2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
125 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
126 SSL_SESSION **psess);
127 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
128 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
139 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 tls1_export_keying_material,
143 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
144 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
148 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
151 tls1_setup_key_block,
152 tls1_generate_master_secret,
153 tls1_change_cipher_state,
154 tls1_final_finish_mac,
155 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
156 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
157 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 tls1_export_keying_material,
160 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
161 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
162 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
166 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
169 tls1_setup_key_block,
170 tls1_generate_master_secret,
171 tls1_change_cipher_state,
172 tls1_final_finish_mac,
173 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
174 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
175 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
177 tls1_export_keying_material,
178 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
179 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
180 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
181 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
185 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
188 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
189 * http, the cache would over fill
191 return (60 * 60 * 2);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
208 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
211 s->version = s->method->version;
214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
217 int nid; /* Curve NID */
218 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
219 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
222 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
223 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
225 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
226 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
230 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
231 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
232 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
233 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
234 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
235 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
236 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
237 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
238 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
239 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
240 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
241 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
242 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
243 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
244 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
245 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
246 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
247 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
248 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
249 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
250 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
251 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
252 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
253 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
256 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
259 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
262 /* The client's default curves / the server's 'auto' curves. */
263 static const unsigned char eccurves_auto[] = {
264 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
265 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
266 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
267 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
268 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
269 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
272 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
273 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
274 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
276 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
277 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
278 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
279 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
282 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
283 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
284 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
285 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
286 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
287 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
288 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
289 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
290 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
291 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
292 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
293 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
294 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
295 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
296 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
297 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
298 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
300 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
301 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
303 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
305 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
306 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
307 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
308 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
309 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
310 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
311 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
312 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
313 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
314 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
315 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
316 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
321 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
322 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
323 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
326 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
328 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
329 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
331 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
334 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
336 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
338 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
340 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
342 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
344 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
346 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
348 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
350 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
352 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
354 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
356 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
358 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
360 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
362 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
364 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
366 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
368 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
370 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
372 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
374 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
376 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
378 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
380 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
382 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
384 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
386 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
388 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
390 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
392 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
400 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
402 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
403 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
404 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
405 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
406 * lists in the first place.
407 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
408 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
409 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
411 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
412 const unsigned char **pcurves,
415 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
417 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
418 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
420 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
421 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
422 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
423 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
424 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
427 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
428 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
432 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
433 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
437 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
438 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
441 if (!s->server || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
442 *pcurves = eccurves_auto;
443 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_auto);
445 *pcurves = eccurves_all;
446 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_all);
451 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
452 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
453 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
457 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
462 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
463 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
465 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
468 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
470 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
471 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
472 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
475 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
478 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
479 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
481 const unsigned char *curves;
482 size_t num_curves, i;
483 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
484 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
486 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
488 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
491 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
492 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
494 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
495 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
497 } else /* Should never happen */
500 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
502 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
503 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
504 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
510 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
511 * if there is no match.
512 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
513 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
514 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
516 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
518 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
519 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
521 /* Can't do anything on client side */
525 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
527 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
528 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
530 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
531 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
532 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
533 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
534 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
535 /* Should never happen */
538 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
542 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
543 * but s->options is a long...
545 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
546 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
548 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
549 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
550 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
551 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
553 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
556 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
559 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
561 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
562 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
563 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
565 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
569 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
570 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
571 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
572 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
573 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
576 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
577 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
585 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
589 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
590 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
592 unsigned char *clist, *p;
595 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
598 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
599 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
602 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
603 unsigned long idmask;
605 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
607 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
616 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
620 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
624 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
627 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
629 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
635 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
637 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
639 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
641 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
642 if (nid == NID_undef)
643 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
644 if (nid == NID_undef)
645 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
646 if (nid == NID_undef)
648 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
649 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
651 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
655 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
656 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
661 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
665 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
668 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
669 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
674 const EC_METHOD *meth;
677 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
678 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
681 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
684 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
688 /* Determine curve ID */
689 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
690 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
691 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
694 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
703 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
705 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
707 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
709 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
711 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
716 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
717 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
718 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
720 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
721 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
724 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
725 * supported (see RFC4492).
727 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
728 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
729 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
730 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
731 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
734 if (i == num_formats)
739 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
740 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
741 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
743 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
745 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
746 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
747 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
748 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
749 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
753 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
754 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
759 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
766 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
770 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
772 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
773 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
774 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
776 *pformats = ecformats_default;
777 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
779 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
781 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
786 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
787 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
789 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
791 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
794 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
797 /* If not EC nothing to do */
798 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
802 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
807 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
810 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
814 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
815 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
817 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
823 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
824 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
825 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
826 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
827 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
829 return 0; /* Should never happen */
830 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
831 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
833 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
835 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
836 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
837 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
839 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
845 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
847 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
849 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
851 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
852 * is compatible with the client extensions.
854 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
856 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
858 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
859 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
860 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
864 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
867 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
868 unsigned char curve_id[2];
869 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
870 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
871 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
872 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
873 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
877 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
878 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
880 /* If auto assume OK */
881 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
886 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
887 /* Need a shared curve */
888 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
895 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
899 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
904 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
907 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
908 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
911 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
912 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
914 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
917 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
918 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
920 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
924 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
926 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
929 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
930 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
931 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
932 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
934 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
935 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
936 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
937 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
938 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
939 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
941 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
942 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
943 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
948 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
949 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
950 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
953 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
956 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
960 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
961 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
962 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
963 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
965 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
966 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
969 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
970 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
974 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
975 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
976 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
977 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
978 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
979 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
980 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
982 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
983 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
988 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
989 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
991 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
992 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
994 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
995 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
996 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
997 /* Should never happen */
1000 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1001 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1006 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1007 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1008 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1009 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1011 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1015 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1016 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1019 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1020 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1022 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1025 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1026 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1028 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1034 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1038 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1039 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1040 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1041 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1044 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1045 if (i == sent_sigslen
1046 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1047 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1051 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1056 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1057 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1058 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1064 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1066 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
1071 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1072 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1073 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1076 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1078 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1079 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1080 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1081 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1082 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1084 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1085 /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
1086 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1087 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
1088 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1090 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1093 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1094 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr;
1095 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1096 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1097 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1098 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1099 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1100 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1101 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1102 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1103 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1105 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1107 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1108 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1109 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1114 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1116 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1117 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1118 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1120 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1123 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1125 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1127 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1130 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1131 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1134 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1135 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1137 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1139 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1141 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1142 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1144 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1145 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1147 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1148 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1149 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)
1150 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1161 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1163 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1164 if (s->renegotiate) {
1167 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1172 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1175 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1178 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1185 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1186 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1189 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1190 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1191 unsigned long size_str;
1195 * check for enough space.
1196 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1197 * 2 for servernamelist length
1198 * 1 for the hostname type
1199 * 2 for hostname length
1203 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1205 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1208 /* extension type and length */
1209 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1210 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1212 /* length of servername list */
1213 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1215 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1216 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1218 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1222 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1223 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1224 * Client Hello message */
1226 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1227 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 * check for enough space.
1234 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1235 * 1 for the srp user identity
1236 * + srp user identity length
1238 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1241 /* fill in the extension */
1242 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1243 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1244 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1245 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1253 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1256 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1257 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1259 unsigned char *etmp;
1261 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1263 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1265 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1267 if (num_formats > 255) {
1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1272 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1273 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1274 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1275 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1276 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1280 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1282 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1283 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1286 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1288 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1290 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1295 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1297 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1298 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1299 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1300 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1301 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1305 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1307 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1308 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1309 ret += curves_list_len;
1311 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1313 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1315 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1316 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1317 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1318 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1319 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1320 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1321 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1323 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1324 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1325 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1328 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1329 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1332 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1335 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1337 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1340 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1346 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1348 const unsigned char *salg;
1349 unsigned char *etmp;
1350 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1351 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1353 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1355 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1357 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1358 /* Fill in lengths */
1359 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1364 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1366 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1370 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1371 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1372 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1378 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1379 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1385 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1387 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1388 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1390 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1391 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1393 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1394 /* save position of id len */
1395 unsigned char *q = ret;
1396 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1397 /* skip over id len */
1399 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1405 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1408 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1409 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1411 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1415 * 1: peer may send requests
1416 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1418 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1419 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1421 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1425 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1427 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1428 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1430 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1432 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1437 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1438 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1440 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1441 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1442 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1443 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1444 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1447 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1450 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1451 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1456 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1459 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1462 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1469 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1470 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1471 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1473 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1474 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1477 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1481 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1482 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1483 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1486 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1487 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1489 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1490 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1496 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1498 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1505 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1508 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1512 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1513 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1516 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1517 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1518 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1519 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1522 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1523 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1524 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1525 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1526 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1531 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1533 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1536 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1541 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1544 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1547 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1555 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1556 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1559 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1560 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1561 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1564 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1567 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1569 const unsigned char *plist;
1572 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1576 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1578 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1580 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1582 if (plistlen > 255) {
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1587 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1588 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1589 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1590 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1595 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1598 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1600 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1601 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1603 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1607 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1608 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1610 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1615 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1618 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1619 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1623 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1626 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1629 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1637 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1638 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1639 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1640 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1641 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1642 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1643 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1644 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1645 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1646 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1648 if (limit - ret < 36)
1650 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1655 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1656 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1657 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1659 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1663 * 1: peer may send requests
1664 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1666 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1667 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1669 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1675 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1676 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1677 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1678 const unsigned char *npa;
1679 unsigned int npalen;
1682 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1684 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1685 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1686 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1688 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1690 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1692 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1696 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1698 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1699 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1701 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1702 * for other cases too.
1704 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1705 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1706 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1707 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1708 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1710 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1715 if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
1716 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1720 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1721 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1722 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1724 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1726 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1730 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1736 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1739 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1744 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1745 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1746 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1747 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1750 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1752 unsigned int data_len;
1753 unsigned int proto_len;
1754 const unsigned char *selected;
1755 unsigned char *data;
1756 unsigned char selected_len;
1759 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1763 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1764 * length-prefixed strings.
1766 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
1767 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
1768 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
1772 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
1774 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
1776 } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
1778 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1779 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1780 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1781 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1782 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1783 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1784 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1787 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1788 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1793 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1797 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1799 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1800 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1801 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1806 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1807 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1808 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1809 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1811 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1813 unsigned int type, size;
1814 unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
1817 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1818 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1819 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1820 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1821 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1822 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1823 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1825 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1826 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1827 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1828 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1831 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1832 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1833 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1834 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1835 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1836 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1837 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1838 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1839 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1840 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1845 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1846 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1847 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size)
1848 || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size))
1851 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1854 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1855 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1856 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1858 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1)
1859 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2)
1860 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1862 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1864 if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1867 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1869 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len)
1870 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1872 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1876 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1878 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1880 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1885 unsigned char *data;
1886 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1888 s->servername_done = 0;
1889 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1891 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1894 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1895 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1897 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1898 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1902 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1903 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1904 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1906 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1907 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1908 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1909 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1910 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1914 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1915 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1918 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1920 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1923 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
1926 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len)
1929 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
1932 if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
1935 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1936 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1938 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
1941 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1942 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
1944 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1945 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1948 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1950 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1951 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1952 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1953 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1954 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1955 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1956 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1957 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1958 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1959 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1960 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1961 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1962 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1963 * the value of the Host: field.
1964 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1965 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1966 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1968 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1972 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1973 unsigned char *sdata;
1974 unsigned int servname_type;
1978 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
1979 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
1982 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
1983 if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
1984 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
1985 || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
1988 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1989 switch (servname_type) {
1990 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1992 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1995 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1996 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1999 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2000 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
2001 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2004 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
2005 (unsigned char *)s->session
2008 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2011 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
2012 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2013 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2014 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2015 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2018 s->servername_done = 1;
2021 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
2022 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2025 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2026 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2027 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2028 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2037 /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
2038 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0)
2042 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2043 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2044 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
2045 || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2048 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2050 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
2053 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2055 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
2056 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
2061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2062 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2063 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2065 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2066 || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
2070 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2071 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2072 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2073 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2074 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2075 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2078 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2079 ecpointformatlist_length;
2080 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2081 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2082 ecpointformatlist_length))
2084 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2087 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2088 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2089 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2092 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2093 unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
2095 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
2096 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
2097 || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
2098 || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
2102 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2105 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2106 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2107 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2108 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2111 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2112 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2113 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2114 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2115 ellipticcurvelist_length))
2117 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2120 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2121 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2125 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2126 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2127 if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
2128 || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2129 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2130 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
2131 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2134 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2137 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
2138 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2141 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2142 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0
2143 || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2146 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2149 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
2150 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
2153 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2154 const unsigned char *sdata;
2156 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2157 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2158 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
2161 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
2163 unsigned int idsize;
2165 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
2166 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
2167 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
2172 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2175 if (data != sdata) {
2176 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2179 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2180 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2181 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2182 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2183 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2186 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2187 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2188 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2193 /* Read in request_extensions */
2194 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2195 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2196 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2201 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2202 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2203 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2204 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2205 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2210 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2213 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2216 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2217 unsigned int hbtype;
2219 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
2220 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2221 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2225 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2226 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2228 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2229 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2230 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2233 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2239 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2240 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2241 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2243 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2246 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2247 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2248 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2249 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2250 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2251 * anything like that, but this might change).
2253 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2254 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2255 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2256 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2257 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2259 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2263 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2264 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2265 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
2267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2268 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2269 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2273 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2275 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2276 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2277 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
2281 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2282 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2283 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2285 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2287 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2290 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2291 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2292 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2293 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2294 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2297 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2302 /* Spurious data on the end */
2303 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
2308 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2310 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2311 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2312 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2314 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2320 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2324 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2327 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2328 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2329 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2333 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2342 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2343 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2344 * fill the length of the block.
2346 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2350 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2351 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
2352 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
2360 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2362 unsigned int length, type, size;
2363 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2364 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2367 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2369 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2371 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2372 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2373 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2374 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2375 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2378 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2379 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2382 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2385 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2386 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2390 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2391 unsigned char *data;
2394 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2395 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2398 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2399 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2401 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2402 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2404 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2405 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2406 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2407 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2408 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2411 tlsext_servername = 1;
2413 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2414 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2415 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2416 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2417 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2418 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2422 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2423 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2424 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2425 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2426 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2429 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2430 ecpointformatlist_length;
2431 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2432 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2433 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2434 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2440 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2442 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2443 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2444 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2445 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2447 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2450 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2451 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2454 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2456 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2458 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2461 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2462 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2465 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2466 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2469 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2470 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2471 unsigned char *selected;
2472 unsigned char selected_len;
2473 /* We must have requested it. */
2474 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2475 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2478 /* The data must be valid */
2479 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2480 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2484 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2486 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2487 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2488 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2491 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2492 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2493 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2496 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2497 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2498 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2502 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2504 /* We must have requested it. */
2505 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2506 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2510 * The extension data consists of:
2511 * uint16 list_length
2512 * uint8 proto_length;
2513 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2515 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2516 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2517 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2518 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2519 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2522 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2523 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2524 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2525 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2528 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2529 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2532 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2535 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2536 unsigned int hbtype;
2537 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2538 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2542 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2543 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2545 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2546 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2547 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2550 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2556 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2557 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2561 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2562 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2563 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2564 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2565 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2566 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2569 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2571 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2574 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2575 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2577 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2581 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2582 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2586 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2587 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2588 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2589 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2590 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2591 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2595 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2604 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2605 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2606 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2607 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2608 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2609 * initial connect only.
2611 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2612 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2613 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2615 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2622 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2628 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2633 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2635 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2636 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2640 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2641 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2644 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2645 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2649 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2651 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2652 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2653 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2654 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2656 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2658 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2661 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2662 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2665 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2666 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2669 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2670 s->servername_done = 0;
2675 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2676 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2678 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2680 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2683 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2684 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2686 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2687 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2689 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2690 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2693 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2694 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2695 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2699 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2703 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2704 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2705 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2706 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2707 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2708 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2709 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2710 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2713 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2714 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2715 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2717 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2720 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2721 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2722 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2723 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2724 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2728 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2732 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2736 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2738 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2739 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2742 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2743 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2744 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2745 * influence which certificate is sent
2747 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2749 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2750 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2751 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2752 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2753 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2757 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2758 * et al can pick it up.
2760 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2761 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2763 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2764 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2765 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2767 /* status request response should be sent */
2768 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2769 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2770 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2772 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2774 /* something bad happened */
2775 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2776 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2777 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2781 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2785 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2786 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2789 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2790 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2798 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2800 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2801 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2805 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2806 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2807 * must contain uncompressed.
2809 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2810 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2811 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2812 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2813 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2814 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2815 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2816 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2817 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2819 unsigned char *list;
2820 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2821 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2822 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2823 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2824 found_uncompressed = 1;
2828 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2830 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2834 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2835 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2837 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2839 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2840 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2841 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2842 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2844 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2846 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2849 * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the
2852 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2853 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2856 * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no
2859 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2860 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2861 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2862 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2864 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2865 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2868 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2869 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2874 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2875 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2878 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2879 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2882 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2883 s->servername_done = 0;
2889 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2892 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2894 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2895 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2899 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2900 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2907 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2908 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2909 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2911 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2912 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2913 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2914 * point to the resulting session.
2916 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2917 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2918 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2921 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2922 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2923 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2924 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2925 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2926 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2927 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2930 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2931 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2932 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2933 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2934 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2935 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2937 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, const PACKET *session_id,
2941 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2945 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2948 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2951 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
2953 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2956 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2960 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2961 unsigned int type, size;
2963 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2964 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2965 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2969 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2973 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2975 unsigned char *etick;
2979 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2982 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2986 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2988 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2989 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2990 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2991 * calculate the master secret later.
2996 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2997 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3001 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
3002 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
3004 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3005 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3008 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3011 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3012 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3015 default: /* fatal error */
3021 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3033 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3035 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3036 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3037 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3038 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3039 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3040 * point to the resulting session.
3043 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3044 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3045 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3046 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3048 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3049 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3050 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3053 unsigned char *sdec;
3054 const unsigned char *p;
3055 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3056 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3059 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3060 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3063 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3064 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3065 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3066 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3067 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3068 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3077 /* Check key name matches */
3078 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3080 if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3081 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3082 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3083 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3089 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3092 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3097 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3098 if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3099 || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3102 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3103 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3104 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3107 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3108 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3109 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3110 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3111 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3113 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3114 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3117 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3118 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3123 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3126 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3130 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3131 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3132 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3136 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3137 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3146 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3150 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3151 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3155 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3162 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3163 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3164 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3165 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3166 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3167 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3168 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3169 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3170 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3171 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3174 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3175 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3176 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3177 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3178 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3179 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3180 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3183 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3186 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3187 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3193 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3196 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3197 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3198 return table[i].nid;
3203 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3209 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3212 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3215 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3216 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3220 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3222 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3229 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3232 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3233 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3234 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3235 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3236 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3237 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3238 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3239 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3240 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3241 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3244 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3250 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3252 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3253 return tls12_md_info + i;
3259 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3261 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3262 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3264 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3267 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3270 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3274 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3275 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3278 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3279 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3282 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3283 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3285 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3286 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3287 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3289 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3290 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3292 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3293 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3299 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3300 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3301 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3303 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3304 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3306 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3307 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3309 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3311 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3312 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3314 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3316 if (psignhash_nid) {
3317 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3318 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
3320 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3324 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3325 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3327 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3328 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3329 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3331 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3332 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3334 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3335 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3339 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3340 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3344 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3346 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3347 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3348 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3350 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3351 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3352 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3354 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3355 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3356 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3358 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3359 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3364 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3365 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3370 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3371 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3378 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3380 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3382 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3385 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3386 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3388 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3390 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3391 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3392 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3393 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3396 return tmpout - out;
3399 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3400 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3401 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3402 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3404 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3405 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3406 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3407 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3408 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3410 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3411 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3414 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3415 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3416 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3418 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3428 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3429 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3431 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3432 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3434 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3436 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3438 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3439 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3440 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3441 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3442 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3443 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3444 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3445 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3446 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3447 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3449 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3450 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3453 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3454 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3458 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3459 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3461 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3463 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3466 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3470 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3471 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3475 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3477 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3480 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3481 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3483 /* Should never happen */
3487 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3488 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3489 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3491 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3492 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3496 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3501 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3502 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3504 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3505 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3508 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3509 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3511 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3512 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3514 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3516 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3518 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3520 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3521 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3523 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3524 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3525 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3526 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3532 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3533 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3534 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3535 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3536 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3538 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3539 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3540 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3541 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3547 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3548 * the certificate for signing.
3550 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3552 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3553 * supported it stays as NULL.
3555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3556 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3557 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3560 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3561 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3562 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3566 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3567 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3569 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3570 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3571 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3572 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3573 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3574 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3575 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3581 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3582 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3583 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3585 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3590 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3597 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3599 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3602 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3603 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3604 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3606 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3607 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3611 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3613 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3615 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3617 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3619 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3620 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3623 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3624 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
3627 unsigned short hbtype;
3628 unsigned int payload;
3629 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3631 if (s->msg_callback)
3632 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3634 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3636 /* Read type and payload length first */
3637 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
3638 return 0; /* silently discard */
3641 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
3642 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3645 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3646 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3650 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3651 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3653 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3654 if (buffer == NULL) {
3655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3660 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3661 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3663 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3665 /* Random padding */
3666 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3667 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3671 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3672 3 + payload + padding);
3674 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3675 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3676 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3677 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3679 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3683 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3687 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3688 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3692 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3694 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3701 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3703 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3705 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3706 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3708 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3709 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3710 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3711 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3715 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3716 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3717 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3721 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3722 if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
3723 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3728 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3729 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3730 * some random stuff.
3731 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3732 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3733 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3734 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3737 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3739 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3744 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3745 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3747 /* Sequence number */
3748 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3749 /* 16 random bytes */
3750 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
3751 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3755 /* Random padding */
3756 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
3757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3761 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3763 if (s->msg_callback)
3764 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3765 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3766 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3768 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3777 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3781 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3784 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3786 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3787 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3788 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3789 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3790 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3791 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3793 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3794 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3795 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3799 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3801 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3804 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3807 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3809 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3811 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3813 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3821 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3822 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3824 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3827 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3828 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3831 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3832 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3837 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3838 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3840 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3844 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3848 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3851 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3854 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3859 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3860 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3862 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3863 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3864 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3866 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3873 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3874 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3875 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3877 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3878 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3879 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3885 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3889 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3893 if (default_nid == -1)
3895 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3897 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3898 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3899 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3904 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3905 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3909 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3910 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3911 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3918 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3919 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3920 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3921 * attempting to use them.
3924 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3926 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3927 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3928 /* Strict mode flags */
3929 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3930 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3931 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3933 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3938 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3939 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3942 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3943 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3945 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3948 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3950 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3951 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3953 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3955 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3956 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3959 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3960 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3961 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3962 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3963 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3971 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3974 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3976 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3977 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3979 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3986 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3987 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3988 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3989 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3990 else if (!check_flags)
3995 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3996 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3998 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4000 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4001 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
4003 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4006 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4007 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4008 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4009 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4010 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4013 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4014 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4015 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4016 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4020 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4021 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4024 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
4025 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
4026 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
4029 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
4030 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
4031 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
4034 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
4035 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
4036 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
4045 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4046 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4048 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4050 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4051 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4052 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4055 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4062 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4063 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4067 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4068 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4069 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4070 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4072 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4079 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4080 else if (check_flags)
4081 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4083 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4084 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4085 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4086 else if (!check_flags)
4089 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4090 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4091 else if (strict_mode) {
4092 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4093 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4094 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4095 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4097 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4104 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4105 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4109 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4112 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4115 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4120 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4121 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4122 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4123 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4124 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4128 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4132 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4134 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4135 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4137 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4138 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4139 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4143 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4146 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4148 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4150 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4151 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4153 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4154 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4155 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4157 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4158 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4159 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4160 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4161 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4166 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4169 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4171 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4172 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4176 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4177 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4178 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4179 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4180 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4182 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4185 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4189 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4192 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4193 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4200 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4201 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4203 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4204 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4205 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4206 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4207 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4208 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4209 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4210 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4211 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4214 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4215 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4217 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4222 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4224 int dh_secbits = 80;
4225 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4226 return DH_get_1024_160();
4227 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4228 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4233 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4234 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4237 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4243 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4244 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4245 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4247 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4248 if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) {
4254 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4255 return DH_get_2048_224();
4256 return DH_get_1024_160();
4260 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4263 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4265 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4266 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4270 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4272 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4275 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4277 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4278 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4279 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4280 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4282 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4283 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4286 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4288 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4291 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4294 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4296 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4297 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4299 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4300 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4302 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4303 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4308 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4309 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4310 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4313 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4315 int rv, start_idx, i;
4317 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4322 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4326 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4327 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4328 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);