2 * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
14 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
17 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
19 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
20 #include <openssl/err.h>
21 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
22 #include <openssl/params.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
25 #include "internal/nelem.h"
26 #include "internal/sizes.h"
27 #include "crypto/rsa.h"
28 #include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
29 #include "prov/implementations.h"
30 #include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
31 #include "prov/der_rsa.h"
33 static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
34 static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
35 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
36 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_signature_init;
37 static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
38 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
39 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
40 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_signverify_init;
41 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
42 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
43 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_signverify_init;
44 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
45 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
46 static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
47 static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
48 static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
49 static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
50 static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
51 static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
52 static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
53 static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
54 static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
55 static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
57 static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
58 { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, "pkcs1" },
59 { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, "sslv23" },
60 { RSA_NO_PADDING, "none" },
61 { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oaep" }, /* Correct spelling first */
62 { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },
63 { RSA_X931_PADDING, "x931" },
64 { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, "pss" },
69 * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
70 * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so
71 * we use that here too.
79 * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
80 * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
81 * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
82 * by their Final function.
84 unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
86 /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */
87 unsigned char aid_buf[128];
95 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
97 /* RSA padding mode */
99 /* message digest for MGF1 */
101 char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
102 /* PSS salt length */
104 /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
112 static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
114 if (prsactx->md != NULL)
115 return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
119 static int rsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md)
122 * Because the RSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate.
123 * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID
126 static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
127 { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 },
128 { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 },
129 { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
130 { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
131 { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
132 { NID_sha512_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_224 },
133 { NID_sha512_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_256 },
134 { NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 },
135 { NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 },
136 { NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 },
137 { NID_md4, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 },
138 { NID_mdc2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 },
139 { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
140 { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 },
141 { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 },
142 { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 },
143 { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 },
146 int mdnid = NID_undef;
151 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) {
152 if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) {
153 mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id;
158 if (mdnid == NID_undef)
159 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
165 static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
167 if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
168 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
172 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
173 if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
174 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
182 static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx)
184 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX));
189 prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
190 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
194 /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
195 #define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
197 static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
199 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
201 if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
204 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
206 if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL)
207 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
209 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
210 /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
211 prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
212 prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
217 static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
220 if (mdname != NULL) {
221 EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
222 int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md);
226 || md_nid == NID_undef
227 || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)) {
232 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
233 EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
236 * TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors?
237 * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no
238 * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had (consider RSA with MD5-SHA1),
239 * but the operation itself is still valid, just as long as it's
240 * not used to construct anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier.
243 if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
244 && DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_RSA_with(&pkt, -1, ctx->rsa, md_nid)
245 && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
246 WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
247 ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
249 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
254 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
260 static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
263 if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
264 EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
266 if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, props)) == NULL)
268 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
273 static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
275 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
277 if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) {
278 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
284 static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
286 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
287 OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
290 static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
292 OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
296 static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
297 size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
299 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
301 size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
302 size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
309 if (sigsize < (size_t)rsasize)
313 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
314 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
319 if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) {
322 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
323 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
324 "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2");
327 ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
331 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
338 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
339 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
340 if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
341 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
344 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) {
345 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
348 memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
349 prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid);
350 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf,
351 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
355 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
359 ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
362 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
369 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
370 /* Check PSS restrictions */
371 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
372 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
373 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
374 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
375 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
380 if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
381 && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
382 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
388 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
390 if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa,
392 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
394 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
397 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf,
398 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
403 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
404 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
408 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa,
416 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
424 static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
428 const unsigned char *sig,
431 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
435 *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
439 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
440 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
441 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
442 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
444 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
447 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
451 if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) {
452 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
455 if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
456 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
457 "Should be %d, but got %d",
458 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret);
463 if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
464 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
467 memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
470 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
474 ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
475 sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa);
477 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
485 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
486 "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed");
490 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa,
493 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
501 static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
502 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
504 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
507 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
508 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
509 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
510 if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen,
512 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
516 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
517 if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, NULL, &rslen, 0, sig, siglen) <= 0)
520 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
525 /* Check PSS restrictions */
526 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
527 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
528 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
529 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
531 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
532 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
533 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
534 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
539 if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
540 && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
541 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
549 * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1()
552 mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
553 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
554 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
555 "Should be %d, but got %d",
560 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
562 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf,
563 prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
565 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
568 ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs,
569 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
573 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
579 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
580 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
584 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
586 rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
589 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
594 if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen))
600 static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
601 const char *props, void *vrsa)
603 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
605 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
606 if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa)
607 || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, props))
610 prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
611 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
614 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL))
620 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
621 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
622 prsactx->mdctx = NULL;
627 int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *data,
630 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
632 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
635 return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
638 int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
641 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
642 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
643 unsigned int dlen = 0;
645 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
646 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
650 * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
651 * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
655 * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
656 * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
657 * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
659 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
663 return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
667 int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
670 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
671 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
672 unsigned int dlen = 0;
674 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
675 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
679 * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
680 * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
681 * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
683 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
686 return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
689 static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
691 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
696 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
697 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
698 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
699 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
702 OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(prsactx));
705 static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
707 PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
708 PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
710 dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
717 dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
720 if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa))
722 dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa;
724 if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
726 dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
728 if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md))
730 dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md;
732 if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
733 dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
734 if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
735 || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
745 static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
747 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
750 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
753 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
755 && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len))
758 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
760 switch (p->data_type) {
761 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER:
762 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode))
765 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
768 const char *word = NULL;
770 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
771 if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) {
772 word = padding_item[i].ptr;
778 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word))
781 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
789 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
790 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname))
793 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
794 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname))
797 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
799 if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) {
800 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen))
802 } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
803 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
804 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
805 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "digest"))
808 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX:
809 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "max"))
812 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
813 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "auto"))
817 if (BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d", prsactx->saltlen)
828 static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
829 OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
830 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
831 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
832 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
833 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
837 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(void)
839 return known_gettable_ctx_params;
842 static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
844 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
847 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
850 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
851 /* Not allowed during certain operations */
852 if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md)
855 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
856 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
857 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
858 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
859 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
861 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
864 && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
867 /* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */
868 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
869 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
870 if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
872 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
876 /* non-PSS code follows */
877 if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
881 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
885 switch (p->data_type) {
886 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
887 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode))
890 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
897 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
898 if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) {
899 pad_mode = padding_item[i].id;
910 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
912 * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible
913 * with signature use.
915 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
916 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
917 "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying");
919 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
920 if (prsactx->mdname[0] == '\0')
921 rsa_setup_md(prsactx, "SHA1", "");
923 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
924 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
926 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
927 if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL) {
928 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
929 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
930 "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS");
934 if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
940 prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
943 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
947 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
948 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED,
949 "PSS saltlen can only be specified if "
950 "PSS padding has been specified first");
954 switch (p->data_type) {
955 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
956 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen))
959 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
960 if (strcmp(p->data, "digest") == 0)
961 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
962 else if (strcmp(p->data, "max") == 0)
963 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
964 else if (strcmp(p->data, "auto") == 0)
965 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
967 saltlen = atoi(p->data);
974 * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
975 * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
976 * lowest saltlen number possible.
978 if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
979 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
983 prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
986 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
988 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
989 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
990 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
991 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
992 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES);
994 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
997 && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp, &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
1000 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
1001 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
1005 /* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */
1006 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1007 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
1008 if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
1009 || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
1011 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
1015 /* non-PSS code follows */
1016 if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, mdprops))
1023 static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
1024 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
1025 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1026 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1027 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1028 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1029 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
1033 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void)
1036 * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
1037 * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
1038 * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
1039 * digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
1041 return known_settable_ctx_params;
1044 static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
1046 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1048 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1051 return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1054 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1056 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1058 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1061 return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1064 static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
1066 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1068 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1071 return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1074 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1076 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1078 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1081 return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1084 const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = {
1085 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
1086 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
1087 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
1088 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
1089 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify },
1090 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_signature_init },
1091 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover },
1092 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
1093 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_init },
1094 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
1095 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1096 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
1097 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final },
1098 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
1099 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_init },
1100 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
1101 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1102 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
1103 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final },
1104 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx },
1105 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx },
1106 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params },
1107 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1108 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params },
1109 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params },
1110 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1111 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params },
1112 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1113 (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params },
1114 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1115 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
1116 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1117 (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params },
1118 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1119 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params },