3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/evp.h>
121 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
122 #include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123 #include <openssl/rand.h>
125 /* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
126 static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1, const unsigned char *v2)
130 if (sizeof(long) == 8)
140 if (is_endian.little)
142 /* not reached on little-endians */
144 * following test is redundant, because input is always aligned,
145 * but I take no chances...
147 if (((size_t)v1 | (size_t)v2) & 0x7)
161 for (i=0; i<7; i++) {
163 /* v1 is larger... but by how much? */
164 if (v1[i] != v2[i] + 1)
167 if (v1[i] != 0x00 || v2[i] != 0xff)
168 return 128; /* too much */
170 /* We checked all the way to the penultimate byte,
171 * so despite higher bytes changing we actually
172 * know that it only changed from (e.g.)
173 * ... (xx) ff ff ff ??
174 * to ... (xx+1) 00 00 00 ??
175 * so we add a 'bias' of 256 for the carry that
176 * happened, and will eventually return
177 * 256 + v1[7] - v2[7]. */
180 } else if (v2[i] > v1[i]) {
181 /* v2 is larger... but by how much? */
182 if (v2[i] != v1[i] + 1)
185 if (v2[i] != 0x00 || v1[i] != 0xff)
186 return -128; /* too much */
188 /* Similar to the case above, we know it changed
189 * from ... (xx) 00 00 00 ??
190 * to ... (xx-1) ff ff ff ??
191 * so we add a 'bias' of -256 for the borrow,
192 * to return -256 + v1[7] - v2[7]. */
197 ret += (int)v1[7] - (int)v2[7];
207 static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
209 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
210 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
211 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
212 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
214 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
215 unsigned short *priority,
216 unsigned long *offset);
218 static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
219 unsigned char *priority);
220 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
222 /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
223 static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
225 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
227 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
229 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
230 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
232 s->packet = rdata->packet;
233 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
234 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
235 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
237 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
238 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
244 dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
246 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
249 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
250 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
253 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
254 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
255 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) {
261 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
265 rdata->packet = s->packet;
266 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
267 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
268 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
273 /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
274 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
275 (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A
276 || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) {
277 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO,
278 sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
283 s->packet_length = 0;
284 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
285 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
287 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
288 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
289 if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
290 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
296 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) {
297 /* Must be a duplicate so ignore it */
298 if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
299 OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
307 static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
311 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
313 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
315 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
325 * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not
328 #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
329 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
330 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
333 * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie,
336 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
337 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
338 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
340 static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
345 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
346 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
349 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
351 /* Check if epoch is current. */
352 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
353 return 1; /* Nothing to do. */
360 * We've still got data from the current packet to read. There could
361 * be a record from the new epoch in it - so don't overwrite it
362 * with the unprocessed records yet (we'll do it when we've
363 * finished reading the current packet).
369 /* Process all the records. */
370 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) {
371 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
372 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
373 if (bitmap == NULL) {
375 * Should not happen. This will only ever be NULL when the
376 * current record is from a different epoch. But that cannot
377 * be the case because we already checked the epoch above
379 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_BUFFERED_RECORDS,
380 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
384 /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
385 if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
389 * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. We did this
390 * check once already when we first received the record - but
391 * we might have updated the window since then due to
392 * records we subsequently processed.
394 replayok = dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap);
397 if (!replayok || !dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
398 /* dump this record */
400 s->packet_length = 0;
404 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
405 s->s3->rrec.seq_num) < 0)
411 * sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records have been
414 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
415 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
422 static int dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
426 (((PQ_64BIT) s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
427 ((PQ_64BIT) s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
429 /* if we're not (re)negotiating, nothing buffered */
433 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
434 if (item && item->priority == priority) {
436 * Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be a
437 * handshake record, since data records as passed up without
440 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
441 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
442 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
444 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
445 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
447 s->packet = rdata->packet;
448 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
449 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
450 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
452 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
455 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
464 static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
470 unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
471 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
477 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
478 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
480 rr->input = &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
483 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
484 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
485 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
486 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
490 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
491 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
494 /* check is not needed I believe */
495 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
496 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
497 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
501 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
502 rr->data = rr->input;
504 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
507 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
508 * 1: if the padding is valid
509 * -1: if the padding is invalid
512 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
514 s->packet_length = 0;
518 printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
521 for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
522 printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
527 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
528 if ((sess != NULL) &&
529 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
530 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
531 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
532 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
533 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
534 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
537 * kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type
539 orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8);
542 * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
543 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
544 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
545 * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
547 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
548 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
549 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
550 orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
551 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
552 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
556 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
558 * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
559 * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
560 * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
561 * contents of the padding bytes.
564 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
565 rr->length -= mac_size;
568 * In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals
569 * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
572 rr->length -= mac_size;
573 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
576 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
577 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
578 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
580 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
585 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
587 s->packet_length = 0;
591 /* r->length is now just compressed */
592 if (s->expand != NULL) {
593 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
594 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
595 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
596 SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
599 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
600 al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
601 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
606 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
607 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
608 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
614 * So at this point the following is true
615 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
616 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
617 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
618 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
622 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
623 s->packet_length = 0;
625 /* Mark receipt of record. */
626 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
631 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
637 * Call this to get a new input record.
638 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
639 * or non-blocking IO.
640 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
641 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
642 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
643 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
645 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
646 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
648 int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
651 unsigned char *p = NULL;
652 unsigned short version;
653 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
654 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
660 * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
661 * This is a non-blocking operation.
663 if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s))
666 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
667 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
670 /* get something from the wire */
671 /* check if we have the header */
672 if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
673 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
674 n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
675 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
677 return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
679 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
680 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
681 s->packet_length = 0;
685 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
690 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
691 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
693 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
697 version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
699 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
702 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
708 * Lets check the version. We tolerate alerts that don't have the exact
709 * version number (e.g. because of protocol version errors)
711 if (!s->first_packet && rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
712 if (version != s->version) {
713 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
715 s->packet_length = 0;
720 if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) {
721 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
723 s->packet_length = 0;
727 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
728 /* record too long, silently discard it */
730 s->packet_length = 0;
734 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
737 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
739 if (rr->length > s->packet_length - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
740 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
742 n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
743 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
746 s->packet_length = 0;
751 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length ==
752 * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
755 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
757 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
758 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
759 if (bitmap == NULL) {
761 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
762 goto again; /* get another record */
764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
765 /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
766 if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
769 * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. Don't check if
770 * we're listening and this message is a ClientHello. They can look
771 * as if they're replayed, since they arrive from different
772 * connections and would be dropped unnecessarily.
774 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
775 s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
776 s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
777 !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
779 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
780 goto again; /* get another record */
782 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
786 /* just read a 0 length packet */
791 * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
792 * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
793 * processed at this time. However, do not buffer anything while
797 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) {
798 if (dtls1_buffer_record
799 (s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num) < 0)
803 s->packet_length = 0;
807 if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
809 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
810 goto again; /* get another record */
818 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
819 * 'type' is one of the following:
821 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
822 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
823 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
825 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
826 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
828 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
829 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
830 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
831 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
832 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
833 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
834 * Change cipher spec protocol
835 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
837 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
839 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
840 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
841 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
842 * Application data protocol
843 * none of our business
845 int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
850 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
852 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
853 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
856 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
857 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
858 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
859 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
860 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
865 * check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting
867 if ((ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
871 * Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
874 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
876 * Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read app data with
879 if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
880 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
881 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
882 || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)
883 && s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
885 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
888 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
889 i = s->handshake_func(s);
893 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
899 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
902 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
903 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
904 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
905 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
910 * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered
911 * during the last handshake in advance, if any.
913 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0) {
915 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
918 /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
919 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
920 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
921 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO,
922 sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
926 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
928 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
933 /* Check for timeout */
934 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
937 /* get new packet if necessary */
938 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
939 ret = dtls1_get_record(s);
941 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
942 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
950 if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
956 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
957 * record that isn't an alert.
959 if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0)
960 s->cert->alert_count = 0;
962 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
964 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
965 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
966 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
968 * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely
969 * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application
970 * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection.
972 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num) <
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
982 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
985 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
987 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
991 if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
992 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
994 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
995 * doing a handshake for the first time
997 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
998 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
999 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1000 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1007 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1010 n = (unsigned int)len;
1012 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1016 if (rr->length == 0) {
1017 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1021 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1023 * We were about to renegotiate but had to read belated application
1024 * data first, so retry.
1026 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
1027 rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
1028 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
1029 || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)) {
1030 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1031 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1032 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1036 * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered
1037 * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read
1038 * anymore, finally set shutdown.
1040 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
1041 s->d1->shutdown_received
1042 && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1043 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1051 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1052 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
1056 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1057 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1060 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
1061 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1062 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1064 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1065 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->handshake_fragment);
1066 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1067 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
1068 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1069 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
1070 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
1071 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
1073 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1074 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
1075 dtls1_process_heartbeat(s);
1077 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1079 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1080 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1081 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1085 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
1086 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1088 * Application data while renegotiating is allowed. Try again
1091 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
1093 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1094 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1095 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1096 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1097 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1101 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
1102 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1107 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1109 * XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello may be
1110 * fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes
1112 if (rr->length < dest_maxlen) {
1113 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1115 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
1116 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
1117 * non-existing alert...
1121 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1126 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1127 for (k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) {
1128 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1131 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
1136 * s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1137 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1138 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1141 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1143 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1144 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1145 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1146 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1148 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1149 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1150 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1151 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1157 * no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages
1160 if (s->msg_callback)
1161 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1162 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1163 s->msg_callback_arg);
1165 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1166 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1167 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1168 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1170 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1171 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1172 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
1177 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1181 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1182 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1185 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1186 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1187 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1188 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1190 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1191 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1192 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1193 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1200 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1201 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1207 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1208 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1211 && SSL_is_init_finished(s)
1212 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding
1213 && s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH
1214 && s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO
1215 && s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0
1216 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0) {
1217 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1219 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1224 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1225 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
1226 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
1228 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1230 if (s->msg_callback)
1231 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1232 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1234 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1235 cb = s->info_callback;
1236 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1237 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1240 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1241 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1244 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1245 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1247 s->cert->alert_count++;
1248 if (s->cert->alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1249 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1254 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1255 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1257 * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
1258 * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so
1259 * that nothing gets discarded.
1261 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
1262 BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1263 s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
1264 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1265 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1266 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1270 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1274 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1275 /* now check if it's a missing record */
1276 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
1278 unsigned int frag_off;
1279 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1284 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1285 dtls1_get_queue_priority
1286 (frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off,
1288 if (!found && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1290 * fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s));
1293 * requested a message not yet sent, send an alert
1296 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1297 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1301 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1304 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1305 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,
1307 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1308 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", alert_descr);
1309 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1310 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1311 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1314 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1322 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1324 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1329 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1330 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1331 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1333 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1335 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1339 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1340 * what the record payload has to look like
1342 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1343 if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
1344 (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1345 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1352 if (s->msg_callback)
1353 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1354 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1357 * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages
1358 * are still missing, so just drop it.
1360 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok) {
1364 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1366 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1367 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1370 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1371 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1373 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1374 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1378 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
1379 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
1382 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
1389 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1391 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1393 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1395 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1396 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1397 if (rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) {
1403 * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client
1404 * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1406 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
1407 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
1410 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1415 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1416 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1417 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences
1418 * are not as expected (and because this is
1419 * not really needed for clients except for
1420 * detecting protocol violations): */
1421 s->state = SSL_ST_BEFORE | (s->server)
1422 ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1424 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1429 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1433 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1437 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1438 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1441 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1442 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1443 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1444 * problems in the blocking world
1446 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1447 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1448 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1449 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1459 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1460 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
1465 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1468 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1470 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1472 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1473 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1474 * happen when type != rr->type
1476 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1479 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1481 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1482 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1483 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1484 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1485 * started), we will indulge it.
1487 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1488 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1489 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1490 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1491 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1492 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1493 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1494 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1497 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1500 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1508 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1513 int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1517 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1519 * Check if we have to continue an interrupted handshake for reading
1520 * belated app data with SCTP.
1522 if ((SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) ||
1523 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
1524 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK
1525 || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)))
1527 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1530 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1534 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,
1535 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1540 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1545 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1550 * this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1554 have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1558 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1559 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1561 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1562 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1567 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1570 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1573 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1574 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1575 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1583 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
1584 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1586 int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1590 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1591 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1592 i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
1596 int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
1597 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1599 unsigned char *p, *pseq;
1600 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
1608 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
1609 * will happen with non blocking IO
1611 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) {
1612 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1613 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
1616 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1617 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
1618 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1621 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1624 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1627 wr = &(s->s3->wrec);
1628 wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
1631 if ((sess == NULL) ||
1632 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
1638 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
1643 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1646 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
1648 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1649 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1652 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
1653 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1656 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
1658 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
1659 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
1660 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
1663 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1664 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1667 if (s->s3->wbuf.len <
1668 (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) {
1669 /* insufficient space */
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1675 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1678 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1680 /* write the header */
1682 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
1685 * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
1686 * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0
1687 * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
1689 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1690 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
1691 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
1693 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1694 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1697 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1701 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
1702 if (s->enc_write_ctx) {
1703 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
1704 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
1705 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
1709 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
1710 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
1711 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1717 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1718 wr->data = p + eivlen; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1719 wr->length = (int)len;
1720 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
1723 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
1726 /* first we compress */
1727 if (s->compress != NULL) {
1728 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
1729 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1733 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
1734 wr->input = wr->data;
1738 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
1739 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
1743 if (mac_size != 0) {
1744 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
1746 wr->length += mac_size;
1749 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1754 wr->length += eivlen;
1756 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
1759 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1761 * if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && !
1765 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1767 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1771 * else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq);
1774 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1776 s2n(wr->length, pseq);
1778 if (s->msg_callback)
1779 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
1780 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1783 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1786 wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1787 wr->length += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1789 #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1790 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1791 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1792 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1793 *((PQ_64BIT *) & (s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1796 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1798 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1800 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1806 /* now let's set up wb */
1807 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1811 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1814 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
1815 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
1816 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
1817 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
1819 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1820 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
1825 static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1829 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1831 cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
1833 memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
1834 return 1; /* this record in new */
1837 if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
1838 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1839 else if (bitmap->map & (1UL << shift))
1840 return 0; /* record previously received */
1842 memcpy(s->s3->rrec.seq_num, seq, 8);
1846 static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1850 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1852 cmp = satsub64be(seq, bitmap->max_seq_num);
1855 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
1856 bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
1859 memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num, seq, 8);
1862 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map) * 8)
1863 bitmap->map |= 1UL << shift;
1867 int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1870 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1871 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1872 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1874 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1876 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1877 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1878 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1880 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1881 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) {
1882 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1884 if (s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0)
1886 * waiting for a new msg
1889 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1894 "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",
1895 s->d1->handshake_read_seq, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1897 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1901 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1903 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1904 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1906 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1907 #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1908 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1911 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1913 if (s->msg_callback)
1914 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1915 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1917 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1918 cb = s->info_callback;
1919 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1920 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1923 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
1924 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
1930 static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
1931 unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1936 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1937 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1938 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1941 * Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch and only if we
1942 * have already processed all of the unprocessed records from the last
1945 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1946 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch &&
1947 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1949 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1957 dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
1958 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset)
1961 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1962 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1966 * Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway. (this implies that
1967 * Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up immediately)
1969 if (SSL_in_init(s)) {
1970 unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1971 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1972 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1973 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1974 unsigned short seq_num;
1975 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1976 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1978 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1979 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1980 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1981 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1983 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1984 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1989 * this is either a record we're waiting for, or a retransmit of
1990 * something we happened to previously receive (higher layers
1991 * will drop the repeat silently
1993 if (seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1995 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1996 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1997 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1999 else if (seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
2000 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
2001 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
2004 *priority = seq_num;
2007 } else /* unknown record type */
2015 void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
2018 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
2020 if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) {
2021 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
2023 memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
2024 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
2027 * We must not use any buffered messages received from the previous
2030 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
2032 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
2033 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq,
2034 sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
2038 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);