- a no_renegotiation alert as required by draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation.
- Some renegotiating TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully
- when they receive the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled
- this alert and would hang waiting for a server hello which it will never
- receive. Now we treat a received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal
- error. This is because applications requesting a renegotiation might well
- expect it to succeed and would have no code in place to handle the server
- denying it so the only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.
+ a no_renegotiation alert as required by RFC5746. Some renegotiating
+ TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully when they receive
+ the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled this alert and would hang
+ waiting for a server hello which it will never receive. Now we treat a
+ received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal error. This is because
+ applications requesting a renegotiation might well expect it to succeed
+ and would have no code in place to handle the server denying it so the
+ only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection.