X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;ds=sidebyside;f=CHANGES;h=797c02118c11938899035b19b58ce9ae72034c1c;hb=73c92dfa0c15d7932d86130a525d1a1bc43c312a;hp=0bf34ab783a6f39563e9470f6b80e42bd8c4a013;hpb=4dc836773e042806235bd724acc711f0cb9b049b;p=openssl.git diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index 0bf34ab783..797c02118c 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -2,33 +2,25 @@ OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ - Changes between 1.0.x and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx] + Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx] - *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which - avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be - Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for - several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug - is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing - 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer. - [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley] + *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(): + this fixes a limiation in previous versions of OpenSSL. + [Steve Henson] *) Experimental encrypt-then-mac support. Experimental support for encrypt then mac from draft-gutmann-tls-encrypt-then-mac-02.txt - To enable it set the appropriate extension number (0x10 for the test - server) using e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac=0x10 + To enable it set the appropriate extension number (0x42 for the test + server) using e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac=0x42 For non-compliant peers (i.e. just about everything) this should have no effect. WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, SUBJECT TO CHANGE. - NOTE: unfortunately the test server value (0x10) clashes with the draft - ALPN extension. Until this is resolved the only way to check against the - test server is to temporarily change the ALPN extension value (ugh!). - [Steve Henson] *) Add callbacks supporting generation and retrieval of supplemental @@ -252,12 +244,6 @@ security. [Emilia Käsper (Google)] - *) Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs. - OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an - intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first - setting is used: whether to trust or reject. - [Steve Henson] - *) New -verify_name option in command line utilities to set verification parameters by name. [Steve Henson] @@ -291,6 +277,42 @@ Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx] + *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission + structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need + to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450) + [Steve Henson] + + *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-02 + + Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the + TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and + less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it + is at least 512 bytes long. + + To enable it use an unused extension number (for example chrome uses + 35655) using: + + e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_padding=35655 + + Since the extension is ignored the actual number doesn't matter as long + as it doesn't clash with any existing extension. + + This will be updated when the extension gets an official number. + + [Adam Langley, Steve Henson] + + *) Add functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD + structure. + [Douglas E. Engert, Steve Henson] + + *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which + avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be + Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for + several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug + is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing + 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer. + [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley] + *) New functions OPENSSL_gmtime_diff and ASN1_TIME_diff to find the difference in days and seconds between two tm or ASN1_TIME structures. [Steve Henson] @@ -461,12 +483,12 @@ *) Fix OCSP checking. [Rob Stradling and Ben Laurie] - *) Backport support for partial chain verification: if an intermediate - certificate is explicitly trusted (using -addtrust option to x509 - utility for example) the verification is sucessful even if the chain - is not complete. - The OCSP checking fix depends on this backport. - [Steve Henson and Rob Stradling ] + *) Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs. + OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an + intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first + setting is used: whether to trust (e.g., -addtrust option to the x509 + utility) or reject. + [Steve Henson] *) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied.