Avoid KCI attack for GOST

Russian GOST ciphersuites are vulnerable to the KCI attack because they use
long-term keys to establish the connection when ssl client authorization is
on. This change brings the GOST implementation into line with the latest
specs in order to avoid the attack. It should not break backwards
compatibility.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
index ff42858ff3612a04cb59d1e19ad60c5b5f2fc035..692544b32c1e2ea7140468a99736275862b16df6 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
@@ -2378,18 +2378,6 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
         SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
         goto err;
     };
-    /*
-     * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
-     */
-    if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
-        if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
-            /*
-             * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
-             * * would be used
-             */
-            ERR_clear_error();
-        }
-    }
     /*
      * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
      * data
@@ -2434,12 +2422,7 @@ static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
         *len = msglen + 2;
     }
     memcpy(*p, tmp, msglen);
-    /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
-    if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
-                          NULL) > 0) {
-        /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
-        s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
-    }
+
     EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
     s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
     s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;