keymgmt: add FIPS error state handling

The functions that check for the provider being runnable are: new, gen_init,
gen, gen_set_template, load, has, match, validate, import and export.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12801)

diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
index 002cdec1f9b655f007b6368f95d8a84cd23083e5..b198f117d14225cf0b7f18bc4df990c91a66e777 100644 (file)
--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dh_kmgmt.c
@@ -135,10 +135,12 @@ static void *dh_newdata(void *provctx)
 {
     DH *dh = NULL;
 
-    dh = dh_new_with_libctx(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx));
-    if (dh != NULL) {
-        DH_clear_flags(dh, DH_FLAG_TYPE_MASK);
-        DH_set_flags(dh, DH_FLAG_TYPE_DH);
+    if (ossl_prov_is_running()) {
+        dh = dh_new_with_libctx(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx));
+        if (dh != NULL) {
+            DH_clear_flags(dh, DH_FLAG_TYPE_MASK);
+            DH_set_flags(dh, DH_FLAG_TYPE_DH);
+        }
     }
     return dh;
 }
@@ -165,7 +167,7 @@ static int dh_has(void *keydata, int selection)
     DH *dh = keydata;
     int ok = 0;
 
-    if (dh != NULL) {
+    if (ossl_prov_is_running() && dh != NULL) {
         if ((selection & DH_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) != 0)
             ok = 1;
 
@@ -185,6 +187,9 @@ static int dh_match(const void *keydata1, const void *keydata2, int selection)
     const DH *dh2 = keydata2;
     int ok = 1;
 
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return 0;
+
     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY) != 0)
         ok = ok && BN_cmp(DH_get0_pub_key(dh1), DH_get0_pub_key(dh2)) == 0;
     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0)
@@ -203,7 +208,7 @@ static int dh_import(void *keydata, int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
     DH *dh = keydata;
     int ok = 1;
 
-    if (dh == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || dh == NULL)
         return 0;
 
     if ((selection & DH_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) == 0)
@@ -226,7 +231,7 @@ static int dh_export(void *keydata, int selection, OSSL_CALLBACK *param_cb,
     OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
     int ok = 1;
 
-    if (dh == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || dh == NULL)
         return 0;
 
     tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
@@ -402,6 +407,9 @@ static int dh_validate(void *keydata, int selection)
     DH *dh = keydata;
     int ok = 0;
 
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return 0;
+
     if ((selection & DH_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) != 0)
         ok = 1;
 
@@ -425,6 +433,9 @@ static void *dh_gen_init_base(void *provctx, int selection, int type)
     OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
     struct dh_gen_ctx *gctx = NULL;
 
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return NULL;
+
     if ((selection & (OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR
                       | OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS)) == 0)
         return NULL;
@@ -460,7 +471,7 @@ static int dh_gen_set_template(void *genctx, void *templ)
     struct dh_gen_ctx *gctx = genctx;
     DH *dh = templ;
 
-    if (gctx == NULL || dh == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || gctx == NULL || dh == NULL)
         return 0;
     gctx->ffc_params = dh_get0_params(dh);
     return 1;
@@ -587,7 +598,7 @@ static void *dh_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
     BN_GENCB *gencb = NULL;
     FFC_PARAMS *ffc;
 
-    if (gctx == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || gctx == NULL)
         return NULL;
 
     /* For parameter generation - If there is a group name just create it */
@@ -686,7 +697,7 @@ void *dh_load(const void *reference, size_t reference_sz)
 {
     DH *dh = NULL;
 
-    if (reference_sz == sizeof(dh)) {
+    if (ossl_prov_is_running() && reference_sz == sizeof(dh)) {
         /* The contents of the reference is the address to our object */
         dh = *(DH **)reference;
         /* We grabbed, so we detach it */

diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dsa_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dsa_kmgmt.c
index 855fa18c38256b0dc3b7e8de0737ba6f53e5e288..8e63d1380d9912dd1d20588b7fabc528077fce7b 100644 (file)
--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dsa_kmgmt.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/dsa_kmgmt.c
@@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ static int dsa_key_todata(DSA *dsa, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[])
 
 static void *dsa_newdata(void *provctx)
 {
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return NULL;
     return dsa_new_with_ctx(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx));
 }
 
