2 * Copyright 2011-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
12 #include <openssl/err.h>
13 #include <openssl/rand.h>
17 * Support framework for NIST SP 800-90A DRBG, AES-CTR mode.
18 * The RAND_DRBG is OpenSSL's pointer to an instance of the DRBG.
20 * The OpenSSL model is to have new and free functions, and that new
21 * does all initialization. That is not the NIST model, which has
22 * instantiation and un-instantiate, and re-use within a new/free
23 * lifecycle. (No doubt this comes from the desire to support hardware
24 * DRBG, where allocation of resources on something like an HSM is
25 * a much bigger deal than just re-setting an allocated resource.)
29 * Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |nid|, with optional |flags|.
30 * Return -2 if the type is not supported, 1 on success and -1 on
33 int RAND_DRBG_set(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int nid, unsigned int flags)
37 drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
43 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE);
46 /* Uninitialized; that's okay. */
56 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_SET, RAND_R_ERROR_INITIALISING_DRBG);
61 * Allocate memory and initialize a new DRBG. The |parent|, if not
62 * NULL, will be used to auto-seed this RAND_DRBG as needed.
64 RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
66 RAND_DRBG *drbg = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*drbg));
67 unsigned char *ucp = OPENSSL_zalloc(RANDOMNESS_NEEDED);
69 if (drbg == NULL || ucp == NULL) {
70 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
73 drbg->size = RANDOMNESS_NEEDED;
74 drbg->randomness = ucp;
76 drbg->parent = parent;
77 if (RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, type, flags) < 0)
81 if (!RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(drbg, drbg_entropy_from_parent,
85 * Add in our address. Note we are adding the pointer
86 * itself, not its contents!
88 || !RAND_DRBG_instantiate(drbg,
89 (unsigned char*)&drbg, sizeof(drbg)))
102 * Uninstantiate |drbg| and free all memory.
104 void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
106 /* The global DRBG is free'd by rand_cleanup_int() */
107 if (drbg == NULL || drbg == &rand_drbg)
110 ctr_uninstantiate(drbg);
111 OPENSSL_cleanse(drbg->randomness, drbg->size);
112 OPENSSL_free(drbg->randomness);
113 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_DRBG, drbg, &drbg->ex_data);
114 OPENSSL_clear_free(drbg, sizeof(*drbg));
118 * Instantiate |drbg|, after it has been initialized. Use |pers| and
119 * |perslen| as prediction-resistance input.
121 int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
122 const unsigned char *pers, size_t perslen)
124 unsigned char *nonce = NULL, *entropy = NULL;
125 size_t noncelen = 0, entlen = 0;
127 if (perslen > drbg->max_pers) {
128 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
129 RAND_R_PERSONALISATION_STRING_TOO_LONG);
132 if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
133 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE,
134 drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR ? RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE
135 : RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED);
139 drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
140 if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
141 entlen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
142 drbg->min_entropy, drbg->max_entropy);
143 if (entlen < drbg->min_entropy || entlen > drbg->max_entropy) {
144 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
148 if (drbg->max_nonce > 0 && drbg->get_nonce != NULL) {
149 noncelen = drbg->get_nonce(drbg, &nonce, drbg->strength / 2,
150 drbg->min_nonce, drbg->max_nonce);
151 if (noncelen < drbg->min_nonce || noncelen > drbg->max_nonce) {
152 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_NONCE);
157 if (!ctr_instantiate(drbg, entropy, entlen,
158 nonce, noncelen, pers, perslen)) {
159 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_INSTANTIATING_DRBG);
163 drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
164 drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
167 if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
168 drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy);
169 if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce!= NULL )
170 drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, nonce);
171 if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
177 * Uninstantiate |drbg|. Must be instantiated before it can be used.
179 int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
181 int ret = ctr_uninstantiate(drbg);
183 OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->ctr, sizeof(drbg->ctr));
184 drbg->state = DRBG_UNINITIALISED;
189 * Mix in the specified data to reseed |drbg|.
191 int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
192 const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
194 unsigned char *entropy = NULL;
197 if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
198 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
201 if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
202 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
208 else if (adinlen > drbg->max_adin) {
209 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
213 drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
214 if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL)
215 entlen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength,
216 drbg->min_entropy, drbg->max_entropy);
217 if (entlen < drbg->min_entropy || entlen > drbg->max_entropy) {
218 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
222 if (!ctr_reseed(drbg, entropy, entlen, adin, adinlen))
224 drbg->state = DRBG_READY;
225 drbg->reseed_counter = 1;
228 if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
229 drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy);
230 if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
236 * Generate |outlen| bytes into the buffer at |out|. Reseed if we need
237 * to or if |prediction_resistance| is set. Additional input can be
238 * sent in |adin| and |adinlen|.
240 int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
241 int prediction_resistance,
242 const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen)
244 if (drbg->state == DRBG_ERROR) {
245 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_IN_ERROR_STATE);
248 if (drbg->state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED) {
249 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_NOT_INSTANTIATED);
252 if (outlen > drbg->max_request) {
253 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_REQUEST_TOO_LARGE_FOR_DRBG);
256 if (adinlen > drbg->max_adin) {
257 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
261 if (drbg->reseed_counter >= drbg->reseed_interval)
262 drbg->state = DRBG_RESEED;
264 if (drbg->state == DRBG_RESEED || prediction_resistance) {
265 if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen)) {
266 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR);
273 if (!ctr_generate(drbg, out, outlen, adin, adinlen)) {
274 drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
275 RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_GENERATE_ERROR);
279 if (drbg->reseed_counter >= drbg->reseed_interval)
280 drbg->state = DRBG_RESEED;
282 drbg->reseed_counter++;
287 * Set the callbacks for entropy and nonce. We currently don't use
288 * the nonce; that's mainly for the KATs
290 int RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
291 RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn cb_get_entropy,
292 RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn cb_cleanup_entropy,
293 RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn cb_get_nonce,
294 RAND_DRBG_cleanup_nonce_fn cb_cleanup_nonce)
296 if (drbg->state != DRBG_UNINITIALISED)
298 drbg->get_entropy = cb_get_entropy;
299 drbg->cleanup_entropy = cb_cleanup_entropy;
300 drbg->get_nonce = cb_get_nonce;
301 drbg->cleanup_nonce = cb_cleanup_nonce;
306 * Set the reseed interval.
308 int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int interval)
310 if (interval < 0 || interval > MAX_RESEED)
312 drbg->reseed_interval = interval;
317 * Get and set the EXDATA
319 int RAND_DRBG_set_ex_data(RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx, void *arg)
321 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx, arg);
324 void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx)
326 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&drbg->ex_data, idx);
331 * The following functions provide a RAND_METHOD that works on the
332 * global DRBG. They lock.
335 static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out, int count)
340 CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_drbg.lock);
341 if (rand_drbg.state == DRBG_UNINITIALISED
342 && RAND_DRBG_instantiate(&rand_drbg, NULL, 0) == 0)
345 for ( ; count > 0; count -= chunk, out += chunk) {
347 if (chunk > rand_drbg.max_request)
348 chunk = rand_drbg.max_request;
349 ret = RAND_DRBG_generate(&rand_drbg, out, chunk, 0, NULL, 0);
356 CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_drbg.lock);
360 static void drbg_cleanup(void)
362 CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_drbg.lock);
363 RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(&rand_drbg);
364 CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_drbg.lock);
367 static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
369 unsigned char *in = (unsigned char *)buf;
370 unsigned char *out, *end;
372 CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_bytes.lock);
373 out = &rand_bytes.buff[rand_bytes.curr];
374 end = &rand_bytes.buff[rand_bytes.size];
376 /* Copy whatever fits into the end of the buffer. */
377 for ( ; --num >= 0 && out < end; rand_bytes.curr++)
380 /* XOR any the leftover. */
382 for (out = rand_bytes.buff; --num >= 0 && out < end; )
386 CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_bytes.lock);
390 static int drbg_seed(const void *buf, int num)
392 return drbg_add(buf, num, num);
395 static int drbg_status(void)
399 CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_drbg.lock);
400 ret = rand_drbg.state == DRBG_READY ? 1 : 0;
401 CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_drbg.lock);
405 RAND_DRBG rand_drbg; /* The default global DRBG. */
407 RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
416 RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)