Revert incompatible OCSP_basic_verify changes.
[openssl.git] / crypto / x509 / x509_vfy.c
1 /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3  * All rights reserved.
4  *
5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
6  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8  * 
9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15  * 
16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17  * the code are not to be removed.
18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22  * 
23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25  * are met:
26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40  * 
41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
52  * 
53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57  */
58
59 #include <stdio.h>
60 #include <time.h>
61 #include <errno.h>
62
63 #include "cryptlib.h"
64 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
65 #include <openssl/lhash.h>
66 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
67 #include <openssl/evp.h>
68 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
69 #include <openssl/x509.h>
70 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71 #include <openssl/objects.h>
72
73 /* CRL score values */
74
75 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
76
77 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL    0x100
78
79 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
80
81 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE         0x080
82
83 /* CRL times valid */
84
85 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME          0x040
86
87 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
88
89 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME   0x020
90
91 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
92
93 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
94
95 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
96
97 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT   0x018
98
99 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
100
101 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH     0x008
102
103 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
104
105 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID          0x004
106
107 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
108
109 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA    0x002
110
111 static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
112 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
113 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
114 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
115 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121
122 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
123                         unsigned int *preasons,
124                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
125 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
126                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
127 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
128                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
129 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
130                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
131 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
132                                 unsigned int *preasons);
133 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
134 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
135                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
136                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
137
138 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
139 const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
140
141
142 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
143         {
144         return ok;
145         }
146
147 #if 0
148 static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
149         {
150         return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
151         }
152 #endif
153
154 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
155
156 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
157         {
158         STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
159         X509 *xtmp;
160         int i;
161         /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
162         certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
163         if (certs == NULL)
164                 return NULL;
165         /* Look for exact match */
166         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++)
167                 {
168                 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
169                 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
170                         break;
171                 }
172         if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
173                 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
174         else
175                 xtmp = NULL;
176         sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
177         return xtmp;
178         }
179
180 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
181         {
182         X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
183         int bad_chain = 0;
184         X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
185         int depth,i,ok=0;
186         int num;
187         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
188         STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
189         if (ctx->cert == NULL)
190                 {
191                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
192                 return -1;
193                 }
194
195         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
196
197         /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
198          * present and that the first entry is in place */
199         if (ctx->chain == NULL)
200                 {
201                 if (    ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
202                         (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
203                         {
204                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
205                         goto end;
206                         }
207                 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
208                 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
209                 }
210
211         /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
212         if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
213             && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
214                 {
215                 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
216                 goto end;
217                 }
218
219         num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
220         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
221         depth=param->depth;
222
223
224         for (;;)
225                 {
226                 /* If we have enough, we break */
227                 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
228                                          * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
229                                          * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
230                                          * code later.
231                                          */
232
233                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
234                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
235
236                 /* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first */
237                 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
238                         {
239                         ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
240                         if (ok < 0)
241                                 return ok;
242                         /* If successful for now free up cert so it
243                          * will be picked up again later.
244                          */
245                         if (ok > 0)
246                                 {
247                                 X509_free(xtmp);
248                                 break;
249                                 }
250                         }
251
252                 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
253                 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
254                         {
255                         xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
256                         if (xtmp != NULL)
257                                 {
258                                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
259                                         {
260                                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
261                                         goto end;
262                                         }
263                                 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
264                                 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
265                                 ctx->last_untrusted++;
266                                 x=xtmp;
267                                 num++;
268                                 /* reparse the full chain for
269                                  * the next one */
270                                 continue;
271                                 }
272                         }
273                 break;
274                 }
275
276         /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
277          * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
278          * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
279
280         /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
281          * is self signed.
282          */
283
284         i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
285         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
286         if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
287                 {
288                 /* we have a self signed certificate */
289                 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
290                         {
291                         /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
292                          * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
293                          * match to avoid possible impersonation.
294                          */
295                         ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
296                         if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) 
297                                 {
298                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
299                                 ctx->current_cert=x;
300                                 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
301                                 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
302                                 bad_chain = 1;
303                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
304                                 if (!ok) goto end;
305                                 }
306                         else 
307                                 {
308                                 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
309                                  * so we get any trust settings.
310                                  */
311                                 X509_free(x);
312                                 x = xtmp;
313                                 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
314                                 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
315                                 }
316                         }
317                 else
318                         {
319                         /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
320                         chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
321                         ctx->last_untrusted--;
322                         num--;
323                         x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
324                         }
325                 }
326
327         /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
328         for (;;)
329                 {
330                 /* If we have enough, we break */
331                 if (depth < num) break;
332
333                 /* If we are self signed, we break */
334                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
335
336                 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
337
338                 if (ok < 0) return ok;
339                 if (ok == 0) break;
340
341                 x = xtmp;
342                 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
343                         {
344                         X509_free(xtmp);
345                         X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
346                         return 0;
347                         }
348                 num++;
349                 }
350
351         /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
352
353         i = check_trust(ctx);
354
355         /* If explicitly rejected error */
356         if (i == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
357                 goto end;
358         /* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error */
359         if (i != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
360                 {
361                 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
362                         {
363                         if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
364                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
365                         else
366                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
367                         ctx->current_cert=x;
368                         }
369                 else
370                         {
371
372                         sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
373                         num++;
374                         ctx->last_untrusted=num;
375                         ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
376                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
377                         chain_ss=NULL;
378                         }
379
380                 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
381                 bad_chain = 1;
382                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
383                 if (!ok) goto end;
384                 }
385
386         /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
387         ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
388
389         if (!ok) goto end;
390
391         /* Check name constraints */
392
393         ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
394         
395         if (!ok) goto end;
396
397         ok = check_id(ctx);
398
399         if (!ok) goto end;
400
401         /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
402         X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
403
404         /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
405          * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
406          */
407
408         ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
409         if(!ok) goto end;
410
411         /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
412         if (ctx->verify != NULL)
413                 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
414         else
415                 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
416         if(!ok) goto end;
417
418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
419         /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
420         ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
421         if (!ok) goto end;
422         ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
423         if (!ok) goto end;
424 #endif
425
426         /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
427         if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
428                 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
429         if(!ok) goto end;
430         if (0)
431                 {
432 end:
433                 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
434                 }
435         if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
436         if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
437         return ok;
438         }
439
440
441 /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
442  */
443
444 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
445 {
446         int i;
447         X509 *issuer;
448         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
449                 {
450                 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
451                 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
452                         return issuer;
453                 }
454         return NULL;
455 }
456
457 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
458
459 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
460 {
461         int ret;
462         ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
463         if (ret == X509_V_OK)
464                 return 1;
465         /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
466         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
467                 return 0;
468
469         ctx->error = ret;
470         ctx->current_cert = x;
471         ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
472         return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
473         return 0;
474 }
475
476 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
477
478 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
479 {
480         *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
481         if (*issuer)
482                 {
483                 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
484                 return 1;
485                 }
486         else
487                 return 0;
488 }
489         
490
491 /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
492  * with the supplied purpose
493  */
494
495 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
496 {
497 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
498         return 1;
499 #else
500         int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
501         X509 *x;
502         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
503         int proxy_path_length = 0;
504         int purpose;
505         int allow_proxy_certs;
506         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
507
508         /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
509            -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
510                use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
511            0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
512                used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
513            1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
514                all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
515         */
516         must_be_ca = -1;
517
518         /* CRL path validation */
519         if (ctx->parent)
520                 {
521                 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
522                 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
523                 }
524         else
525                 {
526                 allow_proxy_certs =
527                         !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
528                 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
529                    software happy */
530                 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
531                         allow_proxy_certs = 1;
532                 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
533                 }
534
535         /* Check all untrusted certificates */
536         for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
537                 {
538                 int ret;
539                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
540                 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
541                         && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
542                         {
543                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
544                         ctx->error_depth = i;
545                         ctx->current_cert = x;
546                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
547                         if (!ok) goto end;
548                         }
549                 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
550                         {
551                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
552                         ctx->error_depth = i;
553                         ctx->current_cert = x;
554                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
555                         if (!ok) goto end;
556                         }
557                 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
558                 switch(must_be_ca)
559                         {
560                 case -1:
561                         if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
562                                 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
563                                 {
564                                 ret = 0;
565                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
566                                 }
567                         else
568                                 ret = 1;
569                         break;
570                 case 0:
571                         if (ret != 0)
572                                 {
573                                 ret = 0;
574                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
575                                 }
576                         else
577                                 ret = 1;
578                         break;
579                 default:
580                         if ((ret == 0)
581                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
582                                         && (ret != 1)))
583                                 {
584                                 ret = 0;
585                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
586                                 }
587                         else
588                                 ret = 1;
589                         break;
590                         }
591                 if (ret == 0)
592                         {
593                         ctx->error_depth = i;
594                         ctx->current_cert = x;
595                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
596                         if (!ok) goto end;
597                         }
598                 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
599                         {
600                         ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
601                         if ((ret == 0)
602                                 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
603                                         && (ret != 1)))
604                                 {
605                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
606                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
607                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
608                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
609                                 if (!ok) goto end;
610                                 }
611                         }
612                 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
613                 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
614                            && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
615                            && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
616                         {
617                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
618                         ctx->error_depth = i;
619                         ctx->current_cert = x;
620                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
621                         if (!ok) goto end;
622                         }
623                 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
624                 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
625                         plen++;
626                 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
627                    certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
628                    certificate.  If not, the next certificate must be a
629                    CA certificate.  */
630                 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
631                         {
632                         if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
633                                 {
634                                 ctx->error =
635                                         X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
636                                 ctx->error_depth = i;
637                                 ctx->current_cert = x;
638                                 ok=cb(0,ctx);
639                                 if (!ok) goto end;
640                                 }
641                         proxy_path_length++;
642                         must_be_ca = 0;
643                         }
644                 else
645                         must_be_ca = 1;
646                 }
647         ok = 1;
648  end:
649         return ok;
650 #endif
651 }
652
653 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
654         {
655         X509 *x;
656         int i, j, rv;
657         /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
658         for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
659                 {
660                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
661                 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
662                 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
663                         continue;
664                 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
665                  * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
666                  * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
667                  * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
668                  */
669                 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
670                         {
671                         NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
672                         if (nc)
673                                 {
674                                 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
675                                 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
676                                         {
677                                         ctx->error = rv;
678                                         ctx->error_depth = i;
679                                         ctx->current_cert = x;
680                                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
681                                                 return 0;
682                                         }
683                                 }
684                         }
685                 }
686         return 1;
687         }
688
689 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
690         {
691         ctx->error = errcode;
692         ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
693         ctx->error_depth = 0;
694         return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
695         }
696
697 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
698         {
699         X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
700         X509 *x = ctx->cert;
701         if (vpm->host && !X509_check_host(x, vpm->host, vpm->hostlen, 0))
702                 {
703                 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
704                         return 0;
705                 }
706         if (vpm->email && !X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0))
707                 {
708                 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
709                         return 0;
710                 }
711         if (vpm->ip && !X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0))
712                 {
713                 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
714                         return 0;
715                 }
716         return 1;
717         }
718
719 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
720 {
721         int i, ok;
722         X509 *x = NULL;
723         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
724         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
725         /* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
726         for (i = ctx->last_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
727                 {
728                 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
729                 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
730                 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
731                 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
732                         return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
733                 /* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if
734                  * not overridden.
735                  */
736                 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
737                         {
738                         ctx->error_depth = i;
739                         ctx->current_cert = x;
740                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
741                         ok = cb(0, ctx);
742                         if (!ok)
743                                 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
744                         }
745                 }
746         /* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted
747          * certificate return success.
748          */
749         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
750                 {
751                 if (ctx->last_untrusted < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
752                         return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
753                 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
754                         {
755                         X509 *mx;
756                         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
757                         mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
758                         if (mx)
759                                 {
760                                 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
761                                 X509_free(x);
762                                 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
763                                 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
764                                 }
765                         }
766                 }
767
768         /* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and
769          * allow standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
770          */
771         return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
772 }
773
774 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
775         {
776         int i, last, ok;
777         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
778                 return 1;
779         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
780                 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
781         else
782                 {
783                 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
784                 if (ctx->parent)
785                         return 1;
786                 last = 0;
787                 }
788         for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
789                 {
790                 ctx->error_depth = i;
791                 ok = check_cert(ctx);
792                 if (!ok) return ok;
793                 }
794         return 1;
795         }
796
797 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
798         {
799         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
800         X509 *x;
801         int ok, cnum;
802         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
803         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
804         ctx->current_cert = x;
805         ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
806         ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
807         ctx->current_reasons = 0;
808         while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
809                 {
810                 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
811                 if (ctx->get_crl)
812                         ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
813                 else
814                         ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
815                 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
816                  * notify callback
817                  */
818                 if(!ok)
819                         {
820                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
821                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
822                         goto err;
823                         }
824                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
825                 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
826                 if (!ok)
827                         goto err;
828
829                 if (dcrl)
830                         {
831                         ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
832                         if (!ok)
833                                 goto err;
834                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
835                         if (!ok)
836                                 goto err;
837                         }
838                 else
839                         ok = 1;
840
841                 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
842                 if (ok != 2)
843                         {
844                         ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
845                         if (!ok)
846                                 goto err;
847                         }
848
849                 X509_CRL_free(crl);
850                 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
851                 crl = NULL;
852                 dcrl = NULL;
853                 }
854         err:
855         X509_CRL_free(crl);
856         X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
857
858         ctx->current_crl = NULL;
859         return ok;
860
861         }
862
863 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
864
865 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
866         {
867         time_t *ptime;
868         int i;
869         if (notify)
870                 ctx->current_crl = crl;
871         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
872                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
873         else
874                 ptime = NULL;
875
876         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
877         if (i == 0)
878                 {
879                 if (!notify)
880                         return 0;
881                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
882                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
883                         return 0;
884                 }
885
886         if (i > 0)
887                 {
888                 if (!notify)
889                         return 0;
890                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
891                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
892                         return 0;
893                 }
894
895         if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
896                 {
897                 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
898
899                 if (i == 0)
900                         {
901                         if (!notify)
902                                 return 0;
903                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
904                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
905                                 return 0;
906                         }
907                 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
908                 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
909                         {
910                         if (!notify)
911                                 return 0;
912                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
913                         if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
914                                 return 0;
915                         }
916                 }
917
918         if (notify)
919                 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
920
921         return 1;
922         }
923
924 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
925                         X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
926                         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
927         {
928         int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
929         unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
930         X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
931         X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
932         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
933
934         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
935                 {
936                 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
937                 reasons = *preasons;
938                 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
939
940                 if (crl_score > best_score)
941                         {
942                         best_crl = crl;
943                         best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
944                         best_score = crl_score;
945                         best_reasons = reasons;
946                         }
947                 }
948
949         if (best_crl)
950                 {
951                 if (*pcrl)
952                         X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
953                 *pcrl = best_crl;
954                 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
955                 *pscore = best_score;
956                 *preasons = best_reasons;
957                 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
958                 if (*pdcrl)
959                         {
960                         X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
961                         *pdcrl = NULL;
962                         }
963                 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
964                 }
965
966         if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
967                 return 1;
968
969         return 0;
970         }
971
972 /* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
973  * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
974  */
975
976 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
977         {
978         ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
979         int i;
980         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
981         if (i >= 0)
982                 {
983                 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
984                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
985                         return 0;
986                 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
987                 }
988         else
989                 exta = NULL;
990
991         i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
992
993         if (i >= 0)
994                 {
995
996                 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
997                         return 0;
998                 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
999                 }
1000         else
1001                 extb = NULL;
1002
1003         if (!exta && !extb)
1004                 return 1;
1005
1006         if (!exta || !extb)
1007                 return 0;
1008
1009
1010         if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1011                 return 0;
1012
1013         return 1;
1014         }
1015
1016 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1017
1018 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1019         {
1020         /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1021         if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1022                         return 0;
1023         /* Base must have a CRL number */
1024         if (!base->crl_number)
1025                         return 0;
1026         /* Issuer names must match */
1027         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
1028                                 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1029                 return 0;
1030         /* AKID and IDP must match */
1031         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1032                         return 0;
1033         if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1034                         return 0;
1035         /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1036         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1037                         return 0;
1038         /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1039         if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1040                         return 1;
1041         return 0;
1042         }
1043
1044 /* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
1045  * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
1046  */
1047
1048 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1049                         X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1050         {
1051         X509_CRL *delta;
1052         int i;
1053         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1054                 return;
1055         if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1056                 return;
1057         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
1058                 {
1059                 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1060                 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
1061                         {
1062                         if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1063                                 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1064                         CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
1065                         *dcrl = delta;
1066                         return;
1067                         }
1068                 }
1069         *dcrl = NULL;
1070         }
1071
1072 /* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
1073  * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
1074  * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
1075  * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
1076  * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1077  */
1078
1079 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1080                         unsigned int *preasons,
1081                         X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1082         {
1083
1084         int crl_score = 0;
1085         unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1086
1087         /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1088
1089         /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1090         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1091                 return 0;
1092         /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1093         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1094                 {
1095                 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1096                         return 0;
1097                 }
1098         else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
1099                 {
1100                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1101                 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1102                         return 0;
1103                 }
1104         /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1105         else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1106                 return 0;
1107         /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1108         if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1109                 {
1110                 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1111                         return 0;
1112                 }
1113         else
1114                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1115
1116         if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1117                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1118
1119         /* Check expiry */
1120         if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1121                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1122
1123         /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1124         crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1125
1126         /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1127
1128         if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1129                 return 0;
1130
1131         /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1132
1133         if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1134                 {
1135                 /* If no new reasons reject */
1136                 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1137                         return 0;
1138                 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1139                 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1140                 }
1141
1142         *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1143
1144         return crl_score;
1145
1146         }
1147
1148 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1149                                 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1150         {
1151         X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1152         X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1153         int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1154         int i;
1155
1156         if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1157                 cidx++;
1158
1159         crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1160
1161         if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1162                 {
1163                 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1164                         {
1165                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1166                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1167                         return;
1168                         }
1169                 }
1170
1171         for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1172                 {
1173                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1174                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1175                         continue;
1176                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1177                         {
1178                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1179                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1180                         return;
1181                         }
1182                 }
1183
1184         /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1185
1186         if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1187                 return;
1188
1189         /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1190          * set of untrusted certificates.
1191          */
1192         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1193                 {
1194                 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1195                 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1196                         continue;
1197                 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1198                         {
1199                         *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1200                         *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1201                         return;
1202                         }
1203                 }
1204         }
1205
1206 /* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1207  * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1208  * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1209  * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in 
1210  * practice.
1211  */
1212
1213 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1214         {
1215         X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1216         int ret;
1217         /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1218         if (ctx->parent)
1219                 return 0;
1220         if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1221                 return -1;
1222
1223         crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1224         /* Copy verify params across */
1225         X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1226
1227         crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1228         crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1229
1230         /* Verify CRL issuer */
1231         ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1232
1233         if (ret <= 0)
1234                 goto err;
1235
1236         /* Check chain is acceptable */
1237
1238         ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1239         err:
1240         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1241         return ret;
1242         }
1243
1244 /* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1245  * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1246  * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1247  * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1248  * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1249  * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1250  */
1251
1252 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1253                         STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1254                         STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1255         {
1256         X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1257         cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1258         crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1259         if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1260                 return 1;
1261         return 0;
1262         }
1263
1264 /* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1265  * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1266  * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1267  * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1268  * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1269  */
1270
1271
1272 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1273         {
1274         X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1275         GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1276         GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1277         int i, j;
1278         if (!a || !b)
1279                 return 1;
1280         if (a->type == 1)
1281                 {
1282                 if (!a->dpname)
1283                         return 0;
1284                 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1285                 if (b->type == 1)
1286                         {
1287                         if (!b->dpname)
1288                                 return 0;
1289                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1290                                 return 1;
1291                         else
1292                                 return 0;
1293                         }
1294                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1295                 nm = a->dpname;
1296                 gens = b->name.fullname;
1297                 }
1298         else if (b->type == 1)
1299                 {
1300                 if (!b->dpname)
1301                         return 0;
1302                 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1303                 gens = a->name.fullname;
1304                 nm = b->dpname;
1305                 }
1306
1307         /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1308         if (nm)
1309                 {
1310                 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1311                         {
1312                         gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);  
1313                         if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1314                                 continue;
1315                         if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1316                                 return 1;
1317                         }
1318                 return 0;
1319                 }
1320
1321         /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1322
1323         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1324                 {
1325                 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1326                 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1327                         {
1328                         genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1329                         if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1330                                 return 1;
1331                         }
1332                 }
1333
1334         return 0;
1335
1336         }
1337
1338 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1339         {
1340         int i;
1341         X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1342         /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1343         if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1344                 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1345         for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1346                 {
1347                 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1348                 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1349                         continue;
1350                 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1351                         return 1;
1352                 }
1353         return 0;
1354         }
1355
1356 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1357
1358 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1359                                 unsigned int *preasons)
1360         {
1361         int i;
1362         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1363                 return 0;
1364         if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1365                 {
1366                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1367                         return 0;
1368                 }
1369         else
1370                 {
1371                 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1372                         return 0;
1373                 }
1374         *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1375         for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1376                 {
1377                 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1378                 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1379                         {
1380                         if (!crl->idp ||
1381                              idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1382                                 {
1383                                 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1384                                 return 1;
1385                                 }
1386                         }
1387                 }
1388         if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1389                 return 1;
1390         return 0;
1391         }
1392
1393 /* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1394  * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1395  */
1396         
1397 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1398                                 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1399         {
1400         int ok;
1401         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1402         int crl_score = 0;
1403         unsigned int reasons;
1404         X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1405         STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1406         X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1407         reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1408         ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, 
1409                                 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1410
1411         if (ok)
1412                 goto done;
1413
1414         /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1415
1416         skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1417
1418         /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1419         if (!skcrl && crl)
1420                 goto done;
1421
1422         get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1423
1424         sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1425
1426         done:
1427
1428         /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1429         if (crl)
1430                 {
1431                 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1432                 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1433                 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1434                 *pcrl = crl;
1435                 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1436                 return 1;
1437                 }
1438
1439         return 0;
1440         }
1441
1442 /* Check CRL validity */
1443 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1444         {
1445         X509 *issuer = NULL;
1446         EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1447         int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1448         cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1449         chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1450         /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1451         if (ctx->current_issuer)
1452                 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1453
1454         /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1455          * is next certificate in chain.
1456          */
1457         else if (cnum < chnum)
1458                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1459         else
1460                 {
1461                 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1462                 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1463                 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1464                         {
1465                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1466                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1467                         if(!ok) goto err;
1468                         }
1469                 }
1470
1471         if(issuer)
1472                 {
1473                 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1474                  * been done
1475                  */
1476                 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1477                         {
1478                         /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1479                         if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1480                                 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1481                                 {
1482                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1483                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1484                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1485                                 }
1486
1487                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1488                                 {
1489                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1490                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1491                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1492                                 }
1493
1494                         if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1495                                 {
1496                                 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1497                                         {
1498                                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1499                                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1500                                         if(!ok) goto err;
1501                                         }
1502                                 }
1503
1504                         if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1505                                 {
1506                                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1507                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1508                                 if(!ok) goto err;
1509                                 }
1510
1511
1512                         }
1513
1514                 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1515                         {
1516                         ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1517                         if (!ok)
1518                                 goto err;
1519                         }
1520
1521                 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1522                 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1523
1524                 if(!ikey)
1525                         {
1526                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1527                         ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1528                         if (!ok) goto err;
1529                         }
1530                 else
1531                         {
1532                         /* Verify CRL signature */
1533                         if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1534                                 {
1535                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1536                                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1537                                 if (!ok) goto err;
1538                                 }
1539                         }
1540                 }
1541
1542         ok = 1;
1543
1544         err:
1545         EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1546         return ok;
1547         }
1548
1549 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1550 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1551         {
1552         int ok;
1553         X509_REVOKED *rev;
1554         /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1555          * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1556          * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since 
1557          * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1558          */
1559         if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1560                 {
1561                 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1562                         return 1;
1563                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1564                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1565                 if(!ok)
1566                         return 0;
1567                 }
1568         /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1569          * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1570          */
1571         if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1572                 {
1573                 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1574                         return 2;
1575                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1576                 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1577                 if (!ok)
1578                         return 0;
1579                 }
1580
1581         return 1;
1582         }
1583
1584 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1585         {
1586         int ret;
1587         if (ctx->parent)
1588                 return 1;
1589         ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1590                                 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1591         if (ret == 0)
1592                 {
1593                 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1594                 return 0;
1595                 }
1596         /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1597         if (ret == -1)
1598                 {
1599                 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1600                  * callback.
1601                  */
1602                 X509 *x;
1603                 int i;
1604                 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1605                         {
1606                         x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1607                         if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1608                                 continue;
1609                         ctx->current_cert = x;
1610                         ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1611                         if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1612                                 return 0;
1613                         }
1614                 return 1;
1615                 }
1616         if (ret == -2)
1617                 {
1618                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1619                 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1620                 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1621                 }
1622
1623         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1624                 {
1625                 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1626                 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1627                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1628                         return 0;
1629                 }
1630
1631         return 1;
1632         }
1633
1634 static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1635         {
1636         time_t *ptime;
1637         int i;
1638
1639         if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1640                 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1641         else
1642                 ptime = NULL;
1643
1644         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1645         if (i == 0)
1646                 {
1647                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1648                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1649                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1650                         return 0;
1651                 }
1652
1653         if (i > 0)
1654                 {
1655                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1656                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1657                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1658                         return 0;
1659                 }
1660
1661         i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1662         if (i == 0)
1663                 {
1664                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1665                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1666                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1667                         return 0;
1668                 }
1669
1670         if (i < 0)
1671                 {
1672                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1673                 ctx->current_cert=x;
1674                 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1675                         return 0;
1676                 }
1677
1678         return 1;
1679         }
1680
1681 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1682         {
1683         int ok=0,n;
1684         X509 *xs,*xi;
1685         EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1686         int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1687
1688         cb=ctx->verify_cb;
1689
1690         n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1691         ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1692         n--;
1693         xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1694
1695         if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1696                 xs=xi;
1697         else
1698                 {
1699                 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN && n == 0)
1700                         return check_cert_time(ctx, xi);
1701                 if (n <= 0)
1702                         {
1703                         ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1704                         ctx->current_cert=xi;
1705                         ok=cb(0,ctx);
1706                         goto end;
1707                         }
1708                 else
1709                         {
1710                         n--;
1711                         ctx->error_depth=n;
1712                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1713                         }
1714                 }
1715
1716 /*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
1717         while (n >= 0)
1718                 {
1719                 ctx->error_depth=n;
1720
1721                 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1722                  * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1723                  * just wastes time.
1724                  */
1725                 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1726                         {
1727                         if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1728                                 {
1729                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1730                                 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1731                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1732                                 if (!ok) goto end;
1733                                 }
1734                         else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1735                                 {
1736                                 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1737                                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1738                                 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1739                                 if (!ok)
1740                                         {
1741                                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1742                                         goto end;
1743                                         }
1744                                 }
1745                         EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1746                         pkey=NULL;
1747                         }
1748
1749                 xs->valid = 1;
1750
1751                 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1752                 if (!ok)
1753                         goto end;
1754
1755                 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1756                 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1757                 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1758                 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
1759                 if (!ok) goto end;
1760
1761                 n--;
1762                 if (n >= 0)
1763                         {
1764                         xi=xs;
1765                         xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1766                         }
1767                 }
1768         ok=1;
1769 end:
1770         return ok;
1771         }
1772
1773 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1774 {
1775         return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1776 }
1777
1778 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1779         {
1780         char *str;
1781         ASN1_TIME atm;
1782         long offset;
1783         char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1784         int i,j;
1785
1786         p=buff1;
1787         i=ctm->length;
1788         str=(char *)ctm->data;
1789         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1790                 {
1791                 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1792                 memcpy(p,str,10);
1793                 p+=10;
1794                 str+=10;
1795                 }
1796         else
1797                 {
1798                 if (i < 13) return 0;
1799                 memcpy(p,str,12);
1800                 p+=12;
1801                 str+=12;
1802                 }
1803
1804         if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1805                 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1806         else
1807                 { 
1808                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1809                 *(p++)= *(str++);
1810                 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1811                 if (*str == '.')
1812                         {
1813                         str++;
1814                         while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1815                         }
1816                 
1817                 }
1818         *(p++)='Z';
1819         *(p++)='\0';
1820
1821         if (*str == 'Z')
1822                 offset=0;
1823         else
1824                 {
1825                 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1826                         return 0;
1827                 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1828                 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1829                 if (*str == '-')
1830                         offset= -offset;
1831                 }
1832         atm.type=ctm->type;
1833         atm.flags = 0;
1834         atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1835         atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1836
1837         if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1838                 return 0;
1839
1840         if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1841                 {
1842                 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1843                 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1844                 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1845                 if (j < 50) j+=100;
1846
1847                 if (i < j) return -1;
1848                 if (i > j) return 1;
1849                 }
1850         i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1851         if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1852                 return -1;
1853         else
1854                 return i;
1855         }
1856
1857 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1858 {
1859         return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1860 }
1861
1862 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1863         {
1864         return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1865         }
1866
1867 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1868                                 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1869         {
1870         time_t t;
1871
1872         if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1873         else time(&t);
1874
1875         if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1876                 {
1877                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1878                         return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1879                 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1880                         return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1881                                                                 offset_sec);
1882                 }
1883         return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1884         }
1885
1886 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1887         {
1888         EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1889         int i,j;
1890
1891         if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1892
1893         for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1894                 {
1895                 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1896                 if (ktmp == NULL)
1897                         {
1898                         X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1899                         return 0;
1900                         }
1901                 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1902                         break;
1903                 else
1904                         {
1905                         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1906                         ktmp=NULL;
1907                         }
1908                 }
1909         if (ktmp == NULL)
1910                 {
1911                 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1912                 return 0;
1913                 }
1914
1915         /* first, populate the other certs */
1916         for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1917                 {
1918                 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1919                 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1920                 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1921                 }
1922         
1923         if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1924         EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1925         return 1;
1926         }
1927
1928 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1929              CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1930         {
1931         /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1932          * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1933         return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1934                         new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1935         }
1936
1937 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1938         {
1939         return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1940         }
1941
1942 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1943         {
1944         return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1945         }
1946
1947 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1948         {
1949         return ctx->error;
1950         }
1951
1952 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1953         {
1954         ctx->error=err;
1955         }
1956
1957 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1958         {
1959         return ctx->error_depth;
1960         }
1961
1962 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1963         {
1964         return ctx->current_cert;
1965         }
1966
1967 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1968         {
1969         return ctx->chain;
1970         }
1971
1972 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1973         {
1974         int i;
1975         X509 *x;
1976         STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1977         if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1978         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1979                 {
1980                 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1981                 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1982                 }
1983         return chain;
1984         }
1985
1986 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1987         {
1988         return ctx->current_issuer;
1989         }
1990
1991 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1992         {
1993         return ctx->current_crl;
1994         }
1995
1996 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1997         {
1998         return ctx->parent;
1999         }
2000
2001 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2002         {
2003         ctx->cert=x;
2004         }
2005
2006 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2007         {
2008         ctx->untrusted=sk;
2009         }
2010
2011 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2012         {
2013         ctx->crls=sk;
2014         }
2015
2016 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2017         {
2018         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2019         }
2020
2021 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2022         {
2023         return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2024         }
2025
2026 /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
2027  * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
2028  * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
2029  * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
2030  * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
