1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
74 /* CRL score values */
76 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
78 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
80 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
82 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
86 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
88 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
90 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
92 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
94 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
96 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
98 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
100 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
102 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
104 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
106 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
108 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
110 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
112 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
113 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
114 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
115 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
124 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
125 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
126 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
127 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
128 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
129 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
130 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
131 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
133 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
134 unsigned int *preasons);
135 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
136 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
137 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
138 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
140 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
141 const char X509_version[] = "X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
143 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
149 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
151 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b);
154 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
155 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
157 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
158 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
164 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
166 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
168 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
171 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
172 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
175 /* Look for exact match */
176 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
177 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
178 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
181 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
182 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
185 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
189 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
191 X509 *x, *xtmp, *chain_ss = NULL;
193 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
194 int depth, i, ok = 0;
196 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
197 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
198 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
199 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
206 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
207 * the first entry is in place
209 if (ctx->chain == NULL) {
210 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
211 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
212 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
215 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
216 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
219 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
220 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
221 && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
222 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
226 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
227 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
228 depth = param->depth;
231 /* If we have enough, we break */
233 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
234 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
235 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
238 /* If we are self signed, we break */
239 if (cert_self_signed(x))
242 * If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
244 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
245 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
249 * If successful for now free up cert so it will be picked up
258 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
259 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
260 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
262 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
263 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
266 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
267 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
268 ctx->last_untrusted++;
272 * reparse the full chain for the next one
281 * at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted certificates.
282 * We now need to add at least one trusted one, if possible, otherwise we
287 * Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is self signed.
290 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
291 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
292 if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
293 /* we have a self signed certificate */
294 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
296 * We have a single self signed certificate: see if we can find
297 * it in the store. We must have an exact match to avoid possible
300 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
301 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
302 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
303 ctx->current_cert = x;
304 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
313 * We have a match: replace certificate with store version so
314 * we get any trust settings.
318 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
319 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
323 * extract and save self signed certificate for later use
325 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
326 ctx->last_untrusted--;
328 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
332 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
334 /* If we have enough, we break */
338 /* If we are self signed, we break */
339 if (cert_self_signed(x))
342 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
350 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
352 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
358 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
360 i = check_trust(ctx);
362 /* If explicitly rejected error */
363 if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
366 * If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
367 * self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
368 * and set bad_chain == 1
370 if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
371 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
372 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
373 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
375 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
376 ctx->current_cert = x;
379 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss);
381 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
382 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
383 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
387 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
394 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
395 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
400 /* Check name constraints */
402 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
412 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
413 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
416 * Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
417 * they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
420 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
424 i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
426 if (i != X509_V_OK) {
428 ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
434 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
435 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
436 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
438 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
442 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
443 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
446 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
450 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
451 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
452 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
457 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
461 if (chain_ss != NULL)
467 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
470 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
473 X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;;
474 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
475 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
476 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) {
478 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, 1))
485 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
487 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
491 return cert_self_signed(x);
492 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
493 if (ret == X509_V_OK) {
496 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
497 if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
499 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
500 ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
501 if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) {
502 ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
508 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
510 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
511 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
515 ctx->current_cert = x;
516 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
517 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
520 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
522 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
524 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
526 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
533 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
537 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
539 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
541 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
542 int proxy_path_length = 0;
544 int allow_proxy_certs;
548 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
549 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
550 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
551 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
552 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
553 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
554 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
558 /* CRL path validation */
560 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
561 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
564 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
566 * A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
569 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
570 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
571 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
574 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
575 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
577 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
578 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
579 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
580 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
581 ctx->error_depth = i;
582 ctx->current_cert = x;
587 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
588 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
589 ctx->error_depth = i;
590 ctx->current_cert = x;
595 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
596 switch (must_be_ca) {
598 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
599 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
601 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
608 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
614 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
617 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
623 ctx->error_depth = i;
624 ctx->current_cert = x;
629 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
630 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
632 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
634 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
635 ctx->error_depth = i;
636 ctx->current_cert = x;
642 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
643 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
644 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
645 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
646 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
647 ctx->error_depth = i;
648 ctx->current_cert = x;
653 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
654 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
657 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
658 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
659 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
661 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
662 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
663 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
664 ctx->error_depth = i;
665 ctx->current_cert = x;
680 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
684 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
685 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
686 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
687 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
688 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
691 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
692 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
693 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
696 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
697 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
699 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
700 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
702 ctx->error_depth = i;
703 ctx->current_cert = x;
704 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
713 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
715 ctx->error = errcode;
716 ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
717 ctx->error_depth = 0;
718 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
721 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id)
724 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(id->hosts);
727 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
728 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(id->hosts, i);
729 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, id->hostflags, &id->peername) > 0)
735 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
737 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
738 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_ID *id = vpm->id;
740 if (id->hosts && check_hosts(x, id) <= 0) {
741 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
744 if (id->email && X509_check_email(x, id->email, id->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
745 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
748 if (id->ip && X509_check_ip(x, id->ip, id->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
749 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
755 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
759 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
761 /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
762 for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
763 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
764 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
765 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
766 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
767 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
769 * If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
772 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
773 ctx->error_depth = i;
774 ctx->current_cert = x;
775 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
778 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
782 * If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
785 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
787 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
788 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
789 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
790 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
792 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
794 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
795 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
800 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
801 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
803 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
806 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
809 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
811 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
812 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
814 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
819 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
820 ctx->error_depth = i;
821 ok = check_cert(ctx);
828 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
830 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
833 unsigned int last_reasons;
834 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
835 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
836 ctx->current_cert = x;
837 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
838 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
839 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
840 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
841 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
842 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
844 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
846 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
848 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
851 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
852 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
855 ctx->current_crl = crl;
856 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
861 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
864 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
870 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
872 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
882 * If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by another iteration,
885 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
886 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
887 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
895 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
900 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
902 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
907 ctx->current_crl = crl;
908 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
909 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
913 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
917 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
918 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
925 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
926 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
930 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
931 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
936 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
937 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
940 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
941 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
944 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
945 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
951 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
956 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
957 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
958 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
960 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
961 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
962 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
963 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
964 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
966 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
967 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
969 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
971 if (crl_score > best_score) {
973 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
974 best_score = crl_score;
975 best_reasons = reasons;
981 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
983 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
984 *pscore = best_score;
985 *preasons = best_reasons;
986 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
988 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
991 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
994 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1001 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1002 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1005 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1007 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1009 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1011 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1012 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1014 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1018 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1022 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1024 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1034 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1040 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1042 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1044 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1045 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1047 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1048 if (!base->crl_number)
1050 /* Issuer names must match */
1051 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1053 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1054 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1056 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1058 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1059 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1061 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1062 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1068 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1069 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1072 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1073 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1077 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1079 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1081 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1082 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1083 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1084 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1085 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1086 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1095 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1096 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1097 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1098 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1099 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1102 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1103 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1107 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1109 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1111 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1112 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1114 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1115 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1116 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1118 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1119 /* If no new reasons reject */
1120 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1123 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1124 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1126 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1127 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1128 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1131 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1133 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1134 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1137 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1138 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1140 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1141 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1143 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1145 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1148 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1150 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1151 /* If no new reasons reject */
1152 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1154 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1155 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1158 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1164 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1165 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1167 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1168 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1169 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1172 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1175 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1177 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1178 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1179 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1180 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1185 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1186 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1187 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1189 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1190 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1191 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1196 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1198 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1202 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1203 * untrusted certificates.
1205 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1206 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1207 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1209 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1210 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1211 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1218 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1219 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1220 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1221 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1224 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1226 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1228 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1231 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1234 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1235 /* Copy verify params across */
1236 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1238 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1239 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1241 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1242 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1247 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1249 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1251 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1256 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1257 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1258 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1259 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1260 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1264 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1265 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1266 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1268 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1269 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1270 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1271 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1277 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1278 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1279 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1280 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1281 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1284 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1286 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1287 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1288 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1295 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1299 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1304 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1306 gens = b->name.fullname;
1307 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1310 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1311 gens = a->name.fullname;
1315 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1317 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1318 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1319 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1321 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1327 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1329 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1330 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1331 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1332 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1333 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1342 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1345 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1346 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1348 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1349 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1350 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1351 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1353 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1359 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1361 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1362 unsigned int *preasons)
1365 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1367 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1368 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1371 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1374 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1375 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1376 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1377 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1378 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1379 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1384 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1385 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1391 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1392 * to find a delta CRL too
1395 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1396 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1399 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1401 unsigned int reasons;
1402 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1403 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1404 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1405 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1406 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1407 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1412 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1414 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1416 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1420 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1422 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1426 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1428 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1429 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1430 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1439 /* Check CRL validity */
1440 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1442 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1443 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1444 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1445 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1446 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1447 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1448 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1449 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1452 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1453 * certificate in chain.
1455 else if (cnum < chnum)
1456 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1458 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1459 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1460 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1461 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1462 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1470 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1472 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1473 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1474 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1475 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1476 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1477 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1482 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1483 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1484 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1489 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1490 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1491 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1492 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1498 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1499 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1500 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1507 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1508 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1513 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1514 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1517 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1518 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1523 rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1524 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
1526 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1530 /* Verify CRL signature */
1531 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1532 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1533 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1543 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1547 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1548 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1553 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1554 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1555 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extension can
1556 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1558 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1559 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1560 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1561 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1566 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL If found make sure reason
1567 * is not removeFromCRL.
1569 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1570 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1572 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1573 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1581 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1586 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1587 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1589 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1592 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1595 * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback.
1599 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1600 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1601 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1603 ctx->current_cert = x;
1604 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1605 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1611 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1612 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1613 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1616 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1617 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1618 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1619 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1626 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int quiet)
1631 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1632 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1636 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1640 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1641 ctx->current_cert = x;
1642 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1649 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1650 ctx->current_cert = x;
1651 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1655 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1659 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1660 ctx->current_cert = x;
1661 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1668 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1669 ctx->current_cert = x;
1670 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1677 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1681 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1682 int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1684 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1686 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1687 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1689 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1691 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1694 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1699 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1700 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1705 ctx->error_depth = n;
1706 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1710 /* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1712 ctx->error_depth = n;
1715 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1716 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
1721 || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
1722 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1723 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1724 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1725 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1728 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1729 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1730 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1731 ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
1733 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1737 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1744 ok = x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, 0);
1748 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1749 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1750 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1751 ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
1758 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1766 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1768 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1771 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1776 char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
1781 str = (char *)ctm->data;
1782 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1783 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17))
1796 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
1802 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1805 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9'))
1816 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1818 offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
1819 offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
1823 atm.type = ctm->type;
1825 atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
1826 atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
1828 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1831 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
1832 i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
1834 i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1835 j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
1844 i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
1845 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1851 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1853 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1856 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1858 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1861 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1862 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1871 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1872 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1873 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1874 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1875 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1877 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1880 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1882 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
1885 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
1888 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1889 ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
1891 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1892 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1895 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1898 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1903 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1904 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1908 /* first, populate the other certs */
1909 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
1910 ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
1911 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
1912 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1916 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
1917 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1921 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1923 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1924 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1926 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1928 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1929 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1930 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
1931 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1934 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1935 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
1936 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1939 /* Issuer names must match */
1940 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
1941 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
1944 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1945 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
1946 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
1949 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
1950 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
1953 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1954 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
1955 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
1958 /* CRLs must verify */
1959 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
1960 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
1961 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
1964 /* Create new CRL */
1965 crl = X509_CRL_new();
1966 if (!crl || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
1968 /* Set issuer name */
1969 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1972 if (!X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(newer)))
1974 if (!X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(newer)))
1977 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
1979 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
1983 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
1984 * number to correct value too.
1987 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
1988 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
1989 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
1990 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
1994 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
1996 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
1998 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
1999 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
2000 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
2002 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
2003 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
2005 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, rvn->serialNumber)) {
2006 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
2009 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
2010 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
2015 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
2017 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
2023 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2029 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
2030 CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
2031 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
2032 CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
2035 * This function is (usually) called only once, by
2036 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c).
2038 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
2039 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
2042 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
2044 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
2047 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2049 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2052 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2057 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2062 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2064 return ctx->error_depth;
2067 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2069 return ctx->current_cert;
2072 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2077 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2081 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2084 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2086 return ctx->current_issuer;
2089 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2091 return ctx->current_crl;
2094 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2099 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2104 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2106 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2109 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2114 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2116 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2119 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2121 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2125 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2126 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2127 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2128 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2129 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2130 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2131 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2135 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2136 int purpose, int trust)
2139 /* If purpose not set use default */
2141 purpose = def_purpose;
2142 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2145 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2147 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2148 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2151 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2152 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2153 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2155 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2156 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2159 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2161 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2163 trust = ptmp->trust;
2166 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2168 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2169 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2174 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2175 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2176 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2177 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2181 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2183 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2184 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2186 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2189 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2193 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2195 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2199 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2200 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2204 ctx->current_method = 0;
2206 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2208 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
2209 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2213 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2214 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2215 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2216 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2217 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2218 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2219 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2223 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2226 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2231 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2235 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2237 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2240 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2241 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2246 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2247 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2250 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2254 if (store && store->check_issued)
2255 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2257 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2259 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2260 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2262 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2264 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2265 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2267 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2269 if (store && store->verify)
2270 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2272 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2274 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2275 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2277 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2279 if (store && store->get_crl)
2280 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2282 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2284 if (store && store->check_crl)
2285 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2287 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2289 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2290 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2292 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2294 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2295 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2297 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2299 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2300 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2302 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2304 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2307 * This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2308 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2309 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation.
2311 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2312 if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2315 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2322 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2323 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2326 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2328 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2329 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2332 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2336 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2337 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2338 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2341 if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
2342 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2345 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
2346 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2349 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2350 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2353 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2355 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2358 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2360 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2363 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2366 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2369 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2370 int (*verify_cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2372 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2375 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2380 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2382 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2385 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2387 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2388 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2391 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2394 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2399 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2402 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2406 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2408 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2410 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2412 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2414 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)