crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

   1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
   2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
   3  * All rights reserved.
   4  *
   5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
   6  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
   7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
   8  *
   9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
  13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
  15  *
  16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  17  * the code are not to be removed.
  18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
  22  *
  23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  25  * are met:
  26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
  27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
  30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
  32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
  33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
  34  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
  37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
  40  *
  41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
  44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
  45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
  46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
  47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
  48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
  49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  52  *
  53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
  56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  57  */
  58
  59 #include <stdio.h>
  60 #include <time.h>
  61 #include <errno.h>
  62
  63 #include "cryptlib.h"
  64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
  65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
  66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
  67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
  68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
  69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
  70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
  71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
  72
  73 /* CRL score values */
  74
  75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
  76
  77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100
  78
  79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
  80
  81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080
  82
  83 /* CRL times valid */
  84
  85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040
  86
  87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
  88
  89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020
  90
  91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
  92
  93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
  94
  95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
  96
  97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018
  98
  99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
 100
 101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008
 102
 103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
 104
 105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004
 106
 107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
 108
 109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002
 110
 111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
 112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
 113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
 114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 116 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 117 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 118 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 119 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 120
 121 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
 122                         unsigned int *preasons,
 123                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
 124 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
 125                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
 126 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
 127                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
 128 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
 129                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
 130 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
 131                                 unsigned int *preasons);
 132 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
 133 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
 134                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
 135                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
 136
 137 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 138 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 139
 140
 141 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
 142         {
 143         return ok;
 144         }
 145
 146 #if 0
 147 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
 148         {
 149         return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
 150         }
 151 #endif
 152
 153 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 154         {
 155         X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
 156         X509_NAME *xn;
 157         int bad_chain = 0;
 158         X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
 159         int depth,i,ok=0;
 160         int num;
 161         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
 162         STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
 163         if (ctx->cert == NULL)
 164                 {
 165                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
 166                 return -1;
 167                 }
 168
 169         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
 170
 171         /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
 172          * present and that the first entry is in place */
 173         if (ctx->chain == NULL)
 174                 {
 175                 if (    ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
 176                         (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
 177                         {
 178                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 179                         goto end;
 180                         }
 181                 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
 182                 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
 183                 }
 184
 185         /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
 186         if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
 187             && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
 188                 {
 189                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 190                 goto end;
 191                 }
 192
 193         num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
 194         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
 195         depth=param->depth;
 196
 197
 198         for (;;)
 199                 {
 200                 /* If we have enough, we break */
 201                 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
 202                                          * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
 203                                          * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
 204                                          * code later.
 205                                          */
 206
 207                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
 208                 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
 209                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
 210
 211                 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
 212                 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
 213                         {
 214                         xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
 215                         if (xtmp != NULL)
 216                                 {
 217                                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
 218                                         {
 219                                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 220                                         goto end;
 221                                         }
 222                                 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
 223                                 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
 224                                 ctx->last_untrusted++;
 225                                 x=xtmp;
 226                                 num++;
 227                                 /* reparse the full chain for
 228                                  * the next one */
 229                                 continue;
 230                                 }
 231                         }
 232                 break;
 233                 }
 234
 235         /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
 236          * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
 237          * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
 238
 239         /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
 240          * is self signed.
 241          */
 242
 243         i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
 244         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
 245         xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
 246         if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
 247                 {
 248                 /* we have a self signed certificate */
 249                 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
 250                         {
 251                         /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
 252                          * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
 253                          * match to avoid possible impersonation.
 254                          */
 255                         ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
 256                         if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
 257                                 {
 258                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
 259                                 ctx->current_cert=x;
 260                                 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
 261                                 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
 262                                 bad_chain = 1;
 263                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 264                                 if (!ok) goto end;
 265                                 }
 266                         else
 267                                 {
 268                                 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
 269                                  * so we get any trust settings.
 270                                  */
 271                                 X509_free(x);
 272                                 x = xtmp;
 273                                 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
 274                                 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
 275                                 }
 276                         }
 277                 else
 278                         {
 279                         /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
 280                         chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
 281                         ctx->last_untrusted--;
 282                         num--;
 283                         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
 284                         }
 285                 }
 286
 287         /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
 288         for (;;)
 289                 {
 290                 /* If we have enough, we break */
 291                 if (depth < num) break;
 292
 293                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
 294                 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
 295                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
 296
 297                 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
 298
 299                 if (ok < 0) return ok;
 300                 if (ok == 0) break;
 301
 302                 x = xtmp;
 303                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
 304                         {
 305                         X509_free(xtmp);
 306                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 307                         return 0;
 308                         }
 309                 num++;
 310                 }
 311
 312         /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
 313         xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
 314
 315         /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
 316         if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
 317                 {
 318                 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
 319                         {
 320                         if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
 321                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
 322                         else
 323                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
 324                         ctx->current_cert=x;
 325                         }
 326                 else
 327                         {
 328
 329                         sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
 330                         num++;
 331                         ctx->last_untrusted=num;
 332                         ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
 333                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
 334                         chain_ss=NULL;
 335                         }
 336
 337                 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
 338                 bad_chain = 1;
 339                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 340                 if (!ok) goto end;
 341                 }
 342
 343         /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
 344         ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
 345
 346         if (!ok) goto end;
 347
 348         /* Check name constraints */
 349
 350         ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
 351
 352         if (!ok) goto end;
 353
 354         /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
 355
 356         if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
 357
 358         if (!ok) goto end;
 359
 360         /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
 361         X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
 362
 363         /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
 364          * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
 365          */
 366
 367         ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
 368         if(!ok) goto end;
 369
 370         /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
 371         if (ctx->verify != NULL)
 372                 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
 373         else
 374                 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
 375         if(!ok) goto end;
 376
 377 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
 378         /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
 379         ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
 380         if (!ok) goto end;
 381         ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
 382         if (!ok) goto end;
 383 #endif
 384
 385         /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
 386         if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
 387                 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
 388         if(!ok) goto end;
 389         if (0)
 390                 {
 391 end:
 392                 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
 393                 }
 394         if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
 395         if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
 396         return ok;
 397         }
 398
 399
 400 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
 401  */
 402
 403 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
 404 {
 405         int i;
 406         X509 *issuer;
 407         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
 408                 {
 409                 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
 410                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
 411                         return issuer;
 412                 }
 413         return NULL;
 414 }
 415
 416 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
 417
 418 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
 419 {
 420         int ret;
 421         ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
 422         if (ret == X509_V_OK)
 423                 return 1;
 424         /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
 425         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
 426                 return 0;
 427
 428         ctx->error = ret;
 429         ctx->current_cert = x;
 430         ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
 431         return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
 432         return 0;
 433 }
 434
 435 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
 436
 437 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
 438 {
 439         *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
 440         if (*issuer)
 441                 {
 442                 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
 443                 return 1;
 444                 }
 445         else
 446                 return 0;
 447 }
 448
 449
 450 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
 451  * with the supplied purpose
 452  */
 453
 454 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 455 {
 456 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
 457         return 1;
 458 #else
 459         int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
 460         X509 *x;
 461         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
 462         int proxy_path_length = 0;
 463         int purpose;
 464         int allow_proxy_certs;
 465         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
 466
 467         /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
 468            -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
 469                use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
 470            0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
 471                used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
 472            1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
 473                all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
 474         */
 475         must_be_ca = -1;
 476
 477         /* CRL path validation */
 478         if (ctx->parent)
 479                 {
 480                 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
 481                 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
 482                 }
 483         else
 484                 {
 485                 allow_proxy_certs =
 486                         !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
 487                 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
 488                    software happy */
 489                 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
 490                         allow_proxy_certs = 1;
 491                 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
 492                 }
 493
 494         /* Check all untrusted certificates */
 495         for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
 496                 {
 497                 int ret;
 498                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
 499                 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
 500                         && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
 501                         {
 502                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
 503                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 504                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 505                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 506                         if (!ok) goto end;
 507                         }
 508                 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
 509                         {
 510                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
 511                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 512                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 513                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 514                         if (!ok) goto end;
 515                         }
 516                 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
 517                 switch(must_be_ca)
 518                         {
 519                 case -1:
 520                         if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
 521                                 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
 522                                 {
 523                                 ret = 0;
 524                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
 525                                 }
 526                         else
 527                                 ret = 1;
 528                         break;
 529                 case 0:
 530                         if (ret != 0)
 531                                 {
 532                                 ret = 0;
 533                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
 534                                 }
 535                         else
 536                                 ret = 1;
 537                         break;
 538                 default:
 539                         if ((ret == 0)
 540                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
 541                                         && (ret != 1)))
 542                                 {
 543                                 ret = 0;
 544                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
 545                                 }
 546                         else
 547                                 ret = 1;
 548                         break;
 549                         }
 550                 if (ret == 0)
 551                         {
 552                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 553                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 554                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 555                         if (!ok) goto end;
 556                         }
 557                 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
 558                         {
 559                         ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
 560                         if ((ret == 0)
 561                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
 562                                         && (ret != 1)))
 563                                 {
 564                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
 565                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
 566                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
 567                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 568                                 if (!ok) goto end;
 569                                 }
 570                         }
 571                 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
 572                 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
 573                            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
 574                            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
 575                         {
 576                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
 577                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 578                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 579                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 580                         if (!ok) goto end;
 581                         }
 582                 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
 583                 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
 584                         plen++;
 585                 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
 586                    certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
 587                    certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a
 588                    CA certificate.  */
 589                 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
 590                         {
 591                         if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
 592                                 {
 593                                 ctx->error =
 594                                         X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
 595                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
 596                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
 597                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 598                                 if (!ok) goto end;
 599                                 }
 600                         proxy_path_length++;
 601                         must_be_ca = 0;
 602                         }
 603                 else
 604                         must_be_ca = 1;
 605                 }
 606         ok = 1;
 607  end:
 608         return ok;
 609 #endif
 610 }
 611
 612 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 613         {
 614         X509 *x;
 615         int i, j, rv;
 616         /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
 617         for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
 618                 {
 619                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
 620                 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
 621                 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
 622                         continue;
 623                 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
 624                  * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
 625                  * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
 626                  * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
 627                  */
 628                 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
 629                         {
 630                         NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
 631                         if (nc)
 632                                 {
 633                                 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
 634                                 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
 635                                         {
 636                                         ctx->error = rv;
 637                                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 638                                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 639                                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
 640                                                 return 0;
 641                                         }
 642                                 }
 643                         }
 644                 }
 645         return 1;
 646         }
 647
 648 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 649 {
 650 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
 651         return 1;
 652 #else
 653         int i, ok;
 654         X509 *x;
 655         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
 656         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
 657 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
 658         i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
 659         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
 660         ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
 661         if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
 662                 return 1;
 663         ctx->error_depth = i;
 664         ctx->current_cert = x;
 665         if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
 666                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
 667         else
 668                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
 669         ok = cb(0, ctx);
 670         return ok;
 671 #endif
 672 }
 673
 674 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 675         {
 676         int i, last, ok;
 677         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
 678                 return 1;
 679         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
 680                 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
 681         else
 682                 last = 0;
 683         for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
 684                 {
 685                 ctx->error_depth = i;
 686                 ok = check_cert(ctx);
 687                 if (!ok) return ok;
 688                 }
 689         return 1;
 690         }
 691
 692 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 693         {
 694         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
 695         X509 *x;
 696         int ok, cnum;
 697         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
 698         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
 699         ctx->current_cert = x;
 700         ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
 701         ctx->current_reasons = 0;
 702         while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
 703                 {
 704                 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
 705                 if (ctx->get_crl)
 706                         ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
 707                 else
 708                         ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
 709                 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
 710                  * notify callback
 711                  */
 712                 if(!ok)
 713                         {
 714                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
 715                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
 716                         goto err;
 717                         }
 718                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
 719                 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
 720                 if (!ok)
 721                         goto err;
 722
 723                 if (dcrl)
 724                         {
 725                         ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
 726                         if (!ok)
 727                                 goto err;
 728                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
 729                         if (!ok)
 730                                 goto err;
 731                         }
 732                 else
 733                         ok = 1;
 734
 735                 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
 736                 if (ok != 2)
 737                         {
 738                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
 739                         if (!ok)
 740                                 goto err;
 741                         }
 742
 743                 X509_CRL_free(crl);
 744                 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
 745                 crl = NULL;
 746                 dcrl = NULL;
 747                 }
 748         err:
 749         X509_CRL_free(crl);
 750         X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
 751
 752         ctx->current_crl = NULL;
 753         return ok;
 754
 755         }
 756
 757 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
 758
 759 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
 760         {
 761         time_t *ptime;
 762         int i;
 763         if (notify)
 764                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
 765         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
 766                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
 767         else
 768                 ptime = NULL;
 769
 770         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
 771         if (i == 0)
 772                 {
 773                 if (!notify)
 774                         return 0;
 775                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
 776                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 777                         return 0;
 778                 }
 779
 780         if (i > 0)
 781                 {
 782                 if (!notify)
 783                         return 0;
 784                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
 785                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 786                         return 0;
 787                 }
 788
 789         if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
 790                 {
 791                 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
 792
 793                 if (i == 0)
 794                         {
 795                         if (!notify)
 796                                 return 0;
 797                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
 798                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 799                                 return 0;
 800                         }
 801                 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
 802                 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
 803                         {
 804                         if (!notify)
 805                                 return 0;
 806                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
 807                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 808                                 return 0;
 809                         }
 810                 }
 811
 812         if (notify)
 813                 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
 814
 815         return 1;
 816         }
 817
 818 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
 819                         X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
 820                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
 821         {
 822         int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
 823         unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
 824         X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
 825         X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
 826         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
 827
 828         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
 829                 {
 830                 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
 831                 reasons = *preasons;
 832                 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
 833
 834                 if (crl_score > best_score)
 835                         {
 836                         best_crl = crl;
 837                         best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
 838                         best_score = crl_score;
 839                         best_reasons = reasons;
 840                         }
 841                 }
 842
 843         if (best_crl)
 844                 {
 845                 if (*pcrl)
 846                         X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
 847                 *pcrl = best_crl;
 848                 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
 849                 *pscore = best_score;
 850                 *preasons = best_reasons;
 851                 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
 852                 if (*pdcrl)
 853                         {
 854                         X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
 855                         *pdcrl = NULL;
 856                         }
 857                 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
 858                 }
 859
 860         if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
 861                 return 1;
 862
 863         return 0;
 864         }
 865
 866 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
 867  * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
 868  */
 869
 870 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
 871         {
 872         ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
 873         int i;
 874         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0);
 875         if (i >= 0)
 876                 {
 877                 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
 878                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
 879                         return 0;
 880                 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
 881                 }
 882         else
 883                 exta = NULL;
 884
 885         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0);
 886
 887         if (i >= 0)
 888                 {
 889
 890                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
 891                         return 0;
 892                 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
 893                 }
 894         else
 895                 extb = NULL;
 896
 897         if (!exta && !extb)
 898                 return 1;
 899
 900         if (!exta || !extb)
 901                 return 0;
 902
 903
 904         if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
 905                 return 0;
 906
 907         return 1;
 908         }
 909
 910 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
 911
 912 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
 913         {
 914         /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
 915         if (!delta->base_crl_number)
 916                         return 0;
 917         /* Base must have a CRL number */
 918         if (!base->crl_number)
 919                         return 0;
 920         /* Issuer names must match */
 921         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
 922                                 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
 923                 return 0;
 924         /* AKID and IDP must match */
 925         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
 926                         return 0;
 927         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
 928                         return 0;
 929         /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
 930         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
 931                         return 0;
 932         /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
 933         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
 934                         return 1;
 935         return 0;
 936         }
 937
 938 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
 939  * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
 940  */
 941
 942 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
 943                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
 944         {
 945         X509_CRL *delta;
 946         int i;
 947         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
 948                 return;
 949         if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
 950                 return;
 951         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
 952                 {
 953                 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
 954                 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
 955                         {
 956                         if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
 957                                 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
 958                         CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
 959                         *dcrl = delta;
 960                         return;
 961                         }
 962                 }
 963         *dcrl = NULL;
 964         }
 965
 966 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
 967  * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
 968  * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
 969  * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
 970  * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
 971  */
 972
 973 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
 974                         unsigned int *preasons,
 975                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
 976         {
 977
 978         int crl_score = 0;
 979         unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
 980
 981         /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
 982
 983         /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
 984         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
 985                 return 0;
 986         /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
 987         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
 988                 {
 989                 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
 990                         return 0;
 991                 }
 992         else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
 993                 {
 994                 /* If no new reasons reject */
 995                 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
 996                         return 0;
 997                 }
 998         /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
 999         else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1000                 return 0;
1001         /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1002         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1003                 {
1004                 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1005                         return 0;
1006                 }
1007         else
1008                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1009
1010         if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1011                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1012
1013         /* Check expiry */
1014         if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1015                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1016
1017         /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1018         crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1019
1020         /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1021
1022         if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1023                 return 0;
1024
1025         /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1026
1027         if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1028                 {
1029                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1030                 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1031                         return 0;
1032                 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1033                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1034                 }
1035
1036         *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1037
1038         return crl_score;
1039
1040         }
1041
1042 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1043                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1044         {
1045         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1046         X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1047         int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1048         int i;
1049
1050         if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1051                 cidx++;
1052
1053         crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1054
1055         if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1056                 {
1057                 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1058                         {
1059                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1060                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1061                         return;
1062                         }
1063                 }
1064
1065         for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1066                 {
1067                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1068                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1069                         continue;
1070                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1071                         {
1072                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1073                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1074                         return;
1075                         }
1076                 }
1077
1078         /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1079
1080         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1081                 return;
1082
1083         /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1084          * set of untrusted certificates.
1085          */
1086         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1087                 {
1088                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1089                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1090                         continue;
1091                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1092                         {
1093                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1094                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1095                         return;
1096                         }
1097                 }
1098         }
1099
1100 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1101  * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1102  * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1103  * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1104  * practice.
1105  */
1106
1107 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1108         {
1109         X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1110         int ret;
1111         /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1112         if (ctx->parent)
1113                 return 0;
1114         if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1115                 return -1;
1116
1117         crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1118         /* Copy verify params across */
1119         X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1120
1121         crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1122         crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1123
1124         /* Verify CRL issuer */
1125         ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1126
1127         if (ret <= 0)
1128                 goto err;
1129
1130         /* Check chain is acceptable */
1131
1132         ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1133         err:
1134         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1135         return ret;
1136         }
1137
1138 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1139  * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1140  * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1141  * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1142  * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1143  * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1144  */
1145
1146 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1147                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1148                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1149         {
1150         X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1151         cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1152         crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1153         if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1154                 return 1;
1155         return 0;
1156         }
1157
1158 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1159  * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1160  * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1161  * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1162  * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1163  */
1164
1165
1166 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1167         {
1168         X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1169         GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1170         GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1171         int i, j;
1172         if (!a || !b)
1173                 return 1;
1174         if (a->type == 1)
1175                 {
1176                 if (!a->dpname)
1177                         return 0;
1178                 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1179                 if (b->type == 1)
1180                         {
1181                         if (!b->dpname)
1182                                 return 0;
1183                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1184                                 return 1;
1185                         else
1186                                 return 0;
1187                         }
1188                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1189                 nm = a->dpname;
1190                 gens = b->name.fullname;
1191                 }
1192         else if (b->type == 1)
1193                 {
1194                 if (!b->dpname)
1195                         return 0;
1196                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1197                 gens = a->name.fullname;
1198                 nm = b->dpname;
1199                 }
1200
1201         /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1202         if (nm)
1203                 {
1204                 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1205                         {
1206                         gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1207                         if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1208                                 continue;
1209                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1210                                 return 1;
1211                         }
1212                 return 0;
1213                 }
1214
1215         /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1216
1217         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1218                 {
1219                 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1220                 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1221                         {
1222                         genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1223                         if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1224                                 return 1;
1225                         }
1226                 }
1227
1228         return 0;
1229
1230         }
1231
1232 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1233         {
1234         int i;
1235         X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1236         /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1237         if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1238                 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1239         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1240                 {
1241                 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1242                 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1243                         continue;
1244                 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1245                         return 1;
1246                 }
1247         return 0;
1248         }
1249
1250 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1251
1252 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1253                                 unsigned int *preasons)
1254         {
1255         int i;
1256         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1257                 return 0;
1258         if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1259                 {
1260                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1261                         return 0;
1262                 }
1263         else
1264                 {
1265                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1266                         return 0;
1267                 }
1268         *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1269         for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1270                 {
1271                 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1272                 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1273                         {
1274                         if (!crl->idp ||
1275                              idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1276                                 {
1277                                 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1278                                 return 1;
1279                                 }
1280                         }
1281                 }
1282         if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1283                 return 1;
1284         return 0;
1285         }
1286
1287 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1288  * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1289  */
1290
1291 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1292                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1293         {
1294         int ok;
1295         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1296         int crl_score = 0;
1297         unsigned int reasons;
1298         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1299         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1300         X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1301         reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1302         ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1303                                 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1304
1305         if (ok)
1306                 goto done;
1307
1308         /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1309
1310         skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1311
1312         /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1313         if (!skcrl && crl)
1314                 goto done;
1315
1316         get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1317
1318         sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1319
1320         done:
1321
1322         /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1323         if (crl)
1324                 {
1325                 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1326                 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1327                 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1328                 *pcrl = crl;
1329                 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1330                 return 1;
1331                 }
1332
1333         return 0;
1334         }
1335
1336 /* Check CRL validity */
1337 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1338         {
1339         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1340         EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1341         int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1342         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1343         chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1344         /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1345         if (ctx->current_issuer)
1346                 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1347
1348         /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1349          * is next certificate in chain.
1350          */
1351         else if (cnum < chnum)
1352                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1353         else
1354                 {
1355                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1356                 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1357                 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1358                         {
1359                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1360                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1361                         if(!ok) goto err;
1362                         }
1363                 }
1364
1365         if(issuer)
1366                 {
1367                 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1368                  * been done
1369                  */
1370                 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1371                         {
1372                         /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1373                         if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1374                                 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1375                                 {
1376                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1377                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1378                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1379                                 }
1380
1381                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1382                                 {
1383                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1384                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1385                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1386                                 }
1387
1388                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1389                                 {
1390                                 if (!check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer))
1391                                         {
1392                                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1393                                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1394                                         if(!ok) goto err;
1395                                         }
1396                                 }
1397
1398                         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1399                                 {
1400                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1401                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1402                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1403                                 }
1404
1405
1406                         }
1407
1408                 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1409                         {
1410                         ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1411                         if (!ok)
1412                                 goto err;
1413                         }
1414
1415                 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1416                 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1417
1418                 if(!ikey)
1419                         {
1420                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1421                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1422                         if (!ok) goto err;
1423                         }
1424                 else
1425                         {
1426                         /* Verify CRL signature */
1427                         if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1428                                 {
1429                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1430                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1431                                 if (!ok) goto err;
1432                                 }
1433                         }
1434                 }
1435
1436         ok = 1;
1437
1438         err:
1439         EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1440         return ok;
1441         }
1442
1443 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1444 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1445         {
1446         int ok;
1447         X509_REVOKED *rev;
1448         /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1449          * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1450          * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1451          * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1452          */
1453         if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1454                 {
1455                 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1456                         return 1;
1457                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1458                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1459                 if(!ok)
1460                         return 0;
1461                 }
1462         /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1463          * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1464          */
1465         if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1466                 {
1467                 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1468                         return 2;
1469                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1470                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1471                 if (!ok)
1472                         return 0;
1473                 }
1474
1475         return 1;
1476         }
1477
1478 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1479         {
1480         int ret;
1481         if (ctx->parent)
1482                 return 1;
1483         ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1484                                 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1485         if (ret == 0)
1486                 {
1487                 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1488                 return 0;
1489                 }
1490         /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1491         if (ret == -1)
1492                 {
1493                 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1494                  * callback.
1495                  */
1496                 X509 *x;
1497                 int i;
1498                 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1499                         {
1500                         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1501                         if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1502                                 continue;
1503                         ctx->current_cert = x;
1504                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1505                         if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1506                                 return 0;
1507                         }
1508                 return 1;
1509                 }
1510         if (ret == -2)
1511                 {
1512                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1513                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1514                 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1515                 }
1516
1517         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1518                 {
1519                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1520                 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1521                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1522                         return 0;
1523                 }
1524
1525         return 1;
1526         }
1527
1528 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1529         {
1530         time_t *ptime;
1531         int i;
1532
1533         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1534                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1535         else
1536                 ptime = NULL;
1537
1538         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1539         if (i == 0)
1540                 {
1541                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1542                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1543                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1544                         return 0;
1545                 }
1546
1547         if (i > 0)
1548                 {
1549                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1550                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1551                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1552                         return 0;
1553                 }
1554
1555         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1556         if (i == 0)
1557                 {
1558                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1559                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1560                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1561                         return 0;
1562                 }
1563
1564         if (i < 0)
1565                 {
1566                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1567                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1568                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1569                         return 0;
1570                 }
1571
1572         return 1;
1573         }
1574
1575 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1576         {
1577         int ok=0,n;
1578         X509 *xs,*xi;
1579         EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1580         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1581
1582         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
1583
1584         n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1585         ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1586         n--;
1587         xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1588
1589         if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1590                 xs=xi;
1591         else
1592                 {
1593                 if (n <= 0)
1594                         {
1595                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1596                         ctx->current_cert=xi;
1597                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
1598                         goto end;
1599                         }
1600                 else
1601                         {
1602                         n--;
1603                         ctx->error_depth=n;
1604                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1605                         }
1606                 }
1607
1608 /*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
1609         while (n >= 0)
1610                 {
1611                 ctx->error_depth=n;
1612
1613                 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1614                  * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1615                  * just wastes time.
1616                  */
1617                 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1618                         {
1619                         if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1620                                 {
1621                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1622                                 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1623                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1624                                 if (!ok) goto end;
1625                                 }
1626                         else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1627                                 {
1628                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1629                                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1630                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1631                                 if (!ok)
1632                                         {
1633                                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1634                                         goto end;
1635                                         }
1636                                 }
1637                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1638                         pkey=NULL;
1639                         }
1640
1641                 xs->valid = 1;
1642
1643                 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1644                 if (!ok)
1645                         goto end;
1646
1647                 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1648                 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1649                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1650                 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
1651                 if (!ok) goto end;
1652
1653                 n--;
1654                 if (n >= 0)
1655                         {
1656                         xi=xs;
1657                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1658                         }
1659                 }
1660         ok=1;
1661 end:
1662         return ok;
1663         }
1664
1665 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1666 {
1667         return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1668 }
1669
1670 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1671         {
1672         char *str;
1673         ASN1_TIME atm;
1674         long offset;
1675         char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1676         int i,j;
1677
1678         p=buff1;
1679         i=ctm->length;
1680         str=(char *)ctm->data;
1681         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1682                 {
1683                 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1684                 memcpy(p,str,10);
1685                 p+=10;
1686                 str+=10;
1687                 }
1688         else
1689                 {
1690                 if (i < 13) return 0;
1691                 memcpy(p,str,12);
1692                 p+=12;
1693                 str+=12;
1694                 }
1695
1696         if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1697                 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1698         else
1699                 {
1700                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1701                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1702                 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1703                 if (*str == '.')
1704                         {
1705                         str++;
1706                         while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1707                         }
1708
1709                 }
1710         *(p++)='Z';
1711         *(p++)='\0';
1712
1713         if (*str == 'Z')
1714                 offset=0;
1715         else
1716                 {
1717                 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1718                         return 0;
1719                 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1720                 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1721                 if (*str == '-')
1722                         offset= -offset;
1723                 }
1724         atm.type=ctm->type;
1725         atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1726         atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1727
1728         if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1729                 return 0;
1730
1731         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1732                 {
1733                 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1734                 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1735                 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1736                 if (j < 50) j+=100;
1737
1738                 if (i < j) return -1;
1739                 if (i > j) return 1;
1740                 }
1741         i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1742         if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1743                 return -1;
1744         else
1745                 return i;
1746         }
1747
1748 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1749 {
1750         return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1751 }
1752
1753 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1754         {
1755         return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1756         }
1757
1758 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1759                                 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1760         {
1761         time_t t;
1762
1763         if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1764         else time(&t);
1765
1766         if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1767                 {
1768                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1769                         return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1770                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1771                         return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1772                                                                 offset_sec);
1773                 }
1774         return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1775         }
1776
1777 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1778         {
1779         EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1780         int i,j;
1781
1782         if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1783
1784         for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1785                 {
1786                 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1787                 if (ktmp == NULL)
1788                         {
1789                         X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1790                         return 0;
1791                         }
1792                 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1793                         break;
1794                 else
1795                         {
1796                         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1797                         ktmp=NULL;
1798                         }
1799                 }
1800         if (ktmp == NULL)
1801                 {
1802                 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1803                 return 0;
1804                 }
1805
1806         /* first, populate the other certs */
1807         for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1808                 {
1809                 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1810                 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1811                 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1812                 }
1813
1814         if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1815         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1816         return 1;
1817         }
1818
1819 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1820              CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1821         {
1822         /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1823          * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1824         return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1825                         new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1826         }
1827
1828 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1829         {
1830         return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1831         }
1832
1833 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1834         {
1835         return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1836         }
1837
1838 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1839         {
1840         return ctx->error;
1841         }
1842
1843 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1844         {
1845         ctx->error=err;
1846         }
1847
1848 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1849         {
1850         return ctx->error_depth;
1851         }
1852
1853 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1854         {
1855         return ctx->current_cert;
1856         }
1857
1858 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1859         {
1860         return ctx->chain;
1861         }
1862
1863 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1864         {
1865         int i;
1866         X509 *x;
1867         STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1868         if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1869         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1870                 {
1871                 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1872                 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1873                 }
1874         return chain;
1875         }
1876
1877 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1878         {
1879         ctx->cert=x;
1880         }
1881
1882 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1883         {
1884         ctx->untrusted=sk;
1885         }
1886
1887 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1888         {
1889         ctx->crls=sk;
1890         }
1891
1892 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1893         {
1894         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1895         }
1896
1897 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1898         {
1899         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1900         }
1901
1902 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1903  * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1904  * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1905  * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1906  * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1907  * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1908  * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1909  * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1910  */
1911
1912 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1913                                 int purpose, int trust)
1914 {
1915         int idx;
1916         /* If purpose not set use default */
1917         if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1918         /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1919         if (purpose)
1920                 {
1921                 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
1922                 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1923                 if (idx == -1)
1924                         {
1925                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1926                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1927                         return 0;
1928                         }
1929                 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1930                 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1931                         {
1932                         idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1933                         if (idx == -1)
1934                                 {
1935                                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1936                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1937                                 return 0;
1938                                 }
1939                         ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1940                         }
1941                 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1942                 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1943                 }
1944         if (trust)
1945                 {
1946                 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1947                 if (idx == -1)
1948                         {
1949                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1950                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1951                         return 0;
1952                         }
1953                 }
1954
1955         if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1956         if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1957         return 1;
1958 }
1959
1960 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1961 {
1962         X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1963         ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1964         if (!ctx)
1965                 {
1966                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1967                 return NULL;
1968                 }
1969         memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1970         return ctx;
1971 }
1972
1973 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1974 {
1975         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1976         OPENSSL_free(ctx);
1977 }
1978
1979 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
1980              STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1981         {
1982         int ret = 1;
1983         ctx->ctx=store;
1984         ctx->current_method=0;
1985         ctx->cert=x509;
1986         ctx->untrusted=chain;
1987         ctx->crls = NULL;
1988         ctx->last_untrusted=0;
1989         ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
1990         ctx->valid=0;
1991         ctx->chain=NULL;
1992         ctx->error=0;
1993         ctx->explicit_policy=0;
1994         ctx->error_depth=0;
1995         ctx->current_cert=NULL;
1996         ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
1997         ctx->tree = NULL;
1998         ctx->parent = NULL;
1999
2000         ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2001
2002         if (!ctx->param)
2003                 {
2004                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2005                 return 0;
2006                 }
2007
2008         /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2009          * use defaults.
2010          */
2011
2012
2013         if (store)
2014                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2015         else
2016                 ctx->param->flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2017
2018         if (store)
2019                 {
2020                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2021                 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2022                 }
2023         else
2024                 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2025
2026         if (ret)
2027                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2028                                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2029
2030         if (ret == 0)
2031                 {
2032                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2033                 return 0;
2034                 }
2035
2036         if (store && store->check_issued)
2037                 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2038         else
2039                 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2040
2041         if (store && store->get_issuer)
2042                 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2043         else
2044                 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2045
2046         if (store && store->verify_cb)
2047                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2048         else
2049                 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2050
2051         if (store && store->verify)
2052                 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2053         else
2054                 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2055
2056         if (store && store->check_revocation)
2057                 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2058         else
2059                 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2060
2061         if (store && store->get_crl)
2062                 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2063         else
2064                 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2065
2066         if (store && store->check_crl)
2067                 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2068         else
2069                 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2070
2071         if (store && store->cert_crl)
2072                 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2073         else
2074                 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2075
2076         if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2077                 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2078         else
2079                 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2080
2081         if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2082                 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2083         else
2084                 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2085
2086         ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2087
2088
2089         /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2090          * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2091          * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2092         /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2093         if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2094                                 &(ctx->ex_data)))
2095                 {
2096                 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2097                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2098                 return 0;
2099                 }
2100         return 1;
2101         }
2102
2103 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2104  * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2105  */
2106
2107 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2108 {
2109         ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2110         ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2111 }
2112
2113 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2114         {
2115         if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2116         if (ctx->param != NULL)
2117                 {
2118                 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2119                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2120                 ctx->param=NULL;
2121                 }
2122         if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2123                 {
2124                 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2125                 ctx->tree=NULL;
2126                 }
2127         if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2128                 {
2129                 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2130                 ctx->chain=NULL;
2131                 }
2132         CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2133         memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2134         }
2135
2136 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2137         {
2138         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2139         }
2140
2141 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2142         {
2143         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2144         }
2145
2146 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2147         {
2148         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2149         }
2150
2151 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2152                                   int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2153         {
2154         ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2155         }
2156
2157 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2158         {
2159         return ctx->tree;
2160         }
2161
2162 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2163         {
2164         return ctx->explicit_policy;
2165         }
2166
2167 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2168         {
2169         const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2170         param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2171         if (!param)
2172                 return 0;
2173         return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2174         }
2175
2176 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2177         {
2178         return ctx->param;
2179         }
2180
2181 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2182         {
2183         if (ctx->param)
2184                 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2185         ctx->param = param;
2186         }
2187
2188 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2189 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2190
2191 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2192
2193 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2194 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)