602 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
1604 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
1608 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
1609 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
1610 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1617 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1618 wr->data=p + eivlen; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1619 wr->length=(int)len;
1620 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1622 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1625 /* first we compress */
1626 if (s->compress != NULL)
1628 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1636 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1640 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1641 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1642 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1646 if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
1648 wr->length+=mac_size;
1651 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1656 wr->length += eivlen;
1658 if(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1) < 1) goto err;
1660 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1661 /* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1662 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1664 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1666 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1670 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
1672 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1674 s2n(wr->length,pseq);
1676 if (s->msg_callback)
1677 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1679 /* we should now have
1680 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1681 * wr->length long */
1682 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1683 wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1685 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1686 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1687 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1688 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1689 *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1692 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1694 if (create_empty_fragment)
1696 /* we are in a recursive call;
1697 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1702 /* now let's set up wb */
1703 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1706 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1707 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1708 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1709 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1710 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1712 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1713 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1720 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1724 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1726 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1729 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1730 return 1; /* this record in new */
1733 if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1734 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1735 else if (bitmap->map & (1UL<<shift))
1736 return 0; /* record previously received */
1738 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1743 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1747 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1749 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1753 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1754 bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
1757 memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num,seq,8);
1761 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1762 bitmap->map |= 1UL<<shift;
1767 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1770 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1771 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1772 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1774 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1776 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1777 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1778 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1780 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1781 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1783 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1785 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg */
1788 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1792 fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1794 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1798 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1801 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1802 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1806 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1807 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1808 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1811 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1813 if (s->msg_callback)
1814 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1815 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1817 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1818 cb=s->info_callback;
1819 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1820 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1824 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1825 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1832 static DTLS1_BITMAP *
1833 dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1838 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1839 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1840 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1842 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1843 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1844 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1845 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
1848 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1856 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority,
1857 unsigned long *offset)
1860 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1861 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1862 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1865 /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
1866 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
1868 if ( SSL_in_init(s))
1870 unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1871 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1872 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1873 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1875 unsigned short seq_num;
1876 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1877 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1879 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1881 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1882 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1883 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1887 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1888 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1892 /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
1893 * retransmit of something we happened to previously
1894 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
1895 if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1897 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1898 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1899 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1901 else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1902 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1903 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1907 *priority = seq_num;
1911 else /* unknown record type */
1920 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1923 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1925 if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
1927 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1929 memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1930 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1934 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1935 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1939 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);