X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=crypto%2Fec%2Fec_key.c;h=416c0e08fc5b9648ae59226725cdfcaccf3348c8;hb=bb315ca716656b7aff89f86d35988062952ccb21;hp=a74ccf70f2259741163bcef59bbc6fcbe0fcf5c2;hpb=8fdc3734c063146b038608c2412a0f2c9b21b6d6;p=openssl.git diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_key.c b/crypto/ec/ec_key.c index a74ccf70f2..416c0e08fc 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_key.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_key.c @@ -1,90 +1,23 @@ -/* crypto/ec/ec_key.c */ /* - * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project. - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). + * Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. - * Portions originally developed by SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and - * contributed to the OpenSSL project. + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "ec_lcl.h" +#include "internal/refcount.h" #include +#include EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void) { - EC_KEY *ret; - - ret = (EC_KEY *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_KEY)); - if (ret == NULL) { - ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return (NULL); - } - - ret->version = 1; - ret->flags = 0; - ret->group = NULL; - ret->pub_key = NULL; - ret->priv_key = NULL; - ret->enc_flag = 0; - ret->conv_form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED; - ret->references = 1; - ret->method_data = NULL; - return (ret); + return EC_KEY_new_method(NULL); } EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid) @@ -97,6 +30,11 @@ EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid) EC_KEY_free(ret); return NULL; } + if (ret->meth->set_group != NULL + && ret->meth->set_group(ret, ret->group) == 0) { + EC_KEY_free(ret); + return NULL; + } return ret; } @@ -107,41 +45,50 @@ void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r) if (r == NULL) return; - i = CRYPTO_add(&r->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC); -#ifdef REF_PRINT - REF_PRINT("EC_KEY", r); -#endif + CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock); + REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r); if (i > 0) return; -#ifdef REF_CHECK - if (i < 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "EC_KEY_free, bad reference count\n"); - abort(); - } + REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); + + if (r->meth != NULL && r->meth->finish != NULL) + r->meth->finish(r); + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + ENGINE_finish(r->engine); #endif + if (r->group && r->group->meth->keyfinish) + r->group->meth->keyfinish(r); + + CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY, r, &r->ex_data); + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(r->lock); EC_GROUP_free(r->group); EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key); - if (r->priv_key != NULL) - BN_clear_free(r->priv_key); + BN_clear_free(r->priv_key); - EC_EX_DATA_free_all_data(&r->method_data); - - OPENSSL_cleanse((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY)); - - OPENSSL_free(r); + OPENSSL_clear_free((void *)r, sizeof(EC_KEY)); } EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src) { - EC_EXTRA_DATA *d; - if (dest == NULL || src == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_COPY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return NULL; } + if (src->meth != dest->meth) { + if (dest->meth->finish != NULL) + dest->meth->finish(dest); + if (dest->group && dest->group->meth->keyfinish) + dest->group->meth->keyfinish(dest); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + if (ENGINE_finish(dest->engine) == 0) + return 0; + dest->engine = NULL; +#endif + } /* copy the parameters */ - if (src->group) { + if (src->group != NULL) { const EC_METHOD *meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(src->group); /* clear the old group */ EC_GROUP_free(dest->group); @@ -150,54 +97,63 @@ EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src) return NULL; if (!EC_GROUP_copy(dest->group, src->group)) return NULL; - } - /* copy the public key */ - if (src->pub_key && src->group) { - EC_POINT_free(dest->pub_key); - dest->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(src->group); - if (dest->pub_key == NULL) - return NULL; - if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->pub_key, src->pub_key)) - return NULL; - } - /* copy the private key */ - if (src->priv_key) { - if (dest->priv_key == NULL) { - dest->priv_key = BN_new(); - if (dest->priv_key == NULL) + + /* copy the public key */ + if (src->pub_key != NULL) { + EC_POINT_free(dest->pub_key); + dest->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(src->group); + if (dest->pub_key == NULL) + return NULL; + if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->pub_key, src->pub_key)) + return NULL; + } + /* copy the private key */ + if (src->priv_key != NULL) { + if (dest->priv_key == NULL) { + dest->priv_key = BN_new(); + if (dest->priv_key == NULL) + return NULL; + } + if (!BN_copy(dest->priv_key, src->priv_key)) + return NULL; + if (src->group->meth->keycopy + && src->group->meth->keycopy(dest, src) == 0) return NULL; } - if (!BN_copy(dest->priv_key, src->priv_key)) - return NULL; } - /* copy method/extra data */ - EC_EX_DATA_free_all_data(&dest->method_data); - for (d = src->method_data; d != NULL; d = d->next) { - void *t = d->dup_func(d->data); - - if (t == NULL) - return 0; - if (!EC_EX_DATA_set_data - (&dest->method_data, t, d->dup_func, d->free_func, - d->clear_free_func)) - return 0; - } /* copy the rest */ dest->enc_flag = src->enc_flag; dest->conv_form = src->conv_form; dest->version = src->version; dest->flags = src->flags; + if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY, + &dest->ex_data, &src->ex_data)) + return NULL; + + if (src->meth != dest->meth) { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + if (src->engine != NULL && ENGINE_init(src->engine) == 0) + return NULL; + dest->engine = src->engine; +#endif + dest->meth = src->meth; + } + + if (src->meth->copy != NULL && src->meth->copy(dest, src) == 0) + return NULL; return dest; } EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *ec_key) { - EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new(); + EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new_method(ec_key->engine); + if (ret == NULL) return NULL; + if (EC_KEY_copy(ret, ec_key) == NULL) { EC_KEY_free(ret); return NULL; @@ -207,92 +163,155 @@ EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *ec_key) int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *r) { - int i = CRYPTO_add(&r->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_EC); -#ifdef REF_PRINT - REF_PRINT("EC_KEY", r); -#endif -#ifdef REF_CHECK - if (i < 2) { - fprintf(stderr, "EC_KEY_up, bad reference count\n"); - abort(); - } -#endif + int i; + + if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0) + return 0; + + REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_KEY", r); + REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } -int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey) +ENGINE *EC_KEY_get0_engine(const EC_KEY *eckey) { - int ok = 0; - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL, *order = NULL; - EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL; + return eckey->engine; +} - if (!eckey || !eckey->group) { +int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey) +{ + if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } + if (eckey->meth->keygen != NULL) + return eckey->meth->keygen(eckey); + ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED); + return 0; +} - if ((order = BN_new()) == NULL) - goto err; - if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - goto err; +int ossl_ec_key_gen(EC_KEY *eckey) +{ + return eckey->group->meth->keygen(eckey); +} + +/* + * ECC Key generation. + * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2 "Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates" + * + * Params: + * eckey An EC key object that contains domain params. The generated keypair + * is stored in this object. + * Returns 1 if the keypair was generated or 0 otherwise. + */ +int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey) +{ + int ok = 0; + BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL; + const BIGNUM *order = NULL; + EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL; + const EC_GROUP *group = eckey->group; if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) { - priv_key = BN_new(); + priv_key = BN_secure_new(); if (priv_key == NULL) goto err; } else priv_key = eckey->priv_key; - if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(eckey->group, order, ctx)) + /* + * Steps (1-2): Check domain parameters and security strength. + * These steps must be done by the user. This would need to be + * stated in the security policy. + */ + + order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group); + if (order == NULL) goto err; + /* + * Steps (3-7): priv_key = DRBG_RAND(order_n_bits) (range [1, n-1]). + * Although this is slightly different from the standard, it is effectively + * equivalent as it gives an unbiased result ranging from 1..n-1. It is also + * faster as the standard needs to retry more often. Also doing + * 1 + rand[0..n-2] would effect the way that tests feed dummy entropy into + * rand so the simpler backward compatible method has been used here. + */ do - if (!BN_rand_range(priv_key, order)) + if (!BN_priv_rand_range(priv_key, order)) goto err; while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ; if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) { - pub_key = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group); + pub_key = EC_POINT_new(group); if (pub_key == NULL) goto err; } else pub_key = eckey->pub_key; - if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx)) + /* Step (8) : pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve) */ + if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, NULL)) goto err; eckey->priv_key = priv_key; eckey->pub_key = pub_key; + priv_key = NULL; + pub_key = NULL; ok = 1; - err: - if (order) - BN_free(order); - if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) - EC_POINT_free(pub_key); - if (priv_key != NULL && eckey->priv_key == NULL) - BN_free(priv_key); - if (ctx != NULL) - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - return (ok); +err: + /* Step (9): If there is an error return an invalid keypair. */ + if (!ok) { + BN_clear(eckey->priv_key); + if (eckey->pub_key != NULL) + EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, eckey->pub_key); + } + + EC_POINT_free(pub_key); + BN_clear_free(priv_key); + return ok; +} + +int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY *eckey) +{ + /* + * See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2: Step (8) + * pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve) + */ + return EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, eckey->priv_key, NULL, + NULL, NULL); } int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey) +{ + if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return 0; + } + + if (eckey->group->meth->keycheck == NULL) { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + + return eckey->group->meth->keycheck(eckey); +} + +int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey) { int ok = 0; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; const BIGNUM *order = NULL; EC_POINT *point = NULL; - if (!eckey || !eckey->group || !eckey->pub_key) { - ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL || eckey->pub_key == NULL) { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) { - ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY); + ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY); goto err; } @@ -302,49 +321,48 @@ int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey) goto err; /* testing whether the pub_key is on the elliptic curve */ - if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx)) { - ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE); + if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE); goto err; } /* testing whether pub_key * order is the point at infinity */ order = eckey->group->order; if (BN_is_zero(order)) { - ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER); + ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, NULL, eckey->pub_key, order, ctx)) { - ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, point)) { - ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER); + ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER); goto err; } /* * in case the priv_key is present : check if generator * priv_key == * pub_key */ - if (eckey->priv_key) { + if (eckey->priv_key != NULL) { if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, order) >= 0) { - ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER); + ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx)) { - ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); + ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (EC_POINT_cmp(eckey->group, point, eckey->pub_key, ctx) != 0) { - ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY); + ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY); goto err; } } ok = 1; err: - if (ctx != NULL) - BN_CTX_free(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); EC_POINT_free(point); - return (ok); + return ok; } int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x, @@ -353,47 +371,33 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x, BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *tx, *ty; EC_POINT *point = NULL; - int ok = 0, tmp_nid, is_char_two = 0; + int ok = 0; - if (!key || !key->group || !x || !y) { + if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL || x == NULL || y == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } ctx = BN_CTX_new(); - if (!ctx) - goto err; + if (ctx == NULL) + return 0; + BN_CTX_start(ctx); point = EC_POINT_new(key->group); - if (!point) + if (point == NULL) goto err; - tmp_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(key->group)); - - if (tmp_nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) - is_char_two = 1; - tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx); ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M - if (is_char_two) { - if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point, - x, y, ctx)) - goto err; - if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point, - tx, ty, ctx)) - goto err; - } else -#endif - { - if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point, - x, y, ctx)) - goto err; - if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point, - tx, ty, ctx)) - goto err; - } + if (ty == NULL) + goto err; + + if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, x, y, ctx)) + goto err; + if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key->group, point, tx, ty, ctx)) + goto err; + /* * Check if retrieved coordinates match originals and are less than field * order: if not values are out of range. @@ -415,8 +419,8 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x, ok = 1; err: - if (ctx) - BN_CTX_free(ctx); + BN_CTX_end(ctx); + BN_CTX_free(ctx); EC_POINT_free(point); return ok; @@ -429,6 +433,8 @@ const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key) int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group) { + if (key->meth->set_group != NULL && key->meth->set_group(key, group) == 0) + return 0; EC_GROUP_free(key->group); key->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group); return (key->group == NULL) ? 0 : 1; @@ -441,8 +447,15 @@ const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key) int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key) { - if (key->priv_key) - BN_clear_free(key->priv_key); + if (key->group == NULL || key->group->meth == NULL) + return 0; + if (key->group->meth->set_private != NULL + && key->group->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0) + return 0; + if (key->meth->set_private != NULL + && key->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0) + return 0; + BN_clear_free(key->priv_key); key->priv_key = BN_dup(priv_key); return (key->priv_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1; } @@ -454,6 +467,9 @@ const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key) int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key) { + if (key->meth->set_public != NULL + && key->meth->set_public(key, pub_key) == 0) + return 0; EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key); key->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(pub_key, key->group); return (key->pub_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1; @@ -481,41 +497,6 @@ void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform) EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(key->group, cform); } -void *EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, - void *(*dup_func) (void *), - void (*free_func) (void *), - void (*clear_free_func) (void *)) -{ - void *ret; - - CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC); - ret = - EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func, - clear_free_func); - CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC); - - return ret; -} - -void *EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, void *data, - void *(*dup_func) (void *), - void (*free_func) (void *), - void (*clear_free_func) (void *)) -{ - EC_EXTRA_DATA *ex_data; - - CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC); - ex_data = - EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func, - clear_free_func); - if (ex_data == NULL) - EC_EX_DATA_set_data(&key->method_data, data, dup_func, free_func, - clear_free_func); - CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC); - - return ex_data; -} - void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag) { if (key->group != NULL) @@ -543,3 +524,126 @@ void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags) { key->flags &= ~flags; } + +size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t form, + unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx) +{ + if (key == NULL || key->pub_key == NULL || key->group == NULL) + return 0; + return EC_POINT_point2buf(key->group, key->pub_key, form, pbuf, ctx); +} + +int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, + BN_CTX *ctx) +{ + if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL) + return 0; + if (key->pub_key == NULL) + key->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(key->group); + if (key->pub_key == NULL) + return 0; + if (EC_POINT_oct2point(key->group, key->pub_key, buf, len, ctx) == 0) + return 0; + /* + * Save the point conversion form. + * For non-custom curves the first octet of the buffer (excluding + * the last significant bit) contains the point conversion form. + * EC_POINT_oct2point() has already performed sanity checking of + * the buffer so we know it is valid. + */ + if ((key->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) == 0) + key->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t)(buf[0] & ~0x01); + return 1; +} + +size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL) + return 0; + if (eckey->group->meth->priv2oct == NULL) { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2OCT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + + return eckey->group->meth->priv2oct(eckey, buf, len); +} + +size_t ec_key_simple_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + size_t buf_len; + + buf_len = (EC_GROUP_order_bits(eckey->group) + 7) / 8; + if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) + return 0; + if (buf == NULL) + return buf_len; + else if (len < buf_len) + return 0; + + /* Octetstring may need leading zeros if BN is to short */ + + if (BN_bn2binpad(eckey->priv_key, buf, buf_len) == -1) { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_PRIV2OCT, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); + return 0; + } + + return buf_len; +} + +int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL) + return 0; + if (eckey->group->meth->oct2priv == NULL) { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); + return 0; + } + return eckey->group->meth->oct2priv(eckey, buf, len); +} + +int ec_key_simple_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) + eckey->priv_key = BN_secure_new(); + if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + eckey->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(buf, len, eckey->priv_key); + if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char **pbuf) +{ + size_t len; + unsigned char *buf; + + len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, NULL, 0); + if (len == 0) + return 0; + if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_PRIV2BUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(eckey, buf, len); + if (len == 0) { + OPENSSL_free(buf); + return 0; + } + *pbuf = buf; + return len; +} + +int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY *eckey) +{ + if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL + || (eckey->group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_NO_SIGN)) + return 0; + return 1; +}