-/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
+/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
+ * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
+ * license.
+ *
+ * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
+ * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
+ * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
+ *
+ * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
+ * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
+ * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
+ *
+ * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
+ * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
+ * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
+ * to make use of the Contribution.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
+ * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
+ * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
+ * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
+ * OTHERWISE.
+ */
#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/md5.h>
-static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
-static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s);
-static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
-#endif
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
-static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
+static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
return(NULL);
}
-SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void)
- {
- static int init=1;
- static SSL_METHOD SSLv3_server_data;
-
- if (init)
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
-
- if (init)
- {
- memcpy((char *)&SSLv3_server_data,(char *)sslv3_base_method(),
- sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
- SSLv3_server_data.ssl_accept=ssl3_accept;
- SSLv3_server_data.get_ssl_method=ssl3_get_server_method;
- init=0;
- }
-
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_METHOD);
- }
- return(&SSLv3_server_data);
- }
+IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
+ ssl3_accept,
+ ssl_undefined_function,
+ ssl3_get_server_method)
int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
- unsigned long l,Time=time(NULL);
+ unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
long num1;
int ret= -1;
s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+
s->new_session = 2;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num=0;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
-
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->hit)
- s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ {
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ }
+#else
+ if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
s->init_num=0;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
- /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH */
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
+ /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
+ /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
{
ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
+ else
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ skip = 1;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ }
+#else
}
else
skip=1;
+
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
- l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* clear this, it may get reset by
* send_server_key_exchange */
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- && !(l & SSL_KRB5)
+ && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
)
/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
/* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
* RSA but we have a sign only certificate
*
+ * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
+ *
* For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
* message only if the cipher suite is either
* ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
- * server certificate contains the server's
+ * server certificate contains the server's
* public key for key exchange.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
- || (l & SSL_kECDHE)
- || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
- || ((l & SSL_kRSA)
+ /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
+ * hint if provided */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
+#endif
+ || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
+ || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
+ || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
* (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
* and in RFC 2246): */
- ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
+ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
/* ... except when the application insists on verification
* (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
- /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
+ /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
+ /* With normal PSK Certificates and
+ * Certificate Requests are omitted */
+ || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
/* no cert request */
skip=1;
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
+ if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (ret == 2)
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num = 0;
}
- else
+ else
{
+ int offset=0;
+ int dgst_num;
+
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
* a client cert, it can be verified
- */
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
- &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
- &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
- &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
- &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
+ * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
+ * should be generalized. But it is next step
+ */
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ return -1;
+ for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
+ {
+ int dgst_size;
+
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
+ dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
+ if (dgst_size < 0)
+ {
+ ret = -1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ offset+=dgst_size;
+ }
}
break;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
+ else if (s->hit)
+ s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+#else
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
+#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
+ case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
+ ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
+ if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
+ s->init_num=0;
+ break;
+
+#endif
+
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
return(ret);
}
-static int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
-static int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
int ok;
long n;
/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
* so permit appropriate message length */
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-1,
return 1;
}
-static int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
+ unsigned int cookie_len;
long n;
unsigned long id;
unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
+#endif
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
/* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
*/
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
{
- s->first_packet=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ s->first_packet=1;
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
+ s->first_packet=0;
d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
p+=2;
- if (s->client_version < s->version)
+ if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
+ (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
{
/* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
s->version = s->client_version;
* might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
* an earlier library version)
*/
- if (j == 0 || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
+ if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
{
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
goto err;
}
else
{
- i=ssl_get_prev_session(s,p,j);
+ i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
if (i == 1)
{ /* previous session */
s->hit=1;
}
p+=j;
+
+ if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
+ {
+ /* cookie stuff */
+ cookie_len = *(p++);
+
+ if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
+ s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
+ {
+ /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
+ if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
+ * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
+ * does not cause an overflow.
+ */
+ if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
+ {
+ /* too much data */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
+ if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
+ cookie_len > 0)
+ {
+ memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
+
+ if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
+ {
+ if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
+ cookie_len) == 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* else cookie verification succeeded */
+ }
+ else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
+ s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ p += cookie_len;
+ }
+
n2s(p,i);
if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
{
break;
}
}
- if (j == 0)
+ if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
{
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
+ /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
+ * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
+ * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
+ * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
+ * enabled, though. */
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
{
- /* Very bad for multi-threading.... */
- s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,
- 0);
- }
- else
- {
- /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
- * list if we are asked to reuse it */
- al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
- goto f_err;
+ s->session->cipher = c;
+ j = 1;
}
}
+ if (j == 0)
+ {
+ /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
+ * list if we are asked to reuse it */
+ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
}
/* compression */
goto f_err;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* TLS extensions*/
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ {
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
+ {
+ /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
+ * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
+ * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
+ * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
+ {
+ unsigned long Time;
+ unsigned char *pos;
+ Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
+ pos=s->s3->server_random;
+ l2n(Time,pos);
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
+ {
+ SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
+ if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
+ ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
+ {
+ s->hit=1;
+ s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
+ s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
+
+ ciphers=NULL;
+
+ /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
+ pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+ if (pref_cipher == NULL)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
+
+ if (s->cipher_list)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
+
+ if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
+
+ s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+ s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
/* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
* options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
- if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
{ /* See if we have a match */
int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
else
comp=NULL;
}
-
- /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
-#if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
- * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
- * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
- {
- if (p < (d+n))
- {
- /* wrong number of bytes,
- * there could be more to follow */
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
#endif
/* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
if (!s->hit)
{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ s->session->compress_meth=0;
+#else
s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
+#endif
if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
{
c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
- if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
+ if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
nc=c;
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
ec=c;
#endif
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
}
+
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ goto f_err;
/* we now have the following setup.
* client_random
return(ret);
}
-static int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,sl;
- unsigned long l,Time;
+ unsigned long l;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ unsigned long Time;
+#endif
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
{
buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
p=s->s3->server_random;
- Time=time(NULL); /* Time */
+ /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
+ Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
l2n(Time,p);
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-sizeof(Time));
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
+ return -1;
+#endif
/* Do the message type and length last */
d=p= &(buf[4]);
* session-id if we want it to be single use.
* Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
* 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
+ *
+ * We also have an additional case where stateless session
+ * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
+ * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
+ * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
+ * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
+ * is unaffected.
*/
- if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER))
+ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+ && !s->hit)
s->session->session_id_length=0;
sl=s->session->session_id_length;
p+=i;
/* put the compression method */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ *(p++)=0;
+#else
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
*(p++)=0;
else
*(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
-
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
/* do the header */
l=(p-d);
d=buf;
*(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
l2n3(l,d);
- s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
/* number of bytes to write */
s->init_num=p-buf;
s->init_off=0;
}
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
-static int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p;
s->init_off=0;
}
- /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
-static int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
{
- type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
+ type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
cert=s->cert;
buf=s->init_buf;
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
+ if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
{
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+
ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
{
}
if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
ecdh = ecdhp;
s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
- if ((ecdh->pub_key == NULL) ||
- (ecdh->priv_key == NULL) ||
+ if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
{
if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
}
}
- if ((ecdh->group == NULL) ||
- (ecdh->pub_key == NULL) ||
- (ecdh->priv_key == NULL))
+ if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
- (EC_GROUP_get_degree(ecdh->group) > 163))
+ (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto err;
* supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
*/
if ((curve_id =
- nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_nid(ecdh->group)))
+ tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
== 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
* First check the size of encoding and
* allocate memory accordingly.
*/
- encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh->group,
- ecdh->pub_key,
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
NULL, 0, NULL);
}
- encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(ecdh->group,
- ecdh->pub_key,
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
* generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
- * In this situation, we need three additional bytes
+ * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
* to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
* structure.
*/
- n = 3 + encodedlen;
+ n = 4 + encodedlen;
/* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
* explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
r[0]=NULL;
r[1]=NULL;
r[2]=NULL;
+ r[3]=NULL;
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
+ n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ }
+ else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
n+=2+nr[i];
}
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
== NULL)
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
+ if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
{
/* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
* In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
- * [1 byte CurveType], [1 byte CurveName]
+ * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
* [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
* the actual encoded point itself
*/
*p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
p += 1;
+ *p = 0;
+ p += 1;
*p = curve_id;
p += 1;
*p = encodedlen;
}
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ /* copy PSK identity hint */
+ s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
+ strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
+ p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ }
+#endif
+
/* not anonymous */
if (pkey != NULL)
{
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,j,nl,off,n;
return(-1);
}
-
-static const int KDF1_SHA1_len = 20;
-static void *KDF1_SHA1(void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t outlen)
- {
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- if (outlen != SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)
- return NULL;
- return SHA1(in, inlen, out);
-#else
- return NULL;
-#endif
- }
-
-static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
int i,al,ok;
long n;
- unsigned long l;
+ unsigned long alg_k;
unsigned char *p;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa=NULL;
DH *dh_srvr;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
+ KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
if (!ok) return((int)n);
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
- l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
+ alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (l & SSL_kRSA)
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
/* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
}
- /* TLS */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
+ /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
+ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
n2s(p,i);
if (n != i+2)
i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
+ goto err;
}
s->session->master_key_length=
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
n2s(p,i);
if (n != i+2)
else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
- {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
+ {
+ krb5_error_code krb5rc;
krb5_data enc_ticket;
krb5_data authenticator;
krb5_data enc_pms;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
- EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
- + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
- int padl, outl;
+ + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+ int padl, outl;
krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
- if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
+ if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
n2s(p,i);
enc_ticket.length = i;
+
+ if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
p+=enc_ticket.length;
n2s(p,i);
authenticator.length = i;
+
+ if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
authenticator.data = (char *)p;
p+=authenticator.length;
goto err;
}
- if (n != enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
- enc_pms.length + 6)
+ if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
+ enc_pms.length + 6))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
- if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
+ if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
&kssl_err)) != 0)
- {
+ {
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
- krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
- if (kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+ printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+ if (kssl_err.text)
+ printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
+ }
/* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
** but will return authtime == 0.
&authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
{
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
- krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
- if (kssl_err.text)
- printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+ printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
+ krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+ if (kssl_err.text)
+ printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ kssl_err.reason);
+ goto err;
}
if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
- goto err;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
+ goto err;
}
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
+ kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
- if (enc == NULL)
- goto err;
+ if (enc == NULL)
+ goto err;
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
+ if (!((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
+ {
+ /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
+ * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
+ * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
+ * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
+ * the protocol version.
+ * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
+ * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
+ */
+ if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
+ (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
- s->session->master_key_length=
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
- if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
- {
- int len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
- if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
- {
- s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
- memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
- }
- }
+ if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
+ {
+ size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
+ if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
+ {
+ s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
+ memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
+ }
+ }
- /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
+ /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
** but it caused problems for apache.
- ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
- ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
- */
- }
+ ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
+ ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
+ */
+ }
else
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
{
int ret = 1;
int field_size = 0;
+ const EC_KEY *tkey;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
- /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
+ /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
+ goto err;
}
/* Let's get server private key and group information */
- if (l & SSL_kECDH)
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
{
- /* use the certificate */
- srvr_ecdh->group = s->cert->key->privatekey-> \
- pkey.eckey->group;
- srvr_ecdh->priv_key = s->cert->key->privatekey-> \
- pkey.eckey->priv_key;
+ /* use the certificate */
+ tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
}
else
{
/* use the ephermeral values we saved when
* generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
*/
- srvr_ecdh->group = s->s3->tmp.ecdh->group;
- srvr_ecdh->priv_key = s->s3->tmp.ecdh->priv_key;
+ tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
+ }
+
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
+ priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
+
+ if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
+ !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
/* Let's get client's public key */
- if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(srvr_ecdh->group))
- == NULL)
+ if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- if (n == 0L)
- {
+ if (n == 0L)
+ {
/* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
- if (l & SSL_kECDHE)
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
- if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
+ if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
== NULL) ||
(clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
- {
+ {
/* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication using ECDH certificates
* so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
* the two ECDH shares are for the same
* group.
*/
- al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
- clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.eckey->pub_key);
- ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
- }
- else
- {
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
+ }
+ else
+ {
/* Get client's public key from encoded point
* in the ClientKeyExchange message.
*/
goto err;
}
- /* Get encoded point length */
- i = *p;
+ /* Get encoded point length */
+ i = *p;
p += 1;
- if (EC_POINT_oct2point(srvr_ecdh->group,
+ if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
- /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
- * currently, so set it to the start
- */
- p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- }
+ /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
+ * currently, so set it to the start
+ */
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ }
/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
- field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_ecdh->group);
+ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
if (field_size <= 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
- /* If field size is not more than 24 octets, then use SHA-1 hash of result;
- * otherwise, use result (see section 4.8 of draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt;
- * this is new with this version of the Internet Draft).
- */
- if (field_size <= 24 * 8)
- i = ECDH_compute_key(p, KDF1_SHA1_len, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, KDF1_SHA1);
- else
- i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
- if (i <= 0)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
+ goto err;
+ }
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
- if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
- {
- srvr_ecdh->priv_key = NULL;
- srvr_ecdh->group = NULL;
- EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
- }
+ EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
/* Compute the master secret */
- s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
+ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
- return (ret);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
+ return (ret);
}
else
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
+ {
+ unsigned char *t = NULL;
+ unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
+ unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
+ int psk_err = 1;
+ char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
+
+ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+
+ n2s(p,i);
+ if (n != i+2)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
+ * string for the callback */
+ memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
+ memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
+ psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
+ psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
+
+ if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+ else if (psk_len == 0)
+ {
+ /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
+ pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
+ t = psk_or_pre_ms;
+ memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+ memset(t, 0, psk_len);
+ t+=psk_len;
+ s2n(psk_len, t);
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
+ s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
+ if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
+ s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto psk_err;
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
+ psk_err = 0;
+ psk_err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ if (psk_err != 0)
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
+ unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
+ size_t outlen;
+
+ /* Get our certificate privatec key*/
+ pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(s->cert->key->privatekey,NULL);
+ EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
+ /* Decrypt session key */
+ if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) || p[1]!=0x81 )
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,p+3,p[2]) <0)
+
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Generate master secret */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ s->session->master_key_length=
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
+
+ }
+ else
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
- {
- srvr_ecdh->priv_key = NULL;
- srvr_ecdh->group = NULL;
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
- }
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
return(-1);
}
-static int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
unsigned char *p;
int type=0,i,j;
X509 *peer;
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
-1,
/* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
- n2s(p,i);
- n-=2;
- if (i > n)
+ /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
+ /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
+ * signature without length field */
+ if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
+ pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
-
+ i=64;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ n2s(p,i);
+ n-=2;
+ if (i > n)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
{
{
j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.eckey);
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
if (j <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
}
else
#endif
+ if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
+ { unsigned char signature[64];
+ int idx;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
+ EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
+ if (i!=64) {
+ fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
+ }
+ for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
+ signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
+ }
+ j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
+ if (j<=0)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+ SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
return(ret);
}
-static int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
X509 *x=NULL;
unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
- n=ssl3_get_message(s,
+ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
-1,
else
{
i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
- if (!i)
+ if (i <= 0)
{
al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
{
x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
- if (x == NULL &&
- /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
- & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
- != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
+ if (x == NULL)
{
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return(0);
+ /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
+ if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
+ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return(0);
+ }
}
l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
+ int len, slen;
+ unsigned int hlen;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ HMAC_CTX hctx;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char key_name[16];
+
+ /* get session encoding length */
+ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+ /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
+ * too long
+ */
+ if (slen > 0xFF00)
+ return -1;
+ /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
+ * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
+ * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
+ * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
+ * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
+ 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
+ EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
+ return -1;
+ senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
+ if (!senc)
+ return -1;
+ p = senc;
+ i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
+
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
+ /* Skip message length for now */
+ p += 3;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+ /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
+ * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
+ * from parent ctx.
+ */
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
+ {
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
+ &hctx, 1) < 0)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
+ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
+ HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+ memcpy(key_name, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
+ }
+ l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
+ /* Skip ticket length for now */
+ p += 2;
+ /* Output key name */
+ macstart = p;
+ memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
+ p += 16;
+ /* output IV */
+ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
+ p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ /* Encrypt session data */
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
+ p += len;
+ EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
+ p += len;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
+ HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+
+ p += hlen;
+ /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
+ /* Total length */
+ len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
+ l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
+ p += 4;
+ s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
+
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num= len;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
+ s->init_off=0;
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ }
+int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
+ {
+ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
+ {
+ unsigned char *p;
+ /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
+ * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
+ * + (ocsp response)
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
+ return -1;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
-/* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
-static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
-{
- /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
- * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
- switch (nid) {
- case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
- return 1;
- case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
- return 2;
- case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
- return 3;
- case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
- return 4;
- case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
- return 5;
- case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
- return 6;
- case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
- return 7;
- case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
- return 8;
- case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
- return 9;
- case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
- return 10;
- case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
- return 11;
- case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
- return 12;
- case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
- return 13;
- case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
- return 14;
- case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
- return 15;
- case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
- return 16;
- case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
- return 17;
- case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
- return 18;
- case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
- return 19;
- case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
- return 20;
- case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
- return 21;
- case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
- return 22;
- case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
- return 23;
- case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
- return 24;
- case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
- return 25;
- default:
- return 0;
+ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
+ /* message length */
+ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
+ /* status type */
+ *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
+ /* length of OCSP response */
+ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
+ /* actual response */
+ memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
+ s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
+ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
}
-}
#endif