#include <stdio.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
#include <openssl/comp.h>
+#endif
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#endif
/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
-static void tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
+static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
int sec_len,
const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
unsigned char *out, int olen)
{
- int chunk,n;
+ int chunk;
unsigned int j;
HMAC_CTX ctx;
HMAC_CTX ctx_tmp;
unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int A1_len;
+ int ret = 0;
chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
+ OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
- HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,sec,sec_len,md, NULL);
- HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,sec,sec_len,md, NULL);
- if (seed1 != NULL) HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len);
- if (seed2 != NULL) HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len);
- if (seed3 != NULL) HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len);
- if (seed4 != NULL) HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len);
- if (seed5 != NULL) HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len);
- HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len);
-
- n=0;
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,sec,sec_len,md, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,sec,sec_len,md, NULL))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+ goto err;
+
for (;;)
{
- HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); /* re-init */
- HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,NULL,0,NULL,NULL); /* re-init */
- HMAC_Update(&ctx,A1,A1_len);
- HMAC_Update(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len);
- if (seed1 != NULL) HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len);
- if (seed2 != NULL) HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len);
- if (seed3 != NULL) HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len);
- if (seed4 != NULL) HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len);
- if (seed5 != NULL) HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len);
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */
+ goto err;
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */
+ goto err;
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+ goto err;
+ if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+ goto err;
if (olen > chunk)
{
- HMAC_Final(&ctx,out,&j);
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,out,&j))
+ goto err;
out+=j;
olen-=j;
- HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len); /* calc the next A1 value */
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len)) /* calc the next A1 value */
+ goto err;
}
else /* last one */
{
- HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len);
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+ goto err;
memcpy(out,A1,olen);
break;
}
}
+ ret = 1;
+err:
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
+ return ret;
}
/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
-static void tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
+static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
const unsigned char *S1;
long m;
const EVP_MD *md;
+ int ret = 0;
/* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
count=0;
if (!md) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
- return;
+ goto err;
}
- tls1_P_hash(md ,S1,len+(slen&1),
- seed1,seed1_len,seed2,seed2_len,seed3,seed3_len,seed4,seed4_len,seed5,seed5_len,
- out2,olen);
+ if (!tls1_P_hash(md ,S1,len+(slen&1),
+ seed1,seed1_len,seed2,seed2_len,seed3,seed3_len,seed4,seed4_len,seed5,seed5_len,
+ out2,olen))
+ goto err;
S1+=len;
for (i=0; i<olen; i++)
{
}
}
}
-
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ return ret;
}
-static void tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
+static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
unsigned char *tmp, int num)
{
- tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ int ret;
+ ret = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
}
printf("\n"); }
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ return ret;
}
int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
{
static const unsigned char empty[]="";
- unsigned char *p,*key_block,*mac_secret;
+ unsigned char *p,*mac_secret;
unsigned char *exp_label;
unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
- unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv,*er1,*er2;
+ unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv;
int client_write;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
#endif
- key_block=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
{
int i;
for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
- printf("%02x", key_block[i]); printf("\n");
+ printf("%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]); printf("\n");
}
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
/* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
- er1= &(s->s3->client_random[0]);
- er2= &(s->s3->server_random[0]);
if ( (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
(which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
{
/* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
* same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
*/
- tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
- exp_label,exp_label_len,
- s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- NULL,0,NULL,0,
- key,j,tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c));
+ if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ exp_label,exp_label_len,
+ s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL,0,NULL,0,
+ key,j,tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
+ goto err2;
key=tmp1;
if (k > 0)
{
- tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
- TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
- s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
- NULL,0,NULL,0,
- empty,0,iv1,iv2,k*2);
+ if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
+ s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ NULL,0,NULL,0,
+ empty,0,iv1,iv2,k*2))
+ goto err2;
if (client_write)
iv=iv1;
else
int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
{
- unsigned char *p1,*p2;
+ unsigned char *p1,*p2=NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
const EVP_MD *hash;
int num;
SSL_COMP *comp;
int mac_type= NID_undef,mac_secret_size=0;
+ int ret=0;
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
- if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
- goto err;
+ }
s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num;
s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1;
+ if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("client random\n");
printf("pre-master\n");
{ int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
#endif
- tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num);
- OPENSSL_free(p2);
+ if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num))
+ goto err;
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("\nkey block\n");
{ int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
}
}
- return(1);
+ ret = 1;
err:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(0);
+ if (p2)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num);
+ OPENSSL_free(p2);
+ }
+ return(ret);
}
+/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
+ * short etc).
+ * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
+ * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
+ * an internal error occured.
+ */
int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
{
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
unsigned long l;
- int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0;
+ int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0;
+ int n;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
if (send)
{
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
+ {
n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+ }
ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
else
{
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
+ {
n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
+ }
ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) ||
- (enc == NULL))
+ if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
{
memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
rec->input=rec->data;
+ ret = 1;
}
else
{
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
- unsigned long ui;
+ unsigned long ui;
printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
- ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+ ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
- ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
- DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
- ds->cipher->iv_len);
+ ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
+ DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
+ ds->cipher->iv_len);
printf("\t\tIV: ");
for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
printf("\n");
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
{
- unsigned long i;
- printf("\trec->data=");
+ unsigned long i;
+ printf("\trec->data=");
for (i=0; i<l; i++)
- printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]); printf("\n");
- }
+ printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]); printf("\n");
+ }
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+ ret = 1;
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
if ((bs != 1) && !send)
- {
- ii=i=rec->data[l-1]; /* padding_length */
- i++;
- /* NB: if compression is in operation the first packet
- * may not be of even length so the padding bug check
- * cannot be performed. This bug workaround has been
- * around since SSLeay so hopefully it is either fixed
- * now or no buggy implementation supports compression
- * [steve]
- */
- if ( (s->options&SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
- && !s->expand)
- {
- /* First packet is even in size, so check */
- if ((memcmp(s->s3->read_sequence,
- "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0",8) == 0) && !(ii & 1))
- s->s3->flags|=TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG;
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
- i--;
- }
- /* TLS 1.0 does not bound the number of padding bytes by the block size.
- * All of them must have value 'padding_length'. */
- if (i > (int)rec->length)
- {
- /* Incorrect padding. SSLerr() and ssl3_alert are done
- * by caller: we don't want to reveal whether this is
- * a decryption error or a MAC verification failure
- * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
- return -1;
- }
- for (j=(int)(l-i); j<(int)l; j++)
- {
- if (rec->data[j] != ii)
- {
- /* Incorrect padding */
- return -1;
- }
- }
- rec->length-=i;
- }
+ ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
+ if (pad && !send)
+ rec->length -= pad;
}
- return(1);
+ return ret;
}
+
int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
{
unsigned int ret;
int i;
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- ssl3_digest_cached_records(s);
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return 0;
+
for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++)
{
if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid)
q=buf;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- ssl3_digest_cached_records(s);
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return 0;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&mask,&md);idx++)
{
if (mask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)
{
- unsigned int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
- if (hashsize > (sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
+ int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
+ if (hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
{
/* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */
err = 1;
{
EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i);
- if (i != hashsize) /* can't really happen */
+ if (i != (unsigned int)hashsize) /* can't really happen */
err = 1;
q+=i;
}
}
}
- tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
- str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
- s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
- out,buf2,sizeof buf2);
+ if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+ str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
+ s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
+ out,buf2,sizeof buf2))
+ err = 1;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
if (err)
int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
{
SSL3_RECORD *rec;
- unsigned char *mac_sec,*seq;
+ unsigned char *seq;
EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
size_t md_size;
int i;
EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
- unsigned char buf[5];
+ unsigned char header[13];
int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
+ int t;
if (send)
{
rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
- mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
hash=ssl->write_hash;
}
else
{
rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
- mac_sec= &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
hash=ssl->read_hash;
}
- md_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
-
- buf[0]=rec->type;
- buf[1]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
- buf[2]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
- buf[3]=rec->length>>8;
- buf[4]=rec->length&0xff;
+ t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
+ md_size=t;
/* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
if (stream_mac)
mac_ctx = &hmac;
}
- if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq;
s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
- EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,dtlsseq,8);
+ memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
}
else
- EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,seq,8);
+ memcpy(header, seq, 8);
+
+ header[8]=rec->type;
+ header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
+ header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
+ header[11]=(rec->length)>>8;
+ header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff;
- EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,buf,5);
- EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
- EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
- if (!stream_mac) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
+ if (!send &&
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+ ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx))
+ {
+ /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
+ * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
+ * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
+ * timing-oracle. */
+ ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
+ mac_ctx,
+ md, &md_size,
+ header, rec->input,
+ rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len,
+ ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
+ ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
+ 0 /* not SSLv3 */);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header));
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
+ t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
+ OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
+ }
+
+ if (!stream_mac)
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("sec=");
{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); }
{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
#endif
- if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
{