X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Fs23_srvr.c;h=050618235f0a6cfa0126581eb7531c0364bce3f7;hb=c5e48d8b0143e7f69c6f5bc9ca8e3ba6e4566a78;hp=8a3bc2ea1f0de2d0cf0a910847b43fa396255cb0;hpb=cb0369d885c9df71f7fbd791ded0f706212f1f4c;p=openssl.git

diff --git a/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
index 8a3bc2ea1f..050618235f 100644
--- a/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
@@ -67,8 +67,10 @@ static SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver);
 int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
 static SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver)
 	{
+#ifndef NO_SSL2
 	if (ver == SSL2_VERSION)
 		return(SSLv2_server_method());
+#endif
 	if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
 		return(SSLv3_server_method());
 	else if (ver == TLS1_VERSION)
@@ -101,7 +103,7 @@ int ssl23_accept(SSL *s)
 	int ret= -1;
 	int new_state,state;
 
-	RAND_seed(&Time,sizeof(Time));
+	RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
 	ERR_clear_error();
 	clear_sys_error();
 
@@ -186,14 +188,29 @@ end:
 
 int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 	{
-	char buf_space[11]; /* request this many bytes in initial read */
+	char buf_space[11]; /* Request this many bytes in initial read.
+	                     * We can detect SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hellos
+	                     * ('type == 3') correctly only when the following
+	                     * is in a single record, which is not guaranteed by
+	                     * the protocol specification:
+	                     * Byte  Content
+	                     *  0     type            \
+	                     *  1/2   version          > record header
+	                     *  3/4   length          /
+	                     *  5     msg_type        \
+	                     *  6-8   length           > Client Hello message
+	                     *  9/10  client_version  /
+	                     */
 	char *buf= &(buf_space[0]);
 	unsigned char *p,*d,*dd;
 	unsigned int i;
 	unsigned int csl,sil,cl;
 	int n=0,j;
-	int type=0,use_sslv2_strong=0;
+	int type=0;
 	int v[2];
+#ifndef NO_RSA
+	int use_sslv2_strong=0;
+#endif
 
 	if (s->state ==	SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
 		{
@@ -264,6 +281,7 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 					 * throw this away and implement it in a way
 					 * that makes sense */
 					{
+#if 0
 					STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
 					SSL_CIPHER *c;
 					int ne2,ne3;
@@ -279,7 +297,7 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 					if (n <= 0) return(n);
 					p=s->packet;
 
-					if ((buf=Malloc(n)) == NULL)
+					if ((buf=OPENSSL_malloc(n)) == NULL)
 						{
 						SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 						goto err;
@@ -313,20 +331,38 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 							goto next_bit;
 							}
 						}
+#else
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION);
+					goto err;
+#endif
 					}
 				}
 			}
 		else if ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
 			 (p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
 			 (p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
-			 (p[9] == p[1]))
+			 ((p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 5 /* silly record length? */)
+				|| (p[9] == p[1])))
 			{
 			/*
 			 * SSLv3 or tls1 header
 			 */
 			
-			/* we must look at client_version inside the client hello: */
-			v[0]=p[9]; v[1]=p[10];
+			v[0]=p[1]; /* major version (= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) */
+			/* We must look at client_version inside the Client Hello message
+			 * to get the correct minor version.
+			 * However if we have only a pathologically small fragment of the
+			 * Client Hello message, this would be difficult, we'd have
+			 * to read at least one additional record to find out.
+			 * This doesn't usually happen in real life, so we just complain
+			 * for now.
+			 */
+			if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+				goto err;
+				}
+			v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
 			if (v[1] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
 				{
 				if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
@@ -341,7 +377,10 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 					}
 				}
 			else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
+				{
+				s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
 				type=3;
+				}
 			}
 		else if ((strncmp("GET ", (char *)p,4) == 0) ||
 			 (strncmp("POST ",(char *)p,5) == 0) ||
@@ -358,7 +397,6 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			}
 		}
 
-next_bit:
 	if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B)
 		{
 		/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 in an SSLv2 header
@@ -397,7 +435,7 @@ next_bit:
 		*(d++) = v[1];
 
 		/* lets populate the random area */
-		/* get the chalenge_length */
+		/* get the challenge_length */
 		i=(cl > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)?SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE:cl;
 		memset(d,0,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
 		memcpy(&(d[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),&(p[csl+sil]),i);
@@ -436,6 +474,10 @@ next_bit:
 
 	if (type == 1)
 		{
+#ifdef NO_SSL2
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
+		goto err;
+#else
 		/* we are talking sslv2 */
 		/* we need to clean up the SSLv3/TLSv1 setup and put in the
 		 * sslv2 stuff. */
@@ -458,9 +500,12 @@ next_bit:
 
 		s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
 		if ((s->options & SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING) ||
-			use_sslv2_strong)
+			use_sslv2_strong ||
+			(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 && s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
 			s->s2->ssl2_rollback=0;
 		else
+			/* reject SSL 2.0 session if client supports SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0
+			 * (SSL 3.0 draft/RFC 2246, App. E.2) */
 			s->s2->ssl2_rollback=1;
 
 		/* setup the n bytes we have read so we get them from
@@ -474,6 +519,7 @@ next_bit:
 
 		s->method=SSLv2_server_method();
 		s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
+#endif
 		}
 
 	if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
@@ -521,10 +567,10 @@ next_bit:
 		}
 	s->init_num=0;
 
-	if (buf != buf_space) Free(buf);
+	if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
 	s->first_packet=1;
 	return(SSL_accept(s));
 err:
-	if (buf != buf_space) Free(buf);
+	if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
 	return(-1);
 	}