X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Frsa%2Frsa_lib.c;h=a73df12dc6f9ba78113289d2333a0f602c6ef17d;hb=23b2fc0b501d6635dd821014aec8ff16689cbb6a;hp=57ba1cbef2f629591d40d74e77b2a4f571d33c69;hpb=0f113f3ee4d629ef9a4a30911b22b224772085e5;p=openssl.git diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c index 57ba1cbef2..a73df12dc6 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c @@ -1,99 +1,38 @@ -/* crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. +/* + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +/* + * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for + * internal use. */ +#include "internal/deprecated.h" #include #include -#include "cryptlib.h" -#include -#include "internal/bn_int.h" -#include -#include -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE -# include -#endif - -const char RSA_version[] = "RSA" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; +#include +#include +#include +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include "internal/refcount.h" +#include "openssl/param_build.h" +#include "crypto/bn.h" +#include "crypto/evp.h" +#include "crypto/rsa.h" +#include "crypto/security_bits.h" +#include "rsa_local.h" -static const RSA_METHOD *default_RSA_meth = NULL; +static RSA *rsa_new_intern(ENGINE *engine, OPENSSL_CTX *libctx); +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE RSA *RSA_new(void) { - RSA *r = RSA_new_method(NULL); - - return r; -} - -void RSA_set_default_method(const RSA_METHOD *meth) -{ - default_RSA_meth = meth; -} - -const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void) -{ - if (default_RSA_meth == NULL) { -#ifdef RSA_NULL - default_RSA_meth = RSA_null_method(); -#else - default_RSA_meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); -#endif - } - - return default_RSA_meth; + return rsa_new_intern(NULL, NULL); } const RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_method(const RSA *rsa) @@ -112,10 +51,8 @@ int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth) if (mtmp->finish) mtmp->finish(rsa); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE - if (rsa->engine) { - ENGINE_finish(rsa->engine); - rsa->engine = NULL; - } + ENGINE_finish(rsa->engine); + rsa->engine = NULL; #endif rsa->meth = meth; if (meth->init) @@ -125,73 +62,71 @@ int RSA_set_method(RSA *rsa, const RSA_METHOD *meth) RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine) { - RSA *ret; + return rsa_new_intern(engine, NULL); +} +#endif + +RSA *ossl_rsa_new_with_ctx(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx) +{ + return rsa_new_intern(NULL, libctx); +} + +static RSA *rsa_new_intern(ENGINE *engine, OPENSSL_CTX *libctx) +{ + RSA *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); - ret = (RSA *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RSA)); if (ret == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + RSAerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return NULL; + } + + ret->references = 1; + ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); + if (ret->lock == NULL) { + RSAerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } + ret->libctx = libctx; ret->meth = RSA_get_default_method(); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE) + ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; if (engine) { if (!ENGINE_init(engine)) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); - OPENSSL_free(ret); - return NULL; + RSAerr(0, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); + goto err; } ret->engine = engine; - } else + } else { ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_RSA(); + } if (ret->engine) { ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine); - if (!ret->meth) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); - ENGINE_finish(ret->engine); - OPENSSL_free(ret); - return NULL; + if (ret->meth == NULL) { + RSAerr(0, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); + goto err; } } #endif - ret->pad = 0; - ret->version = 0; - ret->n = NULL; - ret->e = NULL; - ret->d = NULL; - ret->p = NULL; - ret->q = NULL; - ret->dmp1 = NULL; - ret->dmq1 = NULL; - ret->iqmp = NULL; - ret->references = 1; - ret->_method_mod_n = NULL; - ret->_method_mod_p = NULL; - ret->_method_mod_q = NULL; - ret->blinding = NULL; - ret->mt_blinding = NULL; - ret->bignum_data = NULL; ret->flags = ret->meth->flags & ~RSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW; +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data)) { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE - if (ret->engine) - ENGINE_finish(ret->engine); -#endif - OPENSSL_free(ret); - return (NULL); + goto err; } +#endif if ((ret->meth->init != NULL) && !ret->meth->init(ret)) { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE - if (ret->engine) - ENGINE_finish(ret->engine); -#endif - CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, ret, &ret->ex_data); - OPENSSL_free(ret); - ret = NULL; + RSAerr(0, ERR_R_INIT_FAIL); + goto err; } - return (ret); + + return ret; + + err: + RSA_free(ret); + return NULL; } void RSA_free(RSA *r) @@ -201,130 +136,1304 @@ void RSA_free(RSA *r) if (r == NULL) return; - i = CRYPTO_add(&r->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); -#ifdef REF_PRINT - REF_PRINT("RSA", r); -#endif + CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock); + REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r); if (i > 0) return; -#ifdef REF_CHECK - if (i < 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "RSA_free, bad reference count\n"); - abort(); - } -#endif + REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); - if (r->meth->finish) + if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL) r->meth->finish(r); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE - if (r->engine) - ENGINE_finish(r->engine); +#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE) + ENGINE_finish(r->engine); #endif +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, r, &r->ex_data); +#endif + + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock); + + BN_free(r->n); + BN_free(r->e); + BN_clear_free(r->d); + BN_clear_free(r->p); + BN_clear_free(r->q); + BN_clear_free(r->dmp1); + BN_clear_free(r->dmq1); + BN_clear_free(r->iqmp); + +#if defined(FIPS_MODULE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ACVP_TESTS) + rsa_acvp_test_free(r->acvp_test); +#endif + +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss); + sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free); +#endif + BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding); + BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding); + OPENSSL_free(r->bignum_data); + OPENSSL_free(r); +} + +int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r) +{ + int i; + + if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0) + return 0; + + REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r); + REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); + return i > 1 ? 1 : 0; +} + +OPENSSL_CTX *ossl_rsa_get0_libctx(RSA *r) +{ + return r->libctx; +} + +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE +int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg) +{ + return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg); +} + +void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx) +{ + return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx); +} +#endif + +/* + * Define a scaling constant for our fixed point arithmetic. + * This value must be a power of two because the base two logarithm code + * makes this assumption. The exponent must also be a multiple of three so + * that the scale factor has an exact cube root. Finally, the scale factor + * should not be so large that a multiplication of two scaled numbers + * overflows a 64 bit unsigned integer. + */ +static const unsigned int scale = 1 << 18; +static const unsigned int cbrt_scale = 1 << (2 * 18 / 3); + +/* Define some constants, none exceed 32 bits */ +static const unsigned int log_2 = 0x02c5c8; /* scale * log(2) */ +static const unsigned int log_e = 0x05c551; /* scale * log2(M_E) */ +static const unsigned int c1_923 = 0x07b126; /* scale * 1.923 */ +static const unsigned int c4_690 = 0x12c28f; /* scale * 4.690 */ + +/* + * Multiply two scaled integers together and rescale the result. + */ +static ossl_inline uint64_t mul2(uint64_t a, uint64_t b) +{ + return a * b / scale; +} + +/* + * Calculate the cube root of a 64 bit scaled integer. + * Although the cube root of a 64 bit number does fit into a 32 bit unsigned + * integer, this is not guaranteed after scaling, so this function has a + * 64 bit return. This uses the shifting nth root algorithm with some + * algebraic simplifications. + */ +static uint64_t icbrt64(uint64_t x) +{ + uint64_t r = 0; + uint64_t b; + int s; + + for (s = 63; s >= 0; s -= 3) { + r <<= 1; + b = 3 * r * (r + 1) + 1; + if ((x >> s) >= b) { + x -= b << s; + r++; + } + } + return r * cbrt_scale; +} + +/* + * Calculate the natural logarithm of a 64 bit scaled integer. + * This is done by calculating a base two logarithm and scaling. + * The maximum logarithm (base 2) is 64 and this reduces base e, so + * a 32 bit result should not overflow. The argument passed must be + * greater than unity so we don't need to handle negative results. + */ +static uint32_t ilog_e(uint64_t v) +{ + uint32_t i, r = 0; + + /* + * Scale down the value into the range 1 .. 2. + * + * If fractional numbers need to be processed, another loop needs + * to go here that checks v < scale and if so multiplies it by 2 and + * reduces r by scale. This also means making r signed. + */ + while (v >= 2 * scale) { + v >>= 1; + r += scale; + } + for (i = scale / 2; i != 0; i /= 2) { + v = mul2(v, v); + if (v >= 2 * scale) { + v >>= 1; + r += i; + } + } + r = (r * (uint64_t)scale) / log_e; + return r; +} + +/* + * NIST SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D: Maximum Security Strength Estimates for IFC + * Modulus Lengths. + * + * Note that this formula is also referred to in SP800-56A rev3 Appendix D: + * for FFC safe prime groups for modp and ffdhe. + * After Table 25 and Table 26 it refers to + * "The maximum security strength estimates were calculated using the formula in + * Section 7.5 of the FIPS 140 IG and rounded to the nearest multiple of eight + * bits". + * + * The formula is: + * + * E = \frac{1.923 \sqrt[3]{nBits \cdot log_e(2)} + * \cdot(log_e(nBits \cdot log_e(2))^{2/3} - 4.69}{log_e(2)} + * The two cube roots are merged together here. + */ +uint16_t ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(int n) +{ + uint64_t x; + uint32_t lx; + uint16_t y; + + /* Look for common values as listed in SP 800-56B rev 2 Appendix D */ + switch (n) { + case 2048: + return 112; + case 3072: + return 128; + case 4096: + return 152; + case 6144: + return 176; + case 8192: + return 200; + } + /* + * The first incorrect result (i.e. not accurate or off by one low) occurs + * for n = 699668. The true value here is 1200. Instead of using this n + * as the check threshold, the smallest n such that the correct result is + * 1200 is used instead. + */ + if (n >= 687737) + return 1200; + if (n < 8) + return 0; + + x = n * (uint64_t)log_2; + lx = ilog_e(x); + y = (uint16_t)((mul2(c1_923, icbrt64(mul2(mul2(x, lx), lx))) - c4_690) + / log_2); + return (y + 4) & ~7; +} + + + +int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa) +{ + int bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n); + +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) { + /* This ought to mean that we have private key at hand. */ + int ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos); - if (r->n != NULL) - BN_clear_free(r->n); - if (r->e != NULL) - BN_clear_free(r->e); - if (r->d != NULL) + if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > rsa_multip_cap(bits)) + return 0; + } +#endif + return ifc_ffc_compute_security_bits(bits); +} + +int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d) +{ + /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input + * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e. d may be + * left NULL (in case only the public key is used). + */ + if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL) + || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL)) + return 0; + + if (n != NULL) { + BN_free(r->n); + r->n = n; + } + if (e != NULL) { + BN_free(r->e); + r->e = e; + } + if (d != NULL) { BN_clear_free(r->d); - if (r->p != NULL) + r->d = d; + BN_set_flags(r->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } + r->dirty_cnt++; + + return 1; +} + +int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q) +{ + /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input + * parameters MUST be non-NULL. + */ + if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL) + || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL)) + return 0; + + if (p != NULL) { BN_clear_free(r->p); - if (r->q != NULL) + r->p = p; + BN_set_flags(r->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } + if (q != NULL) { BN_clear_free(r->q); - if (r->dmp1 != NULL) + r->q = q; + BN_set_flags(r->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } + r->dirty_cnt++; + + return 1; +} + +int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp) +{ + /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input + * parameters MUST be non-NULL. + */ + if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL) + || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL) + || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL)) + return 0; + + if (dmp1 != NULL) { BN_clear_free(r->dmp1); - if (r->dmq1 != NULL) + r->dmp1 = dmp1; + BN_set_flags(r->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } + if (dmq1 != NULL) { BN_clear_free(r->dmq1); - if (r->iqmp != NULL) + r->dmq1 = dmq1; + BN_set_flags(r->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } + if (iqmp != NULL) { BN_clear_free(r->iqmp); - if (r->blinding != NULL) - BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding); - if (r->mt_blinding != NULL) - BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding); - if (r->bignum_data != NULL) - OPENSSL_free_locked(r->bignum_data); - OPENSSL_free(r); + r->iqmp = iqmp; + BN_set_flags(r->iqmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } + r->dirty_cnt++; + + return 1; } -int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r) +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE +/* + * Is it better to export RSA_PRIME_INFO structure + * and related functions to let user pass a triplet? + */ +int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[], + BIGNUM *coeffs[], int pnum) { - int i = CRYPTO_add(&r->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); -#ifdef REF_PRINT - REF_PRINT("RSA", r); + STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old = NULL; + RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; + int i; + + if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL || pnum == 0) + return 0; + + prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum); + if (prime_infos == NULL) + return 0; + + if (r->prime_infos != NULL) + old = r->prime_infos; + + for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { + pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new(); + if (pinfo == NULL) + goto err; + if (primes[i] != NULL && exps[i] != NULL && coeffs[i] != NULL) { + BN_clear_free(pinfo->r); + BN_clear_free(pinfo->d); + BN_clear_free(pinfo->t); + pinfo->r = primes[i]; + pinfo->d = exps[i]; + pinfo->t = coeffs[i]; + BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } else { + rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo); + goto err; + } + (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo); + } + + r->prime_infos = prime_infos; + + if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) { + r->prime_infos = old; + goto err; + } + + if (old != NULL) { + /* + * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could + * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not + * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent + * with other *set0* functions: just free it... + */ + sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, rsa_multip_info_free); + } + + r->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI; + r->dirty_cnt++; + + return 1; + err: + /* r, d, t should not be freed */ + sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex); + return 0; +} #endif -#ifdef REF_CHECK - if (i < 2) { - fprintf(stderr, "RSA_up_ref, bad reference count\n"); - abort(); + +void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, + const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d) +{ + if (n != NULL) + *n = r->n; + if (e != NULL) + *e = r->e; + if (d != NULL) + *d = r->d; +} + +void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q) +{ + if (p != NULL) + *p = r->p; + if (q != NULL) + *q = r->q; +} + +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE +int RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(const RSA *r) +{ + int pnum; + + pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(r->prime_infos); + if (pnum <= 0) + pnum = 0; + return pnum; +} + +int RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *primes[]) +{ + int pnum, i; + RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; + + if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0) + return 0; + + /* + * return other primes + * it's caller's responsibility to allocate oth_primes[pnum] + */ + for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i); + primes[i] = pinfo->r; } + + return 1; +} #endif - return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); + +void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, + const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1, + const BIGNUM **iqmp) +{ + if (dmp1 != NULL) + *dmp1 = r->dmp1; + if (dmq1 != NULL) + *dmq1 = r->dmq1; + if (iqmp != NULL) + *iqmp = r->iqmp; } -int RSA_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, - CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE +int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[], + const BIGNUM *coeffs[]) { - return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_RSA, argl, argp, - new_func, dup_func, free_func); + int pnum; + + if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0) + return 0; + + /* return other primes */ + if (exps != NULL || coeffs != NULL) { + RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; + int i; + + /* it's the user's job to guarantee the buffer length */ + for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i); + if (exps != NULL) + exps[i] = pinfo->d; + if (coeffs != NULL) + coeffs[i] = pinfo->t; + } + } + + return 1; } +#endif -int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg) +const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_n(const RSA *r) { - return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg)); + return r->n; } -void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx) +const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_e(const RSA *r) { - return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx)); -} - -int RSA_memory_lock(RSA *r) -{ - int i, j, k, off; - char *p; - BIGNUM *bn, **t[6], *b; - BN_ULONG *ul; - - if (r->d == NULL) - return (1); - t[0] = &r->d; - t[1] = &r->p; - t[2] = &r->q; - t[3] = &r->dmp1; - t[4] = &r->dmq1; - t[5] = &r->iqmp; - k = bn_sizeof_BIGNUM() * 6; - off = k / sizeof(BN_ULONG) + 1; - j = 1; - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) - j += bn_get_top(*t[i]); - if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc_locked((off + j) * sizeof(BN_ULONG))) == NULL) { - RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_MEMORY_LOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return (0); - } - memset(p, 0, (off + j) * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); - bn = (BIGNUM *)p; - ul = (BN_ULONG *)&(p[off]); - for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) { - b = *(t[i]); - *(t[i]) = bn_array_el(bn, i); - memcpy((char *)bn_array_el(bn, i), (char *)b, bn_sizeof_BIGNUM()); - memcpy((char *)ul, bn_get_words(b), sizeof(BN_ULONG) * bn_get_top(b)); - bn_set_static_words(bn_array_el(bn, i), ul, bn_get_top(b)); - ul += bn_get_top(b); - BN_clear_free(b); - } - - /* I should fix this so it can still be done */ - r->flags &= ~(RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC); - - r->bignum_data = p; - return (1); + return r->e; } -int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa) +const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_d(const RSA *r) +{ + return r->d; +} + +const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_p(const RSA *r) +{ + return r->p; +} + +const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_q(const RSA *r) +{ + return r->q; +} + +const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmp1(const RSA *r) +{ + return r->dmp1; +} + +const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_dmq1(const RSA *r) +{ + return r->dmq1; +} + +const BIGNUM *RSA_get0_iqmp(const RSA *r) +{ + return r->iqmp; +} + +const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *RSA_get0_pss_params(const RSA *r) +{ +#ifdef FIPS_MODULE + return NULL; +#else + return r->pss; +#endif +} + +/* Internal */ +RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(RSA *r) +{ + return &r->pss_params; +} + +void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags) +{ + r->flags &= ~flags; +} + +int RSA_test_flags(const RSA *r, int flags) +{ + return r->flags & flags; +} + +void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags) +{ + r->flags |= flags; +} + +int RSA_get_version(RSA *r) +{ + /* { two-prime(0), multi(1) } */ + return r->version; +} + +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE +ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r) +{ + return r->engine; +} + +int RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2) { - return BN_security_bits(BN_num_bits(rsa->n), -1); + /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ + if (ctx != NULL && ctx->pmeth != NULL + && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA + && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) + return -1; + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, optype, cmd, p1, p2); } +#endif + +DEFINE_STACK_OF(BIGNUM) + +int ossl_rsa_set0_all_params(RSA *r, const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *primes, + const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *exps, + const STACK_OF(BIGNUM) *coeffs) +{ +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old_infos = NULL; +#endif + int pnum; + + if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL) + return 0; + + pnum = sk_BIGNUM_num(primes); + if (pnum < 2 + || pnum != sk_BIGNUM_num(exps) + || pnum != sk_BIGNUM_num(coeffs) + 1) + return 0; + + if (!RSA_set0_factors(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 0), + sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, 1)) + || !RSA_set0_crt_params(r, sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 0), + sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, 1), + sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, 0))) + return 0; + +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + old_infos = r->prime_infos; +#endif + + if (pnum > 2) { +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + int i; + + prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum); + if (prime_infos == NULL) + return 0; + + for (i = 2; i < pnum; i++) { + BIGNUM *prime = sk_BIGNUM_value(primes, i); + BIGNUM *exp = sk_BIGNUM_value(exps, i); + BIGNUM *coeff = sk_BIGNUM_value(coeffs, i - 1); + RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL; + + if (!ossl_assert(prime != NULL && exp != NULL && coeff != NULL)) + goto err; + + /* Using rsa_multip_info_new() is wasteful, so allocate directly */ + if ((pinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pinfo))) == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + + pinfo->r = prime; + pinfo->d = exp; + pinfo->t = coeff; + BN_set_flags(pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + BN_set_flags(pinfo->t, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + (void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo); + } + + r->prime_infos = prime_infos; + + if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) { + r->prime_infos = old_infos; + goto err; + } +#else + return 0; +#endif + } + +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + if (old_infos != NULL) { + /* + * This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could + * also be set by this function and r, d, t should not + * be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent + * with other *set0* functions: just free it... + */ + sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old_infos, rsa_multip_info_free); + } +#endif + + r->version = pnum > 2 ? RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI : RSA_ASN1_VERSION_DEFAULT; + r->dirty_cnt++; + + return 1; +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + err: + /* r, d, t should not be freed */ + sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex); + return 0; +#endif +} + +DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(BIGNUM_const, BIGNUM) + +int ossl_rsa_get0_all_params(RSA *r, STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *primes, + STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *exps, + STACK_OF(BIGNUM_const) *coeffs) +{ +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo; + int i, pnum; +#endif + + if (r == NULL) + return 0; + + /* If |p| is NULL, there are no CRT parameters */ + if (RSA_get0_p(r) == NULL) + return 1; + + sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_p(r)); + sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, RSA_get0_q(r)); + sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmp1(r)); + sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, RSA_get0_dmq1(r)); + sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, RSA_get0_iqmp(r)); + +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE + pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r); + for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) { + pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i); + sk_BIGNUM_const_push(primes, pinfo->r); + sk_BIGNUM_const_push(exps, pinfo->d); + sk_BIGNUM_const_push(coeffs, pinfo->t); + } +#endif + + return 1; +} + +#ifndef FIPS_MODULE +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int pad_mode) +{ + OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params; + + if (ctx == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ + if (ctx->pmeth != NULL + && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA + && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) + return -1; + + /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ + if ((!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) + || ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) + && (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx) + || ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL)) + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING, + pad_mode, NULL); + + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PAD_MODE, &pad_mode); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, pad_params); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *pad_mode) +{ + OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params; + + if (ctx == NULL || pad_mode == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ + if (ctx->pmeth != NULL + && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA + && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) + return -1; + + /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ + if ((!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) + || ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) + && (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx) + || ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL)) + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING, 0, + pad_mode); + + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PAD_MODE, pad_mode); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, pad_params)) + return 0; + + return 1; + +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) +{ + const char *name; + + if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA return error */ + if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) + return -1; + + /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ + if (ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md); + + name = (md == NULL) ? "" : EVP_MD_name(md); + + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md_name(ctx, name, NULL); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, + const char *mdprops) +{ + OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[3], *p = rsa_params; + + if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA return error */ + if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) + return -1; + + + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST, + /* + * Cast away the const. This is read + * only so should be safe + */ + (char *)mdname, 0); + if (mdprops != NULL) { + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string( + OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST_PROPS, + /* + * Cast away the const. This is read + * only so should be safe + */ + (char *)mdprops, 0); + } + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, rsa_params); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name, + size_t namelen) +{ + OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params; + + if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA return error */ + if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) + return -1; + + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_DIGEST, + name, namelen); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, rsa_params)) + return -1; + + return 1; +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md) +{ + /* 80 should be big enough */ + char name[80] = ""; + + if (ctx == NULL || md == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA return error */ + if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) + return -1; + + /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ + if (ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD, 0, (void *)md); + + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_oaep_md_name(ctx, name, sizeof(name)) <= 0) + return -1; + + /* May be NULL meaning "unknown" */ + *md = evp_get_digestbyname_ex(ctx->libctx, name); + + return 1; +} + +static int int_set_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + /* For EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() */ + int keytype, int optype, int cmd, + const EVP_MD *md, + /* For EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params() */ + const char *mdname, const char *mdprops) +{ + OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[3], *p = rsa_params; + + if (ctx == NULL || (ctx->operation & optype) == 0) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA return error */ + if (ctx->pmeth != NULL + && (keytype == -1 + ? (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA + && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) + : ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != keytype)) + return -1; + + /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ + if (cmd != -1) { + if ((EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) + && ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) + || (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx) + && ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL) + || (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx) + && ctx->op.keymgmt.genctx == NULL)) + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, keytype, optype, cmd, 0, (void *)md); + + mdname = (md == NULL) ? "" : EVP_MD_name(md); + } + + + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, + /* + * Cast away the const. This is + * read only so should be safe + */ + (char *)mdname, 0); + if (mdprops != NULL) { + *p++ = + OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, + /* + * Cast away the const. This is + * read only so should be safe + */ + (char *)mdprops, 0); + } + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, rsa_params); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) +{ + return int_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, -1, + EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, md, NULL, NULL); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname, + const char *mdprops) +{ + return int_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, -1, + EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, + -1, NULL, mdname, mdprops); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md) +{ + return int_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, + EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, + md, NULL, NULL); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + const char *mdname) +{ + return int_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, + EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, + -1, NULL, mdname, NULL); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, char *name, + size_t namelen) +{ + OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params; + + if (ctx == NULL + || (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) + && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx))) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ + if (ctx->pmeth != NULL + && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA + && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) + return -1; + + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, + name, namelen); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, rsa_params)) + return -1; + + return 1; +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **md) +{ + /* 80 should be big enough */ + char name[80] = ""; + + if (ctx == NULL + || (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) + && !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx))) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ + if (ctx->pmeth != NULL + && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA + && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) + return -1; + + /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ + if ((EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx) + && ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) + || (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx) + && ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL)) + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, + EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD, 0, (void *)md); + + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name(ctx, name, sizeof(name)) <= 0) + return -1; + + /* May be NULL meaning "unknown" */ + *md = evp_get_digestbyname_ex(ctx->libctx, name); + + return 1; +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, void *label, int llen) +{ + OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[2], *p = rsa_params; + + if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA return error */ + if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) + return -1; + + /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ + if (ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, llen, + (void *)label); + + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, + /* + * Cast away the const. This is + * read only so should be safe + */ + (void *)label, + (size_t)llen); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, rsa_params)) + return 0; + + OPENSSL_free(label); + return 1; +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_rsa_oaep_label(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **label) +{ + OSSL_PARAM rsa_params[3], *p = rsa_params; + size_t labellen; + + if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_ASYM_CIPHER_OP(ctx)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA return error */ + if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) + return -1; + + /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ + if (ctx->op.ciph.ciphprovctx == NULL) + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL, 0, + (void *)label); + + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL, + (void **)label, 0); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_OAEP_LABEL_LEN, + &labellen); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, rsa_params)) + return -1; + + if (labellen > INT_MAX) + return -1; + + return (int)labellen; +} + +static int int_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen, + int keytype, int optype) +{ + OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params; + + if (ctx == NULL || (ctx->operation & optype) == 0) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ + if (ctx->pmeth != NULL + && (keytype == -1 + ? (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA + && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) + : ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != keytype)) + return -1; + + /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ + if ((EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx) + && ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL) + || (EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx) + && ctx->op.keymgmt.genctx == NULL)) + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, keytype, optype, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, + saltlen, NULL); + + *p++ = + OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, &saltlen); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, pad_params); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen) +{ + return int_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int saltlen) +{ + return int_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, + EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *saltlen) +{ + OSSL_PARAM pad_params[2], *p = pad_params; + + if (ctx == NULL || saltlen == NULL) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */ + if (ctx->pmeth != NULL + && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA + && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) + return -1; + + /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_SIGNATURE_OP(ctx) + || ctx->op.sig.sigprovctx == NULL) + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN, + 0, saltlen); + + *p++ = + OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, saltlen); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_params(ctx, pad_params)) + return 0; + + return 1; + +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int bits) +{ + OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params; + size_t bits2 = bits; + + if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA return error */ + if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) + return -1; + + /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ + if (ctx->op.keymgmt.genctx == NULL) + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS, bits, NULL); + + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_BITS, &bits2); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +static int evp_pkey_ctx_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp_intern(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, + BIGNUM *pubexp, + int copy) +{ + OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl; + OSSL_PARAM *params; + int ret; + + if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA return error */ + if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) + return -1; + + /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ + if (ctx->op.keymgmt.genctx == NULL) { + if (copy == 1) + pubexp = BN_dup(pubexp); + ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP, 0, pubexp); + if ((copy == 1) && (ret <= 0)) + BN_free(pubexp); + return ret; + } + + if ((tmpl = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) + return 0; + if (!OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, pubexp) + || (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(tmpl)) == NULL) { + OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl); + return 0; + } + OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(tmpl); + + ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params); + OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free_params(params); + + /* + * Satisfy memory semantics for pre-3.0 callers of + * EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(): their expectation is that input + * pubexp BIGNUM becomes managed by the EVP_PKEY_CTX on success. + */ + if ((copy == 0) && (ret > 0)) + ctx->rsa_pubexp = pubexp; + + return ret; +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp) +{ + return evp_pkey_ctx_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp_intern(ctx, pubexp, 0); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM *pubexp) +{ + return evp_pkey_ctx_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp_intern(ctx, pubexp, 1); +} + +int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int primes) +{ + OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params; + size_t primes2 = primes; + + if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_GEN_OP(ctx)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); + /* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */ + return -2; + } + + /* If key type not RSA return error */ + if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA) + return -1; + + /* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */ + if (ctx->op.keymgmt.genctx == NULL) + return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_RSA, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, + EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES, primes, + NULL); + + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_PRIMES, &primes2); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)) + return 0; + + return 1; +} +#endif