@@ -124,7 +126,7 @@ static int dsa_has(void *keydata, int selection)
     DSA *dsa = keydata;
     int ok = 0;
 
-    if (dsa != NULL) {
+    if (ossl_prov_is_running() && dsa != NULL) {
         if ((selection & DSA_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) != 0)
             ok = 1;
 
@@ -144,6 +146,9 @@ static int dsa_match(const void *keydata1, const void *keydata2, int selection)
     const DSA *dsa2 = keydata2;
     int ok = 1;
 
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return 0;
+
     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY) != 0)
         ok = ok
             && BN_cmp(DSA_get0_pub_key(dsa1), DSA_get0_pub_key(dsa2)) == 0;
@@ -164,7 +169,7 @@ static int dsa_import(void *keydata, int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
     DSA *dsa = keydata;
     int ok = 1;
 
-    if (dsa == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || dsa == NULL)
         return 0;
 
     if ((selection & DSA_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) == 0)
@@ -186,7 +191,7 @@ static int dsa_export(void *keydata, int selection, OSSL_CALLBACK *param_cb,
     OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
     int ok = 1;
 
-    if (dsa == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || dsa == NULL)
         goto err;
 
     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL_PARAMETERS) != 0)
@@ -334,6 +339,9 @@ static int dsa_validate(void *keydata, int selection)
     DSA *dsa = keydata;
     int ok = 0;
 
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return 0;
+
     if ((selection & DSA_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) != 0)
         ok = 1;
 
@@ -358,7 +366,7 @@ static void *dsa_gen_init(void *provctx, int selection)
     OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
     struct dsa_gen_ctx *gctx = NULL;
 
-    if ((selection & DSA_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) == 0)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || (selection & DSA_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) == 0)
         return NULL;
 
     if ((gctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*gctx))) != NULL) {
@@ -379,7 +387,7 @@ static int dsa_gen_set_template(void *genctx, void *templ)
     struct dsa_gen_ctx *gctx = genctx;
     DSA *dsa = templ;
 
-    if (gctx == NULL || dsa == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || gctx == NULL || dsa == NULL)
         return 0;
     gctx->ffc_params = dsa_get0_params(dsa);
     return 1;
@@ -490,7 +498,7 @@ static void *dsa_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
     int ret = 0;
     FFC_PARAMS *ffc;
 
-    if (gctx == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || gctx == NULL)
         return NULL;
     dsa = dsa_new_with_ctx(gctx->libctx);
     if (dsa == NULL)
@@ -564,7 +572,7 @@ void *dsa_load(const void *reference, size_t reference_sz)
 {
     DSA *dsa = NULL;
 
-    if (reference_sz == sizeof(dsa)) {
+    if (ossl_prov_is_running() && reference_sz == sizeof(dsa)) {
         /* The contents of the reference is the address to our object */
         dsa = *(DSA **)reference;
         /* We grabbed, so we detach it */

diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
index 9c2e627e37b05657544851b9049617df65085357..6e493caa3be33fb94b6fc423297827012169e62a 100644 (file)
--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c
@@ -212,6 +212,8 @@ int otherparams_to_params(const EC_KEY *ec, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl,
 static
 void *ec_newdata(void *provctx)
 {
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return NULL;
     return EC_KEY_new_with_libctx(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx), NULL);
 }
 
@@ -227,7 +229,7 @@ int ec_has(void *keydata, int selection)
     EC_KEY *ec = keydata;
     int ok = 0;
 
-    if (ec != NULL) {
+    if (ossl_prov_is_running() && ec != NULL) {
         if ((selection & EC_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) != 0)
             ok = 1;
 
@@ -255,6 +257,9 @@ static int ec_match(const void *keydata1, const void *keydata2, int selection)
     BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(ec_key_get_libctx(ec1));
     int ok = 1;
 
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return 0;
+
     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS) != 0)
         ok = ok && group_a != NULL && group_b != NULL
             && EC_GROUP_cmp(group_a, group_b, ctx) == 0;
@@ -280,7 +285,7 @@ int ec_import(void *keydata, int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
     EC_KEY *ec = keydata;
     int ok = 1;
 
-    if (ec == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || ec == NULL)
         return 0;
 
     /*
@@ -327,7 +332,7 @@ int ec_export(void *keydata, int selection, OSSL_CALLBACK *param_cb,
     BN_CTX *bnctx = NULL;
     int ok = 1;
 
-    if (ec == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || ec == NULL)
         return 0;
 
     /*
@@ -681,7 +686,7 @@ int ec_validate(void *keydata, int selection)
     int ok = 0;
     BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(ec_key_get_libctx(eck));
 
-    if (ctx == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || ctx == NULL)
         return 0;
 
     if ((selection & EC_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) != 0)
@@ -721,7 +726,7 @@ static void *ec_gen_init(void *provctx, int selection)
     OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
     struct ec_gen_ctx *gctx = NULL;
 
-    if ((selection & (EC_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS)) == 0)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || (selection & (EC_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS)) == 0)
         return NULL;
 
     if ((gctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*gctx))) != NULL) {
@@ -753,7 +758,7 @@ static int ec_gen_set_template(void *genctx, void *templ)
     EC_KEY *ec = templ;
     const EC_GROUP *ec_group;
 
-    if (gctx == NULL || ec == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || gctx == NULL || ec == NULL)
         return 0;
     if ((ec_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec)) == NULL)
         return 0;
@@ -935,7 +940,8 @@ static void *ec_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
     EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
     int ret = 0;
 
-    if (gctx == NULL
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running()
+        || gctx == NULL
         || (ec = EC_KEY_new_with_libctx(gctx->libctx, NULL)) == NULL)
         return NULL;
 
@@ -994,7 +1000,7 @@ void *ec_load(const void *reference, size_t reference_sz)
 {
     EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
 
-    if (reference_sz == sizeof(ec)) {
+    if (ossl_prov_is_running() && reference_sz == sizeof(ec)) {
         /* The contents of the reference is the address to our object */
         ec = *(EC_KEY **)reference;
         /* We grabbed, so we detach it */

diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ecx_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ecx_kmgmt.c
index fff50ef0bf6ceae9d9d183fb5e6b9b878a9a8d53..6e1a2c91c8144be1dbe31908e4e3ba880f127765 100644 (file)
--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ecx_kmgmt.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ecx_kmgmt.c
@@ -82,21 +82,29 @@ static void *s390x_ecd_keygen448(struct ecx_gen_ctx *gctx);
 
 static void *x25519_new_key(void *provctx)
 {
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return 0;
     return ecx_key_new(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx), ECX_KEY_TYPE_X25519, 0);
 }
 
 static void *x448_new_key(void *provctx)
 {
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return 0;
     return ecx_key_new(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx), ECX_KEY_TYPE_X448, 0);
 }
 
 static void *ed25519_new_key(void *provctx)
 {
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return 0;
     return ecx_key_new(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx), ECX_KEY_TYPE_ED25519, 0);
 }
 
 static void *ed448_new_key(void *provctx)
 {
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return 0;
     return ecx_key_new(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx), ECX_KEY_TYPE_ED448, 0);
 }
 
@@ -105,7 +113,7 @@ static int ecx_has(void *keydata, int selection)
     ECX_KEY *key = keydata;
     int ok = 0;
 
-    if (key != NULL) {
+    if (ossl_prov_is_running() && key != NULL) {
         /*
          * ECX keys always have all the parameters they need (i.e. none).
          * Therefore we always return with 1, if asked about parameters.
@@ -127,6 +135,9 @@ static int ecx_match(const void *keydata1, const void *keydata2, int selection)
     const ECX_KEY *key2 = keydata2;
     int ok = 1;
 
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return 0;
+
     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS) != 0)
         ok = ok && key1->type == key2->type;
     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0) {
@@ -157,7 +168,7 @@ static int ecx_import(void *keydata, int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
     int ok = 1;
     int include_private = 0;
 
-    if (key == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || key == NULL)
         return 0;
 
     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) == 0)
@@ -197,7 +208,7 @@ static int ecx_export(void *keydata, int selection, OSSL_CALLBACK *param_cb,
     OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
     int ret = 0;
 
-    if (key == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || key == NULL)
         return 0;
 
     tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
@@ -409,6 +420,9 @@ static void *ecx_gen_init(void *provctx, int selection, ECX_KEY_TYPE type)
     OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
     struct ecx_gen_ctx *gctx = NULL;
 
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return NULL;
+
     if ((gctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*gctx))) != NULL) {
         gctx->libctx = libctx;
         gctx->type = type;
@@ -539,6 +553,9 @@ static void *x25519_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
 {
     struct ecx_gen_ctx *gctx = genctx;
 
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return 0;
+
 #ifdef S390X_EC_ASM
     if (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.pcc[1] & S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SCALAR_MULTIPLY_X25519))
         return s390x_ecx_keygen25519(gctx);
@@ -550,6 +567,9 @@ static void *x448_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
 {
     struct ecx_gen_ctx *gctx = genctx;
 
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return 0;
+
 #ifdef S390X_EC_ASM
     if (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.pcc[1] & S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SCALAR_MULTIPLY_X448))
         return s390x_ecx_keygen448(gctx);
@@ -560,6 +580,10 @@ static void *x448_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
 static void *ed25519_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
 {
     struct ecx_gen_ctx *gctx = genctx;
+
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return 0;
+
 #ifdef S390X_EC_ASM
     if (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.pcc[1] & S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SCALAR_MULTIPLY_ED25519)
         && OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kdsa[0] & S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_EDDSA_SIGN_ED25519)
@@ -574,6 +598,9 @@ static void *ed448_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
 {
     struct ecx_gen_ctx *gctx = genctx;
 
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return 0;
+
 #ifdef S390X_EC_ASM
     if (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.pcc[1] & S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SCALAR_MULTIPLY_ED448)
         && OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.kdsa[0] & S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_EDDSA_SIGN_ED448)
@@ -594,7 +621,7 @@ void *ecx_load(const void *reference, size_t reference_sz)
 {
     ECX_KEY *key = NULL;
 
-    if (reference_sz == sizeof(key)) {
+    if (ossl_prov_is_running() && reference_sz == sizeof(key)) {
         /* The contents of the reference is the address to our object */
         key = *(ECX_KEY **)reference;
         /* We grabbed, so we detach it */

diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/kdf_legacy_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/kdf_legacy_kmgmt.c
index 33cf87e350147fa369826bf9496fc6d2d7a521b0..f721184ab4e150e433031425f911ff30cdb2dee9 100644 (file)
--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/kdf_legacy_kmgmt.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/kdf_legacy_kmgmt.c
@@ -28,8 +28,12 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_has_fn kdf_has;
 
 KDF_DATA *kdf_data_new(void *provctx)
 {
-    KDF_DATA *kdfdata = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*kdfdata));
+    KDF_DATA *kdfdata;
 
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return NULL;
+
+    kdfdata = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*kdfdata));
     if (kdfdata == NULL)
         return NULL;
 
@@ -63,6 +67,16 @@ int kdf_data_up_ref(KDF_DATA *kdfdata)
 {
     int ref = 0;
 
+    /* This is effectively doing a new operation on the KDF_DATA and should be
+     * adequately guarded again modules' error states.  However, both current
+     * calls here are guarded propery in exchange/kdf_exch.c.  Thus, it
+     * could be removed here.  The concern is that something in the future
+     * might call this function without adequate guards.  It's a cheap call,
+     * it seems best to leave it even though it is currently redundant.
+     */
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return 0;
+
     CRYPTO_UP_REF(&kdfdata->refcnt, &ref, kdfdata->lock);
     return 1;
 }

diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/mac_legacy_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/mac_legacy_kmgmt.c
index dd18eecf12e539fb74c258bc7d2d07d320541758..a0ae3add90063374fa9ce7b3817f59209a11ef4e 100644 (file)
--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/mac_legacy_kmgmt.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/mac_legacy_kmgmt.c
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_free_fn mac_free;
 static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_init_fn mac_gen_init;
 static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_fn mac_gen;
 static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_cleanup_fn mac_gen_cleanup;
+static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_set_params_fn mac_gen_set_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_settable_params_fn mac_gen_settable_params;
 static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_get_params_fn mac_get_params;
 static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gettable_params_fn mac_gettable_params;
 static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_set_params_fn mac_set_params;
@@ -40,6 +42,13 @@ static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_import_types_fn mac_imexport_types;
 static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_export_fn mac_export;
 static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_export_types_fn mac_imexport_types;
 
+static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_new_fn mac_new_cmac;
+static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gettable_params_fn cmac_gettable_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_import_types_fn cmac_imexport_types;
+static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_export_types_fn cmac_imexport_types;
+static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_set_params_fn cmac_gen_set_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_settable_params_fn cmac_gen_settable_params;
+
 struct mac_gen_ctx {
     OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
     int selection;
@@ -50,8 +59,12 @@ struct mac_gen_ctx {
 
 MAC_KEY *mac_key_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, int cmac)
 {
-    MAC_KEY *mackey = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*mackey));
+    MAC_KEY *mackey;
+
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return NULL;
 
+    mackey = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*mackey));
     if (mackey == NULL)
         return NULL;
 
@@ -89,6 +102,16 @@ int mac_key_up_ref(MAC_KEY *mackey)
 {
     int ref = 0;
 
+    /* This is effectively doing a new operation on the MAC_KEY and should be
+     * adequately guarded again modules' error states.  However, both current
+     * calls here are guarded propery in signature/mac_legacy.c.  Thus, it
+     * could be removed here.  The concern is that something in the future
+     * might call this function without adequate guards.  It's a cheap call,
+     * it seems best to leave it even though it is currently redundant.
+     */
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return 0;
+
     CRYPTO_UP_REF(&mackey->refcnt, &ref, mackey->lock);
     return 1;
 }
@@ -113,7 +136,7 @@ static int mac_has(void *keydata, int selection)
     MAC_KEY *key = keydata;
     int ok = 0;
 
-    if (key != NULL) {
+    if (ossl_prov_is_running() && key != NULL) {
         /*
          * MAC keys always have all the parameters they need (i.e. none).
          * Therefore we always return with 1, if asked about parameters.
@@ -133,6 +156,9 @@ static int mac_match(const void *keydata1, const void *keydata2, int selection)
     const MAC_KEY *key2 = keydata2;
     int ok = 1;
 
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return 0;
+
     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) != 0) {
         if ((key1->priv_key == NULL && key2->priv_key != NULL)
                 || (key1->priv_key != NULL && key2->priv_key == NULL)
@@ -201,7 +227,7 @@ static int mac_import(void *keydata, int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
 {
     MAC_KEY *key = keydata;
 
-    if (key == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || key == NULL)
         return 0;
 
     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PRIVATE_KEY) == 0)
@@ -247,7 +273,7 @@ static int mac_export(void *keydata, int selection, OSSL_CALLBACK *param_cb,
     OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
     int ret = 0;
 
-    if (key == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || key == NULL)
         return 0;
 
     tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
@@ -349,6 +375,9 @@ static void *mac_gen_init(void *provctx, int selection)
     OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
     struct mac_gen_ctx *gctx = NULL;
 
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return NULL;
+
     if ((gctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*gctx))) != NULL) {
         gctx->libctx = libctx;
         gctx->selection = selection;
@@ -422,7 +451,7 @@ static void *mac_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb, void *cbarg)
     struct mac_gen_ctx *gctx = genctx;
     MAC_KEY *key;
 
-    if (gctx == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || gctx == NULL)
         return NULL;
 
     if ((key = mac_key_new(gctx->libctx, 0)) == NULL) {
@@ -511,3 +540,4 @@ const OSSL_DISPATCH cmac_legacy_keymgmt_functions[] = {
     { OSSL_FUNC_KEYMGMT_GEN_CLEANUP, (void (*)(void))mac_gen_cleanup },
     { 0, NULL }
 };
+

diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c
index ab2325d4bd3a027b2cd584ab86ae959331342185..5a8da35d60f01fd2609e49bb9b522b14a20b05c5 100644 (file)
--- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c
+++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/rsa_kmgmt.c
@@ -74,8 +74,12 @@ static int pss_params_fromdata(RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss_params,
 static void *rsa_newdata(void *provctx)
 {
     OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
-    RSA *rsa = rsa_new_with_ctx(libctx);
+    RSA *rsa;
 
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return NULL;
+
+    rsa = rsa_new_with_ctx(libctx);
     if (rsa != NULL) {
         RSA_clear_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK);
         RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA);
@@ -86,8 +90,12 @@ static void *rsa_newdata(void *provctx)
 static void *rsapss_newdata(void *provctx)
 {
     OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
-    RSA *rsa = rsa_new_with_ctx(libctx);
+    RSA *rsa;
+
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return NULL;
 
+    rsa = rsa_new_with_ctx(libctx);
     if (rsa != NULL) {
         RSA_clear_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK);
         RSA_set_flags(rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS);
@@ -105,7 +113,7 @@ static int rsa_has(void *keydata, int selection)
     RSA *rsa = keydata;
     int ok = 0;
 
-    if (rsa != NULL) {
+    if (rsa != NULL && ossl_prov_is_running()) {
         if ((selection & RSA_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) != 0)
             ok = 1;
 
@@ -128,6 +136,9 @@ static int rsa_match(const void *keydata1, const void *keydata2, int selection)
     const RSA *rsa2 = keydata2;
     int ok = 1;
 
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return 0;
+
     /* There is always an |e| */
     ok = ok && BN_cmp(RSA_get0_e(rsa1), RSA_get0_e(rsa2)) == 0;
     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_PUBLIC_KEY) != 0)
@@ -143,7 +154,7 @@ static int rsa_import(void *keydata, int selection, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
     int rsa_type;
     int ok = 1;
 
-    if (rsa == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || rsa == NULL)
         return 0;
 
     if ((selection & RSA_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) == 0)
@@ -171,7 +182,7 @@ static int rsa_export(void *keydata, int selection,
     OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
     int ok = 1;
 
-    if (rsa == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || rsa == NULL)
         return 0;
 
     /* TODO(3.0) OAEP should bring on parameters */
@@ -351,6 +362,9 @@ static int rsa_validate(void *keydata, int selection)
     RSA *rsa = keydata;
     int ok = 0;
 
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return 0;
+
     if ((selection & RSA_POSSIBLE_SELECTIONS) != 0)
         ok = 1;
 
@@ -404,6 +418,9 @@ static void *gen_init(void *provctx, int selection, int rsa_type)
     OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
     struct rsa_gen_ctx *gctx = NULL;
 
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+        return NULL;
+
     if ((selection & OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_KEYPAIR) == 0)
         return NULL;
 
@@ -507,7 +524,7 @@ static void *rsa_gen(void *genctx, OSSL_CALLBACK *osslcb, void *cbarg)
     RSA *rsa = NULL, *rsa_tmp = NULL;
     BN_GENCB *gencb = NULL;
 
-    if (gctx == NULL)
+    if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || gctx == NULL)
         return NULL;
 
     switch (gctx->rsa_type) {
@@ -581,7 +598,7 @@ void *rsa_load(const void *reference, size_t reference_sz)
 {
     RSA *rsa = NULL;
 
-    if (reference_sz == sizeof(rsa)) {
+    if (ossl_prov_is_running() && reference_sz == sizeof(rsa)) {
         /* The contents of the reference is the address to our object */
         rsa = *(RSA **)reference;
         /* We grabbed, so we detach it */