1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
112 #include <openssl/objects.h>
113 #include <openssl/evp.h>
114 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
115 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
116 #include <openssl/rand.h>
117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
118 # include <openssl/dh.h>
119 # include <openssl/bn.h>
121 #include "ssl_locl.h"
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
129 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
132 tls1_setup_key_block,
133 tls1_generate_master_secret,
134 tls1_change_cipher_state,
135 tls1_final_finish_mac,
136 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
142 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
143 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
147 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
150 tls1_setup_key_block,
151 tls1_generate_master_secret,
152 tls1_change_cipher_state,
153 tls1_final_finish_mac,
154 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
155 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
156 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
158 tls1_export_keying_material,
159 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
160 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
161 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
165 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
168 tls1_setup_key_block,
169 tls1_generate_master_secret,
170 tls1_change_cipher_state,
171 tls1_final_finish_mac,
172 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
173 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
174 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
176 tls1_export_keying_material,
177 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
178 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
179 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
180 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
184 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
187 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
188 * http, the cache would over fill
190 return (60 * 60 * 2);
197 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
201 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
203 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
207 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
210 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
211 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
213 s->version = s->method->version;
216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
219 int nid; /* Curve NID */
220 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
221 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
224 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
225 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
227 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
228 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
229 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
230 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
231 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
232 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
233 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
234 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
235 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
236 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
237 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
238 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
239 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
240 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
241 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
242 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
243 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
244 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
245 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
246 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
247 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
248 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
249 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
250 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
251 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
252 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
253 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
254 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
255 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
258 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
259 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
264 /* The default curves */
265 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
266 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
267 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
268 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
269 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
270 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
271 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
272 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
273 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
276 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
277 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
278 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
279 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
280 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
281 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
285 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
286 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
287 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
288 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
289 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
290 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
291 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
292 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
293 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
294 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
295 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
296 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
297 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
298 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
299 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
300 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
302 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
303 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
305 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
306 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
307 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
308 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
309 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
310 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
311 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
312 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
313 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
314 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
315 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
316 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
317 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
318 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
319 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
323 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
324 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
325 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
328 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
330 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
331 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
333 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
336 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
338 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
340 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
342 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
344 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
346 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
348 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
350 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
352 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
354 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
356 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
358 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
360 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
362 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
364 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
366 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
368 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
370 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
372 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
374 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
376 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
378 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
380 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
382 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
384 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
386 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
388 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
390 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
392 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
394 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
402 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
404 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
405 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
406 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
407 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
408 * lists in the first place.
409 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
410 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
411 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
413 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
414 const unsigned char **pcurves,
417 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
419 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
420 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
422 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
423 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
424 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
425 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
426 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
429 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
430 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
434 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
435 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
439 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
440 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
443 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
444 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
448 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
449 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
450 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
454 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
459 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
460 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
462 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
465 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
467 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
468 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
469 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
472 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
475 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
476 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
478 const unsigned char *curves;
479 size_t num_curves, i;
480 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
481 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
483 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
485 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
488 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
489 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
491 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
492 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
494 } else /* Should never happen */
497 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
499 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
500 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
501 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
507 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
508 * if there is no match.
509 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
510 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
511 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
513 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
515 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
516 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
518 /* Can't do anything on client side */
522 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
524 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
525 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
527 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
528 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
529 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
530 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
531 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
532 /* Should never happen */
535 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
539 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
540 * but s->options is a long...
542 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
543 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
545 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
546 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
547 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
548 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
550 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
553 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
556 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
558 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
559 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
560 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
562 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
566 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
567 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
568 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
569 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
570 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
573 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
574 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
582 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
586 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
587 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
589 unsigned char *clist, *p;
592 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
595 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
596 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
599 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
600 unsigned long idmask;
602 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
604 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
613 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
617 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
621 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
624 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
626 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
632 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
634 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
636 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
638 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
639 if (nid == NID_undef)
640 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
641 if (nid == NID_undef)
642 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
643 if (nid == NID_undef)
645 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
646 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
648 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
652 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
653 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
658 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
662 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
665 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
666 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
671 const EC_METHOD *meth;
674 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
675 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
678 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
681 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
685 /* Determine curve ID */
686 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
687 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
688 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
691 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
700 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
702 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
704 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
706 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
708 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
713 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
714 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
715 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
717 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
718 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
721 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
722 * supported (see RFC4492).
724 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
725 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
726 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
727 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
728 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
731 if (i == num_formats)
736 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
737 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
738 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
740 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
742 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
743 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
744 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
745 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
746 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
750 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
751 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
756 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
763 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
767 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
769 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
770 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
771 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
773 *pformats = ecformats_default;
774 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
776 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
778 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
783 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
784 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
786 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
788 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
791 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
794 /* If not EC nothing to do */
795 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
797 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
801 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
804 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
808 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
809 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
811 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
817 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
818 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
819 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
820 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
821 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
823 return 0; /* Should never happen */
824 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
825 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
827 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
829 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
830 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
831 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
833 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
839 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
841 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
843 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
845 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
846 * is compatible with the client extensions.
848 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
850 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
852 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
853 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
854 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
858 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
861 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
862 unsigned char curve_id[2];
863 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
864 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
865 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
866 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
867 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
871 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
872 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
876 /* Need a shared curve */
877 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
881 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
885 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
890 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
893 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
894 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
897 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
898 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
900 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
903 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
904 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
906 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
910 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
912 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
915 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
916 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
917 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
918 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
920 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
921 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
922 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
923 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
924 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
925 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
927 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
928 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
929 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
934 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
935 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
936 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
939 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
942 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
946 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
947 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
948 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
949 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
951 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
952 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
955 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
956 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
960 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
961 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
962 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
963 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
964 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
965 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
966 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
968 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
969 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
974 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
975 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
977 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
978 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
980 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
981 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
982 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
983 /* Should never happen */
986 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
987 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
992 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
993 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
994 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
995 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
997 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1001 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1002 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1005 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1006 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1008 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1011 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1012 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1013 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1014 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1020 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1024 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1025 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1026 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1027 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1030 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1031 if (i == sent_sigslen
1032 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1033 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1037 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1042 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1043 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1044 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1046 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1050 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1052 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
1057 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1058 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1059 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1062 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1064 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1065 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1066 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1067 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1068 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1070 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1071 /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
1072 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1073 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
1074 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1076 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1079 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1080 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
1081 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1082 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1083 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1084 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1085 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1086 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1087 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1089 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1091 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1092 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1093 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1098 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1100 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1101 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1102 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1104 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1107 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1109 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1111 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1114 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1115 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1118 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1119 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1121 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1123 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1125 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1126 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1128 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1129 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1131 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1132 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1133 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)
1134 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1145 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1147 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1148 if (s->renegotiate) {
1151 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1156 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1159 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1162 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1169 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1170 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1173 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1174 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1175 unsigned long size_str;
1179 * check for enough space.
1180 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1181 * 2 for servernamelist length
1182 * 1 for the hostname type
1183 * 2 for hostname length
1187 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1189 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1192 /* extension type and length */
1193 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1194 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1196 /* length of servername list */
1197 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1199 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1200 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1202 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1206 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1207 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1208 * Client Hello message */
1210 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1211 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1217 * check for enough space.
1218 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1219 * 1 for the srp user identity
1220 * + srp user identity length
1222 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1225 /* fill in the extension */
1226 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1227 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1228 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1229 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1237 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1240 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1241 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1243 unsigned char *etmp;
1245 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1247 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1249 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1251 if (num_formats > 255) {
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1256 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1257 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1258 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1259 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1260 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1264 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1266 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1267 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1270 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1272 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1274 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1279 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1281 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1282 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1283 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1284 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1285 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1289 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1291 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1292 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1293 ret += curves_list_len;
1295 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1297 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1299 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1300 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1301 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1302 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1303 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1304 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1305 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1307 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1308 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1309 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1312 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1313 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1316 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1319 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1321 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1324 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1330 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1332 const unsigned char *salg;
1333 unsigned char *etmp;
1334 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1335 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1337 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1339 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1341 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1342 /* Fill in lengths */
1343 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1348 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1350 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1354 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1355 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1356 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1362 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1363 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1369 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1371 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1372 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1374 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1375 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1377 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1378 /* save position of id len */
1379 unsigned char *q = ret;
1380 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1381 /* skip over id len */
1383 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1389 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1392 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1393 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1394 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1400 * 1: peer may send requests
1401 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1403 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1404 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1406 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1411 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1413 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1414 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1416 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1418 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1423 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1424 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1426 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1427 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1428 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1429 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1430 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1433 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1436 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1437 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1442 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1445 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1448 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1455 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1456 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1457 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1459 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1460 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1463 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1467 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1468 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1469 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1472 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1473 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1475 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1476 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1482 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1484 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1491 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1494 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1498 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1499 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1502 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1503 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1505 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1507 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1508 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1509 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1510 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1511 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1512 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1517 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1519 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1522 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1527 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1530 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1533 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1541 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1542 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1545 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1546 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1547 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1550 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1555 const unsigned char *plist;
1558 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1562 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1564 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1566 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1568 if (plistlen > 255) {
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1573 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1574 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1575 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1576 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1581 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1584 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1586 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1587 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1589 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1593 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1594 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1596 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1601 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1604 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1605 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1609 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1612 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1615 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1623 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1624 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1625 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1626 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1627 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1628 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1629 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1630 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1631 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1632 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1634 if (limit - ret < 36)
1636 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1641 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1642 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1643 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1645 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1649 * 1: peer may send requests
1650 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1652 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1653 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1655 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1661 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1662 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1663 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1664 const unsigned char *npa;
1665 unsigned int npalen;
1668 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1670 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1671 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1672 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1674 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1676 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1678 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1682 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1684 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1685 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1687 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1688 * for other cases too.
1690 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1691 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1692 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1693 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1694 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1696 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1701 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1702 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1706 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1707 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1708 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1710 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1712 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1716 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1722 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1725 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1730 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1731 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1732 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1733 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1736 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1738 unsigned int data_len;
1739 unsigned int proto_len;
1740 const unsigned char *selected;
1741 const unsigned char *data;
1742 unsigned char selected_len;
1745 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1749 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1750 * length-prefixed strings.
1752 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
1753 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
1754 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
1758 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
1760 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
1762 } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
1764 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1765 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1766 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1767 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1768 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1769 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1770 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1773 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1774 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1779 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1785 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1786 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1787 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1792 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1793 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1794 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1795 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1797 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1799 unsigned int type, size;
1800 const unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
1803 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1804 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1805 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1806 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1807 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1808 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1809 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1811 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1812 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1813 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1814 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1817 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1818 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1819 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1820 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1821 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1822 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1823 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1824 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1825 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1826 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1831 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1832 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1833 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size)
1834 || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size))
1837 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1840 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1841 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1842 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1844 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1)
1845 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2)
1846 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1848 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1850 if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1853 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1855 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len)
1856 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1858 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1862 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1864 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1866 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1871 const unsigned char *data;
1872 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1874 s->servername_done = 0;
1875 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1877 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1880 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1881 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1883 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1884 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1887 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1888 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1889 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1890 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1892 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1893 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1894 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1895 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1896 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1899 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1900 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1901 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1904 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1906 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1909 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
1912 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len)
1915 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
1918 if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
1921 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1922 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1924 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
1927 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1928 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
1930 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1931 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1934 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1936 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1937 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1938 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1939 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1940 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1941 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1942 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1943 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1944 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1945 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1946 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1947 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1948 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1949 * the value of the Host: field.
1950 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1951 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1952 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1954 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1958 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1959 const unsigned char *sdata;
1960 unsigned int servname_type;
1964 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
1965 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
1968 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
1969 if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
1970 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
1971 || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
1974 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1975 switch (servname_type) {
1976 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1978 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1981 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1982 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1985 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1986 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1987 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1990 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
1991 (unsigned char *)s->session
1994 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1997 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
1998 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1999 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2000 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2001 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2004 s->servername_done = 1;
2007 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
2008 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2011 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2012 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2013 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2014 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2023 /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
2024 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0)
2028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2029 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2030 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
2031 || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2034 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2036 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
2039 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2041 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
2042 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
2047 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2048 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2049 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2051 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2052 || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
2056 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2057 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2058 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2059 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2060 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2061 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2064 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2065 ecpointformatlist_length;
2066 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2067 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2068 ecpointformatlist_length))
2070 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2073 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2074 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2075 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2078 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2079 unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
2081 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
2082 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
2083 || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
2084 || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
2088 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2091 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2092 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2093 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2094 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2097 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2098 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2099 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2100 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2101 ellipticcurvelist_length))
2103 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2106 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2107 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2111 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2112 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2113 if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
2114 || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2115 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2116 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
2117 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2120 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2123 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
2124 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2127 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2128 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0
2129 || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2132 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2135 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
2136 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
2139 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2140 const unsigned char *sdata;
2142 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2143 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2144 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
2147 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
2149 unsigned int idsize;
2151 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
2152 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
2153 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
2158 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2161 if (data != sdata) {
2162 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2165 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2166 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2167 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2168 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2169 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2172 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2173 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2174 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2179 /* Read in request_extensions */
2180 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2181 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2182 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2187 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2188 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2189 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2190 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2191 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2196 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2199 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2202 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2203 unsigned int hbtype;
2205 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
2206 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2207 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2211 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2212 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2214 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2215 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2216 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2219 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2225 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2226 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2227 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2229 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2232 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2233 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2234 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2235 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2236 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2237 * anything like that, but this might change).
2239 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2240 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2241 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2242 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2243 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2245 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2249 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2250 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2251 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
2253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2254 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2255 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2259 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2260 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2261 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2262 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2263 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
2267 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2268 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2269 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2272 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2273 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2277 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2278 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2279 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2280 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2281 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2284 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2289 /* Spurious data on the end */
2290 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
2295 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2297 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2298 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2299 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2301 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2307 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2311 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2314 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2315 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2316 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2320 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2321 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2329 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2330 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2331 * fill the length of the block.
2333 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2337 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2338 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
2339 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
2347 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2349 unsigned int length, type, size;
2350 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2351 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2354 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2356 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2358 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2359 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2361 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2362 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2365 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2366 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2369 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2371 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2374 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2375 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2379 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2380 const unsigned char *data;
2383 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2384 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2387 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2388 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2390 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2391 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2393 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2394 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2395 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2396 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2397 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2400 tlsext_servername = 1;
2402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2403 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2404 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2405 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2406 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2407 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2411 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2412 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2413 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2414 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2415 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2418 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2419 ecpointformatlist_length;
2420 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2421 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2422 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2423 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2429 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2431 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2432 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2433 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2434 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2436 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2439 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2440 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2443 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2445 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2447 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2450 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2451 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2454 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2455 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2457 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2458 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2459 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2460 unsigned char *selected;
2461 unsigned char selected_len;
2462 /* We must have requested it. */
2463 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2464 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2467 /* The data must be valid */
2468 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2469 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2473 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2475 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2476 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2477 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2480 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2481 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2482 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2485 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2486 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2487 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2491 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2493 /* We must have requested it. */
2494 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2495 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2499 * The extension data consists of:
2500 * uint16 list_length
2501 * uint8 proto_length;
2502 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2504 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2505 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2506 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2507 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2508 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2511 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2512 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2513 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2514 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2517 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2518 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2521 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2523 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2524 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2525 unsigned int hbtype;
2526 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2527 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2531 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2532 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2534 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2535 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2536 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2539 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2545 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2546 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2550 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2551 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2552 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2553 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2554 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2555 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2558 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2559 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2561 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2564 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2565 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2567 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2571 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2572 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2576 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2577 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2578 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2579 s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2580 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2581 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2585 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2594 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2595 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2596 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2597 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2598 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2599 * initial connect only.
2601 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2602 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2603 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2605 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2611 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2614 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2615 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2616 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2617 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2625 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2631 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2636 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2638 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2639 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2643 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2644 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2647 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2648 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2652 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2654 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2655 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2656 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2657 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2659 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2661 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2664 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2665 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2668 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2669 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2672 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2673 s->servername_done = 0;
2678 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2679 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2681 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2683 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2686 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2687 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2689 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2690 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2693 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2695 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2696 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2697 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2698 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2702 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2706 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2707 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2708 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2709 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2710 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2711 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2712 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2713 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2716 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2717 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2718 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2720 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2723 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2724 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2726 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2727 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2731 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2735 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2739 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2741 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2742 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2745 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2746 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2747 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2748 * influence which certificate is sent
2750 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2752 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2753 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2754 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2755 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2756 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2760 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2761 * et al can pick it up.
2763 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2764 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2766 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2767 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2768 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2770 /* status request response should be sent */
2771 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2772 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2773 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2775 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2777 /* something bad happened */
2778 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2779 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2780 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2784 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2788 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2789 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2792 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2793 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2801 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2803 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2804 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2808 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2809 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2810 * must contain uncompressed.
2812 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2813 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2814 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2815 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2816 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2817 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2818 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2819 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2820 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2822 unsigned char *list;
2823 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2824 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2825 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2826 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2827 found_uncompressed = 1;
2831 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2833 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2837 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2838 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2840 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2842 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2843 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2844 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2845 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2847 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2849 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2852 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2853 * that we don't receive a status message
2855 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2856 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2857 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2860 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2861 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2864 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2865 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2868 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2869 s->servername_done = 0;
2875 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2878 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2880 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2881 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2885 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2893 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2894 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2895 * need to be handled at the same time.
2897 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2900 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2901 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2902 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2903 * point to the resulting session.
2905 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2906 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2907 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2910 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2911 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2912 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2913 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2914 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2915 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2916 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2919 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2920 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2921 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2922 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2923 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2924 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2926 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2929 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2930 const PACKET *session_id,
2934 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2937 int have_ticket = 0;
2938 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2941 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2942 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2945 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2948 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2951 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2955 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2956 unsigned int type, size;
2958 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2959 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2960 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2964 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2968 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2970 const unsigned char *etick;
2972 /* Duplicate extension */
2973 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2981 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2984 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2988 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2990 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2991 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2992 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2993 * calculate the master secret later.
2998 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2999 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3003 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
3004 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
3006 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3007 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3010 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3013 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3014 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3017 default: /* fatal error */
3023 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
3024 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3025 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3031 if (have_ticket == 0)
3038 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3040 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3041 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3042 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3043 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3044 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3045 * point to the resulting session.
3048 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3049 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3050 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3051 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3052 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3054 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3055 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3056 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3059 unsigned char *sdec;
3060 const unsigned char *p;
3061 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3062 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3063 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3064 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3065 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3066 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3069 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3070 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3073 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3074 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3075 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3076 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3085 /* Check key name matches */
3086 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3088 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3089 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3090 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3091 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3097 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3100 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3105 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3106 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3107 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3110 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3111 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3112 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3115 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3116 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3117 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3118 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3119 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3121 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3122 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3125 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3126 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3131 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3135 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3139 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3140 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3141 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3145 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3146 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3155 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3159 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3160 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3164 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3171 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3172 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3173 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3174 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3175 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3176 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3177 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3178 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3179 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3180 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3183 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3184 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3185 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3186 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3187 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3188 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3189 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3192 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3195 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3196 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3202 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3205 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3206 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3207 return table[i].nid;
3212 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3218 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3221 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3224 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3225 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3229 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3231 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3238 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3241 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3242 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3243 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3244 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3245 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3246 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3247 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3248 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3249 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3250 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3253 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3259 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3261 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3262 return tls12_md_info + i;
3268 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3270 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3271 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3273 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3276 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3279 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3283 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3284 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3286 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3287 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3288 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3290 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3291 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3292 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3294 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3295 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3296 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3298 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3299 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3301 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3302 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3308 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3309 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3310 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3312 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3313 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3315 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3316 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3318 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3320 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3321 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3323 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3325 if (psignhash_nid) {
3326 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3327 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3329 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3333 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3334 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3336 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3337 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3338 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3340 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3341 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3343 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3344 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3348 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3349 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3353 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3355 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3356 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3357 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3359 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3360 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3361 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3363 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3364 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3365 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3367 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3368 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3373 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3374 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3379 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3380 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3387 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3389 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3391 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3394 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3395 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3397 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3399 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3400 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3401 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3402 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3405 return tmpout - out;
3408 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3409 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3410 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3411 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3413 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3414 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3415 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3416 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3417 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3419 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3420 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3423 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3424 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3425 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3427 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3437 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3438 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3440 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3441 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3443 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3445 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3447 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3448 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3449 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3450 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3451 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3452 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3453 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3454 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3455 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3456 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3458 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3459 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3462 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3463 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3467 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3468 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3470 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3472 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3475 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3479 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3480 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3484 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3486 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3489 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3490 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3492 /* Should never happen */
3496 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3497 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3498 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3500 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3501 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3505 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3510 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3511 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3513 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3514 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3517 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3518 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3520 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3521 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3523 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3525 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3527 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3529 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3530 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3532 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3533 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3534 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3535 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3541 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3542 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3543 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3544 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3545 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3547 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3548 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3549 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3550 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3556 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3557 * the certificate for signing.
3559 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3561 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3562 * supported it stays as NULL.
3564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3565 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3566 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3568 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3569 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3570 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3571 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3575 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3576 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3578 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3579 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3580 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3581 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3582 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3583 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3584 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3590 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3591 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3592 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3594 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3599 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3606 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3608 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3611 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3612 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3613 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3615 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3616 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3620 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3622 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3624 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3626 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3628 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3629 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3632 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3636 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3639 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3641 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3642 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3643 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3644 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3645 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3646 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3648 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3649 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3650 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3654 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3656 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3659 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3662 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3664 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3666 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3668 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3676 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3677 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3679 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3682 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3683 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3686 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3687 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3692 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3693 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3695 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3699 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3703 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3706 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3709 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3714 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3715 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3717 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3718 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3719 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3721 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3728 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3729 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3730 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3732 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3733 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3734 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3740 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3744 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3748 if (default_nid == -1)
3750 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3752 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3753 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3754 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3759 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3760 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3764 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3765 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3766 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3773 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3774 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3775 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3776 * attempting to use them.
3779 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3781 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3782 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3783 /* Strict mode flags */
3784 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3785 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3786 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3788 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3793 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3794 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3797 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3798 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3800 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3803 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3805 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3806 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3808 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3810 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3811 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3814 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3815 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3816 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3817 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3818 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3826 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3829 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3831 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3832 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3834 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3841 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3842 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3843 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3844 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3845 else if (!check_flags)
3850 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3851 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3853 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3855 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3856 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3858 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3861 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3862 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3863 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3864 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3867 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3868 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3869 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3873 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3874 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3877 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3878 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3879 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3882 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3883 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3884 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3887 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3888 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3889 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3898 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3899 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3901 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3903 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3904 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3905 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3908 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3915 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3916 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3920 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3921 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3922 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3923 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3925 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3932 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3933 else if (check_flags)
3934 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3936 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3937 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3938 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3939 else if (!check_flags)
3942 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3943 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3944 else if (strict_mode) {
3945 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3946 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3947 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3948 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3950 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3957 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3958 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3960 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3962 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3965 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3968 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3972 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3976 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3978 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3979 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3981 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3982 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3983 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3987 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3990 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3992 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3994 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3995 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3997 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3998 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3999 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4001 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4002 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4003 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4004 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4005 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4010 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4013 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4015 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4016 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4020 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4021 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4022 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4023 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4024 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4026 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4029 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4033 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4036 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4037 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4044 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4045 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4047 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4048 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4049 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4050 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4051 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4052 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4053 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4056 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4057 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4059 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4063 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4064 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4066 int dh_secbits = 80;
4067 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4068 return DH_get_1024_160();
4069 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4070 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4075 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4076 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4079 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4085 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4086 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4087 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4089 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4090 if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) {
4096 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4097 return DH_get_2048_224();
4098 return DH_get_1024_160();
4102 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4105 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4108 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4109 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4110 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4111 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4113 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4116 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4118 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4121 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4123 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4124 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4125 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4126 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4128 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4129 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4132 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4134 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4137 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4140 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4142 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4143 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4145 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4146 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4148 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4149 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4154 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4155 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4156 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4159 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4161 int rv, start_idx, i;
4163 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4168 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4172 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4173 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4174 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);