X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fstatem_lib.c;h=c0482b0a90563d19d4931d9926c7ccdfeb386894;hb=72a7a7021fa8bc82a11bc08bac1b0241a92143d0;hp=dc2bd20e936d22efbb4f0d2b329d0f57c1c30d98;hpb=6f54ae7a9079983ea51593d4a91699d14a9c9a99;p=openssl.git diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c index dc2bd20e93..c0482b0a90 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use @@ -396,7 +396,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) #ifdef SSL_DEBUG if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) - fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); + fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", + md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ @@ -439,7 +440,8 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); + fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", + md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, @@ -612,13 +614,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { unsigned int updatetype; - s->key_update_count++; - if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, - SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES); - return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; - } - /* * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must * be on a record boundary. @@ -1028,6 +1023,7 @@ unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop) { void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; + int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand; if (clearbufs) { if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { @@ -1054,7 +1050,7 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop) * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3 * post handshake exchange */ - if (s->statem.cleanuphand) { + if (cleanuphand) { /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ s->renegotiate = 0; s->new_session = 0; @@ -1074,15 +1070,6 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop) /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; - - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { - /* - * We are finishing after the client. We start the timer going - * in case there are any retransmits of our final flight - * required. - */ - dtls1_start_timer(s); - } } else { if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { /* @@ -1104,15 +1091,6 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop) s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); - - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { - /* - * We are finishing after the server. We start the timer going - * in case there are any retransmits of our final flight - * required. - */ - dtls1_start_timer(s); - } } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { @@ -1132,8 +1110,12 @@ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop) /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); - if (cb != NULL) - cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); + if (cb != NULL) { + if (cleanuphand + || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); + } if (!stop) { /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */ @@ -1506,8 +1488,11 @@ static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) */ static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s) { - int i, curve; + int i; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + int curve; EC_KEY *eckey; +#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) @@ -1530,6 +1515,7 @@ static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s) } if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i)) continue; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC) return 1; /* @@ -1543,6 +1529,9 @@ static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s) curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)); if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve)) return 1; +#else + return 1; +#endif } return 0; @@ -2287,10 +2276,24 @@ int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) return 0; } -int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s) { - const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); + const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;; + if (s->server) { + ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); + if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0) + ca_sk = NULL; + } + + if (ca_sk == NULL) + ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); + + return ca_sk; +} + +int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt) +{ /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,