X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fstatem%2Fstatem_lib.c;h=03efdecdacef466b994b08fbc27649a9211623ae;hb=fe3066ee4072e226601209f1b5fb1d343457cef8;hp=0f548d469beb575a52618e871df50c85848cecc0;hpb=61ae935a9831d2b132e50508ccc37f879c17a5c4;p=openssl.git diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c index 0f548d469b..03efdecdac 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c @@ -1,113 +1,12 @@ -/* ssl/statem/statem_lib.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). +/* + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ + /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by @@ -120,7 +19,6 @@ #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" #include -#include #include #include #include @@ -132,9 +30,10 @@ int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) { int ret; + size_t written = 0; ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], - s->init_num); + s->init_num, &written); if (ret < 0) return (-1); if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) @@ -142,57 +41,411 @@ int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll * ignore the result anyway */ - ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], - ret); + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, + (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], + written)) + return -1; - if (ret == s->init_num) { + if (written == s->init_num) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg); return (1); } - s->init_off += ret; - s->init_num -= ret; + s->init_off += written; + s->init_num -= written; return (0); } -int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen) +int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) { - unsigned char *p; - int i; - unsigned long l; + size_t msglen; - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - - i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, - sender, slen, - s->s3->tmp.finish_md); - if (i <= 0) + if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) + || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) + || msglen > INT_MAX) return 0; - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i; - memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); - l = i; + s->init_num = (int)msglen; + s->init_off = 0; + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: + * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator + */ +#define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 +#define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) + +static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, + void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) +{ + static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; + static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + size_t hashlen; + + /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ + memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); + /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ + if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY + || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) + strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); + else + strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); + + /* + * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake + * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because + * that includes the CertVerify itself. + */ + if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY + || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { + memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, + s->cert_verify_hash_len); + hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; + } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { + return 0; + } + + *hdata = tls13tbs; + *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; + } else { + size_t retlen; + + retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); + if (retlen <= 0) + return 0; + *hdatalen = retlen; + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pkey; + const EVP_MD *md; + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; + void *hdata; + unsigned char *sig = NULL; + unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + int pktype, ispss = 0; + if (s->server) { + /* Only happens in TLSv1.3 */ + /* + * TODO(TLS1.3): This needs to change. We should not get this from the + * cipher. However, for now, we have not done the work to separate the + * certificate type from the ciphersuite + */ + pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md); + if (pkey == NULL) + goto err; + } else { + md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys]; + pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; + } + pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); + + mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (mctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Get the data to be signed */ + if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !tls12_get_sigandhash(s, pkt, pkey, md, &ispss)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); + if (sig == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (ispss) { + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 + /* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */ + || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, + (int)s->session->master_key_length, + s->session->master_key)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + + if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + { + if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) + BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); + } +#endif + + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) + goto err; + + OPENSSL_free(sig); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); + return 1; + err: + OPENSSL_free(sig); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + const unsigned char *data; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; +#endif + int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + int type = 0, j, pktype, ispss = 0; + unsigned int len; + X509 *peer; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + size_t hdatalen = 0; + void *hdata; + unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + + if (mctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + + peer = s->session->peer; + pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); + pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); + type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); + + if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, + SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + goto f_err; + } + + /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ /* - * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks + * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without + * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0) */ - if (!s->server) { - OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); - s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 + && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { + len = 64; + } else +#endif + { + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + int rv; + unsigned int sigalg; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalg, pkey); + if (rv == -1) { + goto f_err; + } else if (rv == 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + ispss = SIGID_IS_PSS(sigalg); +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + } else { + /* Use default digest for this key type */ + int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey); + if (idx >= 0) + md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx]; + if (md == NULL) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + } + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + } + j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); + if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) + || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + goto f_err; + } + + if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto f_err; + } + +#ifdef SSL_DEBUG + fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); +#endif + if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto f_err; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + { + if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { + if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto f_err; + } + BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); + data = gost_data; + } + } +#endif + + if (ispss) { + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 + /* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */ + || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1) <= 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto f_err; + } + } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION + && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, + (int)s->session->master_key_length, + s->session->master_key)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto f_err; + } + + if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { + al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto f_err; + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + else + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + if (0) { + f_err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + ossl_statem_set_error(s); + } + BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); + s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + OPENSSL_free(gost_data); +#endif + return ret; +} + +int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + size_t finish_md_len; + const char *sender; + size_t slen; + + if (s->server) { + sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; + slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; } else { - OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i); - s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; + sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; + slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; } - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, l)) { + finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, + sender, slen, + s->s3->tmp.finish_md); + if (finish_md_len == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; + goto err; + } + + s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; + + if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* + * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks + */ + if (!s->server) { + OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, + finish_md_len); + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; + } else { + OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, + finish_md_len); + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; } return 1; + err: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG @@ -203,7 +456,7 @@ int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen) static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) { const char *sender; - int slen; + size_t slen; /* * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set * the appropriate error. @@ -225,11 +478,11 @@ static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) } #endif -enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al; - long remain; - + size_t remain; + remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); /* * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have @@ -238,13 +491,13 @@ enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER - && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) - || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER - && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, - SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); - goto f_err; + && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) + || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER + && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { + al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, + SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + goto f_err; } } else { if (remain != 0) { @@ -288,31 +541,33 @@ enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - statem_set_error(s); + ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } -enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { - int al, i; + int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + size_t md_len; /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ - if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); goto f_err; } s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; - i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; + md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; - if (i < 0 || (unsigned long)i != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { + if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); goto f_err; } - if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) { + if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, + md_len) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); goto f_err; @@ -322,61 +577,208 @@ enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ if (s->server) { - OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); - s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i; + OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, + md_len); + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; } else { - OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); - memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i); - s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i; + OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); + memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, + md_len); + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; + } + + /* + * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing + * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) + */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (s->server) { + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); + goto f_err; + } + } else { + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s->session->master_key, s->handshake_secret, 0, + &s->session->master_key_length)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); + goto f_err; + } + if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER); + goto f_err; + } + if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al)) + goto f_err; + } } - return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - statem_set_error(s); + ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } -int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) +int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { - unsigned char *p; - - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - *p = SSL3_MT_CCS; - s->init_num = 1; - s->init_off = 0; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } return 1; } -unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk) +/* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ +static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain, + int *al) { - unsigned char *p; - unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); + int len; + unsigned char *outbytes; - if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, cpk, &l)) + len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); + if (len < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; + } + if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) + || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, + chain, al)) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +/* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ +static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al) +{ + int i, chain_count; + X509 *x; + STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; + STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; + X509_STORE *chain_store; + int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) + return 1; + + x = cpk->x509; + + /* + * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. + */ + if (cpk->chain != NULL) + extra_certs = cpk->chain; + else + extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; + + if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) + chain_store = NULL; + else if (s->cert->chain_store) + chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; + else + chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; + + if (chain_store != NULL) { + X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); + + if (xs_ctx == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); + goto err; + } + /* + * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we + * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately + * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying + * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can + */ + (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); + /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ + ERR_clear_error(); + chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); + i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); + if (i != 1) { +#if 0 + /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); +#endif + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); + goto err; + } + chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); + for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); + + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) { + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + goto err; + } + } + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + } else { + i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); + if (i != 1) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); + goto err; + } + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal)) + goto err; + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal)) + goto err; + } + } + return 1; - l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - l2n3(l, p); - l += 3; + err: + *al = tmpal; + return 0; +} + +unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, + int *al) +{ + int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l)) { + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt) + || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *al = tmpal; return 0; } - return l + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); + return 1; } -enum WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst) +WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { - enum WORK_STATE ret; + WORK_STATE ret; ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s); if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE) return ret; @@ -405,19 +807,16 @@ enum WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst) s->new_session = 0; if (s->server) { - s->renegotiate = 0; - s->new_session = 0; - ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; - s->handshake_func = statem_accept; + s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; } else { ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; - s->handshake_func = statem_connect; + s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; } @@ -434,6 +833,7 @@ enum WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst) s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; + dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); } } @@ -445,29 +845,42 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al; unsigned char *p; - unsigned long l; + size_t l, readbytes; p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; do { while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, - &p[s->init_num], SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, 0); + &p[s->init_num], + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, + 0, &readbytes); if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; return 0; } if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + /* + * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur + * in the middle of a handshake message. + */ + if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, + SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + goto f_err; + } s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; - s->init_num = i - 1; - s->s3->tmp.message_size = i; + s->init_num = readbytes - 1; + s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; + s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; return 1; } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; } - s->init_num += i; + s->init_num += readbytes; } skip_message = 0; @@ -494,21 +907,16 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) *mt = *p; s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); - if(RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { + if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { /* * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible * ClientHello + * + * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read + * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read */ - /* - * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read - * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read - */ l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; - if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)l)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - goto err; - } s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; @@ -521,11 +929,6 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); goto f_err; } - if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, - (int)l + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - goto err; - } s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; @@ -535,13 +938,12 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) return 1; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - err: return 0; } -int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) +int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) { - long n; + size_t n, readbytes; unsigned char *p; int i; @@ -555,14 +957,14 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; while (n > 0) { i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, - &p[s->init_num], n, 0); + &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; *len = 0; return 0; } - s->init_num += i; - n -= i; + s->init_num += readbytes; + n -= readbytes; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG @@ -575,75 +977,60 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len) #endif /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ - if(RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { - ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num); + if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->init_num)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *len = 0; + return 0; + } if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, + s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } else { - ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, - s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + *len = 0; + return 0; + } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } - /* - * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared - * unsigned - */ - if (s->init_num < 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - *len = 0; - return 0; - } - *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; + *len = s->init_num; return 1; } -int ssl_cert_type(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey) +int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk) { - EVP_PKEY *pk; - int ret = -1, i; - - if (pkey == NULL) - pk = X509_get_pubkey(x); - else - pk = pkey; - if (pk == NULL) - goto err; + if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL) + return -1; - i = pk->type; - if (i == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { - ret = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; - } else if (i == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { - ret = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; - } + switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { + default: + return -1; + case EVP_PKEY_RSA: + return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; + case EVP_PKEY_DSA: + return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - else if (i == EVP_PKEY_EC) { - ret = SSL_PKEY_ECC; - } + case EVP_PKEY_EC: + return SSL_PKEY_ECC; +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: + return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; + case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: + return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; + case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: + return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; #endif - else if (i == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { - ret = SSL_PKEY_GOST01; - } else if (x && (i == EVP_PKEY_DH || i == EVP_PKEY_DHX)) { - /* - * For DH two cases: DH certificate signed with RSA and DH - * certificate signed with DSA. - */ - i = X509_certificate_type(x, pk); - if (i & EVP_PKS_RSA) - ret = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; - else if (i & EVP_PKS_DSA) - ret = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; } - - err: - if (!pkey) - EVP_PKEY_free(pk); - return (ret); } int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) @@ -667,6 +1054,13 @@ int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: + case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH: + case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH: + case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH: + case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH: + case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL: + case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL: + case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK: al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: @@ -680,7 +1074,10 @@ int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; break; + case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED: case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: + case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL: + case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP: al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; break; case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: @@ -711,3 +1108,564 @@ int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) return 0; return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); } + +static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) +{ + int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); + + if (a == b) + return 0; + if (!dtls) + return a < b ? -1 : 1; + return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; +} + +typedef struct { + int version; + const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); + const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); +} version_info; + +#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION +# error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. +#endif + +static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, +#else + {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 + {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, +#else + {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 + {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, +#else + {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 + {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, +#else + {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 + {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, +#else + {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, +#endif + {0, NULL, NULL}, +}; + +#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION +# error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. +#endif + +static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 + {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, +#else + {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 + {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, + {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, +#else + {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, + {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, +#endif + {0, NULL, NULL}, +}; + +/* + * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. + * + * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method + * @method: the intended method. + * + * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. + */ +static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) +{ + int version = method->version; + + if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && + version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || + ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) + return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; + + if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && + version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) + return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; + + if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) + return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) + return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; + else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode()) + return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by + * `SSL *` instance + * + * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method + * @version: Protocol version to test against + * + * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 + */ +int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version) +{ + const version_info *vent; + const version_info *table; + + switch (s->method->version) { + default: + /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ + return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; + case TLS_ANY_VERSION: + table = tls_version_table; + break; + case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: + table = dtls_version_table; + break; + } + + for (vent = table; + vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; + ++vent) { + if (vent->cmeth != NULL && + version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && + ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) { + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version + * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest + * supported protocol version. + * + * @s server SSL handle. + * + * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. + */ +int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) +{ + const version_info *vent; + const version_info *table; + + /* + * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version + * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed + * s->method). + */ + if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) + return 1; + + /* + * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its + * highest protocol version). + */ + if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) + table = tls_version_table; + else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) + table = dtls_version_table; + else { + /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ + return 0; + } + + for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { + if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) + return s->version == vent->version; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS + * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This + * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is + * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. + * + * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. + * @version: the intended limit. + * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. + * + * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. + */ +int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) +{ + if (version == 0) { + *bound = version; + return 1; + } + + /*- + * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. + * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. + * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. + * + * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not + * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user + * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's + * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the + * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. + */ + switch (method_version) { + default: + /* + * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any + * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and + * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version + * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol + * versions. + */ + return 0; + + case TLS_ANY_VERSION: + if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION) + return 0; + break; + + case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: + if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) || + DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER)) + return 0; + break; + } + + *bound = version; + return 1; +} + +/* + * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the + * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and + * the version specific method. + * + * @s: server SSL handle. + * + * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. + */ +int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello) +{ + /*- + * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: + * + * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, + * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. + * + * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the + * handle version. + */ + int server_version = s->method->version; + int client_version = hello->legacy_version; + const version_info *vent; + const version_info *table; + int disabled = 0; + RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; + + s->client_version = client_version; + + switch (server_version) { + default: + /* + * TODO(TLS1.3): This check will fail if someone attempts to do + * renegotiation in TLS1.3 at the moment. We need to ensure we disable + * renegotiation for TLS1.3 + */ + if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) + return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; + /* + * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't + * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope + * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol + * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return + * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) + */ + return 0; + case TLS_ANY_VERSION: + table = tls_version_table; + break; + case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: + table = dtls_version_table; + break; + } + + suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; + + if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; + unsigned int best_vers = 0; + const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; + PACKET versionslist; + + suppversions->parsed = 1; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { + /* Trailing or invalid data? */ + return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { + /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ + if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) + candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION; + /* + * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about + * wheter to ignore versions version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers; + ++vent) + continue; + if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) { + const SSL_METHOD *method; + + method = vent->smeth(); + if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { + best_vers = candidate_vers; + best_method = method; + } + } + } + if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { + /* Trailing data? */ + return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + if (best_vers > 0) { + s->version = best_vers; + s->method = best_method; + return 0; + } + return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + } + + /* + * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest + * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 + */ + if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) + client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; + + /* + * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in + * the ClientHello. + */ + for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { + const SSL_METHOD *method; + + if (vent->smeth == NULL || + version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) + continue; + method = vent->smeth(); + if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { + s->version = vent->version; + s->method = method; + return 0; + } + disabled = 1; + } + return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; +} + +/* + * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the + * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and + * the version specific method. + * + * @s: client SSL handle. + * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. + * + * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. + */ +int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version) +{ + const version_info *vent; + const version_info *table; + + /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */ + if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) + version = TLS1_3_VERSION; + + switch (s->method->version) { + default: + if (version != s->version) + return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; + /* + * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't + * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope + * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol + * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return + * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) + */ + return 0; + case TLS_ANY_VERSION: + table = tls_version_table; + break; + case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: + table = dtls_version_table; + break; + } + + for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { + const SSL_METHOD *method; + int err; + + if (version != vent->version) + continue; + if (vent->cmeth == NULL) + break; + method = vent->cmeth(); + err = ssl_method_error(s, method); + if (err != 0) + return err; + s->method = method; + s->version = version; + return 0; + } + + return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; +} + +/* + * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version + * @s: The SSL connection + * @min_version: The minimum supported version + * @max_version: The maximum supported version + * + * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the + * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx + * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B + * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, + * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. + * + * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, + * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol + * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. + * + * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure + * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. + */ +int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, + int *max_version) +{ + int version; + int hole; + const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; + const SSL_METHOD *method; + const version_info *table; + const version_info *vent; + + switch (s->method->version) { + default: + /* + * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't + * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope + * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol + * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return + * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) + */ + *min_version = *max_version = s->version; + return 0; + case TLS_ANY_VERSION: + table = tls_version_table; + break; + case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: + table = dtls_version_table; + break; + } + + /* + * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols + * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version + * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method + * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". + * + * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above + * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above + * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. + * + * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes + * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" + * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. + * + * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, + * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit + * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else + * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. + * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes + * selected, as we start from scratch. + */ + *min_version = version = 0; + hole = 1; + for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { + /* + * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the + * "version capability" vector. + */ + if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { + hole = 1; + continue; + } + method = vent->cmeth(); + if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { + hole = 1; + } else if (!hole) { + single = NULL; + *min_version = method->version; + } else { + version = (single = method)->version; + *min_version = version; + hole = 0; + } + } + + *max_version = version; + + /* Fail if everything is disabled */ + if (version == 0) + return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for + * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. + * + * @s: client SSL handle. + * + * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. + */ +int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) +{ + int ver_min, ver_max, ret; + + ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max); + + if (ret != 0) + return ret; + + s->version = ver_max; + + /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) + ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; + + s->client_version = ver_max; + return 0; +}