* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
+#include "ssl_locl.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
static SSL_METHOD *ssl2_get_server_method(int ver);
void (*cb)()=NULL;
int new_state,state;
- RAND_seed(&l,sizeof(l));
+ RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
/* init things to blank */
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
s->in_handshake++;
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
- if (((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->cert == NULL)) &&
- (s->cert == NULL))
+ if (s->cert == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
return(-1);
static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
{
- int export,i,n,keya,ek;
+ int is_export,i,n,keya,ek;
unsigned char *p;
SSL_CIPHER *cp;
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
memcpy(s->session->key_arg,&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear+s->s2->tmp.enc]),
(unsigned int)keya);
- if (s->session->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL)
+ if (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY);
&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),&(p[s->s2->tmp.clear]),
(s->s2->ssl2_rollback)?RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
- export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
+ is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL))
{
if (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL2_CF_8_BYTE_ENC)
{
- export=1;
+ is_export=1;
ek=8;
}
else
/* bad decrypt */
#if 1
/* If a bad decrypt, continue with protocol but with a
- * dud master secret */
+ * random master secret (Bleichenbacher attack) */
if ((i < 0) ||
- ((!export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
- || ( export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+i !=
+ ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
+ || (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+i !=
EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))))))
{
- if (export)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ if (is_export)
i=ek;
else
i=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
- RAND_bytes(p,i);
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,i);
}
#else
if (i < 0)
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
}
/* incorrect number of key bytes for non export cipher */
- else if ((!export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
- || ( export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+i !=
+ else if ((!is_export && (i != EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
+ || (is_export && ((i != ek) || (s->s2->tmp.clear+i !=
EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))))
{
error=1;
}
#endif
- if (export) i+=s->s2->tmp.clear;
+ if (is_export) i+=s->s2->tmp.clear;
s->session->master_key_length=i;
memcpy(s->session->master_key,p,(unsigned int)i);
return(1);
unsigned char *p;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cs; /* a stack of SSL_CIPHERS */
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cl; /* the ones we want to use */
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow;
int z;
/* This is a bit of a hack to check for the correct packet
&s->session->ciphers);
if (cs == NULL) goto mem_err;
- cl=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
+ cl=SSL_get_ciphers(s);
- for (z=0; z<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cs); z++)
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
+ {
+ prio=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cl);
+ if (prio == NULL) goto mem_err;
+ allow = cs;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ prio = cs;
+ allow = cl;
+ }
+ for (z=0; z<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); z++)
{
- if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(cl,sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cs,z)) < 0)
+ if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,z)) < 0)
{
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(cs,z);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(prio,z);
z--;
}
}
-
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
+ {
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
+ s->session->ciphers = prio;
+ }
/* s->session->ciphers should now have a list of
* ciphers that are on both the client and server.
* This list is ordered by the order the client sent
- * the ciphers.
+ * the ciphers or in the order of the server's preference
+ * if SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE was set.
*/
}
p+=s->s2->tmp.cipher_spec_length;
*(p++)=SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO; /* type */
hit=s->hit;
*(p++)=(unsigned char)hit;
+#if 1
+ if (!hit)
+ {
+ if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
+ /* This can't really happen because get_client_hello
+ * has called ssl_get_new_session, which does not set
+ * sess_cert. */
+ ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
+ s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ }
+ /* If 'hit' is set, then s->sess_cert may be non-NULL or NULL,
+ * depending on whether it survived in the internal cache
+ * or was retrieved from an external cache.
+ * If it is NULL, we cannot put any useful data in it anyway,
+ * so we don't touch it.
+ */
+
+#else /* That's what used to be done when cert_st and sess_cert_st were
+ * the same. */
if (!hit)
{ /* else add cert to session */
CRYPTO_add(&s->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
- if (s->session->cert != NULL)
- ssl_cert_free(s->session->cert);
- s->session->cert=s->cert;
+ if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
+ ssl_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
+ s->session->sess_cert=s->cert;
}
else /* We have a session id-cache hit, if the
* session-id has no certificate listed against
* the 'cert' structure, grab the 'old' one
* listed against the SSL connection */
{
- if (s->session->cert == NULL)
+ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
{
CRYPTO_add(&s->cert->references,1,
CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT);
- s->session->cert=s->cert;
+ s->session->sess_cert=s->cert;
}
}
+#endif
- if (s->session->cert == NULL)
+ if (s->cert == NULL)
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CERTIFICATE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SPECIFIED);
/* make and send conn_id */
s2n(SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH,p); /* add conn_id length */
s->s2->conn_id_length=SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH;
- RAND_bytes(s->s2->conn_id,(int)s->s2->conn_id_length);
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(s->s2->conn_id,(int)s->s2->conn_id_length);
memcpy(d,s->s2->conn_id,SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH);
d+=SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_LENGTH;
s->init_off=0;
}
/* SSL2_ST_SEND_SERVER_HELLO_B */
- /* If we are using TCP/IP, the performace is bad if we do 2
+ /* If we are using TCP/IP, the performance is bad if we do 2
* writes without a read between them. This occurs when
* Session-id reuse is used, so I will put in a buffering module
*/
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
*(p++)=SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE;
*(p++)=SSL2_AT_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
- RAND_bytes(ccd,SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(ccd,SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
memcpy(p,ccd,SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
s->state=SSL2_ST_SEND_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE_B;
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
- EVP_VerifyInit(&ctx,s->ctx->rsa_md5);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,s->ctx->rsa_md5, NULL);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,s->s2->key_material,
(unsigned int)s->s2->key_material_length);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,ccd,SSL2_MIN_CERT_CHALLENGE_LENGTH);
- i=i2d_X509(s->session->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,NULL);
- buf2=(unsigned char *)Malloc((unsigned int)i);
+ i=i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,NULL);
+ buf2=OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)i);
if (buf2 == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto msg_end;
}
p2=buf2;
- i=i2d_X509(s->session->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,&p2);
+ i=i2d_X509(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509,&p2);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,buf2,(unsigned int)i);
- Free(buf2);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf2);
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x509);
if (pkey == NULL) goto end;
i=EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,p,s->s2->tmp.rlen,pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx));
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
if (i)
{
X509_free(s->session->peer);
s->session->peer=x509;
CRYPTO_add(&x509->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
ret=1;
goto end;
}
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return(i);
}
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
+# if PEDANTIC
+static void *dummy=&dummy;
+# endif
+
+#endif