2 * Copyright 2016-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 #include "ssl_local.h"
12 #include "internal/ktls.h"
13 #include "record/record_local.h"
14 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
15 #include <openssl/evp.h>
16 #include <openssl/kdf.h>
17 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
19 #define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 249
22 static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = { 0x74, 0x6C, 0x73, 0x31, 0x33, 0x20, 0x00 };
24 static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 ";
28 * Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and |data| of length
29 * |datalen| (e.g. typically a hash of the handshake messages), derive a new
30 * secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in the location pointed to be |out|.
31 * The |data| value may be zero length. Any errors will be treated as fatal if
32 * |fatal| is set. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
34 int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
35 const unsigned char *secret,
36 const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
37 const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
38 unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal)
40 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
41 EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(sctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF,
44 OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params;
45 int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
46 const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
50 kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
55 if (labellen > TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN) {
57 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
60 * Probably we have been called from SSL_export_keying_material(),
61 * or SSL_export_keying_material_early().
63 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
65 EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
69 if ((ret = EVP_MD_get_size(md)) <= 0) {
70 EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
72 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
74 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
77 hashlen = (size_t)ret;
79 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode);
80 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
82 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
83 (unsigned char *)secret, hashlen);
84 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PREFIX,
85 (unsigned char *)label_prefix,
86 sizeof(label_prefix) - 1);
87 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_LABEL,
88 (unsigned char *)label, labellen);
90 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DATA,
91 (unsigned char *)data,
93 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
95 ret = EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, outlen, params) <= 0;
96 EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
100 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
102 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
109 * Given a |secret| generate a |key| of length |keylen| bytes. Returns 1 on
110 * success 0 on failure.
112 int tls13_derive_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
113 const unsigned char *secret,
114 unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
116 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
117 static const unsigned char keylabel[] ={ 0x6B, 0x65, 0x79, 0x00 };
119 static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "key";
122 return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, keylabel, sizeof(keylabel) - 1,
123 NULL, 0, key, keylen, 1);
127 * Given a |secret| generate an |iv| of length |ivlen| bytes. Returns 1 on
128 * success 0 on failure.
130 int tls13_derive_iv(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
131 const unsigned char *secret,
132 unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen)
134 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
135 static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = { 0x69, 0x76, 0x00 };
137 static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "iv";
140 return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, ivlabel, sizeof(ivlabel) - 1,
141 NULL, 0, iv, ivlen, 1);
144 int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
145 const unsigned char *secret,
146 unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen)
148 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
149 static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = { 0x66, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x69, 0x73, 0x68, 0x65, 0x64, 0x00 };
151 static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "finished";
154 return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, finishedlabel,
155 sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, 0, fin, finlen, 1);
159 * Given the previous secret |prevsecret| and a new input secret |insecret| of
160 * length |insecretlen|, generate a new secret and store it in the location
161 * pointed to by |outsecret|. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
163 int tls13_generate_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md,
164 const unsigned char *prevsecret,
165 const unsigned char *insecret,
167 unsigned char *outsecret)
174 OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params;
175 int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
176 const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
177 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
178 static const char derived_secret_label[] = { 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x64, 0x00 };
180 static const char derived_secret_label[] = "derived";
182 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
184 kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(sctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF, sctx->propq);
185 kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
192 mdleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
193 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
194 if (!ossl_assert(mdleni >= 0)) {
195 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
196 EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
199 mdlen = (size_t)mdleni;
201 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode);
202 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
204 if (insecret != NULL)
205 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
206 (unsigned char *)insecret,
208 if (prevsecret != NULL)
209 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT,
210 (unsigned char *)prevsecret, mdlen);
211 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PREFIX,
212 (unsigned char *)label_prefix,
213 sizeof(label_prefix) - 1);
214 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_LABEL,
215 (unsigned char *)derived_secret_label,
216 sizeof(derived_secret_label) - 1);
217 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
219 ret = EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, outsecret, mdlen, params) <= 0;
222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
224 EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
229 * Given an input secret |insecret| of length |insecretlen| generate the
230 * handshake secret. This requires the early secret to already have been
231 * generated. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure.
233 int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
234 const unsigned char *insecret,
237 /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
238 return tls13_generate_secret(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), s->early_secret,
239 insecret, insecretlen,
240 (unsigned char *)&s->handshake_secret);
244 * Given the handshake secret |prev| of length |prevlen| generate the master
245 * secret and store its length in |*secret_size|. Returns 1 on success 0 on
248 int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *out,
249 unsigned char *prev, size_t prevlen,
252 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
254 *secret_size = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
255 /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */
256 return tls13_generate_secret(s, md, prev, NULL, 0, out);
260 * Generates the mac for the Finished message. Returns the length of the MAC or
263 size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const char *str, size_t slen,
266 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
267 const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
268 unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
269 unsigned char finsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
270 unsigned char *key = NULL;
271 size_t len = 0, hashlen;
272 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
273 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
278 /* Safe to cast away const here since we're not "getting" any data */
279 if (sctx->propq != NULL)
280 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES,
283 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
285 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) {
286 /* SSLfatal() already called */
290 if (str == SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label) {
291 key = s->server_finished_secret;
292 } else if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
293 key = s->client_finished_secret;
295 if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, md,
296 s->client_app_traffic_secret,
302 if (!EVP_Q_mac(sctx->libctx, "HMAC", sctx->propq, mdname,
303 params, key, hashlen, hash, hashlen,
304 /* outsize as per sizeof(peer_finish_md) */
305 out, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2, &len)) {
306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
311 OPENSSL_cleanse(finsecret, sizeof(finsecret));
316 * There isn't really a key block in TLSv1.3, but we still need this function
317 * for initialising the cipher and hash. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
319 int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
324 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
325 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), s->session, &c, &hash,
326 NULL, NULL, NULL, 0)) {
327 /* Error is already recorded */
328 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
332 ssl_evp_cipher_free(s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc);
333 s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc = c;
334 ssl_evp_md_free(s->s3.tmp.new_hash);
335 s->s3.tmp.new_hash = hash;
340 static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int sending,
342 const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
343 const unsigned char *insecret,
344 const unsigned char *hash,
345 const unsigned char *label,
346 size_t labellen, unsigned char *secret,
347 unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen,
348 unsigned char *iv, size_t *ivlen,
350 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx)
352 int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
356 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
357 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
358 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
361 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
363 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret, label, labellen, hash, hashlen,
364 secret, hashlen, 1)) {
365 /* SSLfatal() already called */
369 *keylen = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(ciph);
371 mode = EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph);
372 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
375 *ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN;
376 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
377 algenc = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc;
378 } else if (s->session->cipher != NULL) {
379 /* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */
380 algenc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc;
381 } else if (s->psksession != NULL && s->psksession->cipher != NULL) {
382 /* We must be doing early data with out-of-band PSK */
383 algenc = s->psksession->cipher->algorithm_enc;
385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
388 if (algenc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8))
389 *taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN;
391 *taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
395 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
396 *taglen = EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
398 /* CHACHA20P-POLY1305 */
399 *taglen = EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN;
401 iivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(ciph);
403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
409 if (!tls13_derive_key(s, md, secret, key, *keylen)
410 || !tls13_derive_iv(s, md, secret, iv, *ivlen)) {
411 /* SSLfatal() already called */
416 if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, sending) <= 0
417 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, *ivlen, NULL) <= 0
418 || (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE
419 && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, *taglen, NULL) <= 0)
420 || EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1) <= 0) {
421 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
429 int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int which)
431 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
432 static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x65, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
433 static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x68, 0x73, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
434 static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
435 static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = {0x73, 0x20, 0x68, 0x73, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
436 static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = {0x73, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00};
437 static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
438 static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = {0x72, 0x65, 0x73, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
439 static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = {0x65, 0x20, 0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
441 static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = "c e traffic";
442 static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = "c hs traffic";
443 static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = "c ap traffic";
444 static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = "s hs traffic";
445 static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = "s ap traffic";
446 static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = "exp master";
447 static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = "res master";
448 static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = "e exp master";
451 unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
452 unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
453 unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
454 unsigned char *hash = hashval;
455 unsigned char *insecret;
456 unsigned char *finsecret = NULL;
457 const char *log_label = NULL;
458 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx = NULL;
459 size_t finsecretlen = 0;
460 const unsigned char *label;
461 size_t labellen, hashlen = 0;
463 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
464 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
465 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
466 size_t keylen, ivlen, taglen;
467 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_KTLS) && defined(OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13)
468 ktls_crypto_info_t crypto_info;
473 if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
476 s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
477 if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
478 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_write_ctx);
480 s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
481 if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) {
482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
486 ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
489 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
492 if (((which & SSL3_CC_CLIENT) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
493 || ((which & SSL3_CC_SERVER) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) {
494 if (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) {
495 EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL;
498 unsigned int hashlenui;
499 const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
501 insecret = s->early_secret;
502 label = client_early_traffic;
503 labellen = sizeof(client_early_traffic) - 1;
504 log_label = CLIENT_EARLY_LABEL;
506 handlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, &hdata);
508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
512 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
513 && s->max_early_data > 0
514 && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
516 * If we are attempting to send early data, and we've decided to
517 * actually do it but max_early_data in s->session is 0 then we
518 * must be using an external PSK.
520 if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
521 && s->max_early_data ==
522 s->psksession->ext.max_early_data)) {
523 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
526 sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
528 if (sslcipher == NULL) {
529 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
534 * We need to calculate the handshake digest using the digest from
535 * the session. We haven't yet selected our ciphersuite so we can't
536 * use ssl_handshake_md().
538 mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
545 * This ups the ref count on cipher so we better make sure we free
548 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(sctx, sslcipher, &cipher)) {
549 /* Error is already recorded */
550 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
551 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
555 md = ssl_md(sctx, sslcipher->algorithm2);
556 if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL)
557 || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, hdata, handlen)
558 || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, hashval, &hashlenui)) {
559 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
560 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
564 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx);
566 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret,
567 early_exporter_master_secret,
568 sizeof(early_exporter_master_secret) - 1,
570 s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen,
572 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
576 if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL,
577 s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen)) {
578 /* SSLfatal() already called */
581 } else if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
582 insecret = s->handshake_secret;
583 finsecret = s->client_finished_secret;
584 finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
585 label = client_handshake_traffic;
586 labellen = sizeof(client_handshake_traffic) - 1;
587 log_label = CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
589 * The handshake hash used for the server read/client write handshake
590 * traffic secret is the same as the hash for the server
591 * write/client read handshake traffic secret. However, if we
592 * processed early data then we delay changing the server
593 * read/client write cipher state until later, and the handshake
594 * hashes have moved on. Therefore we use the value saved earlier
595 * when we did the server write/client read change cipher state.
597 hash = s->handshake_traffic_hash;
599 insecret = s->master_secret;
600 label = client_application_traffic;
601 labellen = sizeof(client_application_traffic) - 1;
602 log_label = CLIENT_APPLICATION_LABEL;
604 * For this we only use the handshake hashes up until the server
605 * Finished hash. We do not include the client's Finished, which is
606 * what ssl_handshake_hash() would give us. Instead we use the
607 * previously saved value.
609 hash = s->server_finished_hash;
612 /* Early data never applies to client-read/server-write */
613 if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) {
614 insecret = s->handshake_secret;
615 finsecret = s->server_finished_secret;
616 finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s));
617 label = server_handshake_traffic;
618 labellen = sizeof(server_handshake_traffic) - 1;
619 log_label = SERVER_HANDSHAKE_LABEL;
621 insecret = s->master_secret;
622 label = server_application_traffic;
623 labellen = sizeof(server_application_traffic) - 1;
624 log_label = SERVER_APPLICATION_LABEL;
628 if (!(which & SSL3_CC_EARLY)) {
629 md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
630 cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc;
631 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)
632 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
633 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
639 * Save the hash of handshakes up to now for use when we calculate the
640 * client application traffic secret
642 if (label == server_application_traffic)
643 memcpy(s->server_finished_hash, hashval, hashlen);
645 if (label == server_handshake_traffic)
646 memcpy(s->handshake_traffic_hash, hashval, hashlen);
648 if (label == client_application_traffic) {
650 * We also create the resumption master secret, but this time use the
651 * hash for the whole handshake including the Client Finished
653 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
654 resumption_master_secret,
655 sizeof(resumption_master_secret) - 1,
656 hashval, hashlen, s->resumption_master_secret,
658 /* SSLfatal() already called */
663 /* check whether cipher is known */
664 if (!ossl_assert(cipher != NULL))
667 if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, md, cipher,
668 insecret, hash, label, labellen, secret, key,
669 &keylen, iv, &ivlen, &taglen, ciph_ctx)) {
670 /* SSLfatal() already called */
674 if (label == server_application_traffic) {
675 memcpy(s->server_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
676 /* Now we create the exporter master secret */
677 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret,
678 exporter_master_secret,
679 sizeof(exporter_master_secret) - 1,
680 hash, hashlen, s->exporter_master_secret,
682 /* SSLfatal() already called */
686 if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->exporter_master_secret,
688 /* SSLfatal() already called */
691 } else if (label == client_application_traffic)
692 memcpy(s->client_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen);
694 if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) {
695 /* SSLfatal() already called */
699 if (finsecret != NULL
700 && !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret,
701 finsecret, finsecretlen)) {
702 /* SSLfatal() already called */
706 if (!s->server && label == client_early_traffic)
707 s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS;
709 s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
711 if ((which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0) {
712 int level = (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0
713 ? OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
714 : ((which &SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) != 0
715 ? OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE
716 : OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION);
718 if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version,
719 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ,
720 level, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, NULL, 0,
721 cipher, taglen, NID_undef, NULL, NULL)) {
722 /* SSLfatal already called */
725 /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me when write rlayer done */
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
730 # if defined(OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13)
731 if (!(which & SSL3_CC_APPLICATION)
732 || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) == 0)
735 /* ktls supports only the maximum fragment size */
736 if (ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s) != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
739 /* ktls does not support record padding */
740 if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL)
743 /* check that cipher is supported */
744 if (!ktls_check_supported_cipher(s, cipher, NULL, taglen))
747 if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
752 if (!ossl_assert(bio != NULL)) {
753 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
757 /* All future data will get encrypted by ktls. Flush the BIO or skip ktls */
758 if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) {
759 if (BIO_flush(bio) <= 0)
763 /* configure kernel crypto structure */
765 * If we get here we are only doing the write side. The read side goes
766 * through the new record layer code.
768 rl_sequence = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
770 if (!ktls_configure_crypto(sctx->libctx, s->version, cipher, NULL,
771 rl_sequence, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE,
772 iv, ivlen, key, keylen, NULL, 0))
775 /* ktls works with user provided buffers directly */
776 if (BIO_set_ktls(bio, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) {
777 if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
778 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
785 if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0) {
786 /* We up-refed this so now we need to down ref */
787 ssl_evp_cipher_free(cipher);
789 OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
790 OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
794 int tls13_update_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int sending)
796 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
797 static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = { 0x74, 0x72 ,0x61 ,0x66 ,0x66 ,0x69 ,0x63 ,0x20 ,0x75 ,0x70 ,0x64, 0x00};
799 static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = "traffic upd";
801 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
802 size_t hashlen = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
803 unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
804 unsigned char *insecret, *iv;
805 unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
806 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
807 size_t keylen, ivlen, taglen;
810 if (s->server == sending)
811 insecret = s->server_app_traffic_secret;
813 insecret = s->client_app_traffic_secret;
816 s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID;
818 ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
819 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
822 ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx;
825 if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, sending, md,
826 s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc, insecret, NULL,
828 sizeof(application_traffic) - 1, secret, key,
829 &keylen, iv, &ivlen, &taglen, ciph_ctx)) {
830 /* SSLfatal() already called */
834 memcpy(insecret, secret, hashlen);
837 if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version,
838 OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ,
839 OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION,
840 key, keylen, iv, ivlen, NULL, 0,
841 s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc, taglen, NID_undef, NULL,
843 /* SSLfatal already called */
848 s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
851 OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key));
852 OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret));
856 int tls13_alert_code(int code)
858 /* There are 2 additional alerts in TLSv1.3 compared to TLSv1.2 */
859 if (code == SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION || code == SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED)
862 return tls1_alert_code(code);
865 int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
866 unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
867 const char *label, size_t llen,
868 const unsigned char *context,
869 size_t contextlen, int use_context)
871 unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
872 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
873 static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
875 static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "exporter";
877 unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
878 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
879 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
880 unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
883 if (ctx == NULL || md == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_allowed(s))
889 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
890 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
891 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
892 || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
893 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
894 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->exporter_master_secret,
895 (const unsigned char *)label, llen,
896 data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
897 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
898 sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
904 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
908 int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
909 unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
910 const char *label, size_t llen,
911 const unsigned char *context,
914 #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
915 static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00};
917 static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "exporter";
919 unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
920 unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
922 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
923 unsigned int hashsize, datalen;
925 const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher;
927 if (ctx == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_early_allowed(s))
930 if (!s->server && s->max_early_data > 0
931 && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0)
932 sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession);
934 sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session);
936 md = ssl_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), sslcipher->algorithm2);
939 * Calculate the hash value and store it in |data|. The reason why
940 * the empty string is used is that the definition of TLS-Exporter
943 * TLS-Exporter(label, context_value, key_length) =
944 * HKDF-Expand-Label(Derive-Secret(Secret, label, ""),
945 * "exporter", Hash(context_value), key_length)
947 * Derive-Secret(Secret, Label, Messages) =
948 * HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label,
949 * Transcript-Hash(Messages), Hash.length)
951 * Here Transcript-Hash is the cipher suite hash algorithm.
954 || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
955 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0
956 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0
957 || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
958 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0
959 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->early_exporter_master_secret,
960 (const unsigned char *)label, llen,
961 data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0)
962 || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel,
963 sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize,
969 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);