2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
125 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
126 SSL_SESSION **psess);
127 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
128 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
191 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
192 * http, the cache would over fill
194 return (60 * 60 * 2);
201 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
205 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
211 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
214 s->version = s->method->version;
217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
220 int nid; /* Curve NID */
221 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
222 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
225 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
226 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
228 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
229 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
230 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
231 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
232 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
235 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
236 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
237 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
238 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
239 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
240 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
241 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
243 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
244 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
245 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
246 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
247 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
248 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
249 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
250 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
251 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
252 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
253 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
254 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
255 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
256 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
259 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
262 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
265 /* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
266 static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
267 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
268 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
269 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
270 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
271 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
272 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
273 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
274 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
275 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
276 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
277 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
280 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
281 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
285 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
286 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
287 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
288 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
289 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
290 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
291 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
292 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
293 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
294 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
295 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
296 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
297 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
298 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
299 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
300 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
301 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
303 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
304 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
306 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
307 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
308 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
309 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
310 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
311 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
312 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
313 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
314 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
315 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
316 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
317 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
318 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
319 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
320 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
324 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
325 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
326 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
329 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
331 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
332 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
334 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
337 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
339 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
341 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
343 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
345 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
347 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
349 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
351 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
353 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
355 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
357 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
359 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
361 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
363 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
365 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
367 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
369 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
371 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
373 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
375 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
377 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
379 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
381 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
383 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
385 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
387 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
389 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
391 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
393 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
395 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
403 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
405 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
406 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
407 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
408 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
409 * lists in the first place.
410 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
411 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
412 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
414 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
415 const unsigned char **pcurves,
418 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
420 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
421 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
423 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
424 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
425 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
426 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
427 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
430 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
431 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
435 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
436 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
440 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
441 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
444 if (!s->server || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
445 *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
446 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
448 *pcurves = eccurves_all;
449 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
454 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
455 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
460 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
465 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
466 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
468 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
471 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
473 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
474 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
475 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
478 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
481 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
482 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
484 const unsigned char *curves;
485 size_t num_curves, i;
486 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
487 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
489 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
491 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
494 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
495 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
497 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
498 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
500 } else /* Should never happen */
503 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
505 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
506 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
507 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
513 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
514 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
515 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
516 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
518 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
520 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
521 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
523 /* Can't do anything on client side */
527 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
529 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
530 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
532 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
533 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
534 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
535 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
536 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
537 /* Should never happen */
540 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
544 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
545 * but s->options is a long...
547 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
548 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
550 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
551 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
552 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
553 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
555 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
558 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
561 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
563 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
564 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
565 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
567 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
571 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
572 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
573 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
574 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
575 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
578 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
579 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
587 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
591 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
592 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
594 unsigned char *clist, *p;
597 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
600 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
601 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
604 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
605 unsigned long idmask;
607 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
609 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
618 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
622 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
626 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
629 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
631 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
637 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
639 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
641 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
643 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
644 if (nid == NID_undef)
645 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
646 if (nid == NID_undef)
647 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
648 if (nid == NID_undef)
650 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
651 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
653 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
657 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
658 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
663 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
667 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
670 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
671 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
676 const EC_METHOD *meth;
679 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
680 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
683 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
686 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
690 /* Determine curve ID */
691 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
692 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
693 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
696 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
705 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
707 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
709 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
711 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
713 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
718 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
719 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
720 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
722 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
723 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
726 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
727 * supported (see RFC4492).
729 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
730 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
731 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
732 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
733 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
736 if (i == num_formats)
741 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
742 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
743 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
745 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
747 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
748 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
749 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
750 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
751 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
755 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
756 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
761 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
768 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
772 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
774 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
775 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
776 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
778 *pformats = ecformats_default;
779 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
781 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
783 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
788 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
789 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
791 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
793 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
796 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
799 /* If not EC nothing to do */
800 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
804 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
809 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
812 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
816 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
817 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
819 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
825 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
826 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
827 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
828 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
829 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
831 return 0; /* Should never happen */
832 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
833 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
835 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
837 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
838 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
839 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
841 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
847 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
848 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
849 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
851 unsigned char curve_id[2];
852 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
853 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
854 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
855 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
859 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
862 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
863 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
864 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
865 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
866 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
867 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
871 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
872 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
874 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
875 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
877 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
879 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
882 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
884 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
890 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
891 /* Need a shared curve */
892 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
898 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
903 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
905 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
909 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
912 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
916 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
921 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
924 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
925 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
928 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
929 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
931 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
934 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
935 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
937 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
941 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
943 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
946 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
947 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
948 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
949 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
951 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
952 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
953 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
954 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
955 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
956 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
957 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
958 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
959 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
960 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
965 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
966 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
967 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
970 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
973 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
977 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
978 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
979 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
980 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
982 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
983 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
986 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
987 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
991 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
992 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
993 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
994 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
995 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
996 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
997 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
999 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1000 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1002 * We expect that GOST 2001 signature and GOST 34.11-94 hash are present in all engines
1003 * and GOST 2012 algorithms are not always present.
1004 * It may change when the old algorithms are deprecated.
1006 if ((EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94) != NULL)
1007 && (EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256) == NULL)) {
1008 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 4;
1009 } else if (EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94) == NULL) {
1010 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 6;
1012 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1014 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
1020 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1021 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
1023 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
1024 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1026 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1027 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1028 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1029 /* Should never happen */
1032 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1033 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1037 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1038 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1039 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1040 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1041 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1043 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
1044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1047 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1048 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1051 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1052 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1054 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1057 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1058 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1060 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1066 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1070 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1071 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1072 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1073 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1076 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1077 if (i == sent_sigslen
1078 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1079 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1083 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1088 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1089 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1090 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1092 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1096 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1098 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
1103 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1104 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1105 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1108 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1110 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1111 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1112 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1113 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1114 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1116 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1117 /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
1118 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1119 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
1120 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1122 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1125 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1126 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1127 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1128 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1129 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1130 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1131 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1132 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1133 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1134 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1135 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1137 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1139 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1140 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1141 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1146 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1148 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1149 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1150 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1152 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1155 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1157 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1159 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1162 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1163 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1166 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1167 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1169 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1171 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1173 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1174 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1176 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1177 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1179 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1180 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1181 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)
1182 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1193 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1195 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1196 if (s->renegotiate) {
1199 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1204 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1207 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1210 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1217 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1218 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1221 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1222 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1223 unsigned long size_str;
1227 * check for enough space.
1228 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1229 * 2 for servernamelist length
1230 * 1 for the hostname type
1231 * 2 for hostname length
1235 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1237 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1240 /* extension type and length */
1241 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1242 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1244 /* length of servername list */
1245 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1247 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1248 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1250 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1254 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1255 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1256 * Client Hello message */
1258 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1259 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1265 * check for enough space.
1266 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1267 * 1 for the srp user identity
1268 * + srp user identity length
1270 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1273 /* fill in the extension */
1274 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1275 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1276 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1277 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1285 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1288 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1289 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1291 unsigned char *etmp;
1293 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1295 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1297 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1299 if (num_formats > 255) {
1300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1304 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1305 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1306 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1307 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1308 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1312 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1314 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1315 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1318 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1320 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1322 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1327 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1329 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1330 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1331 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1332 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1333 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1337 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1339 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1340 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1341 ret += curves_list_len;
1343 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1345 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1347 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1348 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1349 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1350 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1351 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1352 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1353 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1355 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1356 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1357 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1360 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1361 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1364 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1367 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1372 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1378 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1380 const unsigned char *salg;
1381 unsigned char *etmp;
1382 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1383 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1385 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1387 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1389 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1390 /* Fill in lengths */
1391 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1396 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1398 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1402 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1403 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1404 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1410 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1411 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1417 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1419 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1420 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1422 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1423 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1425 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1426 /* save position of id len */
1427 unsigned char *q = ret;
1428 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1429 /* skip over id len */
1431 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1437 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1439 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1440 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1441 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1443 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1447 * 1: peer may send requests
1448 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1450 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1451 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1453 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1457 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1459 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1460 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1462 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1464 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1469 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1470 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1472 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1473 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1474 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1475 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1476 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1479 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1482 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1483 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1488 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1491 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1494 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1501 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1502 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1503 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1505 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1506 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1509 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1513 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1514 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1515 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1518 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1519 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1521 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1522 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1528 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1530 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1537 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1540 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1544 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1545 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1548 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1549 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1551 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1554 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1555 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1556 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1557 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1558 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1563 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1565 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1568 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1573 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1576 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1579 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1580 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1587 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1588 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1591 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1592 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1593 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1596 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1601 const unsigned char *plist;
1604 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1608 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1610 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1612 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1614 if (plistlen > 255) {
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1619 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1620 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1621 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1622 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1627 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1630 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1632 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1633 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1635 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1639 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1640 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1642 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1647 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1650 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1651 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1655 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1658 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1661 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1669 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1670 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1671 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1672 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1673 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1674 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1675 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1676 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1677 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1678 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1680 if (limit - ret < 36)
1682 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1687 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1688 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1689 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1691 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1695 * 1: peer may send requests
1696 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1698 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1699 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1701 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1707 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1708 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1709 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1710 const unsigned char *npa;
1711 unsigned int npalen;
1714 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1716 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1717 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1718 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1720 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1722 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1724 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1728 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1730 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1731 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1733 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1734 * for other cases too.
1736 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1737 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1738 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1739 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1740 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1742 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1747 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1748 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1752 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1753 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1754 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1756 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1758 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1762 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1768 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1771 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1776 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1777 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1778 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1779 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1782 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1784 unsigned int data_len;
1785 unsigned int proto_len;
1786 const unsigned char *selected;
1787 unsigned char *data;
1788 unsigned char selected_len;
1791 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1795 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1796 * length-prefixed strings.
1798 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
1799 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
1800 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
1804 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
1806 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
1808 } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
1810 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1811 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1812 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1813 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1814 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1815 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1816 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1819 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1820 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1825 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1831 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1832 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1833 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1838 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1839 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1840 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1841 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1843 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1845 unsigned int type, size;
1846 unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
1849 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1850 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1851 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1852 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1853 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1854 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1855 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1857 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1858 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1859 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1860 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1863 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1864 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1865 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1866 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1867 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1868 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1869 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1870 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1871 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1872 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1877 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1878 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1879 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size)
1880 || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size))
1883 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1886 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1887 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1888 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1890 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1)
1891 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2)
1892 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1894 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1896 if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1899 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1901 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len)
1902 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1904 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1908 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1910 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1912 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1917 unsigned char *data;
1918 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1920 s->servername_done = 0;
1921 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1923 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1926 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1927 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1929 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1930 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1934 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1935 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1936 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1938 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1939 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1940 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1941 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1942 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1946 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1947 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1950 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1952 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1955 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
1958 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len)
1961 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
1964 if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
1967 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1968 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1970 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
1973 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1974 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
1976 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1977 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1980 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1982 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1983 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1984 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1985 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1986 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1987 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1988 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1989 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1990 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1991 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1992 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1993 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1994 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1995 * the value of the Host: field.
1996 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1997 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1998 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2000 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2004 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2005 unsigned char *sdata;
2006 unsigned int servname_type;
2010 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2011 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
2014 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
2015 if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
2016 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
2017 || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
2020 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2021 switch (servname_type) {
2022 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2024 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2027 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2028 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2031 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2032 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2033 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2036 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
2037 (unsigned char *)s->session
2040 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2043 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2044 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2045 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2046 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2047 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2050 s->servername_done = 1;
2053 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
2054 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2057 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2058 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2059 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2060 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2069 /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
2070 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0)
2074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2075 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2076 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
2077 || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2080 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2082 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
2085 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2087 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
2088 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
2093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2094 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2095 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2097 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2098 || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
2102 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2103 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2104 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2105 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2106 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2107 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2110 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2111 ecpointformatlist_length;
2112 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2113 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2114 ecpointformatlist_length))
2116 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2119 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2120 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2121 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2124 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2125 unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
2127 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
2128 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
2129 || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
2130 || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
2134 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2137 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2138 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2139 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2140 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2143 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2144 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2145 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2146 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2147 ellipticcurvelist_length))
2149 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2152 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2153 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2157 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2158 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2159 if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
2160 || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2161 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2162 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
2163 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2166 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2169 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
2170 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2173 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2174 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0
2175 || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2178 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2181 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
2182 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
2185 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2186 const unsigned char *sdata;
2188 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2189 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2190 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
2193 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
2195 unsigned int idsize;
2197 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
2198 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
2199 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
2204 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2207 if (data != sdata) {
2208 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2211 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2212 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2213 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2214 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2215 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2218 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2219 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2220 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2225 /* Read in request_extensions */
2226 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2227 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2228 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2233 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2234 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2235 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2236 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2237 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2242 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2245 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2247 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2248 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2249 unsigned int hbtype;
2251 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
2252 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2253 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2257 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2258 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2260 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2261 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2262 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2265 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2271 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2272 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2273 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2275 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2278 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2279 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2280 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2281 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2282 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2283 * anything like that, but this might change).
2285 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2286 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2287 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2288 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2289 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2291 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2295 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2296 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2297 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
2299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2300 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2301 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2305 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2307 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2308 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2309 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
2313 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2314 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2315 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2317 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2319 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2322 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2323 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2324 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2325 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2326 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2329 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2334 /* Spurious data on the end */
2335 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
2340 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2342 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2343 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2344 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2346 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2352 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2356 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2359 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2360 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2361 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2365 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2374 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2375 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2376 * fill the length of the block.
2378 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2382 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2383 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
2384 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
2392 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2394 unsigned int length, type, size;
2395 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2396 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2399 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2401 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2403 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2404 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2406 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2407 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2410 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2411 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2414 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2417 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2418 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2422 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2423 unsigned char *data;
2426 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2427 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2430 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2431 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2433 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2434 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2436 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2437 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2438 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2439 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2440 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2443 tlsext_servername = 1;
2445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2446 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2447 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2448 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2449 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2450 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2454 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2455 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2456 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2457 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2458 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2461 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2462 ecpointformatlist_length;
2463 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2464 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2465 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2466 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2472 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2474 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2475 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2476 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2477 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2479 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2482 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2483 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2486 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2488 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2490 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2493 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2494 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2497 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2498 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2501 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2502 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2503 unsigned char *selected;
2504 unsigned char selected_len;
2505 /* We must have requested it. */
2506 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2507 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2510 /* The data must be valid */
2511 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2512 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2516 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2518 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2519 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2520 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2523 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2524 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2525 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2528 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2529 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2530 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2534 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2536 /* We must have requested it. */
2537 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2538 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2542 * The extension data consists of:
2543 * uint16 list_length
2544 * uint8 proto_length;
2545 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2547 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2548 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2549 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2550 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2551 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2554 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2555 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2556 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2557 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2560 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2561 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2564 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2567 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2568 unsigned int hbtype;
2569 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2570 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2574 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2575 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2577 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2578 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2579 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2582 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2588 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2589 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2593 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2594 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2595 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2596 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2597 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2598 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2601 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2603 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2606 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2607 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2609 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2613 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2614 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2618 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2619 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2620 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2621 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2622 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2623 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2627 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2636 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2637 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2638 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2639 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2640 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2641 * initial connect only.
2643 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2644 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2645 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2647 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2654 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2660 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2665 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2667 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2668 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2672 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2673 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2676 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2677 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2681 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2683 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2684 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2685 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2686 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2688 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2690 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2693 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2694 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2697 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2698 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2701 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2702 s->servername_done = 0;
2707 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2708 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2710 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2712 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2714 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2715 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2716 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
2718 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_md5_sha1();
2719 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2722 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
2724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2725 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
2726 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
2727 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
2731 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2735 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2736 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2737 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2738 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2739 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2740 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2741 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2742 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2745 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2746 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2747 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2749 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2752 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2753 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2755 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2756 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2760 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2764 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2768 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2770 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2771 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2774 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2775 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2776 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2777 * influence which certificate is sent
2779 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2781 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2782 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2783 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2784 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2785 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2789 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2790 * et al can pick it up.
2792 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2793 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2795 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2796 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2797 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2799 /* status request response should be sent */
2800 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2801 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2802 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2804 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2806 /* something bad happened */
2807 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2808 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2809 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2813 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2817 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2818 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2821 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2822 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2830 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2832 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2833 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2835 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2837 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2838 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2839 * must contain uncompressed.
2841 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2842 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2843 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2844 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2845 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2846 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2847 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2848 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2849 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2851 unsigned char *list;
2852 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2853 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2854 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2855 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2856 found_uncompressed = 1;
2860 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2862 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2866 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2867 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2869 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2871 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2872 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2873 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2874 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2876 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2878 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2881 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2884 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2885 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2888 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2891 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2892 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2893 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2894 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2896 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2897 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2900 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2901 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2906 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2907 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2910 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2911 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2914 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2915 s->servername_done = 0;
2921 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2924 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2926 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2927 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2931 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2939 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2940 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2941 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2943 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2944 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2945 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2946 * point to the resulting session.
2948 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2949 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2950 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2953 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2954 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2955 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2956 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2957 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2958 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2959 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2962 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2963 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2964 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2965 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2966 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2967 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2969 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id,
2973 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2977 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2980 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2983 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2985 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2988 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2992 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2993 unsigned int type, size;
2995 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2996 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2997 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3001 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
3005 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
3007 unsigned char *etick;
3011 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3014 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3018 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3020 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3021 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3022 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3023 * calculate the master secret later.
3028 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
3029 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3033 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
3034 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
3036 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3037 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3040 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3043 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3044 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3047 default: /* fatal error */
3053 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3065 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3067 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3068 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3069 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3070 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3071 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3072 * point to the resulting session.
3075 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3076 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3077 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3078 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3080 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3081 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3082 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3085 unsigned char *sdec;
3086 const unsigned char *p;
3087 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3088 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3091 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3092 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3095 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3096 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3097 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3098 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3099 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3100 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3109 /* Check key name matches */
3110 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3112 if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3113 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3114 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3115 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3121 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3124 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3129 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3130 if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3131 || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3134 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3135 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3136 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3139 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3140 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3141 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3142 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3143 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3145 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3146 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3149 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3150 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3155 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3158 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3162 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3163 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3164 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3168 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3169 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3178 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3182 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3183 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3187 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3194 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3195 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3196 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3197 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3198 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3199 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3200 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3201 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3202 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3203 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3206 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3207 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3208 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3209 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3210 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3211 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3212 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3215 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3218 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3219 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3225 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3228 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3229 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3230 return table[i].nid;
3235 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3241 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3244 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3247 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3248 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3252 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3254 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3260 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void);
3261 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3264 static const EVP_MD* md_gost94()
3266 return EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3269 static const EVP_MD* md_gost2012_256()
3271 return EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3274 static const EVP_MD* md_gost2012_512()
3276 return EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3279 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3280 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3281 {NID_md5, 64, 0, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3283 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3285 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3286 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3287 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3288 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3289 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3290 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, md_gost94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3291 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, md_gost2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3292 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, md_gost2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3295 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3301 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3303 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3304 return tls12_md_info + i;
3310 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3312 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3313 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3315 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3316 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3318 return inf->mfunc();
3321 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3325 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3326 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3329 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3330 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3332 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3333 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3334 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3336 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3337 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3338 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3340 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3341 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3343 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3344 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3350 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3351 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3352 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3354 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3355 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3357 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3358 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3360 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3362 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3363 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3365 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3367 if (psignhash_nid) {
3368 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3369 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3371 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3375 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3376 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3378 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3379 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3380 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3382 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3383 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3385 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3386 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3390 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3391 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3395 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3397 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3398 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3399 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3401 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3402 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3403 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3405 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3406 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3407 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3409 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3410 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3415 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3416 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3421 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3422 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3429 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3431 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3433 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3436 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3437 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3439 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3441 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3442 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3443 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3444 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3447 return tmpout - out;
3450 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3451 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3452 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3453 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3455 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3456 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3457 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3458 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3459 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3461 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3462 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3465 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3466 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3467 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3469 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3479 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3480 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3482 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3483 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3485 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3487 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3489 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3490 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3491 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3492 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3493 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3494 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3495 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3496 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3497 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3498 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3500 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3501 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3504 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3505 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3509 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3510 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3512 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3514 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3517 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3521 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3522 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3526 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3528 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3531 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3532 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3534 /* Should never happen */
3538 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3539 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3540 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3542 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3543 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3547 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3552 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3553 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3555 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3556 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3559 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3560 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3562 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3563 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3565 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3567 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3569 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3571 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3572 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3574 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3575 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3576 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3577 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3583 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3584 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3585 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3586 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3587 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3589 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3590 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3591 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3592 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3598 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3599 * the certificate for signing.
3601 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3603 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3604 * supported it stays as NULL.
3606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3607 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3608 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3611 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3612 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3613 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3617 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3618 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3620 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3621 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3622 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3623 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3624 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3625 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3626 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3632 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3633 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3634 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3636 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3641 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3648 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3650 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3653 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3654 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3655 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3657 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3658 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3662 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3664 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3666 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3668 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3670 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3671 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3675 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
3678 unsigned short hbtype;
3679 unsigned int payload;
3680 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3682 if (s->msg_callback)
3683 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3685 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3687 /* Read type and payload length first */
3688 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
3689 return 0; /* silently discard */
3692 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
3693 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3696 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3697 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3701 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3702 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3704 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3705 if (buffer == NULL) {
3706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3711 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3712 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3714 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3716 /* Random padding */
3717 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3718 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3722 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3723 3 + payload + padding);
3725 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3726 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3727 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3728 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3730 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3734 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3738 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3739 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3743 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3745 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3752 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3754 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3756 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3757 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3759 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3760 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3761 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3766 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3767 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3768 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3772 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3773 if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
3774 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3779 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3780 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3781 * some random stuff.
3782 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3783 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3784 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3785 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3788 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3790 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3795 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3796 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3798 /* Sequence number */
3799 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3800 /* 16 random bytes */
3801 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
3802 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3806 /* Random padding */
3807 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
3808 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3812 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3814 if (s->msg_callback)
3815 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3816 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3817 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3819 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3828 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3832 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3835 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3837 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3838 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3839 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3840 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3841 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3842 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3844 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3845 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3846 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3850 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3852 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3855 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3858 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3860 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3862 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3864 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3872 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3873 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3875 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3878 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3879 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3882 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3883 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3888 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3889 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3891 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3895 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3899 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3902 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3905 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3910 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3911 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3913 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3914 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3915 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3917 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3924 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3925 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3926 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3928 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3929 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3930 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3936 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3940 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3944 if (default_nid == -1)
3946 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3948 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3949 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3950 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3955 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3956 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3960 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3961 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3962 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3969 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3970 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3971 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3972 * attempting to use them.
3975 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3977 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3978 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3979 /* Strict mode flags */
3980 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3981 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3982 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3984 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3989 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3990 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3993 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3994 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3996 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3999 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4001 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4002 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4004 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4006 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4007 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4010 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4011 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4012 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
4013 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
4014 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4022 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4025 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4027 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4028 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4030 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4037 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4038 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4039 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4040 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4041 else if (!check_flags)
4046 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4047 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4049 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4051 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4052 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
4054 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4057 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4058 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4059 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4060 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4061 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4064 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4065 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4066 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4067 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4071 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4072 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4075 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
4076 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
4077 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
4080 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
4081 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
4082 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
4085 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
4086 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
4087 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
4096 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4097 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4099 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4101 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4102 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4103 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4106 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4113 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4114 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4118 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4119 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4120 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4121 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4123 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4130 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4131 else if (check_flags)
4132 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4134 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4135 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4136 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4137 else if (!check_flags)
4140 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4141 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4142 else if (strict_mode) {
4143 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4144 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4145 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4146 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4148 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4155 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4156 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4160 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4163 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4166 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4171 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4172 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4173 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4174 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4175 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4179 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4183 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4185 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4186 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4188 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4189 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4190 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4194 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4197 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4199 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4201 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4202 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4204 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4205 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4206 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4208 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4209 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4210 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4211 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4212 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4217 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4220 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4222 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4223 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4227 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4228 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4229 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4230 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4231 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4233 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4236 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4240 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4243 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4244 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4251 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4252 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4254 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4255 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4256 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4257 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4258 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4259 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4260 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4261 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4262 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4265 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4266 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4268 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4273 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4275 int dh_secbits = 80;
4276 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4277 return DH_get_1024_160();
4278 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4279 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4284 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4285 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4288 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4294 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4295 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4296 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4298 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4299 if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) {
4305 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4306 return DH_get_2048_224();
4307 return DH_get_1024_160();
4311 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4314 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4316 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4317 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4321 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4323 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4326 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4328 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4329 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4330 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4331 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4333 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4334 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4337 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4339 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4342 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4345 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4347 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4348 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4350 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4351 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4353 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4354 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4359 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4360 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4361 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4364 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4366 int rv, start_idx, i;
4368 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4373 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4377 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4378 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4379 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);