2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
145 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
159 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173 s->version = s->method->version;
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
178 static int nid_list[] =
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
208 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
215 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
246 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
247 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
250 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
252 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
253 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
254 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
256 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
259 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
261 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
264 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
266 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
268 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
270 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
272 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
274 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
276 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
278 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
280 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
286 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
288 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
290 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
292 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
294 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
296 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
298 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
300 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
302 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
306 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
308 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
310 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
312 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
318 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
321 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
322 const unsigned char **pcurves,
327 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
328 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
331 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
332 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
334 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
335 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
336 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
339 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
340 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
344 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
345 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
349 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
350 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
354 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
355 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
358 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
359 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
361 const unsigned char *curves;
363 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
364 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
366 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
369 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
372 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
374 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
377 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
379 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
382 else /* Should never happen */
385 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
386 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
388 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
394 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
395 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
399 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
401 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
402 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
404 /* Can't do anything on client side */
411 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
412 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
415 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
416 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
418 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
419 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
420 /* Should never happen */
423 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
426 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
433 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
435 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
436 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
438 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
442 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
443 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
454 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
455 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
457 unsigned char *clist, *p;
459 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
460 * while curve ids < 32
462 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
463 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
466 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
468 unsigned long idmask;
470 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
472 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
483 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
487 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
492 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
495 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
497 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
501 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
503 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
505 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
507 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
508 if (nid == NID_undef)
509 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
510 if (nid == NID_undef)
511 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
512 if (nid == NID_undef)
514 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
515 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
517 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
520 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
521 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
526 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
528 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
530 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
531 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
537 const EC_METHOD *meth;
540 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
541 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
542 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
545 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
548 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
552 /* Determine curve ID */
553 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
554 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
555 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
559 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
571 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
574 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
576 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
579 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
583 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
584 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
585 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
587 const unsigned char *p;
590 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
591 * is supported (see RFC4492).
593 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
595 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
596 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
597 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
607 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
608 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
610 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
611 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
613 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
618 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
625 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
626 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
628 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
630 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
633 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
636 /* If not EC nothing to do */
637 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
642 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
646 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
647 * supported curves extension.
649 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
652 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
653 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
655 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
662 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
663 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
664 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
665 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
666 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
668 return 0; /* Should never happen */
669 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
670 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
672 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
676 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
677 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
679 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
684 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
685 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
687 unsigned char curve_id[2];
688 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
689 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
690 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
691 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTCOL)
694 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
695 * no other curves permitted.
699 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
700 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
701 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
702 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
703 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
707 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
708 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
710 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
711 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
713 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
716 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
719 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
721 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
727 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
729 /* Need a shared curve */
730 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
736 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
741 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
743 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
747 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
751 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
755 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
756 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
759 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
760 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
762 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
765 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
766 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
768 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
771 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
772 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
774 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
777 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
778 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
779 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
780 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
782 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
784 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
785 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
787 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
788 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
789 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
791 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
792 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
794 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
795 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
799 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
800 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
801 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
804 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
806 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
809 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
811 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
812 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
813 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
815 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
816 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
819 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
820 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
824 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
825 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
827 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
828 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
830 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
832 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
833 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
837 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
839 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
841 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
844 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
847 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
848 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
850 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
851 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
853 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
854 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
855 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
856 /* Should never happen */
859 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
860 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
865 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
867 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
868 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
869 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
871 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
873 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
876 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
881 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
883 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
885 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
886 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
890 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
892 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
894 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
895 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
903 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
906 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
907 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
908 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
910 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
913 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
914 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
916 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
919 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
927 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
928 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
929 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
930 * session and not global settings.
933 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
936 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
937 size_t i, sigalgslen;
938 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
941 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
942 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
943 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
946 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
947 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
950 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
951 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
956 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
961 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
966 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
972 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
973 * signature algorithms.
977 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
978 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
982 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
983 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
987 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
988 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
991 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
993 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
994 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
998 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
999 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1001 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1002 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1004 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1008 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1009 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1011 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1012 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1021 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1024 unsigned char *ret = p;
1025 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1026 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1028 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1031 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1032 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1034 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1036 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1038 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1039 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1040 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1041 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1050 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1051 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1052 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1057 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1059 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1061 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1062 unsigned long size_str;
1065 /* check for enough space.
1066 4 for the servername type and entension length
1067 2 for servernamelist length
1068 1 for the hostname type
1069 2 for hostname length
1073 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1074 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1077 /* extension type and length */
1078 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1079 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1081 /* length of servername list */
1082 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1084 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1085 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1087 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1091 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1096 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1102 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1104 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1107 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1117 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1118 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1119 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1121 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1122 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1128 /* check for enough space.
1129 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1130 1 for the srp user identity
1131 + srp user identity length
1133 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1135 /* fill in the extension */
1136 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1137 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1138 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1139 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1147 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1149 const unsigned char *plist;
1151 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
1153 plist = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1155 plistlen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1158 plist = ecformats_default;
1159 plistlen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
1162 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1163 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1170 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1171 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1172 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1173 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1176 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1177 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1178 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1180 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1181 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1182 if (plistlen > 65532)
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1188 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1189 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1191 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1192 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1193 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1194 * resolves this to two bytes.
1197 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1200 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1202 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1205 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1206 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1207 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1208 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1210 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1211 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1212 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1214 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1215 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1217 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1221 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1222 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1224 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1227 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1228 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1232 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1238 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1241 const unsigned char *salg;
1242 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1243 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1245 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1246 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1248 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1252 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1253 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1254 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1256 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1258 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1260 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1263 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1266 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1271 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1272 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1275 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1279 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1281 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1282 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1288 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1290 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1297 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1298 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1299 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1301 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1302 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1304 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1306 /* save position of id len */
1307 unsigned char *q = ret;
1308 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1309 /* skip over id len */
1311 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1317 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1321 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1322 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1325 * 1: peer may send requests
1326 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1328 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1329 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1331 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1335 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1337 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1338 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1339 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1341 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1346 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1350 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1352 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1354 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1357 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1365 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1366 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1367 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1368 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1369 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1370 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1373 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1374 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1376 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1378 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1379 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1381 *(ret++) = list_len;
1382 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1385 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1392 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1395 unsigned char *ret = p;
1396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1397 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1400 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1401 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1405 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1407 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1409 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1411 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1415 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1419 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1421 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1425 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1427 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1430 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1440 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
1441 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1443 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1446 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1447 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
1448 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
1450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1454 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1455 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
1456 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1457 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1458 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
1461 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1462 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1464 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1465 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1467 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1468 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1472 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1474 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1475 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1479 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1480 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1481 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1483 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1485 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1487 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1490 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1493 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1502 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1504 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1506 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1509 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1517 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1518 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1519 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1520 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1521 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1522 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1523 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1524 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1525 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1526 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1527 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1533 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1534 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1536 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1539 * 1: peer may send requests
1540 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1542 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1543 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1545 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1551 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1552 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1553 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1555 const unsigned char *npa;
1556 unsigned int npalen;
1559 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1560 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1562 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1563 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1565 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1567 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1572 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1574 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1576 size_t authz_length;
1577 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1578 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1579 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1580 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1581 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1583 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1585 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1586 * uint8_t authz_type
1588 * uint8_t data[length]
1590 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1591 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1593 unsigned short length;
1597 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1599 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1603 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1611 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1612 * 2 bytes for extension type
1613 * 2 bytes for extension length
1614 * 1 byte for the list length
1615 * n bytes for the list */
1616 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1618 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1619 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1621 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1622 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1626 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1628 unsigned short length;
1633 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1635 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1638 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1645 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1652 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1654 unsigned short type;
1655 unsigned short size;
1657 unsigned char *data = *p;
1658 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1661 s->servername_done = 0;
1662 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1664 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1668 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1669 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1671 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1672 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1674 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1675 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1677 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1678 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1680 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1681 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1683 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1684 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1686 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1687 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1690 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1694 if (data > (d+n-len))
1697 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1702 if (data+size > (d+n))
1705 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1707 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1708 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1709 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1710 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1712 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1713 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1714 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1715 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1716 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1717 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1718 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1719 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1720 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1721 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1722 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1723 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1724 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1725 the value of the Host: field.
1726 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1727 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1728 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1729 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1733 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1735 unsigned char *sdata;
1741 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1748 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1755 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1761 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1764 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1765 switch (servname_type)
1767 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1770 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1772 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1775 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1777 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1780 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1782 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1785 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1786 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1787 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1788 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1789 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1790 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1793 s->servername_done = 1;
1797 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1798 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1799 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1811 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1816 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1817 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1819 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1821 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1824 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1826 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1829 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1831 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1832 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1834 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1836 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1843 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1844 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1846 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1847 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1849 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1851 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1856 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1858 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1859 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1861 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1862 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1864 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1867 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1868 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1871 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1872 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1873 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1874 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1875 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1878 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1879 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1881 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1882 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1883 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1885 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
1887 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1892 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1894 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1897 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1898 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1900 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1903 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1904 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1907 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1908 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1909 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1910 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1911 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1914 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1915 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1916 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1917 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1919 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1923 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1926 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1927 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1929 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1933 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1934 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1935 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1936 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1938 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1939 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1941 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1946 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1948 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1949 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1951 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1955 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1957 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1959 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1961 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1964 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
1966 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1971 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
1973 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1976 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1978 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1981 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
1984 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1987 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1988 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1992 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1993 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1998 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2002 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2004 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2006 const unsigned char *sdata;
2008 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2013 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2022 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2026 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2030 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2035 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2039 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2044 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2045 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2048 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2049 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2050 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2052 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2053 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2056 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2057 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2059 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2060 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2065 /* Read in request_extensions */
2068 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2075 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2081 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2083 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2084 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2087 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2088 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2090 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2091 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2093 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2098 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2102 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2105 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2109 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2110 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2112 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2113 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2114 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2116 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2122 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2123 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2125 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2128 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2129 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2130 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2131 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2132 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2133 * anything like that, but this might change).
2135 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2136 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2137 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2138 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2139 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2140 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2144 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2145 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2147 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2152 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2154 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2155 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2159 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2163 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2165 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2167 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2171 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2172 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2173 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2176 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2177 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2178 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2179 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2180 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2182 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2186 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2187 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2188 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2190 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2192 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2193 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2194 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2195 1 /* element size */,
2198 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2201 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2202 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2204 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2218 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2220 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2221 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2223 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2225 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2228 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2229 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2230 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2235 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2238 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2240 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2244 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2253 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2254 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2255 * the length of the block. */
2256 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2258 unsigned int off = 0;
2272 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2274 unsigned short length;
2275 unsigned short type;
2276 unsigned short size;
2277 unsigned char *data = *p;
2278 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2279 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2282 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2286 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2287 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2290 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2294 if (data+length != d+n)
2296 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2300 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2305 if (data+size > (d+n))
2308 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2309 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2310 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2312 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2314 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2316 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2319 tlsext_servername = 1;
2322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2323 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2324 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2326 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2327 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2329 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2331 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2334 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2335 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2336 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2338 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2341 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2342 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2344 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2345 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2346 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2347 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2348 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2351 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2353 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2355 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2356 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2358 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2361 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2364 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2367 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2369 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2370 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2371 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2373 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2377 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2380 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2381 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2383 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2387 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2388 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2389 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2390 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2392 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2394 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2396 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2401 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2402 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2404 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2405 * a status request message.
2407 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2409 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2412 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2413 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2416 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2417 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2419 unsigned char *selected;
2420 unsigned char selected_len;
2422 /* We must have requested it. */
2423 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
2425 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2428 /* The data must be valid */
2429 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2431 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2434 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2436 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2439 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2440 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2442 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2445 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2446 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2447 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2450 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2452 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2454 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2457 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2461 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2462 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2464 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2465 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2466 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2468 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2473 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2475 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2480 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2482 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2483 * an authz hello extension if the client
2484 * didn't request a proof. */
2485 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2486 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2488 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2490 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2496 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2500 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2501 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2503 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2507 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2508 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2509 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2510 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2512 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2516 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2524 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2528 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2530 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2532 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2534 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2535 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2537 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2543 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2553 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2554 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2555 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2556 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2557 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2558 * absence on initial connect only.
2560 if (!renegotiate_seen
2561 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2562 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2564 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2565 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2566 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2574 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2577 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2581 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2583 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2588 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2590 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2591 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2593 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2594 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2596 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2597 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2602 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2606 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2607 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2614 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2617 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
2618 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
2619 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
2622 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2623 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2624 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
2625 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
2629 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2630 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
2632 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2635 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
2636 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
2637 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
2638 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
2640 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2645 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2647 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2648 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2651 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2652 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2654 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2655 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2659 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2660 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2661 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2662 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2664 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2665 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2666 * the certificate has changed.
2668 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2671 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2674 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2675 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2676 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2678 /* status request response should be sent */
2679 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2680 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2681 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2683 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2685 /* something bad happened */
2686 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2687 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2688 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2693 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2695 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2697 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2698 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2699 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
2703 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2705 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2708 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2709 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2714 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2715 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2716 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2718 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2720 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2721 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2723 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2724 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2726 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2727 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2729 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2730 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2732 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2733 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2736 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2740 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2742 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2743 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2744 * abort the handshake.
2746 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2747 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2755 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2756 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2759 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2760 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2763 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2764 s->servername_done=0;
2770 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2772 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2773 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2776 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2777 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2778 * it must contain uncompressed.
2780 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2781 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2782 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2783 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2784 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2786 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2788 unsigned char *list;
2789 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2790 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2791 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2793 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2795 found_uncompressed = 1;
2799 if (!found_uncompressed)
2801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2805 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2806 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2808 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2809 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2810 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2811 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2813 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2814 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2816 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2817 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2819 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2821 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2822 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2825 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2826 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2827 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2828 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2830 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2831 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2836 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2839 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2840 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2843 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2844 * there is no response.
2846 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2848 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2849 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2851 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2852 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2855 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2856 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2860 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2861 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2867 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2868 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2871 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2872 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2875 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2876 s->servername_done=0;
2882 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2885 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2887 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2889 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2893 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2901 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2902 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2903 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2905 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2906 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2907 * extension, if any.
2908 * len: the length of the session ID.
2909 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2910 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2911 * point to the resulting session.
2913 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2914 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2915 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2918 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2919 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2920 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2921 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2922 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2923 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2924 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2927 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2928 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2929 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2930 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2931 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2932 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2934 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2935 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2937 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2938 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2942 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2944 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2945 * to permit stateful resumption.
2947 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2949 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2953 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2954 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2961 /* Skip past cipher list */
2966 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2971 /* Now at start of extensions */
2972 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2975 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2977 unsigned short type, size;
2980 if (p + size > limit)
2982 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2987 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2988 * currently have one. */
2989 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2992 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2994 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2995 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2996 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2997 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2998 * calculate the master secret later. */
3001 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3004 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3005 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3007 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3009 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3010 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3012 default: /* fatal error */
3021 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3023 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3024 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3025 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3026 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3027 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3028 * point to the resulting session.
3031 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3032 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3033 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3034 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3036 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3037 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3038 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3041 unsigned char *sdec;
3042 const unsigned char *p;
3043 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3044 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3047 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3048 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3051 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3052 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3053 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3054 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3056 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3057 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3068 /* Check key name matches */
3069 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3071 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3072 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3073 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3074 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3076 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3077 * integrity checks on ticket.
3079 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3082 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3086 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3087 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3088 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3089 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3090 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3092 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3093 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3094 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3095 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3096 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3099 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3102 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3103 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3106 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3109 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3113 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3114 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3115 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3116 * as required by standard.
3119 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3120 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3128 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3133 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3141 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3142 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3143 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3144 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3145 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3146 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3147 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3150 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3151 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3152 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3153 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3156 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3159 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3161 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3167 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3170 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3172 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3173 return table[i].nid;
3178 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3183 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3184 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3187 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3190 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3191 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3195 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3197 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3198 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3201 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3206 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3213 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3214 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3218 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3219 return EVP_sha224();
3221 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3222 return EVP_sha256();
3224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3225 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3226 return EVP_sha384();
3228 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3229 return EVP_sha512();
3237 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3242 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3243 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3246 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3247 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3250 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3251 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3257 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3258 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3259 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3261 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3262 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3264 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3266 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3267 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3269 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3271 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3273 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3274 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3276 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3280 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3281 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3282 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3284 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3287 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3288 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3289 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3290 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3292 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3293 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3294 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3296 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3297 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3299 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3301 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3303 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3308 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3309 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3310 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3312 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3323 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3324 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3326 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3327 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3329 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3331 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3332 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3333 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3335 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3336 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3338 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3340 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3341 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3344 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3345 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3349 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3350 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3356 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3357 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3359 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3362 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3365 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3366 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3367 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3372 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3374 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3380 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3381 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
3382 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3384 /* Should never happen */
3388 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3389 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3391 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3392 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3394 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3396 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3397 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTCOL)
3399 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3400 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3402 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3404 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3406 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3409 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3410 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3411 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3412 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3413 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3415 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3416 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3422 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3423 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3425 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3426 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3428 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3429 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3430 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3431 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3433 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3434 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3439 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3440 * use the certificate for signing.
3442 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3444 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3445 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3448 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3449 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3451 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3452 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3454 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3455 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3458 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3459 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3460 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3467 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3468 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3469 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3471 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3477 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3484 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3486 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3489 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3490 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3491 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3493 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3494 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3498 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3500 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3502 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3504 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3506 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3507 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3513 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3515 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3516 unsigned short hbtype;
3517 unsigned int payload;
3518 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3520 /* Read type and payload length first */
3525 if (s->msg_callback)
3526 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3527 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3528 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3530 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3532 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3535 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3536 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3537 * payload, plus padding
3539 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3542 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3543 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3545 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3547 /* Random padding */
3548 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3550 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3552 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3553 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3554 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3555 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3557 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3562 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3566 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3567 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3568 * sequence number */
3571 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3574 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3582 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3584 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3586 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3587 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3589 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3590 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3591 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3593 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3597 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3598 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3600 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3604 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3605 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3607 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3611 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3612 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3614 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3616 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3617 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3618 * some random stuff.
3619 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3620 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3621 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3622 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3625 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3628 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3629 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3631 /* Sequence number */
3632 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3633 /* 16 random bytes */
3634 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3636 /* Random padding */
3637 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3639 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3642 if (s->msg_callback)
3643 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3644 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3645 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3647 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3656 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3661 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3664 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3666 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3669 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3670 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3672 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3674 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3676 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3684 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3685 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3686 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3687 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3688 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3689 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3692 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3693 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3694 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3695 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3698 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3700 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3701 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3704 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3705 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3709 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3710 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3711 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3715 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3717 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3720 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3722 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3727 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3728 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3730 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3732 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3733 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3734 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3735 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3737 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3745 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3746 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3747 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3748 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3752 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3753 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3754 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3755 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3761 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3765 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3769 if (default_nid == -1)
3771 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3773 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3774 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3775 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3779 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3780 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3784 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3785 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3787 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3793 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3794 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3795 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3796 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
3799 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3801 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3802 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3803 /* Strict mode flags */
3804 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3805 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3806 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3808 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3813 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3814 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3816 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3817 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3820 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3824 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3827 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3829 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3831 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3832 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3835 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3836 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3837 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTCOL)
3839 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3840 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
3849 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3852 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3853 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3854 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3856 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3864 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3865 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3866 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
3869 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3875 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
3876 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
3879 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
3882 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3883 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3885 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3890 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3891 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3892 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3893 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3894 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3897 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3898 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3899 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3900 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3904 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3905 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3913 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
3914 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
3917 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
3920 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3921 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
3923 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3926 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
3934 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3935 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
3937 if (!check_flags) goto end;
3940 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3941 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3942 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3944 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
3949 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3957 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3958 else if(check_flags)
3959 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3961 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3962 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3963 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3964 else if (!check_flags)
3967 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3968 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3969 else if (strict_mode)
3971 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3972 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3974 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3975 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
3979 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3987 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
3989 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3994 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3997 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4000 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4005 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4006 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4007 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4008 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4009 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4014 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4019 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4023 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4024 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4026 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4028 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4030 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4034 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4038 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4041 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4043 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4044 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4046 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4048 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4049 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4051 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4053 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4055 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4056 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4058 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4063 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4067 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4069 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4070 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4074 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4076 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4077 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4078 else if (cpk->digest)
4079 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4082 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4084 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4085 * if the chain is invalid.
4089 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4090 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4093 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4094 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4101 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4102 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4104 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4105 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4106 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4107 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4108 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4109 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4111 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4112 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4114 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);