s2_clnt.c: compensate for compiler bug.

[openssl.git] / ssl / ssl3.h

diff --git a/ssl/ssl3.h b/ssl/ssl3.h
index 93f9ead3059b807c2d4e78122f551326d9a3bd3f..4e72c1749bc1b9710866b01bdba2809ccb2cfdf2 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/ssl3.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl3.h
@@ -388,6 +388,17 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG             0x0008
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY            0x0010
 #define TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE              0x0020
+ 
+/* SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is set when we
+ * restart a handshake because of MS SGC and so prevents us
+ * from restarting the handshake in a loop. It's reset on a
+ * renegotiation, so effectively limits the client to one restart
+ * per negotiation. This limits the possibility of a DDoS
+ * attack where the client handshakes in a loop using SGC to
+ * restart. Servers which permit renegotiation can still be
+ * effected, but we can't prevent that.
+ */
+#define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE            0x0040
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
 
@@ -466,12 +477,6 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
        void *server_opaque_prf_input;
        size_t server_opaque_prf_input_len;
 
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-       /* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from
-          our peer. */
-       int next_proto_neg_seen;
-#endif
-
        struct  {
                /* actually only needs to be 16+20 */
                unsigned char cert_verify_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
@@ -529,6 +534,12 @@ typedef struct ssl3_state_st
         unsigned char previous_server_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
         unsigned char previous_server_finished_len;
         int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+       /* Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from
+          our peer. */
+       int next_proto_neg_seen;
+#endif
        } SSL3_STATE;
 
 #endif