clear_ciphers(s);
s->first_packet = 0;
+ s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
+
/* Reset DANE verification result state */
s->dane.mdpth = -1;
s->dane.pdpth = -1;
s->ext.ocsp.resp = NULL;
s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0;
SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx);
- s->initial_ctx = ctx;
+ s->session_ctx = ctx;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (ctx->ext.ecpointformats) {
s->ext.ecpointformats =
s->method = ctx->method;
+ s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
+
if (!s->method->ssl_new(s))
goto err;
/* Free up if allocated */
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname);
- SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx);
+ SSL_CTX_free(s->session_ctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ecpointformats);
OPENSSL_free(s->ext.supportedgroups);
}
}
+int SSL_key_update(SSL *s, SSL_KEY_UPDATE updatetype)
+{
+ /*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): How will applications know whether TLSv1.3+ has been
+ * negotiated, and that it is appropriate to call SSL_key_update() instead
+ * of SSL_renegotiate().
+ */
+ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
+ && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_INVALID_KEY_UPDATE_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!SSL_is_init_finished(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_STILL_IN_INIT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
+ s->key_update = updatetype;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+SSL_KEY_UPDATE SSL_get_key_update_type(SSL *s)
+{
+ return s->key_update;
+}
+
int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s)
{
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (s->renegotiate == 0)
s->renegotiate = 1;
int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s)
{
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
+ return 0;
+
if (s->renegotiate == 0)
s->renegotiate = 1;
static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a)
{
+ const unsigned char *session_id = a->session_id;
unsigned long l;
+ unsigned char tmp_storage[4];
+
+ if (a->session_id_length < sizeof(tmp_storage)) {
+ memset(tmp_storage, 0, sizeof(tmp_storage));
+ memcpy(tmp_storage, a->session_id, a->session_id_length);
+ session_id = tmp_storage;
+ }
l = (unsigned long)
- ((unsigned int)a->session_id[0]) |
- ((unsigned int)a->session_id[1] << 8L) |
- ((unsigned long)a->session_id[2] << 16L) |
- ((unsigned long)a->session_id[3] << 24L);
+ ((unsigned long)session_id[0]) |
+ ((unsigned long)session_id[1] << 8L) |
+ ((unsigned long)session_id[2] << 16L) |
+ ((unsigned long)session_id[3] << 24L);
return (l);
}
void ssl_set_masks(SSL *s)
{
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_GOST)
- CERT_PKEY *cpk;
-#endif
CERT *c = s->cert;
uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
int rsa_enc, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dsa_sign;
unsigned long mask_k, mask_a;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok;
- X509 *x = NULL;
#endif
if (c == NULL)
return;
dh_tmp = 0;
#endif
- rsa_enc = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
- rsa_sign = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] & CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+ rsa_enc = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA] & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
+ rsa_sign = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA] & CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
dsa_sign = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] & CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
have_ecc_cert = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ECC] & CERT_PKEY_VALID;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512]);
- if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
+ if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512)) {
mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
mask_a |= SSL_aGOST12;
}
- cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256]);
- if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
+ if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256)) {
mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
mask_a |= SSL_aGOST12;
}
- cpk = &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01]);
- if (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
+ if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST01)) {
mask_k |= SSL_kGOST;
mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (have_ecc_cert) {
uint32_t ex_kusage;
- cpk = &c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC];
- x = cpk->x509;
- ex_kusage = X509_get_key_usage(x);
+ ex_kusage = X509_get_key_usage(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
ecdsa_ok = ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
if (!(pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ECC] & CERT_PKEY_SIGN))
ecdsa_ok = 0;
#endif
-static int ssl_get_server_cert_index(const SSL *s)
-{
- int idx;
- idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
- if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC && !s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509)
- idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
- if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC) {
- if (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].x509)
- idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
- else if (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].x509)
- idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
- else if (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].x509)
- idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
- else
- idx = -1;
- }
- if (idx == -1)
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_CERT_INDEX, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return idx;
-}
-
-CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(SSL *s)
-{
- CERT *c;
- int i;
-
- c = s->cert;
- if (!s->s3 || !s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
- return NULL;
- ssl_set_masks(s);
-
- i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s);
-
- /* This may or may not be an error. */
- if (i < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- /* May be NULL. */
- return &c->pkeys[i];
-}
-
-EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,
- const EVP_MD **pmd)
-{
- unsigned long alg_a;
- CERT *c;
- int idx = -1;
-
- alg_a = cipher->algorithm_auth;
- c = s->cert;
-
- if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL))
- idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) {
- if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)
- idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
- else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL)
- idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
- } else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
- (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL))
- idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
- if (idx == -1) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return (NULL);
- }
- if (pmd)
- *pmd = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
- return c->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
-}
-
int ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(SSL *s, const unsigned char **serverinfo,
size_t *serverinfo_length)
{
- CERT *c = NULL;
- int i = 0;
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
*serverinfo_length = 0;
- c = s->cert;
- i = ssl_get_server_cert_index(s);
-
- if (i == -1)
- return 0;
- if (c->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL)
+ if (cpk == NULL || cpk->serverinfo == NULL)
return 0;
- *serverinfo = c->pkeys[i].serverinfo;
- *serverinfo_length = c->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length;
+ *serverinfo = cpk->serverinfo;
+ *serverinfo_length = cpk->serverinfo_length;
return 1;
}
return -1;
}
- s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s);
+ s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s, 0);
if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) {
if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
return ssl->ctx;
if (ctx == NULL)
- ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
+ ctx = ssl->session_ctx;
new_cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
if (new_cert == NULL) {
return NULL;
/*
* Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer
* variable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any.
- * If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md Returns newly
- * allocated ctx;
+ * If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this md.
+ * Returns the newly allocated ctx;
*/
EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md)
}
#endif
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_CTX_keylog_cb_func cb)
+{
+ ctx->keylog_callback = cb;
+}
+
+SSL_CTX_keylog_cb_func SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->keylog_callback;
+}
+
+static int nss_keylog_int(const char *prefix,
+ SSL *ssl,
+ const uint8_t *parameter_1,
+ size_t parameter_1_len,
+ const uint8_t *parameter_2,
+ size_t parameter_2_len)
+{
+ char *out = NULL;
+ char *cursor = NULL;
+ size_t out_len = 0;
+ size_t i;
+ size_t prefix_len;
+
+ if (ssl->ctx->keylog_callback == NULL) return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Our output buffer will contain the following strings, rendered with
+ * space characters in between, terminated by a NULL character: first the
+ * prefix, then the first parameter, then the second parameter. The
+ * meaning of each parameter depends on the specific key material being
+ * logged. Note that the first and second parameters are encoded in
+ * hexadecimal, so we need a buffer that is twice their lengths.
+ */
+ prefix_len = strlen(prefix);
+ out_len = prefix_len + (2*parameter_1_len) + (2*parameter_2_len) + 3;
+ if ((out = cursor = OPENSSL_malloc(out_len)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_NSS_KEYLOG_INT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ strcpy(cursor, prefix);
+ cursor += prefix_len;
+ *cursor++ = ' ';
+
+ for (i = 0; i < parameter_1_len; i++) {
+ sprintf(cursor, "%02x", parameter_1[i]);
+ cursor += 2;
+ }
+ *cursor++ = ' ';
+
+ for (i = 0; i < parameter_2_len; i++) {
+ sprintf(cursor, "%02x", parameter_2[i]);
+ cursor += 2;
+ }
+ *cursor = '\0';
+
+ ssl->ctx->keylog_callback(ssl, (const char *)out);
+ OPENSSL_free(out);
+ return 1;
+
+}
+
+int ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(SSL *ssl,
+ const uint8_t *encrypted_premaster,
+ size_t encrypted_premaster_len,
+ const uint8_t *premaster,
+ size_t premaster_len)
+{
+ if (encrypted_premaster_len < 8) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOG_RSA_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* We only want the first 8 bytes of the encrypted premaster as a tag. */
+ return nss_keylog_int("RSA",
+ ssl,
+ encrypted_premaster,
+ 8,
+ premaster,
+ premaster_len);
+}
+
+int ssl_log_secret(SSL *ssl,
+ const char *label,
+ const uint8_t *secret,
+ size_t secret_len)
+{
+ return nss_keylog_int(label,
+ ssl,
+ ssl->s3->client_random,
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
+ secret,
+ secret_len);
+}
+
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff