*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
+#include "e_os.h" /* strcasecmp */
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
+#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/params.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/proverr.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "internal/sizes.h"
#include "crypto/rsa.h"
-#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
+#include "prov/providercommon.h"
#include "prov/implementations.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
#include "prov/der_rsa.h"
-
-static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_sign_init;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
-static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
+#include "prov/securitycheck.h"
+
+#define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1
+
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_sign_init;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
+static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
- { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, "pkcs1" },
- { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, "sslv23" },
- { RSA_NO_PADDING, "none" },
- { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oaep" }, /* Correct spelling first */
- { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },
- { RSA_X931_PADDING, "x931" },
- { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, "pss" },
+ { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15 },
+ { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23 },
+ { RSA_NO_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE },
+ { RSA_X931_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_X931 },
+ { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PSS },
{ 0, NULL }
};
*/
typedef struct {
- OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx;
char *propq;
RSA *rsa;
int operation;
* by their Final function.
*/
unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
-
- /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */
- unsigned char aid_buf[128];
- unsigned char *aid;
- size_t aid_len;
+ unsigned int mgf1_md_set : 1;
/* main digest */
EVP_MD *md;
int pad_mode;
/* message digest for MGF1 */
EVP_MD *mgf1_md;
+ int mgf1_mdnid;
char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
/* PSS salt length */
int saltlen;
} PROV_RSA_CTX;
+/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
+#define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
+
static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
{
if (prsactx->md != NULL)
return 0;
}
-static int rsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md)
+static int rsa_check_padding(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx,
+ const char *mdname, const char *mgf1_mdname,
+ int mdnid)
{
- /*
- * Because the RSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate.
- * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID
- * map.
- */
- static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
- { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 },
- { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 },
- { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
- { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
- { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
- { NID_sha512_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_224 },
- { NID_sha512_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_256 },
- { NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 },
- { NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 },
- { NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 },
- { NID_md4, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 },
- { NID_mdc2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 },
- { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
- { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 },
- { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 },
- { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 },
- { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 },
- };
- size_t i;
- int mdnid = NID_undef;
-
- if (md == NULL)
- goto end;
-
- for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) {
- if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) {
- mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- end:
- return mdnid;
-}
-
-static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
-{
- if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
- if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
+ switch(prsactx->pad_mode) {
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
return 0;
- }
+ case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+ if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
+ if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx))
+ if ((mdname != NULL && !EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
+ || (mgf1_mdname != NULL
+ && !EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mgf1_mdname))) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
}
return 1;
}
-static int rsa_check_parameters(EVP_MD *md, PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
+static int rsa_check_parameters(PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx, int min_saltlen)
{
if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
int max_saltlen;
/* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
- max_saltlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) - EVP_MD_size(md);
+ max_saltlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) - EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
if ((RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
max_saltlen--;
- if (prsactx->min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
+ if (min_saltlen < 0 || min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
+ prsactx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
}
return 1;
}
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL;
char *propq_copy = NULL;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return NULL;
+
if ((prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX))) == NULL
|| (propq != NULL
&& (propq_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL)) {
return NULL;
}
- prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
+ prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx);
prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
prsactx->propq = propq_copy;
return prsactx;
}
-/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
-#define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
+static int rsa_pss_compute_saltlen(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ int saltlen = ctx->saltlen;
+
+ if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
+ saltlen = EVP_MD_size(ctx->md);
+ } else if (saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO || saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
+ saltlen = RSA_size(ctx->rsa) - EVP_MD_size(ctx->md) - 2;
+ if ((RSA_bits(ctx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
+ saltlen--;
+ }
+ if (saltlen < 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ } else if (saltlen < ctx->min_saltlen) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
+ "minimum salt length: %d, actual salt length: %d",
+ ctx->min_saltlen, saltlen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return saltlen;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *rsa_generate_signature_aid(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx,
+ unsigned char *aid_buf,
+ size_t buf_len,
+ size_t *aid_len)
+{
+ WPACKET pkt;
+ unsigned char *aid = NULL;
+ int saltlen;
+ RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 pss_params;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, aid_buf, buf_len)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ switch(ctx->pad_mode) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ if (!ossl_DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_MDWithRSAEncryption(&pkt, -1,
+ ctx->mdnid)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ break;
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
+ saltlen = rsa_pss_compute_saltlen(ctx);
+ if (saltlen < 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+ if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_defaults(&pss_params)
+ || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_hashalg(&pss_params, ctx->mdnid)
+ || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_maskgenhashalg(&pss_params,
+ ctx->mgf1_mdnid)
+ || !ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_set_saltlen(&pss_params, saltlen)
+ || !ossl_DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_RSA_PSS(&pkt, -1,
+ RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS,
+ &pss_params)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED,
+ "Algorithm ID generation");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
+ WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, aid_len);
+ aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
+ }
+ cleanup:
+ WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
+ return aid;
+}
static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
const char *mdprops)
if (mdname != NULL) {
EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
- int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md);
- WPACKET pkt;
+ int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+ int md_nid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, sha1_allowed);
+ size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
if (md == NULL
|| md_nid == NID_undef
- || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)
- || !rsa_check_parameters(md, ctx)) {
+ || !rsa_check_padding(ctx, mdname, NULL, md_nid)
+ || mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname)) {
if (md == NULL)
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
"%s could not be fetched", mdname);
if (md_nid == NID_undef)
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
"digest=%s", mdname);
+ if (mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname))
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
EVP_MD_free(md);
return 0;
}
+ if (!ctx->mgf1_md_set) {
+ if (!EVP_MD_up_ref(md)) {
+ EVP_MD_free(md);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
+ ctx->mgf1_md = md;
+ ctx->mgf1_mdnid = md_nid;
+ OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
+ }
+
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
- /*
- * TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors?
- * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no
- * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had (consider RSA with MD5-SHA1),
- * but the operation itself is still valid, just as long as it's
- * not used to construct anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier.
- */
- ctx->aid_len = 0;
- if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
- && DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_MDWithRSAEncryption(&pkt, -1, ctx->rsa,
- md_nid)
- && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
- WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
- ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
- }
- WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
-
ctx->mdctx = NULL;
ctx->md = md;
ctx->mdnid = md_nid;
static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
const char *mdprops)
{
+ size_t len;
+ EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ int mdnid;
+
if (mdprops == NULL)
mdprops = ctx->propq;
- if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
- EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
-
- if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops)) == NULL) {
+ if ((md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops)) == NULL) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
"%s could not be fetched", mdname);
return 0;
}
- OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
+ /* The default for mgf1 is SHA1 - so allow SHA1 */
+ if ((mdnid = ossl_digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, 1)) == NID_undef
+ || !rsa_check_padding(ctx, NULL, mdname, mdnid)) {
+ if (mdnid == NID_undef)
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
+ "digest=%s", mdname);
+ EVP_MD_free(md);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
+ if (len >= sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname)) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
+ EVP_MD_free(md);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
+ ctx->mgf1_md = md;
+ ctx->mgf1_mdnid = mdnid;
+ ctx->mgf1_md_set = 1;
return 1;
}
-static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation)
+static int rsa_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation)
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+
if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
return 0;
prsactx->rsa = vrsa;
prsactx->operation = operation;
+ if (!ossl_rsa_check_key(vrsa, operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
/* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
{
const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss =
- rsa_get0_pss_params_30(prsactx->rsa);
+ ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(prsactx->rsa);
- if (!rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) {
- int md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss);
- int mgf1md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss);
- int min_saltlen = rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss);
+ if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) {
+ int md_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss);
+ int mgf1md_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss);
+ int min_saltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss);
const char *mdname, *mgf1mdname;
+ size_t len;
- mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(md_nid);
- mgf1mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(mgf1md_nid);
- prsactx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
+ mdname = ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(md_nid);
+ mgf1mdname = ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(mgf1md_nid);
if (mdname == NULL) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
return 0;
}
- strncpy(prsactx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(prsactx->mdname));
- strncpy(prsactx->mgf1_mdname, mgf1mdname,
- sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname));
+ len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mdname, mdname,
+ sizeof(prsactx->mdname));
+ if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mdname)) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "hash algorithm name too long");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mgf1_mdname, mgf1mdname,
+ sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname));
+ if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname)) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
+ "MGF1 hash algorithm name too long");
+ return 0;
+ }
prsactx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
- return rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq)
- && rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mgf1mdname, prsactx->propq);
+ /* call rsa_setup_mgf1_md before rsa_setup_md to avoid duplication */
+ return rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mgf1mdname, prsactx->propq)
+ && rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq)
+ && rsa_check_parameters(prsactx, min_saltlen);
}
}
static int rsa_sign_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
{
- return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+ return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
}
static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+
if (sig == NULL) {
*siglen = rsasize;
return 1;
prsactx->rsa);
if (ret <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
ret = sltmp;
ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
prsactx->rsa);
if (ret <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
ret = sltmp;
prsactx->tbuf, tbs,
prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
prsactx->saltlen)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf,
end:
#endif
if (ret <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
static int rsa_verify_recover_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
{
- return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER);
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+ return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER);
}
static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
int ret;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+
if (rout == NULL) {
*routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
return 1;
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
RSA_X931_PADDING);
if (ret < 1) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
ret--;
}
*routlen = ret;
- if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
- ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
- "buffer size is %d, should be %d",
- routsize, ret);
- return 0;
+ if (rout != prsactx->tbuf) {
+ if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
+ "buffer size is %d, should be %d",
+ routsize, ret);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
}
- memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
break;
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa);
if (ret <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
ret = sltmp;
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa,
prsactx->pad_mode);
if (ret < 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
}
static int rsa_verify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
{
- return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+ return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
}
static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
size_t rslen;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen,
prsactx->rsa)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
return 1;
case RSA_X931_PADDING:
- if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, NULL, &rslen, 0, sig, siglen) <= 0)
+ if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
+ return 0;
+ if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, prsactx->tbuf, &rslen, 0,
+ sig, siglen) <= 0)
return 0;
break;
case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf,
prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
if (ret <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs,
prsactx->tbuf,
prsactx->saltlen);
if (ret <= 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
return 1;
rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
prsactx->pad_mode);
if (rslen == 0) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
return 0;
}
}
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
- prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
- if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation)
- || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, NULL)) /* TODO RL */
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+
+ if (prsactx != NULL)
+ prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
+ if (!rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation))
+ return 0;
+ if (mdname != NULL
+ /* was rsa_setup_md already called in rsa_signverify_init()? */
+ && (mdname[0] == '\0' || strcasecmp(prsactx->mdname, mdname) != 0)
+ && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq))
return 0;
prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
static int rsa_digest_sign_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
void *vrsa)
{
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
}
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int dlen = 0;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || prsactx == NULL)
+ return 0;
prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
- if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
return 0;
-
/*
* If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
* are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
*/
if (sig != NULL) {
/*
- * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
- * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
- * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
+ * The digests used here are all known (see rsa_get_md_nid()), so they
+ * should not exceed the internal buffer size of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE.
*/
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
return 0;
static int rsa_digest_verify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
void *vrsa)
{
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
}
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int dlen = 0;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return 0;
+
+ if (prsactx == NULL)
+ return 0;
prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
- if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
+ if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
return 0;
/*
- * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
- * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
- * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
+ * The digests used here are all known (see rsa_get_md_nid()), so they
+ * should not exceed the internal buffer size of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE.
*/
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
return 0;
if (prsactx == NULL)
return;
- RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
OPENSSL_free(prsactx->propq);
free_tbuf(prsactx);
+ RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(prsactx));
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(*prsactx));
}
static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
+ if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
+ return NULL;
+
dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
if (dstctx == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
dstctx->md = NULL;
dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
dstctx->tbuf = NULL;
+ dstctx->propq = NULL;
if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa))
goto err;
goto err;
}
+ if (srcctx->propq != NULL) {
+ dstctx->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(srcctx->propq);
+ if (dstctx->propq == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
return dstctx;
err:
rsa_freectx(dstctx);
return 0;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
- if (p != NULL
- && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len))
- return 0;
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */
+ unsigned char aid_buf[128];
+ unsigned char *aid;
+ size_t aid_len;
+
+ aid = rsa_generate_signature_aid(prsactx, aid_buf,
+ sizeof(aid_buf), &aid_len);
+ if (aid == NULL || !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, aid, aid_len))
+ return 0;
+ }
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
if (p != NULL)
if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen))
return 0;
} else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
+ const char *value = NULL;
+
switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "digest"))
- return 0;
+ value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST;
break;
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX:
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "max"))
- return 0;
+ value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX;
break;
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "auto"))
- return 0;
+ value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO;
break;
default:
- if (BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d", prsactx->saltlen)
- <= 0)
- return 0;
- break;
+ {
+ int len = BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d",
+ prsactx->saltlen);
+
+ if (len <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ p->return_size = len;
+ break;
+ }
}
+ if (value != NULL
+ && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, value))
+ return 0;
}
}
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
-static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(void)
+static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vctx)
{
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
{
PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
+ int pad_mode;
+ int saltlen;
+ char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = NULL;
+ char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = NULL;
+ char mgf1mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmgf1mdname = NULL;
+ char mgf1mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmgf1mdprops = NULL;
if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
return 0;
+ pad_mode = prsactx->pad_mode;
+ saltlen = prsactx->saltlen;
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
/* Not allowed during certain operations */
if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md)
return 0;
if (p != NULL) {
- char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
- char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
+ pmdname = mdname;
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
return 0;
- if (propsp == NULL)
- pmdprops = NULL;
- else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
- &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
- return 0;
-
- if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
- /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
- if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
- return 1;
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
- return 0;
+ if (propsp != NULL) {
+ pmdprops = mdprops;
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
+ &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
+ return 0;
}
-
- /* non-PSS code follows */
- if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
- return 0;
}
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
if (p != NULL) {
- int pad_mode = 0;
const char *err_extra_text = NULL;
switch (p->data_type) {
"PSS padding only allowed for sign and verify operations";
goto bad_pad;
}
- if (prsactx->md == NULL
- && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1, NULL)) {
- return 0;
- }
break;
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
err_extra_text = "PKCS#1 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
err_extra_text);
return 0;
}
- if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
- return 0;
- prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
}
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
if (p != NULL) {
- int saltlen;
-
- if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED,
"PSS saltlen can only be specified if "
"PSS padding has been specified first");
return 0;
break;
case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
- if (strcmp(p->data, "digest") == 0)
+ if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST) == 0)
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
- else if (strcmp(p->data, "max") == 0)
+ else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX) == 0)
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
- else if (strcmp(p->data, "auto") == 0)
+ else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO) == 0)
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
else
saltlen = atoi(p->data);
* lowest saltlen number possible.
*/
if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
- switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
+ switch (saltlen) {
case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH,
+ "Cannot use autodetected salt length");
return 0;
}
break;
EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
return 0;
}
- /* FALLTHRU */
+ break;
default:
if (saltlen >= 0 && saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
}
}
}
-
- prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
}
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
if (p != NULL) {
- char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
- char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES);
- if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
+ pmgf1mdname = mgf1mdname;
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmgf1mdname, sizeof(mgf1mdname)))
return 0;
- if (propsp == NULL)
- pmdprops = NULL;
- else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
- &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
- return 0;
+ if (propsp != NULL) {
+ pmgf1mdprops = mgf1mdprops;
+ if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
+ &pmgf1mdprops, sizeof(mgf1mdprops)))
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
+ if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
return 0;
}
+ }
- if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
- /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL */
- if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
- || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
- return 1;
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
- return 0;
- }
+ prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
+ prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
+
+ if (prsactx->md == NULL && pmdname == NULL
+ && pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
+ pmdname = RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME;
- /* non-PSS code follows */
- if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
+ if (pmgf1mdname != NULL
+ && !rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, pmgf1mdname, pmgf1mdprops))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (pmdname != NULL) {
+ if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, pmdname, pmdprops))
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx, NULL, NULL, prsactx->mdnid))
return 0;
}
-
return 1;
}
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
-static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void)
+static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *provctx)
{
/*
* TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
}
-const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = {
+const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_rsa_signature_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init },
{ OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff