2 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
3 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
5 /* ====================================================================
6 * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
16 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
17 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
20 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
21 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
22 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
23 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
25 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
26 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
27 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
28 * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org.
30 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
31 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
32 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
34 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
36 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
37 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
39 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
40 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
41 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
42 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
43 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
44 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
45 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
46 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
48 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
49 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
50 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
51 * ====================================================================
53 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
54 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
55 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
61 #include <openssl/objects.h>
62 #include <openssl/rand.h>
65 #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
66 # include <sys/timeb.h>
67 #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) && !defined(_WINSOCK2API_)
68 # include <sys/timeval.h>
69 #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
70 # include <sys/times.h>
71 #elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
72 # include <sys/time.h>
75 static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t);
76 static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int type, unsigned long len);
77 static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s);
78 static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void);
80 /* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
81 static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = { 1500, 512, 256 };
83 const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data = {
87 tls1_generate_master_secret,
88 tls1_change_cipher_state,
89 tls1_final_finish_mac,
90 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
91 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
92 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
94 tls1_export_keying_material,
95 SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
96 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
97 dtls1_set_handshake_header,
101 const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_2_enc_data = {
104 tls1_setup_key_block,
105 tls1_generate_master_secret,
106 tls1_change_cipher_state,
107 tls1_final_finish_mac,
108 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
109 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
110 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
112 tls1_export_keying_material,
113 SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS
114 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
115 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
116 dtls1_set_handshake_header,
117 dtls1_handshake_write
120 long dtls1_default_timeout(void)
123 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the DTLSv1 spec is way too long for
124 * http, the cache would over fill
126 return (60 * 60 * 2);
129 int dtls1_new(SSL *s)
133 if (!DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(&s->rlayer)) {
139 if ((d1 = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*d1))) == NULL) {
144 d1->buffered_messages = pqueue_new();
145 d1->sent_messages = pqueue_new();
148 d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
154 if (d1->buffered_messages == NULL || d1->sent_messages == NULL) {
155 pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages);
156 pqueue_free(d1->sent_messages);
163 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
167 static void dtls1_clear_queues(SSL *s)
170 hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
172 while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages)) != NULL) {
173 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
174 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
178 while ((item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) != NULL) {
179 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
180 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
185 void dtls1_free(SSL *s)
187 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(&s->rlayer);
191 dtls1_clear_queues(s);
193 pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_messages);
194 pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages);
200 void dtls1_clear(SSL *s)
202 pqueue *buffered_messages;
203 pqueue *sent_messages;
205 unsigned int link_mtu;
207 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(&s->rlayer);
210 buffered_messages = s->d1->buffered_messages;
211 sent_messages = s->d1->sent_messages;
213 link_mtu = s->d1->link_mtu;
215 dtls1_clear_queues(s);
217 memset(s->d1, 0, sizeof(*s->d1));
220 s->d1->cookie_len = sizeof(s->d1->cookie);
223 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU) {
225 s->d1->link_mtu = link_mtu;
228 s->d1->buffered_messages = buffered_messages;
229 s->d1->sent_messages = sent_messages;
233 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT)
234 s->client_version = s->version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
235 else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
236 s->version = DTLS_MAX_VERSION;
238 s->version = s->method->version;
241 long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg)
246 case DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT:
247 if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, (struct timeval *)parg) != NULL) {
251 case DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT:
252 ret = dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
254 case DTLS_CTRL_SET_LINK_MTU:
255 if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu())
257 s->d1->link_mtu = larg;
259 case DTLS_CTRL_GET_LINK_MIN_MTU:
260 return (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu();
261 case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
263 * We may not have a BIO set yet so can't call dtls1_min_mtu()
264 * We'll have to make do with dtls1_link_min_mtu() and max overhead
266 if (larg < (long)dtls1_link_min_mtu() - DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD)
271 ret = ssl3_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg);
277 void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s)
279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
280 /* Disable timer for SCTP */
281 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
282 memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout));
287 /* If timer is not set, initialize duration with 1 second */
288 if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
289 s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
292 /* Set timeout to current time */
293 get_current_time(&(s->d1->next_timeout));
295 /* Add duration to current time */
296 s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec += s->d1->timeout_duration;
297 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
298 &(s->d1->next_timeout));
301 struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft)
303 struct timeval timenow;
305 /* If no timeout is set, just return NULL */
306 if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
310 /* Get current time */
311 get_current_time(&timenow);
313 /* If timer already expired, set remaining time to 0 */
314 if (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec ||
315 (s->d1->next_timeout.tv_sec == timenow.tv_sec &&
316 s->d1->next_timeout.tv_usec <= timenow.tv_usec)) {
317 memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft));
321 /* Calculate time left until timer expires */
322 memcpy(timeleft, &(s->d1->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval));
323 timeleft->tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec;
324 timeleft->tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec;
325 if (timeleft->tv_usec < 0) {
327 timeleft->tv_usec += 1000000;
331 * If remaining time is less than 15 ms, set it to 0 to prevent issues
332 * because of small devergences with socket timeouts.
334 if (timeleft->tv_sec == 0 && timeleft->tv_usec < 15000) {
335 memset(timeleft, 0, sizeof(*timeleft));
341 int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s)
343 struct timeval timeleft;
345 /* Get time left until timeout, return false if no timer running */
346 if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, &timeleft) == NULL) {
350 /* Return false if timer is not expired yet */
351 if (timeleft.tv_sec > 0 || timeleft.tv_usec > 0) {
355 /* Timer expired, so return true */
359 void dtls1_double_timeout(SSL *s)
361 s->d1->timeout_duration *= 2;
362 if (s->d1->timeout_duration > 60)
363 s->d1->timeout_duration = 60;
364 dtls1_start_timer(s);
367 void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s)
369 /* Reset everything */
370 memset(&s->d1->timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->timeout));
371 memset(&s->d1->next_timeout, 0, sizeof(s->d1->next_timeout));
372 s->d1->timeout_duration = 1;
373 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT, 0,
374 &(s->d1->next_timeout));
375 /* Clear retransmission buffer */
376 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
379 int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s)
383 s->d1->timeout.num_alerts++;
385 /* Reduce MTU after 2 unsuccessful retransmissions */
386 if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > 2
387 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
389 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU, 0,
391 if (mtu < s->d1->mtu)
395 if (s->d1->timeout.num_alerts > DTLS1_TMO_ALERT_COUNT) {
396 /* fail the connection, enough alerts have been sent */
397 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM, SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED);
404 int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s)
406 /* if no timer is expired, don't do anything */
407 if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) {
411 dtls1_double_timeout(s);
413 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
416 s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts++;
417 if (s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts > DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT) {
418 s->d1->timeout.read_timeouts = 1;
420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
421 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
422 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
423 return dtls1_heartbeat(s);
427 dtls1_start_timer(s);
428 return dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
431 static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t)
441 SystemTimeToFileTime(&st, &now.ft);
443 now.ul -= 116444736000000000ULL;
445 now.ul -= 116444736000000000UI64; /* re-bias to 1/1/1970 */
447 t->tv_sec = (long)(now.ul / 10000000);
448 t->tv_usec = ((int)(now.ul % 10000000)) / 10;
449 #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
452 t->tv_sec = (long)tb.time;
453 t->tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000;
455 gettimeofday(t, NULL);
460 #define LISTEN_SUCCESS 2
461 #define LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST 1
464 int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *s, BIO_ADDR *client)
466 int next, n, ret = 0, clearpkt = 0;
467 unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH];
468 unsigned char seq[SEQ_NUM_SIZE];
469 const unsigned char *data;
470 unsigned char *p, *buf;
471 unsigned long reclen, fragoff, fraglen, msglen;
472 unsigned int rectype, versmajor, msgseq, msgtype, clientvers, cookielen;
475 BIO_ADDR *tmpclient = NULL;
476 PACKET pkt, msgpkt, msgpayload, session, cookiepkt;
478 /* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */
484 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
485 wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
488 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
493 * We only peek at incoming ClientHello's until we're sure we are going to
494 * to respond with a HelloVerifyRequest. If its a ClientHello with a valid
495 * cookie then we leave it in the BIO for accept to handle.
497 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL);
500 * Note: This check deliberately excludes DTLS1_BAD_VER because that version
501 * requires the MAC to be calculated *including* the first ClientHello
502 * (without the cookie). Since DTLSv1_listen is stateless that cannot be
503 * supported. DTLS1_BAD_VER must use cookies in a stateful manner (e.g. via
506 if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) {
507 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
511 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
512 if ((bufm = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
513 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
517 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(bufm, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
519 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
524 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
531 * Technically a ClientHello could be SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
532 * + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH bytes long. Normally init_buf does not store
533 * the record header as well, but we do here. We've set up init_buf to
534 * be the standard size for simplicity. In practice we shouldn't ever
535 * receive a ClientHello as long as this. If we do it will get dropped
536 * in the record length check below.
538 n = BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
541 if(BIO_should_retry(rbio)) {
542 /* Non-blocking IO */
548 /* If we hit any problems we need to clear this packet from the BIO */
551 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, buf, n)) {
552 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
557 * Parse the received record. If there are any problems with it we just
558 * dump it - with no alert. RFC6347 says this "Unlike TLS, DTLS is
559 * resilient in the face of invalid records (e.g., invalid formatting,
560 * length, MAC, etc.). In general, invalid records SHOULD be silently
561 * discarded, thus preserving the association; however, an error MAY be
562 * logged for diagnostic purposes."
565 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
566 if (n < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
567 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
572 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf,
573 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
575 /* Get the record header */
576 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &rectype)
577 || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &versmajor)) {
578 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
582 if (rectype != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
583 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
588 * Check record version number. We only check that the major version is
591 if (versmajor != DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR) {
592 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
596 if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 1)
597 /* Save the sequence number: 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
598 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE)
599 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &msgpkt)) {
600 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
604 * We allow data remaining at the end of the packet because there could
605 * be a second record (but we ignore it)
608 /* This is an initial ClientHello so the epoch has to be 0 */
609 if (seq[0] != 0 || seq[1] != 0) {
610 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
614 /* Get a pointer to the raw message for the later callback */
615 data = PACKET_data(&msgpkt);
617 /* Finished processing the record header, now process the message */
618 if (!PACKET_get_1(&msgpkt, &msgtype)
619 || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &msglen)
620 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpkt, &msgseq)
621 || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fragoff)
622 || !PACKET_get_net_3(&msgpkt, &fraglen)
623 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&msgpkt, &msgpayload, fraglen)
624 || PACKET_remaining(&msgpkt) != 0) {
625 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
629 if (msgtype != SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
630 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
634 /* Message sequence number can only be 0 or 1 */
636 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_INVALID_SEQUENCE_NUMBER);
641 * We don't support fragment reassembly for ClientHellos whilst
642 * listening because that would require server side state (which is
643 * against the whole point of the ClientHello/HelloVerifyRequest
644 * mechanism). Instead we only look at the first ClientHello fragment
645 * and require that the cookie must be contained within it.
647 if (fragoff != 0 || fraglen > msglen) {
648 /* Non initial ClientHello fragment (or bad fragment) */
649 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_FRAGMENTED_CLIENT_HELLO);
654 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, data,
655 fraglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
656 s->msg_callback_arg);
658 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&msgpayload, &clientvers)) {
659 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
664 * Verify client version is supported
666 if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(clientvers, (unsigned int)s->method->version) &&
667 s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
668 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
672 if (!PACKET_forward(&msgpayload, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
673 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &session)
674 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&msgpayload, &cookiepkt)) {
676 * Could be malformed or the cookie does not fit within the initial
677 * ClientHello fragment. Either way we can't handle it.
679 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
684 * Check if we have a cookie or not. If not we need to send a
685 * HelloVerifyRequest.
687 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt) == 0) {
688 next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST;
691 * We have a cookie, so lets check it.
693 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb == NULL) {
694 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_COOKIE_CALLBACK);
698 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookiepkt),
699 PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt)) ==
702 * We treat invalid cookies in the same was as no cookie as
705 next = LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST;
707 /* Cookie verification succeeded */
708 next = LISTEN_SUCCESS;
712 if (next == LISTEN_SEND_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
714 * There was no cookie in the ClientHello so we need to send a
715 * HelloVerifyRequest. If this fails we do not worry about trying
716 * to resend, we just drop it.
720 * Dump the read packet, we don't need it any more. Ignore return
723 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL);
724 BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
725 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 1, NULL);
727 /* Generate the cookie */
728 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
729 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, cookie, &cookielen) == 0 ||
731 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
736 p = &buf[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH];
737 msglen = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(p + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
740 *p++ = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
745 /* Message sequence number is always 0 for a HelloVerifyRequest */
749 * We never fragment a HelloVerifyRequest, so fragment offset is 0
750 * and fragment length is message length
755 /* Set reclen equal to length of whole handshake message */
756 reclen = msglen + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
758 /* Add the record header */
761 *(p++) = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
763 * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we
764 * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version
765 * 1.0 header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
767 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
768 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
769 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff;
771 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
772 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
776 * Record sequence number is always the same as in the received
779 memcpy(p, seq, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
786 * Set reclen equal to length of whole record including record
789 reclen += DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
792 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, buf,
793 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
796 if ((tmpclient = BIO_ADDR_new()) == NULL) {
797 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLSV1_LISTEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
802 * This is unneccessary if rbio and wbio are one and the same - but
803 * maybe they're not. We ignore errors here - some BIOs do not
806 if(BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, tmpclient) > 0) {
807 (void)BIO_dgram_set_peer(wbio, tmpclient);
809 BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient);
812 if (BIO_write(wbio, buf, reclen) < (int)reclen) {
813 if(BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
815 * Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just
816 * going to drop this packet.
823 if (BIO_flush(wbio) <= 0) {
824 if(BIO_should_retry(wbio)) {
826 * Non-blocking IO...but we're stateless, so we're just
827 * going to drop this packet.
834 } while (next != LISTEN_SUCCESS);
837 * Set expected sequence numbers to continue the handshake.
839 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 1;
840 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1;
841 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
842 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(&s->rlayer, seq);
845 * We are doing cookie exchange, so make sure we set that option in the
848 SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE);
851 * Tell the state machine that we've done the initial hello verify
854 ossl_statem_set_hello_verify_done(s);
856 /* Some BIOs may not support this. If we fail we clear the client address */
857 if (BIO_dgram_get_peer(rbio, client) <= 0)
858 BIO_ADDR_clear(client);
863 BIO_ADDR_free(tmpclient);
864 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE, 0, NULL);
866 /* Dump this packet. Ignore return value */
867 BIO_read(rbio, buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
872 static int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, int htype, unsigned long len)
874 dtls1_set_message_header(s, htype, len, 0, len);
875 s->init_num = (int)len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
877 /* Buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
879 if (!dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0))
885 static int dtls1_handshake_write(SSL *s)
887 return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
891 int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
894 unsigned short hbtype;
895 unsigned int payload;
896 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
899 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
900 p, length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
902 /* Read type and payload length first */
903 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
904 return 0; /* silently discard */
905 if (length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
906 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
910 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
911 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
914 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
915 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
916 unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
917 2 /* heartbeat length */ +
921 if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
925 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte message type,
926 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
928 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
933 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
934 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
936 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
939 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
940 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
944 r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
946 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
947 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
948 buffer, write_length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
950 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
954 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
958 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
959 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
963 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
966 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
973 int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
975 unsigned char *buf, *p;
977 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
978 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
980 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
981 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
982 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
983 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
987 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
988 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
993 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
994 if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1000 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
1001 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
1002 * some random stuff.
1003 * - Message Type, 1 byte
1004 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
1005 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
1006 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
1009 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1016 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
1017 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
1019 /* Sequence number */
1020 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
1021 /* 16 random bytes */
1022 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
1023 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1027 /* Random padding */
1028 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
1029 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1033 ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
1035 if (s->msg_callback)
1036 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1037 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
1038 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1040 dtls1_start_timer(s);
1041 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
1051 int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
1054 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1057 wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s);
1058 if (wbio != NULL && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(wbio) &&
1059 !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) {
1060 ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(wbio);
1065 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1,
1069 ret = ssl3_shutdown(s);
1070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1071 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL);
1076 int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s)
1078 if (s->d1->link_mtu) {
1080 s->d1->link_mtu - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
1081 s->d1->link_mtu = 0;
1084 /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
1085 if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
1086 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) {
1088 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
1091 * I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
1092 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number
1094 if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s)) {
1095 /* Set to min mtu */
1096 s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s);
1097 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
1106 static unsigned int dtls1_link_min_mtu(void)
1108 return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
1109 sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
1112 unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s)
1114 return dtls1_link_min_mtu() - BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));