2031  * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
2032  * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
2033  * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
2034  */
2035
2036 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2037                                 int purpose, int trust)
2038 {
2039         int idx;
2040         /* If purpose not set use default */
2041         if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
2042         /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2043         if (purpose)
2044                 {
2045                 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
2046                 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2047                 if (idx == -1)
2048                         {
2049                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2050                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2051                         return 0;
2052                         }
2053                 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2054                 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
2055                         {
2056                         idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2057                         if (idx == -1)
2058                                 {
2059                                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2060                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2061                                 return 0;
2062                                 }
2063                         ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2064                         }
2065                 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2066                 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
2067                 }
2068         if (trust)
2069                 {
2070                 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2071                 if (idx == -1)
2072                         {
2073                         X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2074                                                 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2075                         return 0;
2076                         }
2077                 }
2078
2079         if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2080         if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
2081         return 1;
2082 }
2083
2084 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2085 {
2086         X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
2087         ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2088         if (!ctx)
2089                 {
2090                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2091                 return NULL;
2092                 }
2093         memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
2094         return ctx;
2095 }
2096
2097 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2098 {
2099         X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2100         OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2101 }
2102
2103 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2104              STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2105         {
2106         int ret = 1;
2107         ctx->ctx=store;
2108         ctx->current_method=0;
2109         ctx->cert=x509;
2110         ctx->untrusted=chain;
2111         ctx->crls = NULL;
2112         ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2113         ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2114         ctx->valid=0;
2115         ctx->chain=NULL;
2116         ctx->error=0;
2117         ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2118         ctx->error_depth=0;
2119         ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2120         ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2121         ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2122         ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2123         ctx->current_reasons=0;
2124         ctx->tree = NULL;
2125         ctx->parent = NULL;
2126
2127         ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2128
2129         if (!ctx->param)
2130                 {
2131                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2132                 return 0;
2133                 }
2134
2135         /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2136          * use defaults.
2137          */
2138
2139
2140         if (store)
2141                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2142         else
2143                 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2144
2145         if (store)
2146                 {
2147                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2148                 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2149                 }
2150         else
2151                 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2152
2153         if (ret)
2154                 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2155                                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2156
2157         if (ret == 0)
2158                 {
2159                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2160                 return 0;
2161                 }
2162
2163         if (store && store->check_issued)
2164                 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2165         else
2166                 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2167
2168         if (store && store->get_issuer)
2169                 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2170         else
2171                 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2172
2173         if (store && store->verify_cb)
2174                 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2175         else
2176                 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2177
2178         if (store && store->verify)
2179                 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2180         else
2181                 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2182
2183         if (store && store->check_revocation)
2184                 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2185         else
2186                 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2187
2188         if (store && store->get_crl)
2189                 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2190         else
2191                 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2192
2193         if (store && store->check_crl)
2194                 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2195         else
2196                 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2197
2198         if (store && store->cert_crl)
2199                 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2200         else
2201                 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2202
2203         if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2204                 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2205         else
2206                 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2207
2208         if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2209                 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2210         else
2211                 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2212
2213         ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2214
2215
2216         /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2217          * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2218          * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2219         /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2220         if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2221                                 &(ctx->ex_data)))
2222                 {
2223                 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2224                 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2225                 return 0;
2226                 }
2227         return 1;
2228         }
2229
2230 /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2231  * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2232  */
2233
2234 void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2235 {
2236         ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2237         ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2238 }
2239
2240 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2241         {
2242         if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2243         if (ctx->param != NULL)
2244                 {
2245                 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2246                         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2247                 ctx->param=NULL;
2248                 }
2249         if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2250                 {
2251                 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2252                 ctx->tree=NULL;
2253                 }
2254         if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2255                 {
2256                 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2257                 ctx->chain=NULL;
2258                 }
2259         CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2260         memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2261         }
2262
2263 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2264         {
2265         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2266         }
2267
2268 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2269         {
2270         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2271         }
2272
2273 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2274         {
2275         X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2276         }
2277
2278 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2279                                   int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2280         {
2281         ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2282         }
2283
2284 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2285         {
2286         return ctx->tree;
2287         }
2288
2289 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2290         {
2291         return ctx->explicit_policy;
2292         }
2293
2294 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2295         {
2296         const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2297         param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2298         if (!param)
2299                 return 0;
2300         return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2301         }
2302
2303 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2304         {
2305         return ctx->param;
2306         }
2307
2308 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2309         {
2310         if (ctx->param)
2311                 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2312         ctx->param = param;
2313         }
2314
2315 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2316 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2317
2318 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2319
2320 IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2321 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)