crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

   1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
   2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
   3  * All rights reserved.
   4  *
   5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
   6  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
   7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
   8  *
   9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
  13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
  15  *
  16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  17  * the code are not to be removed.
  18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
  22  *
  23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  25  * are met:
  26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
  27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
  30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
  32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
  33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
  34  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
  37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
  40  *
  41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
  44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
  45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
  46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
  47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
  48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
  49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  52  *
  53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
  56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  57  */
  58
  59 #include <stdio.h>
  60 #include <time.h>
  61 #include <errno.h>
  62
  63 #include "cryptlib.h"
  64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
  65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
  66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
  67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
  68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
  69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
  70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
  71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
  72 #include "x509_lcl.h"
  73
  74 /* CRL score values */
  75
  76 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
  77
  78 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100
  79
  80 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
  81
  82 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080
  83
  84 /* CRL times valid */
  85
  86 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040
  87
  88 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
  89
  90 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020
  91
  92 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
  93
  94 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
  95
  96 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
  97
  98 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018
  99
 100 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
 101
 102 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008
 103
 104 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
 105
 106 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004
 107
 108 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
 109
 110 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002
 111
 112 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
 113 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
 114 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
 115 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 116 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 117 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 118 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 119 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 120 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 121 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 122
 123 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
 124                         unsigned int *preasons,
 125                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
 126 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
 127                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
 128 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
 129                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
 130 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
 131                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
 132 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
 133                                 unsigned int *preasons);
 134 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
 135 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
 136                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
 137                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
 138
 139 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 140 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 141
 142
 143 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
 144         {
 145         return ok;
 146         }
 147
 148 #if 0
 149 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
 150         {
 151         return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
 152         }
 153 #endif
 154 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
 155 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
 156         {
 157         X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
 158         if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
 159                 return 1;
 160         else
 161                 return 0;
 162         }
 163
 164 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
 165
 166 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
 167         {
 168         STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
 169         X509 *xtmp = NULL;
 170         int i;
 171         /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
 172         certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
 173         if (certs == NULL)
 174                 return NULL;
 175         /* Look for exact match */
 176         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
 177                 {
 178                 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
 179                 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
 180                         break;
 181                 }
 182         if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
 183                 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
 184         else
 185                 xtmp = NULL;
 186         sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
 187         return xtmp;
 188         }
 189
 190 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 191         {
 192         X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
 193         int bad_chain = 0;
 194         X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
 195         int depth,i,ok=0;
 196         int num;
 197         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
 198         STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
 199         if (ctx->cert == NULL)
 200                 {
 201                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
 202                 return -1;
 203                 }
 204
 205         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
 206
 207         /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
 208          * present and that the first entry is in place */
 209         if (ctx->chain == NULL)
 210                 {
 211                 if (    ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
 212                         (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
 213                         {
 214                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 215                         goto end;
 216                         }
 217                 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
 218                 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
 219                 }
 220
 221         /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
 222         if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
 223             && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
 224                 {
 225                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 226                 goto end;
 227                 }
 228
 229         num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
 230         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
 231         depth=param->depth;
 232
 233
 234         for (;;)
 235                 {
 236                 /* If we have enough, we break */
 237                 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
 238                                          * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
 239                                          * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
 240                                          * code later.
 241                                          */
 242
 243                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
 244                 if (cert_self_signed(x))
 245                         break;
 246                 /* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
 247                 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
 248                         {
 249                         ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
 250                         if (ok < 0)
 251                                 return ok;
 252                         /* If successful for now free up cert so it
 253                          * will be picked up again later.
 254                          */
 255                         if (ok > 0)
 256                                 {
 257                                 X509_free(xtmp);
 258                                 break;
 259                                 }
 260                         }
 261
 262                 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
 263                 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
 264                         {
 265                         xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
 266                         if (xtmp != NULL)
 267                                 {
 268                                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
 269                                         {
 270                                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 271                                         goto end;
 272                                         }
 273                                 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
 274                                 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
 275                                 ctx->last_untrusted++;
 276                                 x=xtmp;
 277                                 num++;
 278                                 /* reparse the full chain for
 279                                  * the next one */
 280                                 continue;
 281                                 }
 282                         }
 283                 break;
 284                 }
 285
 286         /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
 287          * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
 288          * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
 289
 290         /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
 291          * is self signed.
 292          */
 293
 294         i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
 295         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
 296         if (cert_self_signed(x))
 297                 {
 298                 /* we have a self signed certificate */
 299                 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
 300                         {
 301                         /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
 302                          * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
 303                          * match to avoid possible impersonation.
 304                          */
 305                         ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
 306                         if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
 307                                 {
 308                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
 309                                 ctx->current_cert=x;
 310                                 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
 311                                 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
 312                                 bad_chain = 1;
 313                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 314                                 if (!ok) goto end;
 315                                 }
 316                         else
 317                                 {
 318                                 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
 319                                  * so we get any trust settings.
 320                                  */
 321                                 X509_free(x);
 322                                 x = xtmp;
 323                                 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
 324                                 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
 325                                 }
 326                         }
 327                 else
 328                         {
 329                         /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
 330                         chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
 331                         ctx->last_untrusted--;
 332                         num--;
 333                         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
 334                         }
 335                 }
 336
 337         /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
 338         for (;;)
 339                 {
 340                 /* If we have enough, we break */
 341                 if (depth < num) break;
 342
 343                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
 344                 if (cert_self_signed(x))
 345                         break;
 346
 347                 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
 348
 349                 if (ok < 0) return ok;
 350                 if (ok == 0) break;
 351
 352                 x = xtmp;
 353                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
 354                         {
 355                         X509_free(xtmp);
 356                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 357                         return 0;
 358                         }
 359                 num++;
 360                 }
 361
 362         /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
 363
 364         i = check_trust(ctx);
 365
 366         /* If explicitly rejected error */
 367         if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
 368                 goto end;
 369         /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's
 370          * a single self signed certificate in which case we've indicated
 371          * an error already and set bad_chain == 1
 372          */
 373         if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain)
 374                 {
 375                 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
 376                         {
 377                         if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
 378                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
 379                         else
 380                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
 381                         ctx->current_cert=x;
 382                         }
 383                 else
 384                         {
 385
 386                         sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
 387                         num++;
 388                         ctx->last_untrusted=num;
 389                         ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
 390                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
 391                         chain_ss=NULL;
 392                         }
 393
 394                 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
 395                 bad_chain = 1;
 396                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 397                 if (!ok) goto end;
 398                 }
 399
 400         /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
 401         ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
 402
 403         if (!ok) goto end;
 404
 405         /* Check name constraints */
 406
 407         ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
 408
 409         if (!ok) goto end;
 410
 411         ok = check_id(ctx);
 412
 413         if (!ok) goto end;
 414
 415         /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
 416         X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
 417
 418         /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
 419          * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
 420          */
 421
 422         ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
 423         if(!ok) goto end;
 424
 425         i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
 426                                                         ctx->param->flags);
 427         if (i != X509_V_OK)
 428                 {
 429                 ctx->error = i;
 430                 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
 431                 ok = cb(0, ctx);
 432                 if (!ok)
 433                         goto end;
 434                 }
 435
 436         /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
 437         if (ctx->verify != NULL)
 438                 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
 439         else
 440                 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
 441         if(!ok) goto end;
 442
 443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
 444         /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
 445         ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
 446         if (!ok) goto end;
 447         ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
 448         if (!ok) goto end;
 449 #endif
 450
 451         /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
 452         if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
 453                 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
 454         if(!ok) goto end;
 455         if (0)
 456                 {
 457 end:
 458                 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
 459                 }
 460         if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
 461         if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
 462         return ok;
 463         }
 464
 465
 466 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
 467  */
 468
 469 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
 470 {
 471         int i;
 472         X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;;
 473         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
 474                 {
 475                 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
 476                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
 477                         {
 478                         rv = issuer;
 479                         if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, 1))
 480                                 break;
 481                         }
 482                 }
 483         return rv;
 484 }
 485
 486 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
 487
 488 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
 489 {
 490         int ret;
 491         if (x == issuer)
 492                 return cert_self_signed(x);
 493         ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
 494         if (ret == X509_V_OK)
 495                 {
 496                 int i;
 497                 X509 *ch;
 498                 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
 499                 if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
 500                         return 1;
 501                 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
 502                         {
 503                         ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
 504                         if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer))
 505                                 {
 506                                 ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
 507                                 break;
 508                                 }
 509                         }
 510                 }
 511
 512         if (ret == X509_V_OK)
 513                 return 1;
 514         /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
 515         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
 516                 return 0;
 517
 518         ctx->error = ret;
 519         ctx->current_cert = x;
 520         ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
 521         return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
 522         return 0;
 523 }
 524
 525 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
 526
 527 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
 528 {
 529         *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
 530         if (*issuer)
 531                 {
 532                 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
 533                 return 1;
 534                 }
 535         else
 536                 return 0;
 537 }
 538
 539
 540 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
 541  * with the supplied purpose
 542  */
 543
 544 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 545 {
 546 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
 547         return 1;
 548 #else
 549         int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
 550         X509 *x;
 551         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
 552         int proxy_path_length = 0;
 553         int purpose;
 554         int allow_proxy_certs;
 555         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
 556
 557         /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
 558            -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
 559                use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
 560            0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
 561                used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
 562            1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
 563                all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
 564         */
 565         must_be_ca = -1;
 566
 567         /* CRL path validation */
 568         if (ctx->parent)
 569                 {
 570                 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
 571                 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
 572                 }
 573         else
 574                 {
 575                 allow_proxy_certs =
 576                         !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
 577                 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
 578                    software happy */
 579                 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
 580                         allow_proxy_certs = 1;
 581                 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
 582                 }
 583
 584         /* Check all untrusted certificates */
 585         for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
 586                 {
 587                 int ret;
 588                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
 589                 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
 590                         && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
 591                         {
 592                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
 593                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 594                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 595                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 596                         if (!ok) goto end;
 597                         }
 598                 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
 599                         {
 600                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
 601                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 602                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 603                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 604                         if (!ok) goto end;
 605                         }
 606                 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
 607                 switch(must_be_ca)
 608                         {
 609                 case -1:
 610                         if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
 611                                 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
 612                                 {
 613                                 ret = 0;
 614                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
 615                                 }
 616                         else
 617                                 ret = 1;
 618                         break;
 619                 case 0:
 620                         if (ret != 0)
 621                                 {
 622                                 ret = 0;
 623                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
 624                                 }
 625                         else
 626                                 ret = 1;
 627                         break;
 628                 default:
 629                         if ((ret == 0)
 630                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
 631                                         && (ret != 1)))
 632                                 {
 633                                 ret = 0;
 634                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
 635                                 }
 636                         else
 637                                 ret = 1;
 638                         break;
 639                         }
 640                 if (ret == 0)
 641                         {
 642                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 643                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 644                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 645                         if (!ok) goto end;
 646                         }
 647                 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
 648                         {
 649                         ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
 650                         if ((ret == 0)
 651                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
 652                                         && (ret != 1)))
 653                                 {
 654                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
 655                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
 656                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
 657                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 658                                 if (!ok) goto end;
 659                                 }
 660                         }
 661                 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
 662                 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
 663                            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
 664                            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
 665                         {
 666                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
 667                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 668                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 669                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
 670                         if (!ok) goto end;
 671                         }
 672                 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
 673                 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
 674                         plen++;
 675                 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
 676                    certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
 677                    certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a
 678                    CA certificate.  */
 679                 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
 680                         {
 681                         if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
 682                                 {
 683                                 ctx->error =
 684                                         X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
 685                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
 686                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
 687                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
 688                                 if (!ok) goto end;
 689                                 }
 690                         proxy_path_length++;
 691                         must_be_ca = 0;
 692                         }
 693                 else
 694                         must_be_ca = 1;
 695                 }
 696         ok = 1;
 697  end:
 698         return ok;
 699 #endif
 700 }
 701
 702 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 703         {
 704         X509 *x;
 705         int i, j, rv;
 706         /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
 707         for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
 708                 {
 709                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
 710                 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
 711                 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
 712                         continue;
 713                 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
 714                  * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
 715                  * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
 716                  * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
 717                  */
 718                 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
 719                         {
 720                         NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
 721                         if (nc)
 722                                 {
 723                                 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
 724                                 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
 725                                         {
 726                                         ctx->error = rv;
 727                                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 728                                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 729                                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
 730                                                 return 0;
 731                                         }
 732                                 }
 733                         }
 734                 }
 735         return 1;
 736         }
 737
 738 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
 739         {
 740         ctx->error = errcode;
 741         ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
 742         ctx->error_depth = 0;
 743         return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
 744         }
 745
 746 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
 747         {
 748         int i;
 749         int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
 750         unsigned char *name;
 751
 752         for (i = 0; i < n; ++i)
 753                 {
 754                 name = (unsigned char *)sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
 755                 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags) > 0)
 756                         return 1;
 757                 }
 758         return n == 0;
 759         }
 760
 761 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 762         {
 763         X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
 764         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
 765         X509 *x = ctx->cert;
 766         if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0)
 767                 {
 768                 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
 769                         return 0;
 770                 }
 771         if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0)
 772                 {
 773                 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
 774                         return 0;
 775                 }
 776         if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0)
 777                 {
 778                 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
 779                         return 0;
 780                 }
 781         return 1;
 782         }
 783
 784 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 785 {
 786         int i, ok;
 787         X509 *x = NULL;
 788         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
 789         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
 790         /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
 791         for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
 792                 {
 793                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
 794                 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
 795                 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
 796                 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
 797                         return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
 798                 /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
 799                  * not overridden.
 800                  */
 801                 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
 802                         {
 803                         ctx->error_depth = i;
 804                         ctx->current_cert = x;
 805                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
 806                         ok = cb(0, ctx);
 807                         if (!ok)
 808                                 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
 809                         }
 810                 }
 811         /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
 812          * certificate return success.
 813          */
 814         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
 815                 {
 816                 X509 *mx;
 817                 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
 818                         return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
 819                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
 820                 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
 821                 if (mx)
 822                         {
 823                         (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
 824                         X509_free(x);
 825                         ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
 826                         return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
 827                         }
 828                 }
 829
 830         /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
 831          * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
 832          */
 833         return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
 834 }
 835
 836 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 837         {
 838         int i, last, ok;
 839         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
 840                 return 1;
 841         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
 842                 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
 843         else
 844                 {
 845                 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
 846                 if (ctx->parent)
 847                         return 1;
 848                 last = 0;
 849                 }
 850         for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
 851                 {
 852                 ctx->error_depth = i;
 853                 ok = check_cert(ctx);
 854                 if (!ok) return ok;
 855                 }
 856         return 1;
 857         }
 858
 859 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 860         {
 861         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
 862         X509 *x;
 863         int ok, cnum;
 864         unsigned int last_reasons;
 865         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
 866         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
 867         ctx->current_cert = x;
 868         ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
 869         ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
 870         ctx->current_reasons = 0;
 871         while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
 872                 {
 873                 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
 874                 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
 875                 if (ctx->get_crl)
 876                         ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
 877                 else
 878                         ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
 879                 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
 880                  * notify callback
 881                  */
 882                 if(!ok)
 883                         {
 884                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
 885                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
 886                         goto err;
 887                         }
 888                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
 889                 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
 890                 if (!ok)
 891                         goto err;
 892
 893                 if (dcrl)
 894                         {
 895                         ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
 896                         if (!ok)
 897                                 goto err;
 898                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
 899                         if (!ok)
 900                                 goto err;
 901                         }
 902                 else
 903                         ok = 1;
 904
 905                 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
 906                 if (ok != 2)
 907                         {
 908                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
 909                         if (!ok)
 910                                 goto err;
 911                         }
 912
 913                 X509_CRL_free(crl);
 914                 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
 915                 crl = NULL;
 916                 dcrl = NULL;
 917                 /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
 918                  * another iteration, so exit loop.
 919                  */
 920                 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons)
 921                         {
 922                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
 923                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
 924                         goto err;
 925                         }
 926                 }
 927         err:
 928         X509_CRL_free(crl);
 929         X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
 930
 931         ctx->current_crl = NULL;
 932         return ok;
 933
 934         }
 935
 936 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
 937
 938 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
 939         {
 940         time_t *ptime;
 941         int i;
 942         if (notify)
 943                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
 944         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
 945                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
 946         else
 947                 ptime = NULL;
 948
 949         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
 950         if (i == 0)
 951                 {
 952                 if (!notify)
 953                         return 0;
 954                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
 955                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 956                         return 0;
 957                 }
 958
 959         if (i > 0)
 960                 {
 961                 if (!notify)
 962                         return 0;
 963                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
 964                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 965                         return 0;
 966                 }
 967
 968         if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
 969                 {
 970                 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
 971
 972                 if (i == 0)
 973                         {
 974                         if (!notify)
 975                                 return 0;
 976                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
 977                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 978                                 return 0;
 979                         }
 980                 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
 981                 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
 982                         {
 983                         if (!notify)
 984                                 return 0;
 985                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
 986                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
 987                                 return 0;
 988                         }
 989                 }
 990
 991         if (notify)
 992                 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
 993
 994         return 1;
 995         }
 996
 997 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
 998                         X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
 999                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1000         {
1001         int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
1002         unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
1003         X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
1004         X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
1005         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
1006
1007         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
1008                 {
1009                 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1010                 reasons = *preasons;
1011                 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
1012
1013                 if (crl_score > best_score)
1014                         {
1015                         best_crl = crl;
1016                         best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
1017                         best_score = crl_score;
1018                         best_reasons = reasons;
1019                         }
1020                 }
1021
1022         if (best_crl)
1023                 {
1024                 if (*pcrl)
1025                         X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1026                 *pcrl = best_crl;
1027                 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1028                 *pscore = best_score;
1029                 *preasons = best_reasons;
1030                 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1031                 if (*pdcrl)
1032                         {
1033                         X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1034                         *pdcrl = NULL;
1035                         }
1036                 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1037                 }
1038
1039         if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1040                 return 1;
1041
1042         return 0;
1043         }
1044
1045 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1046  * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1047  */
1048
1049 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1050         {
1051         ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1052         int i;
1053         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1054         if (i >= 0)
1055                 {
1056                 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1057                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1058                         return 0;
1059                 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1060                 }
1061         else
1062                 exta = NULL;
1063
1064         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1065
1066         if (i >= 0)
1067                 {
1068
1069                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1070                         return 0;
1071                 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1072                 }
1073         else
1074                 extb = NULL;
1075
1076         if (!exta && !extb)
1077                 return 1;
1078
1079         if (!exta || !extb)
1080                 return 0;
1081
1082
1083         if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1084                 return 0;
1085
1086         return 1;
1087         }
1088
1089 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1090
1091 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1092         {
1093         /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1094         if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1095                         return 0;
1096         /* Base must have a CRL number */
1097         if (!base->crl_number)
1098                         return 0;
1099         /* Issuer names must match */
1100         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1101                                 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1102                 return 0;
1103         /* AKID and IDP must match */
1104         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1105                         return 0;
1106         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1107                         return 0;
1108         /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1109         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1110                         return 0;
1111         /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1112         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1113                         return 1;
1114         return 0;
1115         }
1116
1117 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
1118  * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
1119  */
1120
1121 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1122                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1123         {
1124         X509_CRL *delta;
1125         int i;
1126         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1127                 return;
1128         if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1129                 return;
1130         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
1131                 {
1132                 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1133                 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
1134                         {
1135                         if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1136                                 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1137                         CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1138                         *dcrl = delta;
1139                         return;
1140                         }
1141                 }
1142         *dcrl = NULL;
1143         }
1144
1145 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
1146  * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
1147  * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
1148  * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
1149  * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1150  */
1151
1152 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1153                         unsigned int *preasons,
1154                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1155         {
1156
1157         int crl_score = 0;
1158         unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1159
1160         /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1161
1162         /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1163         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1164                 return 0;
1165         /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1166         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1167                 {
1168                 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1169                         return 0;
1170                 }
1171         else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
1172                 {
1173                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1174                 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1175                         return 0;
1176                 }
1177         /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1178         else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1179                 return 0;
1180         /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1181         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1182                 {
1183                 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1184                         return 0;
1185                 }
1186         else
1187                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1188
1189         if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1190                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1191
1192         /* Check expiry */
1193         if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1194                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1195
1196         /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1197         crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1198
1199         /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1200
1201         if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1202                 return 0;
1203
1204         /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1205
1206         if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1207                 {
1208                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1209                 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1210                         return 0;
1211                 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1212                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1213                 }
1214
1215         *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1216
1217         return crl_score;
1218
1219         }
1220
1221 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1222                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1223         {
1224         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1225         X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1226         int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1227         int i;
1228
1229         if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1230                 cidx++;
1231
1232         crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1233
1234         if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1235                 {
1236                 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1237                         {
1238                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1239                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1240                         return;
1241                         }
1242                 }
1243
1244         for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1245                 {
1246                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1247                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1248                         continue;
1249                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1250                         {
1251                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1252                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1253                         return;
1254                         }
1255                 }
1256
1257         /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1258
1259         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1260                 return;
1261
1262         /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1263          * set of untrusted certificates.
1264          */
1265         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1266                 {
1267                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1268                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1269                         continue;
1270                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1271                         {
1272                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1273                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1274                         return;
1275                         }
1276                 }
1277         }
1278
1279 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1280  * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1281  * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1282  * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1283  * practice.
1284  */
1285
1286 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1287         {
1288         X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1289         int ret;
1290         /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1291         if (ctx->parent)
1292                 return 0;
1293         if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1294                 return -1;
1295
1296         crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1297         /* Copy verify params across */
1298         X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1299
1300         crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1301         crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1302
1303         /* Verify CRL issuer */
1304         ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1305
1306         if (ret <= 0)
1307                 goto err;
1308
1309         /* Check chain is acceptable */
1310
1311         ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1312         err:
1313         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1314         return ret;
1315         }
1316
1317 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1318  * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1319  * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1320  * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1321  * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1322  * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1323  */
1324
1325 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1326                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1327                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1328         {
1329         X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1330         cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1331         crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1332         if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1333                 return 1;
1334         return 0;
1335         }
1336
1337 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1338  * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1339  * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1340  * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1341  * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1342  */
1343
1344
1345 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1346         {
1347         X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1348         GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1349         GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1350         int i, j;
1351         if (!a || !b)
1352                 return 1;
1353         if (a->type == 1)
1354                 {
1355                 if (!a->dpname)
1356                         return 0;
1357                 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1358                 if (b->type == 1)
1359                         {
1360                         if (!b->dpname)
1361                                 return 0;
1362                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1363                                 return 1;
1364                         else
1365                                 return 0;
1366                         }
1367                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1368                 nm = a->dpname;
1369                 gens = b->name.fullname;
1370                 }
1371         else if (b->type == 1)
1372                 {
1373                 if (!b->dpname)
1374                         return 0;
1375                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1376                 gens = a->name.fullname;
1377                 nm = b->dpname;
1378                 }
1379
1380         /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1381         if (nm)
1382                 {
1383                 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1384                         {
1385                         gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1386                         if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1387                                 continue;
1388                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1389                                 return 1;
1390                         }
1391                 return 0;
1392                 }
1393
1394         /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1395
1396         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1397                 {
1398                 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1399                 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1400                         {
1401                         genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1402                         if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1403                                 return 1;
1404                         }
1405                 }
1406
1407         return 0;
1408
1409         }
1410
1411 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1412         {
1413         int i;
1414         X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1415         /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1416         if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1417                 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1418         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1419                 {
1420                 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1421                 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1422                         continue;
1423                 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1424                         return 1;
1425                 }
1426         return 0;
1427         }
1428
1429 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1430
1431 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1432                                 unsigned int *preasons)
1433         {
1434         int i;
1435         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1436                 return 0;
1437         if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1438                 {
1439                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1440                         return 0;
1441                 }
1442         else
1443                 {
1444                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1445                         return 0;
1446                 }
1447         *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1448         for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1449                 {
1450                 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1451                 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1452                         {
1453                         if (!crl->idp ||
1454                              idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1455                                 {
1456                                 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1457                                 return 1;
1458                                 }
1459                         }
1460                 }
1461         if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1462                 return 1;
1463         return 0;
1464         }
1465
1466 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1467  * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1468  */
1469
1470 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1471                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1472         {
1473         int ok;
1474         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1475         int crl_score = 0;
1476         unsigned int reasons;
1477         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1478         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1479         X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1480         reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1481         ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1482                                 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1483
1484         if (ok)
1485                 goto done;
1486
1487         /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1488
1489         skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1490
1491         /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1492         if (!skcrl && crl)
1493                 goto done;
1494
1495         get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1496
1497         sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1498
1499         done:
1500
1501         /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1502         if (crl)
1503                 {
1504                 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1505                 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1506                 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1507                 *pcrl = crl;
1508                 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1509                 return 1;
1510                 }
1511
1512         return 0;
1513         }
1514
1515 /* Check CRL validity */
1516 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1517         {
1518         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1519         EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1520         int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1521         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1522         chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1523         /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1524         if (ctx->current_issuer)
1525                 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1526
1527         /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1528          * is next certificate in chain.
1529          */
1530         else if (cnum < chnum)
1531                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1532         else
1533                 {
1534                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1535                 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1536                 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1537                         {
1538                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1539                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1540                         if(!ok) goto err;
1541                         }
1542                 }
1543
1544         if(issuer)
1545                 {
1546                 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1547                  * been done
1548                  */
1549                 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1550                         {
1551                         /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1552                         if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1553                                 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1554                                 {
1555                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1556                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1557                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1558                                 }
1559
1560                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1561                                 {
1562                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1563                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1564                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1565                                 }
1566
1567                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1568                                 {
1569                                 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1570                                         {
1571                                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1572                                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1573                                         if(!ok) goto err;
1574                                         }
1575                                 }
1576
1577                         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1578                                 {
1579                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1580                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1581                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1582                                 }
1583
1584
1585                         }
1586
1587                 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1588                         {
1589                         ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1590                         if (!ok)
1591                                 goto err;
1592                         }
1593
1594                 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1595                 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1596
1597                 if(!ikey)
1598                         {
1599                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1600                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1601                         if (!ok) goto err;
1602                         }
1603                 else
1604                         {
1605                         int rv;
1606                         rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1607                         if (rv != X509_V_OK)
1608                                 {
1609                                 ctx->error=rv;
1610                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1611                                 if (!ok)
1612                                         goto err;
1613                                 }
1614                         /* Verify CRL signature */
1615                         if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1616                                 {
1617                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1618                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1619                                 if (!ok) goto err;
1620                                 }
1621                         }
1622                 }
1623
1624         ok = 1;
1625
1626         err:
1627         EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1628         return ok;
1629         }
1630
1631 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1632 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1633         {
1634         int ok;
1635         X509_REVOKED *rev;
1636         /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1637          * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1638          * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1639          * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1640          */
1641         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1642                 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1643                 {
1644                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1645                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1646                 if(!ok)
1647                         return 0;
1648                 }
1649         /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1650          * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1651          */
1652         if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1653                 {
1654                 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1655                         return 2;
1656                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1657                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1658                 if (!ok)
1659                         return 0;
1660                 }
1661
1662         return 1;
1663         }
1664
1665 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1666         {
1667         int ret;
1668         if (ctx->parent)
1669                 return 1;
1670         ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1671                                 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1672         if (ret == 0)
1673                 {
1674                 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1675                 return 0;
1676                 }
1677         /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1678         if (ret == -1)
1679                 {
1680                 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1681                  * callback.
1682                  */
1683                 X509 *x;
1684                 int i;
1685                 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1686                         {
1687                         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1688                         if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1689                                 continue;
1690                         ctx->current_cert = x;
1691                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1692                         if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1693                                 return 0;
1694                         }
1695                 return 1;
1696                 }
1697         if (ret == -2)
1698                 {
1699                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1700                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1701                 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1702                 }
1703
1704         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1705                 {
1706                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1707                 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1708                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1709                         return 0;
1710                 }
1711
1712         return 1;
1713         }
1714
1715 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int quiet)
1716         {
1717         time_t *ptime;
1718         int i;
1719
1720         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1721                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1722         else
1723                 ptime = NULL;
1724
1725         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1726         if (i == 0)
1727                 {
1728                 if (quiet)
1729                         return 0;
1730                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1731                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1732                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1733                         return 0;
1734                 }
1735
1736         if (i > 0)
1737                 {
1738                 if (quiet)
1739                         return 0;
1740                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1741                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1742                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1743                         return 0;
1744                 }
1745
1746         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1747         if (i == 0)
1748                 {
1749                 if (quiet)
1750                         return 0;
1751                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1752                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1753                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1754                         return 0;
1755                 }
1756
1757         if (i < 0)
1758                 {
1759                 if (quiet)
1760                         return 0;
1761                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1762                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1763                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1764                         return 0;
1765                 }
1766
1767         return 1;
1768         }
1769
1770 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1771         {
1772         int ok=0,n;
1773         X509 *xs,*xi;
1774         EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1775         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1776
1777         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
1778
1779         n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1780         ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1781         n--;
1782         xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1783
1784         if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1785                 xs=xi;
1786         else
1787                 {
1788                 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
1789                         {
1790                         xs = xi;
1791                         goto check_cert;
1792                         }
1793                 if (n <= 0)
1794                         {
1795                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1796                         ctx->current_cert=xi;
1797                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
1798                         goto end;
1799                         }
1800                 else
1801                         {
1802                         n--;
1803                         ctx->error_depth=n;
1804                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1805                         }
1806                 }
1807
1808 /*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
1809         while (n >= 0)
1810                 {
1811                 ctx->error_depth=n;
1812
1813                 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1814                  * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1815                  * just wastes time.
1816                  */
1817                 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1818                         {
1819                         if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1820                                 {
1821                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1822                                 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1823                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1824                                 if (!ok) goto end;
1825                                 }
1826                         else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1827                                 {
1828                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1829                                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1830                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1831                                 if (!ok)
1832                                         {
1833                                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1834                                         goto end;
1835                                         }
1836                                 }
1837                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1838                         pkey=NULL;
1839                         }
1840
1841                 xs->valid = 1;
1842
1843                 check_cert:
1844                 ok = x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, 0);
1845                 if (!ok)
1846                         goto end;
1847
1848                 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1849                 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1850                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1851                 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
1852                 if (!ok) goto end;
1853
1854                 n--;
1855                 if (n >= 0)
1856                         {
1857                         xi=xs;
1858                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1859                         }
1860                 }
1861         ok=1;
1862 end:
1863         return ok;
1864         }
1865
1866 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1867 {
1868         return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1869 }
1870
1871 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1872         {
1873         char *str;
1874         ASN1_TIME atm;
1875         long offset;
1876         char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1877         int i,j;
1878
1879         p=buff1;
1880         i=ctm->length;
1881         str=(char *)ctm->data;
1882         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1883                 {
1884                 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1885                 memcpy(p,str,10);
1886                 p+=10;
1887                 str+=10;
1888                 }
1889         else
1890                 {
1891                 if (i < 13) return 0;
1892                 memcpy(p,str,12);
1893                 p+=12;
1894                 str+=12;
1895                 }
1896
1897         if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1898                 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1899         else
1900                 {
1901                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1902                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1903                 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1904                 if (*str == '.')
1905                         {
1906                         str++;
1907                         while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1908                         }
1909
1910                 }
1911         *(p++)='Z';
1912         *(p++)='\0';
1913
1914         if (*str == 'Z')
1915                 offset=0;
1916         else
1917                 {
1918                 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1919                         return 0;
1920                 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1921                 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1922                 if (*str == '-')
1923                         offset= -offset;
1924                 }
1925         atm.type=ctm->type;
1926         atm.flags = 0;
1927         atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1928         atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1929
1930         if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1931                 return 0;
1932
1933         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1934                 {
1935                 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1936                 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1937                 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1938                 if (j < 50) j+=100;
1939
1940                 if (i < j) return -1;
1941                 if (i > j) return 1;
1942                 }
1943         i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1944         if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1945                 return -1;
1946         else
1947                 return i;
1948         }
1949
1950 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1951 {
1952         return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1953 }
1954
1955 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1956         {
1957         return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1958         }
1959
1960 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1961                                 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1962         {
1963         time_t t;
1964
1965         if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1966         else time(&t);
1967
1968         if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1969                 {
1970                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1971                         return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1972                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1973                         return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1974                                                                 offset_sec);
1975                 }
1976         return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1977         }
1978
1979 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1980         {
1981         EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1982         int i,j;
1983
1984         if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1985
1986         for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1987                 {
1988                 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1989                 if (ktmp == NULL)
1990                         {
1991                         X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1992                         return 0;
1993                         }
1994                 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1995                         break;
1996                 else
1997                         {
1998                         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1999                         ktmp=NULL;
2000                         }
2001                 }
2002         if (ktmp == NULL)
2003                 {
2004                 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
2005                 return 0;
2006                 }
2007
2008         /* first, populate the other certs */
2009         for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
2010                 {
2011                 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
2012                 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
2013                 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
2014                 }
2015
2016         if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
2017         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
2018         return 1;
2019         }
2020
2021 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
2022
2023 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
2024                         EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
2025         {
2026         X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
2027         int i;
2028         STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
2029         /* CRLs can't be delta already */
2030         if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number)
2031                         {
2032                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
2033                         return NULL;
2034                         }
2035         /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
2036         if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number)
2037                         {
2038                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
2039                         return NULL;
2040                         }
2041         /* Issuer names must match */
2042         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
2043                                 X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2044                         {
2045                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
2046                         return NULL;
2047                         }
2048         /* AKID and IDP must match */
2049         if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier))
2050                         {
2051                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
2052                         return NULL;
2053                         }
2054         if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
2055                         {
2056                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
2057                         return NULL;
2058                         }
2059         /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
2060         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0)
2061                         {
2062                         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
2063                         return NULL;
2064                         }
2065         /* CRLs must verify */
2066         if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
2067                         X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0))
2068                 {
2069                 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
2070                 return NULL;
2071                 }
2072         /* Create new CRL */
2073         crl = X509_CRL_new();
2074         if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
2075                 goto memerr;
2076         /* Set issuer name */
2077         if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
2078                 goto memerr;
2079
2080         if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
2081                 goto memerr;
2082         if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
2083                 goto memerr;
2084
2085         /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
2086
2087         if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
2088                 goto memerr;
2089
2090         /* Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set
2091          * CRL number to correct value too.
2092          */
2093
2094         for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++)
2095                 {
2096                 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
2097                 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
2098                 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
2099                         goto memerr;
2100                 }
2101
2102         /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
2103
2104         revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
2105
2106         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++)
2107                 {
2108                 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2109                 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2110                 /* Add only if not also in base.
2111                  * TODO: need something cleverer here for some more complex
2112                  * CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2113                  */
2114                 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber))
2115                         {
2116                         rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2117                         if (!rvtmp)
2118                                 goto memerr;
2119                         if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp))
2120                                 {
2121                                 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2122                                 goto memerr;
2123                                 }
2124                         }
2125                 }
2126         /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2127
2128         if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2129                 goto memerr;
2130
2131         return crl;
2132
2133         memerr:
2134         X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2135         if (crl)
2136                 X509_CRL_free(crl);
2137         return NULL;
2138         }
2139
2140 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2141              CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2142         {
2143         /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
2144          * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
2145         return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2146                         new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2147         }
2148
2149 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2150         {
2151         return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
2152         }
2153
2154 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2155         {
2156         return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
2157         }
2158
2159 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2160         {
2161         return ctx->error;
2162         }
2163
2164 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2165         {
2166         ctx->error=err;
2167         }
2168
2169 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2170         {
2171         return ctx->error_depth;
2172         }
2173
2174 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2175         {
2176         return ctx->current_cert;
2177         }
2178
2179 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2180         {
2181         return ctx->chain;
2182         }
2183
2184 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2185         {
2186         if (!ctx->chain)
2187                 return NULL;
2188         return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2189         }
2190
2191 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2192         {
2193         return ctx->current_issuer;
2194         }
2195
2196 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2197         {
2198         return ctx->current_crl;
2199         }
2200
2201 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2202         {
2203         return ctx->parent;
2204         }
2205
2206 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2207         {
2208         ctx->cert=x;
2209         }
2210
2211 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2212         {
2213         ctx->untrusted=sk;
2214         }
2215
2216 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2217         {
2218         ctx->crls=sk;
2219         }
2220
2221 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2222         {
2223         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2224         }
2225
2226 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2227         {
2228         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2229         }
2230
2231 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
2232  * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
2233  * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
2234  * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
2235  * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
2236  * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
2237  * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
2238  * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
2239  */
2240
2241 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2242                                 int purpose, int trust)
2243 {
2244         int idx;
2245         /* If purpose not set use default */
2246         if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
2247         /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2248         if (purpose)
2249                 {
2250                 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2251                 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2252                 if (idx == -1)
2253                         {
2254                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2255                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2256                         return 0;
2257                         }
2258                 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2259                 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
2260                         {
2261                         idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2262                         if (idx == -1)
2263                                 {
2264                                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2265                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2266                                 return 0;
2267                                 }
2268                         ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2269                         }
2270                 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2271                 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
2272                 }
2273         if (trust)
2274                 {
2275                 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2276                 if (idx == -1)
2277                         {
2278                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2279                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2280                         return 0;
2281                         }
2282                 }
2283
2284         if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2285         if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
2286         return 1;
2287 }
2288
2289 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2290 {
2291         X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2292         ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2293         if (!ctx)
2294                 {
2295                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2296                 return NULL;
2297                 }
2298         memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2299         return ctx;
2300 }
2301
2302 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2303 {
2304         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2305         OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2306 }
2307
2308 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2309              STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2310         {
2311         int ret = 1;
2312         ctx->ctx=store;
2313         ctx->current_method=0;
2314         ctx->cert=x509;
2315         ctx->untrusted=chain;
2316         ctx->crls = NULL;
2317         ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2318         ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2319         ctx->valid=0;
2320         ctx->chain=NULL;
2321         ctx->error=0;
2322         ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2323         ctx->error_depth=0;
2324         ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2325         ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2326         ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2327         ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2328         ctx->current_reasons=0;
2329         ctx->tree = NULL;
2330         ctx->parent = NULL;
2331
2332         ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2333
2334         if (!ctx->param)
2335                 {
2336                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2337                 return 0;
2338                 }
2339
2340         /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2341          * use defaults.
2342          */
2343
2344
2345         if (store)
2346                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2347         else
2348                 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2349
2350         if (store)
2351                 {
2352                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2353                 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2354                 }
2355         else
2356                 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2357
2358         if (ret)
2359                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2360                                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2361
2362         if (ret == 0)
2363                 {
2364                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2365                 return 0;
2366                 }
2367
2368         if (store && store->check_issued)
2369                 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2370         else
2371                 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2372
2373         if (store && store->get_issuer)
2374                 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2375         else
2376                 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2377
2378         if (store && store->verify_cb)
2379                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2380         else
2381                 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2382
2383         if (store && store->verify)
2384                 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2385         else
2386                 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2387
2388         if (store && store->check_revocation)
2389                 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2390         else
2391                 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2392
2393         if (store && store->get_crl)
2394                 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2395         else
2396                 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2397
2398         if (store && store->check_crl)
2399                 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2400         else
2401                 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2402
2403         if (store && store->cert_crl)
2404                 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2405         else
2406                 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2407
2408         if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2409                 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2410         else
2411                 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2412
2413         if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2414                 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2415         else
2416                 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2417
2418         ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2419
2420
2421         /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2422          * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2423          * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2424         /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2425         if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2426                                 &(ctx->ex_data)))
2427                 {
2428                 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2429                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2430                 return 0;
2431                 }
2432         return 1;
2433         }
2434
2435 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2436  * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2437  */
2438
2439 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2440 {
2441         ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2442         ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2443 }
2444
2445 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2446         {
2447         if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2448         if (ctx->param != NULL)
2449                 {
2450                 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2451                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2452                 ctx->param=NULL;
2453                 }
2454         if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2455                 {
2456                 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2457                 ctx->tree=NULL;
2458                 }
2459         if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2460                 {
2461                 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2462                 ctx->chain=NULL;
2463                 }
2464         CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2465         memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2466         }
2467
2468 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2469         {
2470         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2471         }
2472
2473 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2474         {
2475         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2476         }
2477
2478 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2479         {
2480         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2481         }
2482
2483 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2484                                   int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2485         {
2486         ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2487         }
2488
2489 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2490         {
2491         return ctx->tree;
2492         }
2493
2494 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2495         {
2496         return ctx->explicit_policy;
2497         }
2498
2499 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2500         {
2501         const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2502         param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2503         if (!param)
2504                 return 0;
2505         return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2506         }
2507
2508 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2509         {
2510         return ctx->param;
2511         }
2512
2513 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2514         {
2515         if (ctx->param)
2516                 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2517         ctx->param = param;
2518         }
2519
2520 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2521 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2522
2523 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2524
2525 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2526 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)