#include "record_local.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = {
- 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
- 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
- 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
- 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
- 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
- 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
-};
-
-static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = {
- 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
- 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
- 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
- 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
- 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
- 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
-};
-
/*
* Clear the contents of an SSL3_RECORD but retain any memory allocated
*/
return 1;
}
-/*-
- * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|. Calls SSLfatal on
- * internal error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller to
- * report a bad_record_mac
- *
- * Returns:
- * 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error
- * 1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
- */
-int ssl3_enc(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int sending,
- SSL_MAC_BUF *mac, size_t macsize)
-{
- SSL3_RECORD *rec;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
- size_t l, i;
- size_t bs;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
-
- rec = inrecs;
- /*
- * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case
- */
- if (n_recs != 1)
- return 0;
- if (sending) {
- ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
- if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
- enc = NULL;
- else
- enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
- } else {
- ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
- if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
- enc = NULL;
- else
- enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
- }
-
- if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
- memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
- rec->input = rec->data;
- } else {
- int provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL);
-
- l = rec->length;
- bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_block_size(ds);
-
- /* COMPRESS */
-
- if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
- /*
- * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
- * padding on the provider side.
- */
- i = bs - (l % bs);
-
- /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
- l += i;
- /*
- * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the
- * padding length.
- */
- memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
- rec->length += i;
- rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1);
- }
-
- if (!sending) {
- if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) {
- /* Publicly invalid */
- return 0;
- }
- /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
- }
-
- if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL) {
- int outlen;
-
- if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, rec->data, &outlen, rec->input,
- (unsigned int)l))
- return 0;
- rec->length = outlen;
-
- if (!sending && mac != NULL) {
- /* Now get a pointer to the MAC */
- OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
-
- /* Get the MAC */
- mac->alloced = 0;
-
- *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
- (void **)&mac->mac,
- macsize);
- *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
-
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
- /* Shouldn't normally happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- } else {
- if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1) {
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!sending)
- return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&rec->length,
- rec->orig_len,
- rec->data,
- (mac != NULL) ? &mac->mac : NULL,
- (mac != NULL) ? &mac->alloced : NULL,
- bs,
- macsize,
- SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx);
- }
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
#define MAX_PADDING 256
/*-
* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Calls SSLfatal on internal
size_t bs, ctr, padnum, loop;
unsigned char padval;
const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
- int tlstree_enc = sending ? (s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE)
- : (s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE);
+ int tlstree_enc = (s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE);
if (n_recs == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- if (sending) {
- if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->write_hash)) {
- int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(s->write_hash);
- if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
+ assert(sending);
+ if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->write_hash)) {
+ int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(s->write_hash);
+
+ if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
- ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
- if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
- enc = NULL;
- else {
- int ivlen;
-
- enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
- /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
- if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
- && EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
- ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(enc);
- else
- ivlen = 0;
- if (ivlen > 1) {
- for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
- if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
- /*
- * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
- * happen?? (steve)
- */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- } else if (RAND_bytes_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx,
- recs[ctr].input,
- ivlen, 0) <= 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
+ }
+ ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
+ enc = NULL;
+ else {
+ int ivlen;
+
+ enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+ /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
+ if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
+ && EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+ ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(enc);
+ else
+ ivlen = 0;
+ if (ivlen > 1) {
+ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
+ if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
+ /*
+ * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
+ * happen?? (steve)
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ } else if (RAND_bytes_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx,
+ recs[ctr].input,
+ ivlen, 0) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
}
}
- } else {
- if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->read_hash)) {
- int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(s->read_hash);
- if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
- if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
- enc = NULL;
- else
- enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
}
if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
& EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0) {
unsigned char *seq;
- seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
- : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+ seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* DTLS does not support pipelining */
unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
- s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) :
- DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p);
+ s2n(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer), p);
memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8);
} else {
return 0;
}
- if (sending) {
- reclen[ctr] += pad;
- recs[ctr].length += pad;
- }
+ reclen[ctr] += pad;
+ recs[ctr].length += pad;
- } else if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
+ } else if ((bs != 1) && !provided) {
/*
* We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
* padding on the provider side.
reclen[ctr] += padnum;
recs[ctr].length += padnum;
}
-
- if (!sending) {
- if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) {
- /* Publicly invalid */
- return 0;
- }
- }
}
if (n_recs > 1) {
unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
* So if we are in ETM mode, we use seq 'as is' in the ctrl-function.
* Otherwise we have to decrease it in the implementation
*/
- if (sending && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s))
+ if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s))
decrement_seq = 1;
- seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
- : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+ seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_TLSTREE, decrement_seq, seq) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
(unsigned int)reclen[0]))
return 0;
recs[0].length = outlen;
-
- /*
- * The length returned from EVP_CipherUpdate above is the actual
- * payload length. We need to adjust the data/input ptr to skip over
- * any explicit IV
- */
- if (!sending) {
- if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
- recs[0].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- recs[0].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
- recs[0].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- recs[0].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- } else if (bs != 1 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
- recs[0].data += bs;
- recs[0].input += bs;
- recs[0].orig_len -= bs;
- }
-
- /* Now get a pointer to the MAC (if applicable) */
- if (macs != NULL) {
- OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
-
- /* Get the MAC */
- macs[0].alloced = 0;
-
- *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
- (void **)&macs[0].mac,
- macsize);
- *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
-
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
- /* Shouldn't normally happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
} else {
/* Legacy cipher */
/* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
return 0;
}
-
- if (!sending) {
- for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
- /* Adjust the record to remove the explicit IV/MAC/Tag */
- if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
- recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
- recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- } else if (bs != 1 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
- if (recs[ctr].length < bs)
- return 0;
- recs[ctr].data += bs;
- recs[ctr].input += bs;
- recs[ctr].length -= bs;
- recs[ctr].orig_len -= bs;
- }
-
- /*
- * If using Mac-then-encrypt, then this will succeed but
- * with a random MAC if padding is invalid
- */
- if (!tls1_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&recs[ctr].length,
- recs[ctr].orig_len,
- recs[ctr].data,
- (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].mac : NULL,
- (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].alloced
- : NULL,
- bs,
- pad ? (size_t)pad : macsize,
- (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(enc)
- & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0,
- SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx))
- return 0;
- }
- }
}
}
return 1;
}
-int n_ssl3_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
- int sending)
-{
- unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq;
- const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
- unsigned char *p, rec_char;
- size_t md_size;
- size_t npad;
- int t;
- unsigned int md_size_u;
- EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
-
- /*
- * All read record layer operations should have been moved to the new
- * record layer code
- */
- assert(sending);
-
- mac_sec = &(sc->s3.write_mac_secret[0]);
- seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&sc->rlayer);
- hash = sc->write_hash;
-
- t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash);
- if (t < 0)
- return 0;
- md_size = t;
- npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size;
-
- /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
- md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
-
- if (md_ctx == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- rec_char = rec->type;
- p = md;
- s2n(rec->length, p);
- if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
- || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
- return 0;
- }
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
-
- ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
- return 1;
-}
-
int tls1_mac_old(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
int sending)
{
int i;
EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx;
unsigned char header[13];
- int stream_mac = sending ? (sc->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
- : (sc->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM);
- int tlstree_mac = sending ? (sc->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE)
- : (sc->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE);
+ int stream_mac = (sc->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM);
+ int tlstree_mac = (sc->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE);
int t;
int ret = 0;
if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc)) {
unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
- s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&sc->rlayer) :
- DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&sc->rlayer), p);
+ s2n(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&sc->rlayer), p);
memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff