*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
+#include "e_os.h" /* strcasecmp */
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/params.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/proverr.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "internal/sizes.h"
#include "crypto/rsa.h"
#include "prov/providercommon.h"
-#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
#include "prov/implementations.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
#include "prov/der_rsa.h"
* by their Final function.
*/
unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
-
- /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */
- unsigned char aid_buf[128];
- unsigned char *aid;
- size_t aid_len;
+ unsigned int mgf1_md_set : 1;
/* main digest */
EVP_MD *md;
int pad_mode;
/* message digest for MGF1 */
EVP_MD *mgf1_md;
+ int mgf1_mdnid;
char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
/* PSS salt length */
int saltlen;
} PROV_RSA_CTX;
+/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
+#define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
+
static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
{
if (prsactx->md != NULL)
return 0;
}
-static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
+static int rsa_check_padding(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx,
+ const char *mdname, const char *mgf1_mdname,
+ int mdnid)
{
- if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
- if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
+ switch(prsactx->pad_mode) {
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
return 0;
- }
+ case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+ if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
+ if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx))
+ if ((mdname != NULL && !EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
+ || (mgf1_mdname != NULL
+ && !EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mgf1_mdname))) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
}
return 1;
}
-static int rsa_check_parameters(PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
+static int rsa_check_parameters(PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx, int min_saltlen)
{
if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
int max_saltlen;
max_saltlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) - EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
if ((RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
max_saltlen--;
- if (prsactx->min_saltlen < 0 || prsactx->min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
+ if (min_saltlen < 0 || min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
+ prsactx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
}
return 1;
}
return prsactx;
}
-/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
-#define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
+static int rsa_pss_compute_saltlen(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int saltlen = ctx->saltlen;
+
+ if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
+ saltlen = EVP_MD_size(ctx->md);
+ } else if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO || saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
+ saltlen = RSA_size(ctx->rsa) - EVP_MD_size(ctx->md) - 2;
+ if ((RSA_bits(ctx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
+ saltlen--;
+ }
+ if (saltlen < 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ } else if (saltlen < ctx->min_saltlen) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
+ "minimum salt length: %d, actual salt length: %d",
+ ctx->min_saltlen, saltlen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return saltlen;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *rsa_generate_signature_aid(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *aid_buf,
+ size_t buf_len,
+ size_t *aid_len)
+{
+ WPACKET pkt;
+ unsigned char *aid = NULL;
+ int saltlen;
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, aid_buf, buf_len)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ switch(ctx->pad_mode) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ if (!ossl_DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_MDWithRSAEncryption(&pkt, -1,
+ ctx->mdnid)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ break;
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
+ saltlen = rsa_pss_compute_saltlen(ctx);
+ if (saltlen < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+ if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params)
+ || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(&pss_params, ctx->mdnid)
+ || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(&pss_params,
+ ctx->mgf1_mdnid)
+ || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(&pss_params, saltlen)
+ || !ossl_DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_RSA_PSS(&pkt, -1,
+ RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS,
+ &pss_params)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED,
+ "Algorithm ID generation");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
+ WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, aid_len);
+ aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
+ }
+ cleanup:
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
+ return aid;
+}
static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
const char *mdprops)
mdprops = ctx->propq;
if (mdname != NULL) {
- WPACKET pkt;
EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
- int md_nid = digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, sha1_allowed);
+ int md_nid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, sha1_allowed);
size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
if (md == NULL
|| md_nid == NID_undef
- || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)
+ || !rsa_check_padding(ctx, mdname, NULL, md_nid)
|| mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname)) {
if (md == NULL)
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
return 0;
}
+ if (!ctx->mgf1_md_set) {
+ if (!EVP_MD_up_ref(md)) {
+ EVP_MD_free(md);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
+ ctx->mgf1_md = md;
+ ctx->mgf1_mdnid = md_nid;
+ OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
+ }
+
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
- /*
- * TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors?
- * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no
- * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had (consider RSA with MD5-SHA1),
- * but the operation itself is still valid, just as long as it's
- * not used to construct anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier.
- */
- ctx->aid_len = 0;
- if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
- && ossl_DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_MDWithRSAEncryption(&pkt, -1,
- ctx->rsa,
- md_nid)
- && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
- WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
- ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
- }
- WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
-
ctx->mdctx = NULL;
ctx->md = md;
ctx->mdnid = md_nid;
{
size_t len;
EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ int mdnid;
if (mdprops == NULL)
mdprops = ctx->propq;
- if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
- EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
-
if ((md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops)) == NULL) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
"%s could not be fetched", mdname);
return 0;
}
/* The default for mgf1 is SHA1 - so allow SHA1 */
- if (digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, 1) == NID_undef) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
- "digest=%s", mdname);
+ if ((mdnid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, 1)) == NID_undef
+ || !rsa_check_padding(ctx, NULL, mdname, mdnid)) {
+ if (mdnid == NID_undef)
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
+ "digest=%s", mdname);
EVP_MD_free(md);
return 0;
}
- ctx->mgf1_md = md;
len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
if (len >= sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname)) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
"%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
+ EVP_MD_free(md);
return 0;
}
+ EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
+ ctx->mgf1_md = md;
+ ctx->mgf1_mdnid = mdnid;
+ ctx->mgf1_md_set = 1;
return 1;
}
mdname = ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(md_nid);
mgf1mdname = ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(mgf1md_nid);
- prsactx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
if (mdname == NULL) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
}
prsactx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
- return rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq)
- && rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mgf1mdname, prsactx->propq)
- && rsa_check_parameters(prsactx);
+ /* call rsa_setup_mgf1_md before rsa_setup_md to avoid duplication */
+ return rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mgf1mdname, prsactx->propq)
+ && rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq)
+ && rsa_check_parameters(prsactx, min_saltlen);
}
}
prsactx->rsa);
if (ret <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
ret = sltmp;
ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
prsactx->rsa);
if (ret <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
ret = sltmp;
prsactx->tbuf, tbs,
prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
prsactx->saltlen)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf,
end:
#endif
if (ret <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
RSA_X931_PADDING);
if (ret < 1) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
ret--;
ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa);
if (ret <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
ret = sltmp;
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa,
prsactx->pad_mode);
if (ret < 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
}
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen,
prsactx->rsa)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
return 1;
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf,
prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
if (ret <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs,
prsactx->tbuf,
prsactx->saltlen);
if (ret <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
return 1;
rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
prsactx->pad_mode);
if (rslen == 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
}
if (prsactx != NULL)
prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
- if (!rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation)
- || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, NULL)) /* TODO RL */
+ if (!rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation))
+ return 0;
+ if (mdname != NULL
+ /* was rsa_setup_md already called in rsa_signverify_init()? */
+ && (mdname[0] == '\0' || strcasecmp(prsactx->mdname, mdname) != 0)
+ && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq))
return 0;
prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
return 0;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
- if (p != NULL
- && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len))
- return 0;
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */
+ unsigned char aid_buf[128];
+ unsigned char *aid;
+ size_t aid_len;
+
+ aid = rsa_generate_signature_aid(prsactx, aid_buf,
+ sizeof(aid_buf), &aid_len);
+ if (aid == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, aid, aid_len))
+ return 0;
+ }
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
if (p != NULL)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ int pad_mode;
+ int saltlen;
+ char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = NULL;
+ char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = NULL;
+ char mgf1mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmgf1mdname = NULL;
+ char mgf1mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmgf1mdprops = NULL;
if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
return 0;
+ pad_mode = prsactx->pad_mode;
+ saltlen = prsactx->saltlen;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
/* Not allowed during certain operations */
if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md)
return 0;
if (p != NULL) {
- char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
- char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
+ pmdname = mdname;
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
return 0;
- if (propsp == NULL)
- pmdprops = NULL;
- else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
- &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
- return 0;
-
- if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
- /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
- if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
- return 1;
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
- return 0;
+ if (propsp != NULL) {
+ pmdprops = mdprops;
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
+ &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
+ return 0;
}
-
- /* non-PSS code follows */
- if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
- return 0;
}
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
if (p != NULL) {
- int pad_mode = 0;
const char *err_extra_text = NULL;
switch (p->data_type) {
"PSS padding only allowed for sign and verify operations";
goto bad_pad;
}
- if (prsactx->md == NULL
- && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME, NULL)) {
- return 0;
- }
break;
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
err_extra_text = "PKCS#1 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
err_extra_text);
return 0;
}
- if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
- return 0;
- prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
}
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
if (p != NULL) {
- int saltlen;
-
- if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED,
"PSS saltlen can only be specified if "
"PSS padding has been specified first");
* lowest saltlen number possible.
*/
if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
switch (saltlen) {
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH,
+ "Cannot use autodetected salt length");
return 0;
}
break;
}
}
}
-
- prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
}
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
if (p != NULL) {
- char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
- char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES);
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
+ pmgf1mdname = mgf1mdname;
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmgf1mdname, sizeof(mgf1mdname)))
return 0;
- if (propsp == NULL)
- pmdprops = NULL;
- else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
- &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
- return 0;
+ if (propsp != NULL) {
+ pmgf1mdprops = mgf1mdprops;
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
+ &pmgf1mdprops, sizeof(mgf1mdprops)))
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
return 0;
}
+ }
- if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
- /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL */
- if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
- || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
- return 1;
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
- return 0;
- }
+ prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
+ prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
+
+ if (prsactx->md == NULL && pmdname == NULL
+ && pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
+ pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME;
- /* non-PSS code follows */
- if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
+ if (pmgf1mdname != NULL
+ && !rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, pmgf1mdname, pmgf1mdprops))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (pmdname != NULL) {
+ if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, pmdname, pmdprops))
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx, NULL, NULL, prsactx->mdnid))
return 0;
}
-
return 1;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff