-/* ssl/s3_cbc.c */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+/*
+ * Copyright 2012-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This file has no dependencies on the rest of libssl because it is shared
+ * with the providers. It contains functions for low level MAC calculations.
+ * Responsibility for this lies with the HMAC implementation in the
+ * providers. However there are legacy code paths in libssl which also need to
+ * do this. In time those legacy code paths can be removed and this file can be
+ * moved out of libssl.
+ */
+
+
+/*
+ * MD5 and SHA-1 low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
+ * internal use.
*/
+#include "internal/deprecated.h"
-#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#include "internal/constant_time.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
+# include <openssl/md5.h>
+#endif
#include <openssl/sha.h>
+char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md,
+ unsigned char *md_out,
+ size_t *md_out_size,
+ const unsigned char *header,
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t data_size,
+ size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+ const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+ size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
+
+# define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
+
+# define l2n6(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
+
+# define l2n8(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
+ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
+
/*
* MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's
* length field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.)
*/
#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
-
-
+#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
/*
- * u32toLE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in
+ * u32toLE serializes an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in
* little-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four.
*/
-#define u32toLE(n, p) \
- (*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n), \
- *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>8), \
- *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>16), \
- *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>24))
+# define u32toLE(n, p) \
+ (*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n), \
+ *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>8), \
+ *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>16), \
+ *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>24))
/*
* These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the
u32toLE(md5->C, md_out);
u32toLE(md5->D, md_out);
}
+#endif /* FIPS_MODULE */
static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
{
#undef LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
#define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX
-/*
- * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function
- * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports.
- */
-char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
-{
- if (FIPS_mode())
- return 0;
- switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {
- case NID_md5:
- case NID_sha1:
- case NID_sha224:
- case NID_sha256:
- case NID_sha384:
- case NID_sha512:
- return 1;
- default:
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
/*-
* ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded SSLv3/TLS
* record.
* md_out_size: if non-NULL, the number of output bytes is written here.
* header: the 13-byte, TLS record header.
* data: the record data itself, less any preceding explicit IV.
- * data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC
- * once the padding has been removed.
+ * data_size: the secret, reported length of the data once the MAC and padding
+ * has been removed.
* data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole
- * record, including padding.
+ * record, including MAC and padding.
* is_sslv3: non-zero if we are to use SSLv3. Otherwise, TLS.
*
- * On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding
- * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain
- * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the
- * padding too. )
+ * On entry: we know that data is data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size in length
* Returns 1 on success or 0 on error
*/
-int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,
- unsigned char *md_out,
- size_t *md_out_size,
- const unsigned char header[13],
- const unsigned char *data,
- size_t data_plus_mac_size,
- size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
- const unsigned char *mac_secret,
- unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3)
+int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md,
+ unsigned char *md_out,
+ size_t *md_out_size,
+ const unsigned char *header,
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t data_size,
+ size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
+ const unsigned char *mac_secret,
+ size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3)
{
union {
- double align;
+ OSSL_UNION_ALIGN;
unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)];
} md_state;
void (*md_final_raw) (void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out);
void (*md_transform) (void *ctx, const unsigned char *block);
- unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64;
- unsigned sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks,
+ size_t md_size, md_block_size = 64;
+ size_t sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks,
len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks,
num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b;
- unsigned int bits; /* at most 18 bits */
+ size_t bits; /* at most 18 bits */
unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES];
/* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */
unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned i, j, md_out_size_u;
+ size_t i, j;
+ unsigned md_out_size_u;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
/*
* mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that
* terminates * the hash.
*/
- unsigned md_length_size = 8;
+ size_t md_length_size = 8;
char length_is_big_endian = 1;
- int ret;
+ int ret = 0;
/*
* This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about
* many possible overflows later in this function.
*/
- OPENSSL_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024 * 1024);
+ if (!ossl_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024 * 1024))
+ return 0;
- switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {
- case NID_md5:
+ if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "MD5")) {
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
+ return 0;
+#else
if (MD5_Init((MD5_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
return 0;
md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw;
md_size = 16;
sslv3_pad_length = 48;
length_is_big_endian = 0;
- break;
- case NID_sha1:
+#endif
+ } else if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA1")) {
if (SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
return 0;
md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;
md_transform =
(void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA1_Transform;
md_size = 20;
- break;
- case NID_sha224:
+ } else if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-224")) {
if (SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
return 0;
md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
md_transform =
(void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform;
md_size = 224 / 8;
- break;
- case NID_sha256:
+ } else if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-256")) {
if (SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
return 0;
md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
md_transform =
(void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform;
md_size = 32;
- break;
- case NID_sha384:
+ } else if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-384")) {
if (SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
return 0;
md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
md_size = 384 / 8;
md_block_size = 128;
md_length_size = 16;
- break;
- case NID_sha512:
+ } else if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-512")) {
if (SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
return 0;
md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
md_size = 64;
md_block_size = 128;
md_length_size = 16;
- break;
- default:
+ } else {
/*
* ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been called first to
* check that the hash function is supported.
*/
- OPENSSL_assert(0);
- if (md_out_size)
+ if (md_out_size != NULL)
*md_out_size = 0;
- return 0;
+ return ossl_assert(0);
}
- OPENSSL_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES);
- OPENSSL_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE);
- OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ if (!ossl_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES)
+ || !ossl_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE)
+ || !ossl_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE))
+ return 0;
header_length = 13;
if (is_sslv3) {
* of hash termination (0x80 + 64-bit length) don't fit in the final
* block, we say that the final two blocks can vary based on the padding.
* TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not
- * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks can
+ * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final |variance_blocks|
+ * blocks can
* vary based on the padding. Later in the function, if the message is
* short and there obviously cannot be this many blocks then
* variance_blocks can be reduced.
*/
- variance_blocks = is_sslv3 ? 2 : 6;
+ variance_blocks = is_sslv3 ? 2 : ( ((255 + 1 + md_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size) + 1);
/*
* From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13
* bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) or 71/75 bytes
/*
* mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be MACed.
*/
- mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + header_length - md_size;
+ mac_end_offset = data_size + header_length;
/*
* c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that contains
* application data.
*/
bits += 8 * md_block_size;
memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
- OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));
+ if (!ossl_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad)))
+ return 0;
memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
if (k > 0) {
if (is_sslv3) {
- unsigned overhang;
+ size_t overhang;
/*
* The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block. overhang is
for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks + variance_blocks;
i++) {
unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
- unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_a);
- unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8(i, index_b);
+ unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8_s(i, index_a);
+ unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8_s(i, index_b);
for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++) {
unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1;
if (k < header_length)
b = data[k - header_length];
k++;
- is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c);
- is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8(j, c + 1);
+ is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8_s(j, c);
+ is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8_s(j, c + 1);
/*
* If this is the block containing the end of the application
* data, and we are at the offset for the 0x80 value, then
*/
b = constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b);
/*
- * If this the the block containing the end of the application
- * data and we're past the 0x80 value then just write zero.
+ * If this block contains the end of the application data
+ * and we're past the 0x80 value then just write zero.
*/
b = b & ~is_past_cp1;
/*
mac_out[j] |= block[j] & is_block_b;
}
- md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (md_ctx == NULL)
goto err;
- if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx), NULL /* engine */ ) <= 0)
+
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL /* engine */ ) <= 0)
goto err;
if (is_sslv3) {
/* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */
memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length);
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
goto err;
} else {
/* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
goto err;
}
ret = EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
if (ret && md_out_size)
*md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
- EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md_ctx);
-
- return 1;
-err:
- EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md_ctx);
- return 0;
-}
-/*
- * Due to the need to use EVP in FIPS mode we can't reimplement digests but
- * we can ensure the number of blocks processed is equal for all cases by
- * digesting additional data.
- */
-
-void tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx,
- EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx, const unsigned char *data,
- size_t data_len, size_t orig_len)
-{
- size_t block_size, digest_pad, blocks_data, blocks_orig;
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
- return;
- block_size = EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(mac_ctx);
- /*-
- * We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA*
- * digests and TLS to deal with.
- * Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9
- * otherwise.
- * Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks
- * processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest
- * block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise.
- * So we have:
- * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size
- * equivalently:
- * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1
- * HMAC adds a constant overhead.
- * We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes
- * blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128
- * for SHA384/SHA512 and
- * blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64
- * otherwise.
- */
- digest_pad = block_size == 64 ? 21 : 29;
- blocks_orig = (orig_len + digest_pad) / block_size;
- blocks_data = (data_len + digest_pad) / block_size;
- /*
- * MAC enough blocks to make up the difference between the original and
- * actual lengths plus one extra block to ensure this is never a no op.
- * The "data" pointer should always have enough space to perform this
- * operation as it is large enough for a maximum length TLS buffer.
- */
- EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, data,
- (blocks_orig - blocks_data + 1) * block_size);
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+ return ret;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff