X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fs3_srvr.c;h=92f73b668102828da9d3dfea2f977a4f7159c494;hb=f6d13ac8cf4cacf4f0150290b4aee67062bfacc7;hp=8c8c1486ee2e4588d3a4655b4fe5738ca51ba92e;hpb=4cba294d795b6f5840280f2ba0fb7d23a61ff07e;p=openssl.git

diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 8c8c1486ee..92f73b6681 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -189,7 +189,6 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 	BUF_MEM *buf;
 	unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
 	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
-	long num1;
 	int ret= -1;
 	int new_state,state,skip=0;
 
@@ -271,6 +270,18 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 				s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
 				s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
 				}
+			else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
+				!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+				{
+				/* Server attempting to renegotiate with
+				 * client that doesn't support secure
+				 * renegotiation.
+				 */
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+				ret = -1;
+				goto end;
+				}
 			else
 				{
 				/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
@@ -471,15 +482,24 @@ int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
 			break;
 		
 		case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
-			/* number of bytes to be flushed */
-			num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_WPENDING,0,NULL);
-			if (num1 > 0)
+
+			/* This code originally checked to see if
+			 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
+			 * and then flushed. This caused problems
+			 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
+			 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
+			 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
+			 * still exist. So instead we just flush
+			 * unconditionally.
+			 */
+
+			s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
+			if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
 				{
-				s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
-				num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
-				if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
-				s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
+				ret= -1;
+				goto end;
 				}
+			s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
 
 			s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
 			break;
@@ -2266,7 +2286,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 			goto err;
 			}
-		if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
+		if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
 		    {
 		    /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
 		     * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
@@ -2276,8 +2296,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 		     * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. 
 		     * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
 		     */
-		    if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
-			   (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
+		    if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
 			       SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);