2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
235 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
315 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
324 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
387 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
390 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
391 const unsigned char **pcurves,
396 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
397 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
400 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
401 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
403 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
404 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
405 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
408 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
409 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
413 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
414 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
418 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
419 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
423 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
424 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
428 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
429 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
431 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
434 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
435 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
437 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
438 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
441 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
442 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
444 const unsigned char *curves;
446 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
447 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
449 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
452 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
455 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
457 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
460 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
462 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
465 else /* Should never happen */
468 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
469 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
471 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
472 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
477 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
478 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
482 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
484 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
485 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
487 /* Can't do anything on client side */
494 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
495 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
498 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
499 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
500 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
501 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
502 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
503 /* Should never happen */
506 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
509 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
511 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
516 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
518 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
519 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
521 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
523 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
527 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
528 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
539 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
540 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
542 unsigned char *clist, *p;
544 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
545 * while curve ids < 32
547 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
548 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
551 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
553 unsigned long idmask;
555 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
557 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
568 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
572 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
577 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
580 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
582 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
586 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
588 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
590 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
592 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
593 if (nid == NID_undef)
594 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
595 if (nid == NID_undef)
596 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
597 if (nid == NID_undef)
599 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
600 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
602 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
605 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
606 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
611 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
615 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
617 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
618 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
623 const EC_METHOD *meth;
626 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
627 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
630 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
633 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
637 /* Determine curve ID */
638 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
639 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
640 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
644 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
656 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
658 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
661 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
663 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
666 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
670 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
671 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
672 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
674 const unsigned char *p;
677 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
678 * is supported (see RFC4492).
680 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
682 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
683 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
684 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
694 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
695 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
697 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
698 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
700 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
705 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
712 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
715 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
717 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
719 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
724 *pformats = ecformats_default;
725 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
727 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
729 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
733 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
734 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
736 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
738 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
741 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
744 /* If not EC nothing to do */
745 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
750 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
754 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
755 * supported curves extension.
757 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
760 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
761 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
763 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
770 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
771 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
772 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
773 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
774 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
776 return 0; /* Should never happen */
777 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
778 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
780 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
784 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
785 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
787 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
792 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
793 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
795 unsigned char curve_id[2];
796 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
797 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
798 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
799 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
802 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
803 * no other curves permitted.
807 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
808 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
809 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
810 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
811 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
815 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
816 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
818 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
819 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
821 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
824 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
827 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
829 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
835 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
837 /* Need a shared curve */
838 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
844 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
849 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
851 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
855 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
861 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
866 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
870 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
871 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
874 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
875 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
877 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
880 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
881 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
883 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
886 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
887 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
889 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
892 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
893 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
894 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
895 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
897 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
898 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
899 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
900 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
903 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
904 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
907 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
911 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
912 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
913 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
916 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
918 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
922 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
924 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
925 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
926 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
928 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
929 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
932 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
933 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
937 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
938 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
940 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
941 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
943 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
945 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
946 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
950 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
951 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
954 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
955 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
957 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
958 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
960 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
961 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
962 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
963 /* Should never happen */
966 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
967 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
973 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
975 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
976 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
977 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
979 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
984 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
989 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
991 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
994 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
998 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1000 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1003 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1011 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1015 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1016 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1017 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1019 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1022 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1023 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1028 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1034 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1035 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1036 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1042 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1045 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1046 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1050 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1051 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1052 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1053 * session and not global settings.
1056 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1061 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1062 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1063 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1066 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1067 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1068 * signature algorithms.
1070 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1071 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1072 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1073 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1074 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1075 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1077 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1079 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1080 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1084 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1085 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1087 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1088 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1090 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1092 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1094 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1095 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1101 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1104 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1106 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1109 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1111 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1113 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1116 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1119 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1120 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1122 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1124 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1127 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1128 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1130 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1132 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1134 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1135 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1136 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1137 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1146 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1147 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1148 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1153 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1155 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1157 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1158 unsigned long size_str;
1161 /* check for enough space.
1162 4 for the servername type and entension length
1163 2 for servernamelist length
1164 1 for the hostname type
1165 2 for hostname length
1169 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1170 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1173 /* extension type and length */
1174 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1175 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1177 /* length of servername list */
1178 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1180 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1181 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1183 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1187 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1192 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1200 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1203 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1213 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1214 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1215 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1217 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1218 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1224 /* check for enough space.
1225 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1226 1 for the srp user identity
1227 + srp user identity length
1229 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1231 /* fill in the extension */
1232 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1233 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1234 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1235 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1240 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1243 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1245 const unsigned char *plist;
1248 unsigned char *etmp;
1250 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1252 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1253 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1260 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1261 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1262 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1263 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1266 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1267 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1268 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1270 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1271 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1272 if (plistlen > 65532)
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1279 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1281 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1282 for (i = 0; i < plistlen; i += 2, plist += 2)
1284 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, plist, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1291 plistlen = etmp - ret - 4;
1293 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1294 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1295 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1296 * resolves this to two bytes.
1298 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1302 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1304 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1307 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1308 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1309 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1310 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1312 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1313 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1314 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1316 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1317 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1319 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1323 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1324 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1326 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1329 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1330 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1334 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1340 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1343 const unsigned char *salg;
1344 unsigned char *etmp;
1345 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1346 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1348 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1350 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1352 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1353 /* Fill in lengths */
1354 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1359 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1360 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1362 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1364 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1366 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1372 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1377 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1380 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1384 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1386 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1387 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1393 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1395 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1402 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1403 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1404 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1406 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1407 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1409 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1411 /* save position of id len */
1412 unsigned char *q = ret;
1413 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1414 /* skip over id len */
1416 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1422 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1426 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1427 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1429 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1432 * 1: peer may send requests
1433 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1435 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1436 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1438 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1442 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1444 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1445 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1446 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1448 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1453 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1455 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1457 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1458 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1459 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1460 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1461 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1462 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1465 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1469 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1471 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1473 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1476 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1484 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1485 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1487 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1488 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1492 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1493 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1495 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1496 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1498 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1500 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1501 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1502 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1503 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1505 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1507 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1509 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1515 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1517 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1522 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1525 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1529 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1532 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1533 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1535 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1538 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1539 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1540 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1541 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1543 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1544 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1548 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1550 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1552 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1554 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1558 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1562 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1568 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1570 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1573 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1585 const unsigned char *plist;
1587 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1590 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1592 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1593 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1600 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1601 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1602 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1603 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1607 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1608 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1610 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1612 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1613 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1617 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1619 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1620 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1624 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1625 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1627 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1629 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1631 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1634 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1637 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1646 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1648 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1650 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1653 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1661 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1662 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1663 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1664 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1665 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1666 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1667 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1668 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1669 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1670 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1671 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1677 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1678 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1680 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1682 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1685 * 1: peer may send requests
1686 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1688 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1689 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1691 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1697 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1698 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1699 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1701 const unsigned char *npa;
1702 unsigned int npalen;
1705 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1706 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1708 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1709 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1711 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1713 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1717 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1719 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1720 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1722 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1723 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1725 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1726 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1729 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1735 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1737 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1738 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1740 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1742 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1746 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1750 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1753 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1757 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1759 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1760 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1761 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1764 * returns: 0 on success. */
1765 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1766 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1770 const unsigned char *selected;
1771 unsigned char selected_len;
1774 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1780 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1781 * length-prefixed strings. */
1782 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1783 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1792 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1794 proto_len = data[i];
1800 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1806 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1807 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1808 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1809 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1810 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1811 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1812 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1814 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1817 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1818 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1823 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1827 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1828 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1829 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1830 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1835 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1836 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1837 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1838 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1840 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1841 unsigned short type, size;
1842 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1843 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1844 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1845 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1846 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1847 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1848 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1850 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1851 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1852 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1853 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1856 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1857 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1858 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1859 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1860 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1861 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1862 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1863 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1864 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1865 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1868 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1877 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1880 if (data+size > d+n)
1884 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1886 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1887 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1889 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1891 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1893 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1898 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1900 if (data + len != d+n)
1902 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1906 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1908 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1911 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1913 unsigned short type;
1914 unsigned short size;
1916 unsigned char *data = *p;
1917 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1920 s->servername_done = 0;
1921 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1923 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1926 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1928 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1929 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1932 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1933 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1934 if (s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1936 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types);
1937 s->s3->serverinfo_client_tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1941 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1942 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1946 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1947 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1948 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1950 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1951 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1953 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1954 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1956 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1957 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1959 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1960 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1962 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1963 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1965 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1966 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1969 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1970 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1973 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1977 if (data > (d+n-len))
1980 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1985 if (data+size > (d+n))
1988 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1990 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1991 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1992 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1993 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1995 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1996 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1997 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1998 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1999 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2000 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2001 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2002 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2003 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2004 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2005 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2006 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2007 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2008 the value of the Host: field.
2009 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2010 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2011 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2012 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2016 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2018 unsigned char *sdata;
2024 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2031 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2038 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2044 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2047 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2048 switch (servname_type)
2050 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2053 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2055 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2058 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2060 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2063 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2065 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2068 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2069 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2070 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2071 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2072 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2073 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2076 s->servername_done = 1;
2080 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2081 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2082 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2094 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2099 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2100 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2102 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2104 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2107 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2109 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2112 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2114 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2115 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2117 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2119 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2126 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2128 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2129 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2131 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2132 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2134 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2139 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2141 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2142 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2144 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2145 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2147 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2150 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2151 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2154 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2155 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2156 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2157 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2158 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2161 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2163 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2164 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2165 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2167 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2168 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2170 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2175 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2177 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2180 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2181 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2183 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2186 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2187 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2190 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2191 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2192 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2193 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2194 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2197 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2198 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2199 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2201 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2205 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2208 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2209 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2211 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2215 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2216 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2217 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2218 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2220 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2221 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2223 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2228 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2230 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2231 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2233 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2237 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2239 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2241 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2243 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2246 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2248 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2253 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2255 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2258 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2260 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2263 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2266 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2269 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2270 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2274 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2279 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2283 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2285 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2287 const unsigned char *sdata;
2289 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2294 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2303 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2307 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2311 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2316 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2320 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2325 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2326 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2329 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2330 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2331 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2333 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2334 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2337 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2338 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2340 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2341 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2346 /* Read in request_extensions */
2349 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2356 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2362 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2364 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2365 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2368 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2369 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2371 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2372 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2374 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2379 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2383 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2386 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2390 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2391 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2393 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2394 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2395 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2397 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2403 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2404 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2405 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2407 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2410 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2411 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2412 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2413 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2414 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2415 * anything like that, but this might change).
2417 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2418 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2419 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2420 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2421 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2422 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2426 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2427 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2428 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2430 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2433 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2434 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2438 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2439 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2441 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2445 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2446 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2447 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2448 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2449 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2453 if (!custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al))
2456 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2457 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2458 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2468 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2470 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2471 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2473 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2475 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2478 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2479 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2480 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2485 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2488 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2490 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2494 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2503 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2504 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2505 * the length of the block. */
2506 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2508 unsigned int off = 0;
2522 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2524 unsigned short length;
2525 unsigned short type;
2526 unsigned short size;
2527 unsigned char *data = *p;
2528 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2529 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2532 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2535 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2537 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2538 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2542 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2543 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2546 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2547 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2550 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2554 if (data+length != d+n)
2556 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2560 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2565 if (data+size > (d+n))
2568 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2569 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2570 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2572 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2574 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2576 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2579 tlsext_servername = 1;
2582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2583 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2585 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2586 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2588 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2590 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2595 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2596 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2597 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2599 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2602 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2603 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2606 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2607 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2608 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2609 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2610 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2613 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2615 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2617 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2618 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2620 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2623 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2625 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2628 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2630 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2631 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2633 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2637 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2640 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2641 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2643 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2647 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2648 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2649 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2650 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2652 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2654 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2656 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2661 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2663 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2664 * a status request message.
2666 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2668 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2671 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2672 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2675 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2676 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2678 unsigned char *selected;
2679 unsigned char selected_len;
2681 /* We must have requested it. */
2682 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2684 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2687 /* The data must be valid */
2688 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2690 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2693 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2695 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2698 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2699 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2701 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2704 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2705 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2706 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2710 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2714 /* We must have requested it. */
2715 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2717 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2722 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2725 /* The extension data consists of:
2726 * uint16 list_length
2727 * uint8 proto_length;
2728 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2732 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2734 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2738 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2740 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2743 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2744 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2745 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2746 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2748 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2751 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2752 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2755 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2757 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2759 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2762 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2766 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2767 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2769 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2770 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2771 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2773 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2778 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2780 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2784 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2785 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2787 else if (!custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al))
2789 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2790 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2792 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2793 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2794 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2803 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2807 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2809 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2811 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2813 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2814 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2816 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2822 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2832 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2833 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2834 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2835 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2836 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2837 * absence on initial connect only.
2839 if (!renegotiate_seen
2840 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2841 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2843 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2845 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2853 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2856 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2860 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2862 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2867 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2869 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2870 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2872 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2873 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2875 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2876 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2881 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2885 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2886 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2893 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2898 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2900 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2901 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2904 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2905 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2907 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2908 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2912 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2913 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2914 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2915 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2917 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2919 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2920 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2921 * so this has to happen here in
2922 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2926 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2928 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2931 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2932 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2937 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2938 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2939 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2941 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2943 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2944 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2946 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2947 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2949 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2950 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2952 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2953 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2955 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2956 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2959 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2963 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2965 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2966 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2967 * abort the handshake.
2969 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2970 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2978 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2979 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2982 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2983 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2986 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2987 s->servername_done=0;
2993 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2995 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2998 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2999 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3000 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3001 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3003 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3006 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3007 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3008 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3009 if (certpkey == NULL)
3011 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3014 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3015 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3017 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3018 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3021 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3022 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3023 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3025 /* status request response should be sent */
3026 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3027 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3028 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3030 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3032 /* something bad happened */
3033 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3034 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3035 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3040 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3045 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3046 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3049 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3050 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3058 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3060 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3061 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3063 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3064 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3065 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3066 * it must contain uncompressed.
3068 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3069 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3070 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3071 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3072 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3074 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3076 unsigned char *list;
3077 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3078 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3079 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3081 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3083 found_uncompressed = 1;
3087 if (!found_uncompressed)
3089 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3093 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3094 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3096 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3097 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3098 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3099 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3101 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3102 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3104 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3105 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3107 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3109 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3110 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3113 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3114 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3115 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3116 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3118 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3119 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3124 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3127 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3128 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3131 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3132 * there is no response.
3134 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3136 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3137 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3139 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3140 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3143 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3144 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3148 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3149 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3155 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3156 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3159 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3160 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3163 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3164 s->servername_done=0;
3170 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3173 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3175 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3177 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3181 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3189 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3190 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3191 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3193 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3194 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3195 * extension, if any.
3196 * len: the length of the session ID.
3197 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3198 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3199 * point to the resulting session.
3201 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3202 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3203 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3206 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3207 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3208 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3209 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3210 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3211 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3212 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3215 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3216 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3217 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3218 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3219 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3220 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3222 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3223 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3225 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3226 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3230 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3232 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3233 * to permit stateful resumption.
3235 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3237 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3241 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3249 /* Skip past cipher list */
3254 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3259 /* Now at start of extensions */
3260 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3263 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3265 unsigned short type, size;
3268 if (p + size > limit)
3270 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3275 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3276 * currently have one. */
3277 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3280 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3282 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3283 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3284 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3285 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3286 * calculate the master secret later. */
3289 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3292 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3293 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3295 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3297 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3298 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3300 default: /* fatal error */
3309 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3311 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3312 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3313 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3314 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3315 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3316 * point to the resulting session.
3319 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3320 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3321 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3322 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3324 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3325 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3326 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3329 unsigned char *sdec;
3330 const unsigned char *p;
3331 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3332 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3335 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3336 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3339 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3340 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3341 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3342 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3344 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3345 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3356 /* Check key name matches */
3357 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3359 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3360 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3361 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3362 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3364 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3365 * integrity checks on ticket.
3367 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3370 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3374 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3375 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3376 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3377 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3378 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3380 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3381 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3382 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3383 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3384 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3387 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3390 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3391 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3393 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3398 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3401 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3405 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3406 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3407 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3408 * as required by standard.
3411 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3412 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3420 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3425 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3433 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3434 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3435 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3436 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3437 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3438 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3439 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3442 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3443 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3444 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3445 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3448 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3451 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3453 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3459 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3462 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3464 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3465 return table[i].nid;
3470 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3475 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3476 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3479 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3482 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3483 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3487 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3489 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3490 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3497 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3500 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3501 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3504 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3506 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3509 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3511 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3512 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3513 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3515 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3516 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3518 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3519 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3520 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3522 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3523 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3527 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3531 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3533 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3536 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3538 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3539 #ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS
3540 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3543 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3544 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3546 return inf->mfunc();
3549 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3554 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3555 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3558 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3559 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3562 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3563 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3569 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3570 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3571 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3573 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3574 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3576 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3578 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3579 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3581 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3583 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3585 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3586 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3588 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3592 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3593 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3594 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3596 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3599 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3600 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3602 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3603 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3604 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3606 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3607 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3609 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3610 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3613 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3614 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3615 * then RSA is disabled.
3618 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3620 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3621 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3622 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3623 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3624 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3625 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3628 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3629 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3634 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3635 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3640 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3641 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3646 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3647 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3654 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3656 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3658 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3661 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3662 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3664 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3666 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3668 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3670 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3671 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3674 return tmpout - out;
3677 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3678 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3679 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3680 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3682 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3683 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3684 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3686 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3687 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3689 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3691 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3696 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3697 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3698 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3700 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3711 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3712 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3714 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3715 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3717 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3719 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3720 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3722 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3723 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3725 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3726 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3728 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3729 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3731 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3733 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3734 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3737 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3738 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3742 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3743 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3749 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3750 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3752 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3755 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3758 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3759 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3760 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3765 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3767 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3773 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3774 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3775 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3777 /* Should never happen */
3781 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3782 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3783 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3784 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3786 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3787 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3789 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3791 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3792 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3794 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3795 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3797 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3799 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3801 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3804 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3805 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3806 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3807 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3808 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3810 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3811 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3817 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3818 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3820 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3821 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3823 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3824 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3825 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3826 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3828 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3829 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3834 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3835 * use the certificate for signing.
3837 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3839 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3840 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3843 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3844 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3847 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3849 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3850 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3854 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3855 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3862 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3863 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3864 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3866 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3872 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3879 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3881 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3884 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3885 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3886 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3888 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3889 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3893 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3895 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3897 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3899 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3901 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3902 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3908 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3910 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3911 unsigned short hbtype;
3912 unsigned int payload;
3913 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3915 if (s->msg_callback)
3916 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3917 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3918 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3920 /* Read type and payload length first */
3921 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3922 return 0; /* silently discard */
3925 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3926 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3929 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3931 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3934 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3935 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3936 * payload, plus padding
3938 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3941 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3942 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3944 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3946 /* Random padding */
3947 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3949 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3951 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3952 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3953 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3954 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3956 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3961 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3965 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3966 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3967 * sequence number */
3970 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3973 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3981 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3983 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3985 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3986 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3988 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3989 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3990 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3996 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3997 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4003 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4004 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4006 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4010 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4011 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4013 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4015 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4016 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4017 * some random stuff.
4018 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4019 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4020 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4021 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4024 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4027 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4028 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4030 /* Sequence number */
4031 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4032 /* 16 random bytes */
4033 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4035 /* Random padding */
4036 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4038 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4041 if (s->msg_callback)
4042 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4043 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4044 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4046 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4055 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4060 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4063 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4065 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4068 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4069 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4071 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4073 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4075 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4083 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4084 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4085 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4086 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4087 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4088 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4091 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4092 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4093 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4094 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4097 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4099 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4100 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4103 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4104 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4108 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4109 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4110 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4114 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4118 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4121 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4123 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4128 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4129 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4131 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4133 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4134 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4135 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4136 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4138 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4146 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4147 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4148 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4149 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4153 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4154 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4155 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4156 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4162 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4166 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4170 if (default_nid == -1)
4172 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4174 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4175 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4176 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4180 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4181 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4185 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4186 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4188 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4194 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4195 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4196 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4197 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4200 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4202 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4203 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4204 /* Strict mode flags */
4205 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4206 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4207 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4209 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4214 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4215 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4217 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4218 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4221 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4225 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4228 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4230 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4232 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4233 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4236 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4237 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4238 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4240 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4241 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4250 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4253 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4254 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4255 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4257 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4265 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4266 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4267 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4270 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4276 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4277 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4280 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4283 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4284 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4286 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4291 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4292 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4293 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4294 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4295 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4298 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4299 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4300 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4301 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4305 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4306 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4314 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4315 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4318 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4321 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4322 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4324 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4327 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4335 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4336 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4338 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4341 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4342 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4343 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4345 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4350 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4358 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4359 else if(check_flags)
4360 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4362 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4363 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4364 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4365 else if (!check_flags)
4368 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4369 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4370 else if (strict_mode)
4372 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4373 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4375 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4376 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4380 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4388 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4390 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4395 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4398 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4401 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4406 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4407 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4408 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4409 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4410 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4415 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4420 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4424 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4425 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4427 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4429 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4431 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4435 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4439 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4442 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4444 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4445 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4447 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4449 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4450 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4452 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4454 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4456 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4457 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4459 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4464 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4468 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4470 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4471 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4475 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4477 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4478 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4479 else if (cpk->digest)
4480 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4483 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4485 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4486 * if the chain is invalid.
4490 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4491 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4494 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4495 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4502 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4503 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4505 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4506 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4507 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4508 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4509 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4510 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4512 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4513 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4515 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4521 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4523 int dh_secbits = 80;
4524 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4525 return DH_get_1024_160();
4526 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4528 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4535 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4536 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4539 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4546 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4547 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4548 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4550 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4551 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4558 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4559 return DH_get_2048_224();
4560 return DH_get_1024_160();
4564 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4567 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4570 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4571 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4576 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4578 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4581 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4583 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4584 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4585 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4586 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4589 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4590 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4593 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4595 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4598 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4601 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4604 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4605 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4609 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4610 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4612 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4613 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4617 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4618 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4619 * not sending one to the peer.
4620 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4623 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4625 int rv, start_idx, i;
4628 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4634 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4638 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4640 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4641 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);