Experimental new date handling routines. These fix issues with X509_time_adj()
[openssl.git] / crypto / x509 / x509_vfy.c
1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3  * All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
6  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8  * 
9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15  * 
16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17  * the code are not to be removed.
18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22  * 
23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25  * are met:
26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40  * 
41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
52  * 
53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57  */
58
59 #include <stdio.h>
60 #include <time.h>
61 #include <errno.h>
62
63 #include "cryptlib.h"
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
72
73 /* CRL score values */
74
75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
76
77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100
78
79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
80
81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080
82
83 /* CRL times valid */
84
85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040
86
87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
88
89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020
90
91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
92
93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
94
95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
96
97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018
98
99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
100
101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008
102
103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
104
105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004
106
107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
108
109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002
110
111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120
121 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
122                         unsigned int *preasons,
123                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
124 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
125                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
126 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
127                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
128 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
129                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
130 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
131                                 unsigned int *preasons);
132 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
133 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
134                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
135                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
136
137 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
138 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
139
140
141 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
142         {
143         return ok;
144         }
145
146 #if 0
147 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
148         {
149         return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
150         }
151 #endif
152
153 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
154         {
155         X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
156         X509_NAME *xn;
157         int bad_chain = 0;
158         X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
159         int depth,i,ok=0;
160         int num;
161         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
162         STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
163         if (ctx->cert == NULL)
164                 {
165                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
166                 return -1;
167                 }
168
169         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
170
171         /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
172          * present and that the first entry is in place */
173         if (ctx->chain == NULL)
174                 {
175                 if (    ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
176                         (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
177                         {
178                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
179                         goto end;
180                         }
181                 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
182                 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
183                 }
184
185         /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
186         if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
187             && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
188                 {
189                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
190                 goto end;
191                 }
192
193         num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
194         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
195         depth=param->depth;
196
197
198         for (;;)
199                 {
200                 /* If we have enough, we break */
201                 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
202                                          * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
203                                          * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
204                                          * code later.
205                                          */
206
207                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
208                 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
209                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
210
211                 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
212                 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
213                         {
214                         xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
215                         if (xtmp != NULL)
216                                 {
217                                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
218                                         {
219                                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
220                                         goto end;
221                                         }
222                                 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
223                                 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
224                                 ctx->last_untrusted++;
225                                 x=xtmp;
226                                 num++;
227                                 /* reparse the full chain for
228                                  * the next one */
229                                 continue;
230                                 }
231                         }
232                 break;
233                 }
234
235         /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
236          * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
237          * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
238
239         /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
240          * is self signed.
241          */
242
243         i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
244         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
245         xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
246         if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
247                 {
248                 /* we have a self signed certificate */
249                 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
250                         {
251                         /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
252                          * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
253                          * match to avoid possible impersonation.
254                          */
255                         ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
256                         if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 
257                                 {
258                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
259                                 ctx->current_cert=x;
260                                 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
261                                 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
262                                 bad_chain = 1;
263                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
264                                 if (!ok) goto end;
265                                 }
266                         else 
267                                 {
268                                 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
269                                  * so we get any trust settings.
270                                  */
271                                 X509_free(x);
272                                 x = xtmp;
273                                 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
274                                 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
275                                 }
276                         }
277                 else
278                         {
279                         /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
280                         chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
281                         ctx->last_untrusted--;
282                         num--;
283                         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
284                         }
285                 }
286
287         /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
288         for (;;)
289                 {
290                 /* If we have enough, we break */
291                 if (depth < num) break;
292
293                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
294                 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
295                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
296
297                 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
298
299                 if (ok < 0) return ok;
300                 if (ok == 0) break;
301
302                 x = xtmp;
303                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
304                         {
305                         X509_free(xtmp);
306                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
307                         return 0;
308                         }
309                 num++;
310                 }
311
312         /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
313         xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
314
315         /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
316         if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
317                 {
318                 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
319                         {
320                         if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
321                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
322                         else
323                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
324                         ctx->current_cert=x;
325                         }
326                 else
327                         {
328
329                         sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
330                         num++;
331                         ctx->last_untrusted=num;
332                         ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
333                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
334                         chain_ss=NULL;
335                         }
336
337                 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
338                 bad_chain = 1;
339                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
340                 if (!ok) goto end;
341                 }
342
343         /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
344         ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
345
346         if (!ok) goto end;
347
348         /* Check name constraints */
349
350         ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
351         
352         if (!ok) goto end;
353
354         /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
355
356         if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
357
358         if (!ok) goto end;
359
360         /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
361         X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
362
363         /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
364          * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
365          */
366
367         ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
368         if(!ok) goto end;
369
370         /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
371         if (ctx->verify != NULL)
372                 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
373         else
374                 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
375         if(!ok) goto end;
376
377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
378         /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
379         ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
380         if (!ok) goto end;
381         ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
382         if (!ok) goto end;
383 #endif
384
385         /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
386         if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
387                 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
388         if(!ok) goto end;
389         if (0)
390                 {
391 end:
392                 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
393                 }
394         if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
395         if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
396         return ok;
397         }
398
399
400 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
401  */
402
403 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
404 {
405         int i;
406         X509 *issuer;
407         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
408                 {
409                 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
410                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
411                         return issuer;
412                 }
413         return NULL;
414 }
415
416 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
417
418 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
419 {
420         int ret;
421         ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
422         if (ret == X509_V_OK)
423                 return 1;
424         /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
425         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
426                 return 0;
427
428         ctx->error = ret;
429         ctx->current_cert = x;
430         ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
431         return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
432         return 0;
433 }
434
435 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
436
437 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
438 {
439         *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
440         if (*issuer)
441                 {
442                 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
443                 return 1;
444                 }
445         else
446                 return 0;
447 }
448         
449
450 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
451  * with the supplied purpose
452  */
453
454 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
455 {
456 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
457         return 1;
458 #else
459         int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
460         X509 *x;
461         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
462         int proxy_path_length = 0;
463         int purpose;
464         int allow_proxy_certs;
465         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
466
467         /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
468            -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
469                use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
470            0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
471                used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
472            1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
473                all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
474         */
475         must_be_ca = -1;
476
477         /* CRL path validation */
478         if (ctx->parent)
479                 {
480                 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
481                 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
482                 }
483         else
484                 {
485                 allow_proxy_certs =
486                         !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
487                 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
488                    software happy */
489                 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
490                         allow_proxy_certs = 1;
491                 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
492                 }
493
494         /* Check all untrusted certificates */
495         for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
496                 {
497                 int ret;
498                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
499                 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
500                         && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
501                         {
502                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
503                         ctx->error_depth = i;
504                         ctx->current_cert = x;
505                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
506                         if (!ok) goto end;
507                         }
508                 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
509                         {
510                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
511                         ctx->error_depth = i;
512                         ctx->current_cert = x;
513                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
514                         if (!ok) goto end;
515                         }
516                 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
517                 switch(must_be_ca)
518                         {
519                 case -1:
520                         if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
521                                 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
522                                 {
523                                 ret = 0;
524                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
525                                 }
526                         else
527                                 ret = 1;
528                         break;
529                 case 0:
530                         if (ret != 0)
531                                 {
532                                 ret = 0;
533                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
534                                 }
535                         else
536                                 ret = 1;
537                         break;
538                 default:
539                         if ((ret == 0)
540                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
541                                         && (ret != 1)))
542                                 {
543                                 ret = 0;
544                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
545                                 }
546                         else
547                                 ret = 1;
548                         break;
549                         }
550                 if (ret == 0)
551                         {
552                         ctx->error_depth = i;
553                         ctx->current_cert = x;
554                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
555                         if (!ok) goto end;
556                         }
557                 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
558                         {
559                         ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
560                         if ((ret == 0)
561                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
562                                         && (ret != 1)))
563                                 {
564                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
565                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
566                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
567                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
568                                 if (!ok) goto end;
569                                 }
570                         }
571                 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
572                 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
573                            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
574                            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
575                         {
576                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
577                         ctx->error_depth = i;
578                         ctx->current_cert = x;
579                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
580                         if (!ok) goto end;
581                         }
582                 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
583                 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
584                         plen++;
585                 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
586                    certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
587                    certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a
588                    CA certificate.  */
589                 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
590                         {
591                         if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
592                                 {
593                                 ctx->error =
594                                         X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
595                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
596                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
597                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
598                                 if (!ok) goto end;
599                                 }
600                         proxy_path_length++;
601                         must_be_ca = 0;
602                         }
603                 else
604                         must_be_ca = 1;
605                 }
606         ok = 1;
607  end:
608         return ok;
609 #endif
610 }
611
612 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
613         {
614         X509 *x;
615         int i, j, rv;
616         /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
617         for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
618                 {
619                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
620                 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
621                 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
622                         continue;
623                 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
624                  * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
625                  * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
626                  * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
627                  */
628                 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
629                         {
630                         NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
631                         if (nc)
632                                 {
633                                 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
634                                 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
635                                         {
636                                         ctx->error = rv;
637                                         ctx->error_depth = i;
638                                         ctx->current_cert = x;
639                                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
640                                                 return 0;
641                                         }
642                                 }
643                         }
644                 }
645         return 1;
646         }
647
648 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
649 {
650 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
651         return 1;
652 #else
653         int i, ok;
654         X509 *x;
655         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
656         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
657 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
658         i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
659         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
660         ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
661         if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
662                 return 1;
663         ctx->error_depth = i;
664         ctx->current_cert = x;
665         if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
666                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
667         else
668                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
669         ok = cb(0, ctx);
670         return ok;
671 #endif
672 }
673
674 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
675         {
676         int i, last, ok;
677         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
678                 return 1;
679         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
680                 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
681         else
682                 last = 0;
683         for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
684                 {
685                 ctx->error_depth = i;
686                 ok = check_cert(ctx);
687                 if (!ok) return ok;
688                 }
689         return 1;
690         }
691
692 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
693         {
694         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
695         X509 *x;
696         int ok, cnum;
697         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
698         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
699         ctx->current_cert = x;
700         ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
701         ctx->current_reasons = 0;
702         while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
703                 {
704                 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
705                 if (ctx->get_crl)
706                         ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
707                 else
708                         ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
709                 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
710                  * notify callback
711                  */
712                 if(!ok)
713                         {
714                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
715                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
716                         goto err;
717                         }
718                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
719                 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
720                 if (!ok)
721                         goto err;
722
723                 if (dcrl)
724                         {
725                         ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
726                         if (!ok)
727                                 goto err;
728                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
729                         if (!ok)
730                                 goto err;
731                         }
732                 else
733                         ok = 1;
734
735                 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
736                 if (ok != 2)
737                         {
738                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
739                         if (!ok)
740                                 goto err;
741                         }
742
743                 X509_CRL_free(crl);
744                 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
745                 crl = NULL;
746                 dcrl = NULL;
747                 }
748         err:
749         X509_CRL_free(crl);
750         X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
751
752         ctx->current_crl = NULL;
753         return ok;
754
755         }
756
757 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
758
759 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
760         {
761         time_t *ptime;
762         int i;
763         if (notify)
764                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
765         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
766                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
767         else
768                 ptime = NULL;
769
770         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
771         if (i == 0)
772                 {
773                 if (!notify)
774                         return 0;
775                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
776                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
777                         return 0;
778                 }
779
780         if (i > 0)
781                 {
782                 if (!notify)
783                         return 0;
784                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
785                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
786                         return 0;
787                 }
788
789         if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
790                 {
791                 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
792
793                 if (i == 0)
794                         {
795                         if (!notify)
796                                 return 0;
797                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
798                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
799                                 return 0;
800                         }
801                 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
802                 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
803                         {
804                         if (!notify)
805                                 return 0;
806                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
807                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
808                                 return 0;
809                         }
810                 }
811
812         if (notify)
813                 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
814
815         return 1;
816         }
817
818 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
819                         X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
820                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
821         {
822         int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
823         unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
824         X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
825         X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
826         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
827
828         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
829                 {
830                 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
831                 reasons = *preasons;
832                 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
833
834                 if (crl_score > best_score)
835                         {
836                         best_crl = crl;
837                         best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
838                         best_score = crl_score;
839                         best_reasons = reasons;
840                         }
841                 }
842
843         if (best_crl)
844                 {
845                 if (*pcrl)
846                         X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
847                 *pcrl = best_crl;
848                 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
849                 *pscore = best_score;
850                 *preasons = best_reasons;
851                 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
852                 if (*pdcrl)
853                         {
854                         X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
855                         *pdcrl = NULL;
856                         }
857                 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
858                 }
859
860         if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
861                 return 1;
862
863         return 0;
864         }
865
866 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
867  * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
868  */
869
870 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
871         {
872         ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
873         int i;
874         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0);
875         if (i >= 0)
876                 {
877                 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
878                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
879                         return 0;
880                 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
881                 }
882         else
883                 exta = NULL;
884
885         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0);
886
887         if (i >= 0)
888                 {
889
890                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
891                         return 0;
892                 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
893                 }
894         else
895                 extb = NULL;
896
897         if (!exta && !extb)
898                 return 1;
899
900         if (!exta || !extb)
901                 return 0;
902
903
904         if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
905                 return 0;
906
907         return 1;
908         }
909
910 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
911
912 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
913         {
914         /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
915         if (!delta->base_crl_number)
916                         return 0;
917         /* Base must have a CRL number */
918         if (!base->crl_number)
919                         return 0;
920         /* Issuer names must match */
921         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
922                                 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
923                 return 0;
924         /* AKID and IDP must match */
925         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
926                         return 0;
927         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
928                         return 0;
929         /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
930         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
931                         return 0;
932         /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
933         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
934                         return 1;
935         return 0;
936         }
937
938 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
939  * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
940  */
941
942 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
943                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
944         {
945         X509_CRL *delta;
946         int i;
947         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
948                 return;
949         if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
950                 return;
951         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
952                 {
953                 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
954                 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
955                         {
956                         if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
957                                 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
958                         CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
959                         *dcrl = delta;
960                         return;
961                         }
962                 }
963         *dcrl = NULL;
964         }
965
966 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
967  * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
968  * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
969  * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
970  * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
971  */
972
973 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
974                         unsigned int *preasons,
975                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
976         {
977
978         int crl_score = 0;
979         unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
980
981         /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
982
983         /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
984         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
985                 return 0;
986         /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
987         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
988                 {
989                 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
990                         return 0;
991                 }
992         else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
993                 {
994                 /* If no new reasons reject */
995                 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
996                         return 0;
997                 }
998         /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
999         else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1000                 return 0;
1001         /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1002         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1003                 {
1004                 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1005                         return 0;
1006                 }
1007         else
1008                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1009
1010         if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1011                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1012
1013         /* Check expiry */
1014         if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1015                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1016
1017         /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1018         crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1019
1020         /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1021
1022         if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1023                 return 0;
1024
1025         /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1026
1027         if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1028                 {
1029                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1030                 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1031                         return 0;
1032                 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1033                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1034                 }
1035
1036         *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1037
1038         return crl_score;
1039
1040         }
1041
1042 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1043                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1044         {
1045         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1046         X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1047         int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1048         int i;
1049
1050         if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1051                 cidx++;
1052
1053         crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1054
1055         if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1056                 {
1057                 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1058                         {
1059                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1060                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1061                         return;
1062                         }
1063                 }
1064
1065         for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1066                 {
1067                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1068                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1069                         continue;
1070                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1071                         {
1072                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1073                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1074                         return;
1075                         }
1076                 }
1077
1078         /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1079
1080         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1081                 return;
1082
1083         /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1084          * set of untrusted certificates.
1085          */
1086         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1087                 {
1088                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1089                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1090                         continue;
1091                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1092                         {
1093                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1094                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1095                         return;
1096                         }
1097                 }
1098         }
1099
1100 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1101  * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1102  * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1103  * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in 
1104  * practice.
1105  */
1106
1107 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1108         {
1109         X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1110         int ret;
1111         /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1112         if (ctx->parent)
1113                 return 0;
1114         if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1115                 return -1;
1116
1117         crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1118         /* Copy verify params across */
1119         X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1120
1121         crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1122         crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1123
1124         /* Verify CRL issuer */
1125         ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1126
1127         if (!ret)
1128                 goto err;
1129
1130         /* Check chain is acceptable */
1131
1132         ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1133         err:
1134         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1135         return ret;
1136         }
1137
1138 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1139  * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1140  * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1141  * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1142  * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1143  * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1144  */
1145
1146 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1147                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1148                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1149         {
1150         X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1151         cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1152         crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1153         if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1154                 return 1;
1155         return 0;
1156         }
1157
1158 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1159  * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1160  * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1161  * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1162  * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1163  */
1164
1165
1166 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1167         {
1168         X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1169         GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1170         GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1171         int i, j;
1172         if (!a || !b)
1173                 return 1;
1174         if (a->type == 1)
1175                 {
1176                 if (!a->dpname)
1177                         return 0;
1178                 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1179                 if (b->type == 1)
1180                         {
1181                         if (!b->dpname)
1182                                 return 0;
1183                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1184                                 return 1;
1185                         else
1186                                 return 0;
1187                         }
1188                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1189                 nm = a->dpname;
1190                 gens = b->name.fullname;
1191                 }
1192         else if (b->type == 1)
1193                 {
1194                 if (!b->dpname)
1195                         return 0;
1196                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1197                 gens = a->name.fullname;
1198                 nm = b->dpname;
1199                 }
1200
1201         /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1202         if (nm)
1203                 {
1204                 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1205                         {
1206                         gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);  
1207                         if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1208                                 continue;
1209                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1210                                 return 1;
1211                         }
1212                 return 0;
1213                 }
1214
1215         /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1216
1217         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1218                 {
1219                 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1220                 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1221                         {
1222                         genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1223                         if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1224                                 return 1;
1225                         }
1226                 }
1227
1228         return 0;
1229
1230         }
1231
1232 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1233         {
1234         int i;
1235         X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1236         /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1237         if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1238                 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1239         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1240                 {
1241                 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1242                 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1243                         continue;
1244                 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1245                         return 1;
1246                 }
1247         return 0;
1248         }
1249
1250 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1251
1252 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1253                                 unsigned int *preasons)
1254         {
1255         int i;
1256         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1257                 return 0;
1258         if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1259                 {
1260                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1261                         return 0;
1262                 }
1263         else
1264                 {
1265                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1266                         return 0;
1267                 }
1268         *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1269         for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1270                 {
1271                 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1272                 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1273                         {
1274                         if (!crl->idp ||
1275                              idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1276                                 {
1277                                 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1278                                 return 1;
1279                                 }
1280                         }
1281                 }
1282         if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1283                 return 1;
1284         return 0;
1285         }
1286
1287 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1288  * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1289  */
1290         
1291 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1292                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1293         {
1294         int ok;
1295         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1296         int crl_score = 0;
1297         unsigned int reasons;
1298         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1299         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1300         X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1301         reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1302         ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, 
1303                                 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1304
1305         if (ok)
1306                 goto done;
1307
1308         /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1309
1310         skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1311
1312         /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1313         if (!skcrl && crl)
1314                 goto done;
1315
1316         get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1317
1318         sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1319
1320         done:
1321
1322         /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1323         if (crl)
1324                 {
1325                 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1326                 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1327                 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1328                 *pcrl = crl;
1329                 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1330                 return 1;
1331                 }
1332
1333         return 0;
1334         }
1335
1336 /* Check CRL validity */
1337 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1338         {
1339         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1340         EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1341         int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1342         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1343         chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1344         /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1345         if (ctx->current_issuer)
1346                 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1347
1348         /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1349          * is next certificate in chain.
1350          */
1351         else if (cnum < chnum)
1352                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1353         else
1354                 {
1355                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1356                 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1357                 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1358                         {
1359                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1360                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1361                         if(!ok) goto err;
1362                         }
1363                 }
1364
1365         if(issuer)
1366                 {
1367                 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1368                  * been done
1369                  */
1370                 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1371                         {
1372                         /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1373                         if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1374                                 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1375                                 {
1376                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1377                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1378                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1379                                 }
1380
1381                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1382                                 {
1383                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1384                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1385                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1386                                 }
1387
1388                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1389                                 {
1390                                 if (!check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer))
1391                                         {
1392                                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1393                                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1394                                         if(!ok) goto err;
1395                                         }
1396                                 }
1397
1398                         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1399                                 {
1400                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1401                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1402                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1403                                 }
1404
1405
1406                         }
1407
1408                 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1409                         {
1410                         ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1411                         if (!ok)
1412                                 goto err;
1413                         }
1414
1415                 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1416                 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1417
1418                 if(!ikey)
1419                         {
1420                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1421                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1422                         if (!ok) goto err;
1423                         }
1424                 else
1425                         {
1426                         /* Verify CRL signature */
1427                         if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1428                                 {
1429                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1430                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1431                                 if (!ok) goto err;
1432                                 }
1433                         }
1434                 }
1435
1436         ok = 1;
1437
1438         err:
1439         EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1440         return ok;
1441         }
1442
1443 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1444 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1445         {
1446         int ok;
1447         X509_REVOKED *rev;
1448         /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1449          * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1450          * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since 
1451          * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1452          */
1453         if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1454                 {
1455                 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1456                         return 1;
1457                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1458                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1459                 if(!ok)
1460                         return 0;
1461                 }
1462         /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1463          * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1464          */
1465         if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1466                 {
1467                 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1468                         return 2;
1469                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1470                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1471                 if (!ok)
1472                         return 0;
1473                 }
1474
1475         return 1;
1476         }
1477
1478 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1479         {
1480         int ret;
1481         if (ctx->parent)
1482                 return 1;
1483         ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1484                                 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1485         if (ret == 0)
1486                 {
1487                 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1488                 return 0;
1489                 }
1490         /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1491         if (ret == -1)
1492                 {
1493                 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1494                  * callback.
1495                  */
1496                 X509 *x;
1497                 int i;
1498                 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1499                         {
1500                         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1501                         if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1502                                 continue;
1503                         ctx->current_cert = x;
1504                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1505                         if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1506                                 return 0;
1507                         }
1508                 return 1;
1509                 }
1510         if (ret == -2)
1511                 {
1512                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1513                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1514                 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1515                 }
1516
1517         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1518                 {
1519                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1520                 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1521                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1522                         return 0;
1523                 }
1524
1525         return 1;
1526         }
1527
1528 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1529         {
1530         time_t *ptime;
1531         int i;
1532
1533         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1534                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1535         else
1536                 ptime = NULL;
1537
1538         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1539         if (i == 0)
1540                 {
1541                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1542                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1543                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1544                         return 0;
1545                 }
1546
1547         if (i > 0)
1548                 {
1549                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1550                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1551                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1552                         return 0;
1553                 }
1554
1555         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1556         if (i == 0)
1557                 {
1558                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1559                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1560                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1561                         return 0;
1562                 }
1563
1564         if (i < 0)
1565                 {
1566                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1567                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1568                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1569                         return 0;
1570                 }
1571
1572         return 1;
1573         }
1574
1575 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1576         {
1577         int ok=0,n;
1578         X509 *xs,*xi;
1579         EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1580         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1581
1582         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
1583
1584         n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1585         ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1586         n--;
1587         xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1588
1589         if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1590                 xs=xi;
1591         else
1592                 {
1593                 if (n <= 0)
1594                         {
1595                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1596                         ctx->current_cert=xi;
1597                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
1598                         goto end;
1599                         }
1600                 else
1601                         {
1602                         n--;
1603                         ctx->error_depth=n;
1604                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1605                         }
1606                 }
1607
1608 /*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
1609         while (n >= 0)
1610                 {
1611                 ctx->error_depth=n;
1612                 if (!xs->valid)
1613                         {
1614                         if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1615                                 {
1616                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1617                                 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1618                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1619                                 if (!ok) goto end;
1620                                 }
1621                         else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1622                                 /* XXX  For the final trusted self-signed cert,
1623                                  * this is a waste of time.  That check should
1624                                  * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
1625                                  * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
1626                                  * we don't verify again and again in SSL
1627                                  * handshakes and the like once the cert has
1628                                  * been declared trusted. */
1629                                 {
1630                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1631                                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1632                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1633                                 if (!ok)
1634                                         {
1635                                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1636                                         goto end;
1637                                         }
1638                                 }
1639                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1640                         pkey=NULL;
1641                         }
1642
1643                 xs->valid = 1;
1644
1645                 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1646                 if (!ok)
1647                         goto end;
1648
1649                 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1650                 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1651                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1652                 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
1653                 if (!ok) goto end;
1654
1655                 n--;
1656                 if (n >= 0)
1657                         {
1658                         xi=xs;
1659                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1660                         }
1661                 }
1662         ok=1;
1663 end:
1664         return ok;
1665         }
1666
1667 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1668 {
1669         return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1670 }
1671
1672 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1673         {
1674         char *str;
1675         ASN1_TIME atm;
1676         long offset;
1677         char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1678         int i,j;
1679
1680         p=buff1;
1681         i=ctm->length;
1682         str=(char *)ctm->data;
1683         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1684                 {
1685                 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1686                 memcpy(p,str,10);
1687                 p+=10;
1688                 str+=10;
1689                 }
1690         else
1691                 {
1692                 if (i < 13) return 0;
1693                 memcpy(p,str,12);
1694                 p+=12;
1695                 str+=12;
1696                 }
1697
1698         if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1699                 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1700         else
1701                 { 
1702                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1703                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1704                 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1705                 if (*str == '.')
1706                         {
1707                         str++;
1708                         while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1709                         }
1710                 
1711                 }
1712         *(p++)='Z';
1713         *(p++)='\0';
1714
1715         if (*str == 'Z')
1716                 offset=0;
1717         else
1718                 {
1719                 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1720                         return 0;
1721                 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1722                 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1723                 if (*str == '-')
1724                         offset= -offset;
1725                 }
1726         atm.type=ctm->type;
1727         atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1728         atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1729
1730         if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1731                 return 0;
1732
1733         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1734                 {
1735                 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1736                 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1737                 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1738                 if (j < 50) j+=100;
1739
1740                 if (i < j) return -1;
1741                 if (i > j) return 1;
1742                 }
1743         i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1744         if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1745                 return -1;
1746         else
1747                 return i;
1748         }
1749
1750 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1751 {
1752         return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1753 }
1754
1755 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1756         {
1757         return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1758         }
1759
1760 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1761                                 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1762         {
1763         time_t t;
1764         int type = -1;
1765
1766         if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1767         else time(&t);
1768
1769         if (s) type = s->type;
1770         if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1771                 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1772         if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1773                 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1774         return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1775         }
1776
1777 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1778         {
1779         EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1780         int i,j;
1781
1782         if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1783
1784         for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1785                 {
1786                 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1787                 if (ktmp == NULL)
1788                         {
1789                         X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1790                         return 0;
1791                         }
1792                 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1793                         break;
1794                 else
1795                         {
1796                         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1797                         ktmp=NULL;
1798                         }
1799                 }
1800         if (ktmp == NULL)
1801                 {
1802                 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1803                 return 0;
1804                 }
1805
1806         /* first, populate the other certs */
1807         for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1808                 {
1809                 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1810                 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1811                 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1812                 }
1813         
1814         if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1815         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1816         return 1;
1817         }
1818
1819 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1820              CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1821         {
1822         /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1823          * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1824         return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1825                         new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1826         }
1827
1828 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1829         {
1830         return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1831         }
1832
1833 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1834         {
1835         return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1836         }
1837
1838 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1839         {
1840         return ctx->error;
1841         }
1842
1843 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1844         {
1845         ctx->error=err;
1846         }
1847
1848 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1849         {
1850         return ctx->error_depth;
1851         }
1852
1853 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1854         {
1855         return ctx->current_cert;
1856         }
1857
1858 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1859         {
1860         return ctx->chain;
1861         }
1862
1863 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1864         {
1865         int i;
1866         X509 *x;
1867         STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1868         if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1869         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1870                 {
1871                 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1872                 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1873                 }
1874         return chain;
1875         }
1876
1877 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1878         {
1879         ctx->cert=x;
1880         }
1881
1882 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1883         {
1884         ctx->untrusted=sk;
1885         }
1886
1887 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1888         {
1889         ctx->crls=sk;
1890         }
1891
1892 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1893         {
1894         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1895         }
1896
1897 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1898         {
1899         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1900         }
1901
1902 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1903  * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1904  * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1905  * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1906  * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1907  * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1908  * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1909  * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1910  */
1911
1912 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1913                                 int purpose, int trust)
1914 {
1915         int idx;
1916         /* If purpose not set use default */
1917         if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1918         /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1919         if (purpose)
1920                 {
1921                 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
1922                 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1923                 if (idx == -1)
1924                         {
1925                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1926                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1927                         return 0;
1928                         }
1929                 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1930                 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1931                         {
1932                         idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1933                         if (idx == -1)
1934                                 {
1935                                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1936                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1937                                 return 0;
1938                                 }
1939                         ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1940                         }
1941                 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1942                 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1943                 }
1944         if (trust)
1945                 {
1946                 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1947                 if (idx == -1)
1948                         {
1949                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1950                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1951                         return 0;
1952                         }
1953                 }
1954
1955         if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1956         if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1957         return 1;
1958 }
1959
1960 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1961 {
1962         X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1963         ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1964         if (!ctx)
1965                 {
1966                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1967                 return NULL;
1968                 }
1969         memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1970         return ctx;
1971 }
1972
1973 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1974 {
1975         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1976         OPENSSL_free(ctx);
1977 }
1978
1979 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
1980              STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1981         {
1982         int ret = 1;
1983         ctx->ctx=store;
1984         ctx->current_method=0;
1985         ctx->cert=x509;
1986         ctx->untrusted=chain;
1987         ctx->crls = NULL;
1988         ctx->last_untrusted=0;
1989         ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
1990         ctx->valid=0;
1991         ctx->chain=NULL;
1992         ctx->error=0;
1993         ctx->explicit_policy=0;
1994         ctx->error_depth=0;
1995         ctx->current_cert=NULL;
1996         ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
1997         ctx->tree = NULL;
1998         ctx->parent = NULL;
1999
2000         ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2001
2002         if (!ctx->param)
2003                 {
2004                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2005                 return 0;
2006                 }
2007
2008         /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2009          * use defaults.
2010          */
2011
2012
2013         if (store)
2014                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2015         else
2016                 ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2017
2018         if (store)
2019                 {
2020                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2021                 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2022                 }
2023         else
2024                 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2025
2026         if (ret)
2027                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2028                                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2029
2030         if (ret == 0)
2031                 {
2032                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2033                 return 0;
2034                 }
2035
2036         if (store && store->check_issued)
2037                 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2038         else
2039                 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2040
2041         if (store && store->get_issuer)
2042                 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2043         else
2044                 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2045
2046         if (store && store->verify_cb)
2047                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2048         else
2049                 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2050
2051         if (store && store->verify)
2052                 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2053         else
2054                 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2055
2056         if (store && store->check_revocation)
2057                 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2058         else
2059                 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2060
2061         if (store && store->get_crl)
2062                 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2063         else
2064                 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2065
2066         if (store && store->check_crl)
2067                 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2068         else
2069                 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2070
2071         if (store && store->cert_crl)
2072                 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2073         else
2074                 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2075
2076         if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2077                 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2078         else
2079                 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2080
2081         if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2082                 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2083         else
2084                 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2085
2086         ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2087
2088
2089         /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2090          * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2091          * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2092         /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2093         if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2094                                 &(ctx->ex_data)))
2095                 {
2096                 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2097                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2098                 return 0;
2099                 }
2100         return 1;
2101         }
2102
2103 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2104  * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2105  */
2106
2107 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2108 {
2109         ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2110         ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2111 }
2112
2113 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2114         {
2115         if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2116         if (ctx->param != NULL)
2117                 {
2118                 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2119                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2120                 ctx->param=NULL;
2121                 }
2122         if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2123                 {
2124                 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2125                 ctx->tree=NULL;
2126                 }
2127         if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2128                 {
2129                 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2130                 ctx->chain=NULL;
2131                 }
2132         CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2133         memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2134         }
2135
2136 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2137         {
2138         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2139         }
2140
2141 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2142         {
2143         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2144         }
2145
2146 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2147         {
2148         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2149         }
2150
2151 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2152                                   int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2153         {
2154         ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2155         }
2156
2157 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2158         {
2159         return ctx->tree;
2160         }
2161
2162 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2163         {
2164         return ctx->explicit_policy;
2165         }
2166
2167 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2168         {
2169         const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2170         param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2171         if (!param)
2172                 return 0;
2173         return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2174         }
2175
2176 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2177         {
2178         return ctx->param;
2179         }
2180
2181 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2182         {
2183         if (ctx->param)
2184                 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2185         ctx->param = param;
2186         }
2187
2188 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2189 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2190
2191 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2192
2193 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2194 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)