2 * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
21 #include "ssl_local.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
25 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
27 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
31 tls1_generate_master_secret,
32 tls1_change_cipher_state,
33 tls1_final_finish_mac,
34 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
35 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 tls1_export_keying_material,
39 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
40 tls_close_construct_packet,
44 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
48 tls1_generate_master_secret,
49 tls1_change_cipher_state,
50 tls1_final_finish_mac,
51 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
52 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 tls1_export_keying_material,
55 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
56 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
57 tls_close_construct_packet,
61 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
65 tls1_generate_master_secret,
66 tls1_change_cipher_state,
67 tls1_final_finish_mac,
68 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
69 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 tls1_export_keying_material,
72 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
73 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
74 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
75 tls_close_construct_packet,
79 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
82 tls13_setup_key_block,
83 tls13_generate_master_secret,
84 tls13_change_cipher_state,
85 tls13_final_finish_mac,
86 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
87 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 tls13_export_keying_material,
90 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
91 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
92 tls_close_construct_packet,
96 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
99 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
100 * http, the cache would over fill
102 return (60 * 60 * 2);
109 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
115 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
117 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
121 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
126 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
127 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
129 s->version = s->method->version;
134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
137 * Table of curve information.
138 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
139 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
141 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
142 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
143 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
144 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
145 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
146 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
147 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
148 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
149 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
150 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
151 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
152 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
153 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
154 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
155 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
156 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
157 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
158 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
159 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
160 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
161 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
162 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
163 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
164 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
165 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
166 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
167 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
168 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
169 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
170 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
171 {EVP_PKEY_X448, 224, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X448 (30) */
174 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
175 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
176 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
180 /* The default curves */
181 static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
182 29, /* X25519 (29) */
183 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
185 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
186 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
189 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
194 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id)
196 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
197 if (group_id < 1 || group_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))
199 return &nid_list[group_id - 1];
202 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
205 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
206 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
207 return (uint16_t)(i + 1);
213 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
214 * the number of groups supported.
216 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
220 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
221 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
222 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
223 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
224 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
227 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
228 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
232 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
233 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
238 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
239 *pgroups = eccurves_default;
240 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default);
242 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
243 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
249 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
250 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op)
252 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *cinfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(curve);
253 unsigned char ctmp[2];
257 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
258 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
261 ctmp[0] = curve >> 8;
262 ctmp[1] = curve & 0xff;
263 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)ctmp);
266 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
267 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
270 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
277 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
278 * if there is no match.
279 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
280 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
281 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
283 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
285 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
286 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
289 /* Can't do anything on client side */
293 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
295 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
296 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
298 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
300 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
301 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
302 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
303 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
304 /* Should never happen */
307 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
311 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
312 * otherwise peer decides.
314 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
315 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
316 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
318 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
319 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
322 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
323 uint16_t id = pref[i];
325 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
326 || !tls_curve_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
334 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
338 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
339 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
344 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
347 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
353 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
357 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
358 unsigned long idmask;
360 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
361 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
363 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
376 # define MAX_CURVELIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
380 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
383 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
385 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
391 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
393 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
395 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
397 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
398 if (nid == NID_undef)
399 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
400 if (nid == NID_undef)
401 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
402 if (nid == NID_undef)
404 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
405 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
407 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
411 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
412 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
416 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
420 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
422 /* Return group id of a key */
423 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
425 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
430 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
431 return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp));
434 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
435 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
439 unsigned char comp_id;
442 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
443 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
445 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
446 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
448 /* Get required compression id */
449 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
450 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
451 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
453 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
458 int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
460 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
461 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
462 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
463 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
468 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
469 * supported (see RFC4492).
471 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
474 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
475 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
481 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
482 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
484 const uint16_t *groups;
490 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
491 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
492 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
494 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
495 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
497 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
498 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
501 /* Should never happen */
506 if (check_own_groups) {
507 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
508 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
509 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
513 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
516 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
520 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
521 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
524 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
525 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
526 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
527 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
531 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
534 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
538 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
540 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
541 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
542 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
544 *pformats = ecformats_default;
545 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
547 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
549 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
554 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
555 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
557 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
561 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
564 /* If not EC nothing to do */
565 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
567 /* Check compression */
568 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
570 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
572 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
575 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
578 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
581 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
585 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
586 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
587 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
588 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
589 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
591 return 0; /* Should never happen */
592 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
593 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
602 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
604 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
606 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
607 * is compatible with the client extensions.
609 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
611 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
613 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
615 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
617 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
620 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
621 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
622 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
623 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
630 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
635 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
637 /* Default sigalg schemes */
638 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
640 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
641 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
642 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
643 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
647 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
648 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
649 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
650 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
651 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
652 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
654 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
655 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
656 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
659 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
660 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
662 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
663 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
665 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
666 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
668 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
669 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
670 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
673 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
674 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
675 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
680 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
681 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
682 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
686 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
688 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
689 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
690 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
691 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
692 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
693 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
694 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
695 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
696 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
697 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
698 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
699 NID_undef, NID_undef},
700 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
701 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
702 NID_undef, NID_undef},
703 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
704 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
705 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
706 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
707 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
708 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
710 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
711 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
712 NID_undef, NID_undef},
713 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
714 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
715 NID_undef, NID_undef},
716 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
717 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
718 NID_undef, NID_undef},
719 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
720 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
721 NID_undef, NID_undef},
722 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
723 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
724 NID_undef, NID_undef},
725 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
726 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
727 NID_undef, NID_undef},
728 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
729 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
730 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
731 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
732 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
733 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
734 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
735 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
736 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
737 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
738 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
739 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
740 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
741 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
742 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
744 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
745 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
746 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
747 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
748 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
749 NID_undef, NID_undef},
750 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
751 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
752 NID_undef, NID_undef},
753 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
754 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
755 NID_undef, NID_undef},
756 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
757 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
758 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
760 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
761 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
762 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
763 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
764 NID_undef, NID_undef},
765 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
766 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
767 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
768 NID_undef, NID_undef},
769 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
770 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
771 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
772 NID_undef, NID_undef}
775 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
776 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
777 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
778 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
779 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
784 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
785 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
787 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
788 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
789 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
790 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
791 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
792 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
793 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
794 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
795 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
796 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
799 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
800 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
803 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
805 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
807 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
812 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
813 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
818 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
819 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
822 md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
832 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
834 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
835 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
836 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
838 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
839 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA *rsa, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
845 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md) || md == NULL)
847 if (RSA_size(rsa) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
853 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
854 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
855 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
856 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
857 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
859 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
865 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
866 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
867 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
869 if (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
876 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
878 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
881 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
883 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
890 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
893 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
895 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
896 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
898 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
900 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
904 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
906 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
908 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
909 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
912 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
914 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
916 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
919 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
923 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
926 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
930 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
931 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
932 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
933 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
935 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
936 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
939 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
940 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
945 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
946 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
947 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
949 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
950 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
951 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
952 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
953 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
954 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
956 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
957 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
961 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
963 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
964 * specified EC curve.
966 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
968 const uint16_t *sigs;
971 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
972 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
973 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
975 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
976 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
979 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
980 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs[i]);
984 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
985 && lu->curve != NID_undef
986 && curve == lu->curve)
995 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
996 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
999 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1001 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1002 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1004 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1005 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
1006 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1008 /* Should never happen */
1011 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1012 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1013 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1014 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1015 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1018 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1019 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1020 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1022 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
1024 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1025 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1028 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1029 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1030 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1032 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1035 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1036 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx)
1037 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1038 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1039 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1044 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1046 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1047 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1048 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1049 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1050 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1054 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1055 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1056 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
1057 int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
1059 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1060 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1061 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1065 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1066 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1067 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1068 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1069 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1072 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1073 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1074 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1075 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1077 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1078 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1083 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1085 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1090 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1091 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1092 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1093 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1096 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1097 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1098 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1099 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1100 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1103 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
1104 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1105 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1110 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1111 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1113 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1114 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1115 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1116 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
1117 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1118 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1119 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1123 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1124 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1128 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1130 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1132 *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1136 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1138 if (s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1140 *pnid = s->s3->tmp.sigalg->sig;
1145 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1146 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1147 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1149 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1152 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1154 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1156 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1157 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1158 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1159 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver,
1160 &s->s3->tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1163 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1164 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1165 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1166 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1168 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1170 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1171 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1172 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1179 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1180 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1181 * @c: cipher to check
1182 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1183 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1185 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1187 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1189 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1190 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1192 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
1194 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1195 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1198 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1199 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1201 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1202 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1203 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1205 if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))
1208 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1209 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1212 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1215 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1217 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1219 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1222 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1226 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1227 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1228 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1229 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1230 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1231 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1232 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1234 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1235 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1237 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1238 && s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1239 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1240 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1242 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1243 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1248 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1249 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1250 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1251 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1259 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1261 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1264 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1267 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1268 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1269 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1274 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1276 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1277 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1278 * point to the resulting session.
1280 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1284 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1287 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1290 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1291 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1294 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1295 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1297 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1298 if (!ticketext->present)
1299 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1301 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1303 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1304 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1308 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1310 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1311 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1312 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1313 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1316 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1317 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1318 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1319 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1320 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1321 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1323 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1324 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1325 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1326 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1327 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1328 * point to the resulting session.
1330 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1331 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1332 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1334 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1335 unsigned char *sdec;
1336 const unsigned char *p;
1337 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1338 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1340 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1341 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1342 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1343 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1345 if (eticklen == 0) {
1347 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1348 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1350 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1353 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1355 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1356 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1357 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1358 * calculate the master secret later.
1360 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1364 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1365 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1366 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1370 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1371 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1373 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1376 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1378 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1381 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1382 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1383 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1384 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1387 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1391 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1397 /* Check key name matches */
1398 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1399 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1400 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1403 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1404 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1405 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1406 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1407 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1408 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1409 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1412 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1416 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1419 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1421 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1425 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1427 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1428 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1432 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1433 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1434 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1435 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1439 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1440 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1443 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1444 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1445 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1446 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1447 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1448 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1449 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1451 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1454 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1456 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1462 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1466 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1468 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1470 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1474 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1475 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1476 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1480 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1481 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1484 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1486 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1491 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1493 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1496 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1497 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1500 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1501 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1502 * performs any action
1504 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1505 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1506 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1507 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1508 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
1509 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
1512 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
1513 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
1514 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
1516 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
1518 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
1519 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1522 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
1523 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1524 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1528 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
1529 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1530 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1531 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1532 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1536 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
1537 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
1538 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1539 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
1540 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1541 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
1542 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1544 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1548 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1552 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1554 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1555 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1556 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
1557 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1566 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1567 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1569 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1572 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1573 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
1575 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1576 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1578 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1579 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1580 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1581 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1582 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1585 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1586 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1589 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
1590 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
1591 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
1592 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
1593 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1596 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1597 && s->s3->tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1599 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1602 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
1603 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
1604 * ciphersuites enabled.
1607 if (s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
1610 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1611 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
1612 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
1613 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1615 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1616 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
1617 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
1620 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kGOST) != 0)
1628 if (lu->hash == NID_undef)
1630 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1631 secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
1632 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1633 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1634 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1635 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1639 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1640 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1644 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1646 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1647 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1648 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
1650 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1653 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1654 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
1655 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1656 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1661 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1665 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1666 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1667 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1668 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1670 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
1673 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1674 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1679 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1680 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1682 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1684 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1687 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1688 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1690 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1691 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1692 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1693 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1701 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1702 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1703 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1704 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1706 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1707 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1708 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1709 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1711 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1712 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1714 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1715 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1726 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1727 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1729 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1730 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1732 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1734 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1736 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1737 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1738 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1739 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1740 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1741 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1742 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1743 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1744 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1745 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1747 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1748 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1751 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1752 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1756 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1757 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1759 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1761 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
1762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1765 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1769 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1770 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1774 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
1780 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1782 /* Invalid data length */
1783 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1788 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
1789 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1792 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1800 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
1807 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
1809 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1810 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1812 /* Should never happen */
1813 if (s->cert == NULL)
1817 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
1818 &s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
1820 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs,
1821 &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
1825 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1827 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1830 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1832 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1835 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1838 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1839 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
1840 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1842 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1843 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1845 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1846 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
1847 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1852 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1853 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1854 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1856 uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1857 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1858 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1861 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1863 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1867 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1869 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1870 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1872 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1874 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1875 if (psignhash != NULL)
1876 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1878 return (int)numsigalgs;
1881 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1882 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1883 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1885 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1886 if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1888 || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
1889 || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1891 shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1893 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1895 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1896 if (psignhash != NULL)
1897 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1899 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1901 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1902 return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
1905 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1906 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1910 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
1911 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1914 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1916 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1917 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1918 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1919 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1920 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1921 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1922 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1923 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1925 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1926 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1927 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1930 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1931 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1933 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1935 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1937 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
1938 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
1939 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1942 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
1944 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1946 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1948 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1950 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1951 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
1952 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
1953 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
1954 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
1955 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
1959 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1961 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
1962 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
1966 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1973 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1974 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1975 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
1977 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1979 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
1980 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
1984 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1988 /* Reject duplicates */
1989 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
1990 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
1999 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2000 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2002 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2006 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2010 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2013 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2018 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2022 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2025 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2026 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2027 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2029 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2030 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2031 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2037 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2039 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2044 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2048 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2050 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2051 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2052 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2054 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2056 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2057 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2062 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2067 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2068 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2069 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2071 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2072 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2073 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2079 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2083 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2085 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2087 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2089 if (default_nid == -1)
2091 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2093 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2095 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2097 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2098 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2099 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2101 sigalgslen = s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2104 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2106 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2107 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2108 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2109 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2110 if (sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2116 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2117 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2121 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2122 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2123 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2130 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2131 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2132 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2133 * attempting to use them.
2136 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2138 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2139 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2140 /* Strict mode flags */
2141 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2142 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2143 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2145 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2150 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2151 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2154 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2155 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2157 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2160 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2162 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2163 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2165 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2167 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2168 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2177 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2180 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2182 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2183 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2185 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2192 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2193 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2194 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2195 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2196 else if (!check_flags)
2201 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2202 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2204 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2207 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2208 || s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2210 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2214 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2215 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2218 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2219 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2220 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2224 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2225 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2228 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2229 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2230 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2233 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2234 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2235 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2238 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2239 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2240 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2249 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2250 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2252 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2254 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2255 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2256 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
2258 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2261 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2268 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2269 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2271 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2272 * so check_flags is always set.
2274 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2275 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2276 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2280 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2281 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2282 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2283 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2285 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2292 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2293 else if (check_flags)
2294 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2296 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2297 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2298 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2299 else if (!check_flags)
2302 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2303 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2304 else if (strict_mode) {
2305 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2306 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2307 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2308 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2310 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2317 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2318 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2320 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2322 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2325 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2328 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2332 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2335 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2336 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2337 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2341 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2344 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2347 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names;
2349 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2350 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2352 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2353 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2354 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2356 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2357 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2358 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2359 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2360 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2365 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2368 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2370 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2371 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2375 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2376 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2378 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2381 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2385 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2388 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2389 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2396 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2397 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2399 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2400 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2401 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2402 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2403 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2404 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2405 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2406 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2407 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2410 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2411 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2413 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2417 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2419 int dh_secbits = 80;
2420 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2421 return DH_get_1024_160();
2422 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2423 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2428 if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
2430 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
2433 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2439 if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
2444 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2445 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2447 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2448 if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2456 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2457 return DH_get_2048_224();
2458 return DH_get_1024_160();
2462 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2465 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2468 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2469 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2470 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2471 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2473 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2476 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2478 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2481 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2483 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2484 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2485 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2486 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2488 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2490 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2491 if (nid == NID_undef)
2494 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2496 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2499 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2502 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2504 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2505 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2507 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2508 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2510 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2511 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2516 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2517 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2518 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2521 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2523 int rv, start_idx, i;
2525 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2530 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2534 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2535 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2536 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2544 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2545 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2548 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2550 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2551 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2553 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2555 || (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
2556 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
2557 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
2560 return s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2564 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
2565 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
2567 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
2569 static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
2572 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2573 int mdnid, pknid, default_mdnid;
2576 /* If the EVP_PKEY reports a mandatory digest, allow nothing else. */
2578 if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &default_mdnid) == 2 &&
2579 sig->hash != default_mdnid)
2582 /* If it didn't report a mandatory NID, for whatever reasons,
2583 * just clear the error and allow all hashes to be used. */
2586 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2587 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
2588 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
2590 || !X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
2593 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
2594 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2595 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2596 * signing certificate.
2598 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
2607 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
2608 * with signature scheme |sig|.
2609 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2610 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2611 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2613 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
2615 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2618 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2621 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
2622 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
2626 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
2627 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
2629 static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
2634 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
2637 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
2638 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
2641 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
2645 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
2646 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
2647 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
2649 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
2651 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2658 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
2659 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2660 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2662 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2663 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2664 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2665 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2666 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2668 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2669 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
2671 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
2672 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
2675 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
2676 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
2678 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2681 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(tmppkey);
2682 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2684 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
2689 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2690 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2691 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(tmppkey), lu))
2697 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
2704 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2705 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2707 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2708 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2710 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2711 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2712 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2714 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
2716 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2719 s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL;
2720 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2722 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2723 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
2727 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2728 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2732 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2733 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2735 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2738 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2740 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2744 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2745 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2746 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2747 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2754 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2757 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2758 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2761 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
2764 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2766 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2767 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
2770 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2771 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
2773 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2774 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2775 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
2777 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
2780 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2781 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
2785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2787 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
2788 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
2789 * we have to assume GOST support.
2791 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
2792 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2795 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2796 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2797 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2801 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2805 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
2808 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2809 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2810 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2815 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2817 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2818 size_t sent_sigslen;
2820 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2823 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2824 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2828 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2829 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2830 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2831 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
2832 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
2835 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2839 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2840 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2845 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2848 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2849 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2855 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2856 s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
2857 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2858 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu;
2862 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
2864 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2865 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2867 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2871 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2875 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
2877 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2878 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2880 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2884 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2888 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
2890 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;