2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 #define CHECKLEN(curr, val, limit) \
25 (((curr) >= (limit)) || (size_t)((limit) - (curr)) < (size_t)(val))
27 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
28 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
30 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
31 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
33 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
37 tls1_generate_master_secret,
38 tls1_change_cipher_state,
39 tls1_final_finish_mac,
40 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
41 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
42 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
44 tls1_export_keying_material,
46 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
47 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
51 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
55 tls1_generate_master_secret,
56 tls1_change_cipher_state,
57 tls1_final_finish_mac,
58 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
59 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
60 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
62 tls1_export_keying_material,
63 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
64 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
65 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
69 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
73 tls1_generate_master_secret,
74 tls1_change_cipher_state,
75 tls1_final_finish_mac,
76 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
77 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
78 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
80 tls1_export_keying_material,
81 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
82 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
83 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
84 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
88 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
91 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
92 * http, the cache would over fill
101 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
105 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
107 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
111 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
114 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
115 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
117 s->version = s->method->version;
120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
123 int nid; /* Curve NID */
124 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
125 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
129 * Table of curve information.
130 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
131 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
133 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
134 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
135 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
136 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
137 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
138 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
139 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
140 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
141 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
142 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
143 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
144 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
145 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
146 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
147 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
148 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
149 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
150 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
151 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
152 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
153 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
154 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
155 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
156 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
157 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
158 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
159 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
160 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
161 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
162 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
165 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
166 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
167 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
168 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
171 /* The default curves */
172 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
173 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
174 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
175 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
176 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
179 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
180 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
181 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
184 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
186 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
187 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
188 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
190 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
192 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
196 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
199 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
200 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
207 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
209 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
210 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
211 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
212 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
213 * lists in the first place.
214 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
215 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
216 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
218 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
219 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
221 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
224 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
225 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
227 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
228 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
229 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
230 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
231 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
234 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
235 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
239 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
240 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
244 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
245 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
248 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
249 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
253 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
254 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
255 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
259 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
263 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
264 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
266 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
269 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
271 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
272 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
273 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
276 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
279 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
280 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
282 const unsigned char *curves;
283 size_t num_curves, i;
284 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
285 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
287 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
289 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
292 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
293 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
295 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
296 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
298 } else /* Should never happen */
301 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
303 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
304 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
305 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
311 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
312 * if there is no match.
313 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
314 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
315 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
317 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
319 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
320 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
323 /* Can't do anything on client side */
327 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
329 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
330 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
332 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
334 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
335 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
336 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
337 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
338 /* Should never happen */
341 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
345 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
346 * but s->options is a long...
348 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
349 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
351 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
352 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
353 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
354 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
356 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
358 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
359 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
361 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
362 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
363 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
366 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
368 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
376 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
380 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
381 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
383 unsigned char *clist, *p;
386 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
389 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
390 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
393 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
394 unsigned long idmask;
396 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
398 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
407 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
411 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
415 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
418 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
420 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
426 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
428 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
430 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
432 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
433 if (nid == NID_undef)
434 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
435 if (nid == NID_undef)
436 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
437 if (nid == NID_undef)
439 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
440 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
442 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
446 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
447 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
451 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
455 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
458 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
459 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
466 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
467 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
470 /* Determine curve ID */
471 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
472 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
473 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
477 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
479 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
481 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
482 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
484 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
485 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
487 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
493 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
494 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
495 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
497 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
498 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
501 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
502 * supported (see RFC4492).
504 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
505 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
506 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
507 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
508 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
511 if (i == num_formats)
516 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
517 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
518 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
520 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
522 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
523 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
524 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
525 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
526 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
530 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
531 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
536 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
543 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
547 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
549 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
550 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
551 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
553 *pformats = ecformats_default;
554 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
556 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
558 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
563 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
564 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
566 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
568 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
571 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
574 /* If not EC nothing to do */
575 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
577 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
581 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
584 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
588 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
589 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
591 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
597 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
598 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
599 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
600 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
601 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
603 return 0; /* Should never happen */
604 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
605 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
607 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
609 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
610 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
611 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
613 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
619 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
621 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
623 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
625 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
626 * is compatible with the client extensions.
628 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
630 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
633 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
636 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
637 unsigned char curve_id[2];
638 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
639 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
640 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
641 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
642 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
646 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
647 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
651 /* Need a shared curve */
652 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
656 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
660 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
665 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
668 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
669 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
672 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
673 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
675 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
678 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
679 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
681 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
685 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
687 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
690 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
691 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
692 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
693 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
695 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
696 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
697 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
698 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
699 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
700 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
702 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
703 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
704 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
709 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
710 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
711 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
714 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const unsigned char **psigs)
717 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
721 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
722 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
723 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
724 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
726 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
727 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
730 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
731 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
735 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
736 if (s->server == sent && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
737 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
738 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
739 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
740 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
741 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
743 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
744 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
749 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
750 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
752 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
753 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
755 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
756 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
757 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
758 /* Should never happen */
761 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
762 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
763 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
768 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
769 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
770 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
772 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
776 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
777 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
780 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
781 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
782 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
783 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
786 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
787 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
789 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
795 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
799 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
800 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
801 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
802 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
805 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
806 if (i == sent_sigslen
807 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
808 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
809 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
812 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
814 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
817 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
818 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
819 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
824 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
826 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
831 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
832 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
833 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
835 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
838 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
840 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
842 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
843 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
844 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
845 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
847 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
848 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
849 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
850 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
852 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
854 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
855 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
856 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
862 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
863 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
864 * @c: cipher to check
865 * @op: Security check that you want to do
866 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
868 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
870 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
872 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
873 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
875 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
877 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
878 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
881 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
882 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
884 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
885 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
886 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
888 if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))
891 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
892 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
895 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
898 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
900 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
902 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
905 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
907 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
908 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
918 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
919 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
920 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
921 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
922 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
925 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
927 PACKET extensions = *packet;
928 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
929 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
932 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
933 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
936 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
937 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
943 if (num_extensions <= 1)
946 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
947 if (extension_types == NULL) {
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
952 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
953 extensions = *packet;
954 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
956 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
957 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
958 /* This should not happen. */
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
964 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
965 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
968 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
969 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
970 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
971 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
976 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
980 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
981 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
984 unsigned char *orig = buf;
985 unsigned char *ret = buf;
986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
987 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
989 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
991 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
992 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
994 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
995 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
997 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
998 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
999 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1000 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1011 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1013 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1014 if (s->renegotiate) {
1017 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1022 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
1025 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1028 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1035 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1036 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1039 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1040 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1044 * check for enough space.
1045 * 4 for the servername type and extension length
1046 * 2 for servernamelist length
1047 * 1 for the hostname type
1048 * 2 for hostname length
1051 size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname);
1052 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + size_str, limit))
1055 /* extension type and length */
1056 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1057 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1059 /* length of servername list */
1060 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1062 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1063 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1065 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1068 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1069 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1070 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1071 * Client Hello message */
1073 size_t login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1074 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1080 * check for enough space.
1081 * 4 for the srp type type and extension length
1082 * 1 for the srp user identity
1083 * + srp user identity length
1085 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + login_len, limit))
1088 /* fill in the extension */
1089 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1090 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1091 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1092 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1100 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1102 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1103 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1105 unsigned char *etmp;
1107 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1109 if (num_formats > 255) {
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1114 * check for enough space.
1115 * 4 bytes for the ec point formats type and extension length
1116 * 1 byte for the length of the formats
1119 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + num_formats, limit))
1122 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1123 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1124 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1125 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1126 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1130 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1132 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1133 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1136 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1141 * check for enough space.
1142 * 4 bytes for the ec curves type and extension length
1143 * 2 bytes for the curve list length
1144 * + curve list length
1146 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + (num_curves * 2), limit))
1149 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1151 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1152 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1153 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1154 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1155 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1159 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1161 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1162 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1163 ret += curves_list_len;
1165 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1167 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1169 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1170 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1171 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1172 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1173 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1174 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1175 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1177 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1178 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1179 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1182 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1183 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1186 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1189 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + ticklen, limit))
1191 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1194 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1201 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1203 size_t extlen, idlen;
1208 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1209 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1210 lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1213 idlen += (size_t)lentmp + 2;
1216 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1217 lentmp = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1220 extlen = (size_t)lentmp;
1224 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1227 * 2 bytes for status request type
1228 * 2 bytes for status request len
1229 * 1 byte for OCSP request type
1230 * 2 bytes for length of ids
1231 * 2 bytes for length of extensions
1233 * + length of extensions
1235 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 9 + idlen + extlen, limit))
1238 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1239 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1240 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1242 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1243 /* save position of id len */
1244 unsigned char *q = ret;
1245 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1246 /* skip over id len */
1248 lentmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1254 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1258 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1259 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1262 * check for enough space.
1263 * 4 bytes for the heartbeat ext type and extension length
1264 * 1 byte for the mode
1266 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit))
1269 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1273 * 1: peer may send requests
1274 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1276 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1277 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1279 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1284 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1286 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1287 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1291 * check for enough space.
1292 * 4 bytes for the NPN ext type and extension length
1294 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1296 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1302 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1303 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1304 * (see longer comment below)
1306 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1308 * check for enough space.
1309 * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length
1310 * 2 bytes for the ALPN protocol list length
1311 * + ALPN protocol list length
1313 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, limit))
1315 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1316 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1317 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1318 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1319 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1320 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1323 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1326 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1327 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1333 * check for enough space.
1334 * 4 bytes for the SRTP type and extension length
1335 * + SRTP profiles length
1337 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
1340 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1343 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1350 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1351 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1352 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1355 * In 1.1.0 before 1.1.0c we negotiated EtM with DTLS, then just
1356 * silently failed to actually do it. It is fixed in 1.1.1 but to
1357 * ease the transition especially from 1.1.0b to 1.1.0c, we just
1358 * disable it in 1.1.0.
1360 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1362 * check for enough space.
1363 * 4 bytes for the ETM type and extension length
1365 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1367 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1372 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1374 * check for enough space.
1375 * 4 bytes for the SCT type and extension length
1377 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1380 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret);
1386 * check for enough space.
1387 * 4 bytes for the EMS type and extension length
1389 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1391 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1395 * WebSphere application server can not handle having the
1396 * last extension be 0-length (e.g. EMS, EtM), so keep those
1399 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1401 const unsigned char *salg;
1402 unsigned char *etmp;
1403 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
1406 * check for enough space.
1407 * 4 bytes for the sigalgs type and extension length
1408 * 2 bytes for the sigalg list length
1409 * + sigalg list length
1411 if (CHECKLEN(ret, salglen + 6, limit))
1413 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1415 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1417 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1418 /* Fill in lengths */
1419 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1425 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1426 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1427 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1428 * appear last. WebSphere 7.x/8.x is intolerant of empty extensions
1429 * being last, so minimum length of 1.
1431 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1432 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1434 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1435 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1442 * check for enough space. Strictly speaking we know we've already
1443 * got enough space because to get here the message size is < 0x200,
1444 * but we know that we've allocated far more than that in the buffer
1445 * - but for consistency and robustness we're going to check anyway.
1447 * 4 bytes for the padding type and extension length
1450 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + hlen, limit))
1452 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1454 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1461 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1464 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1468 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1469 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1472 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1473 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1475 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1478 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1479 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1480 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1481 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1486 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1488 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1491 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1497 * check for enough space.
1498 * 4 bytes for the reneg type and extension length
1499 * + reneg data length
1501 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
1504 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1507 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1515 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1516 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1519 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1520 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1522 * check for enough space.
1523 * 4 bytes for the server name type and extension length
1525 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1528 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1533 const unsigned char *plist;
1536 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1539 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1541 if (plistlen > 255) {
1542 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1547 * check for enough space.
1548 * 4 bytes for the ec points format type and extension length
1549 * 1 byte for the points format list length
1550 * + length of points format list
1552 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5 + plistlen, limit))
1555 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1556 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1557 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1558 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1563 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1566 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1568 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1570 * check for enough space.
1571 * 4 bytes for the Ticket type and extension length
1573 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1575 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1579 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1582 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1585 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1587 * check for enough space.
1588 * 4 bytes for the Status request type and extension length
1590 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1592 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1596 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1599 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1600 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1605 * check for enough space.
1606 * 4 bytes for the SRTP profiles type and extension length
1607 * + length of the SRTP profiles list
1609 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + el, limit))
1612 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1615 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1623 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1624 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1625 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1626 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1627 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1628 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1629 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1630 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1631 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1632 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1635 /* check for enough space. */
1636 if (CHECKLEN(ret, sizeof(cryptopro_ext), limit))
1638 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext));
1639 ret += sizeof(cryptopro_ext);
1642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1643 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1644 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1646 * check for enough space.
1647 * 4 bytes for the Heartbeat type and extension length
1648 * 1 byte for the mode
1650 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 5, limit))
1652 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1656 * 1: peer may send requests
1657 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1659 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1660 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1662 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1668 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1669 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1670 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1671 const unsigned char *npa;
1672 unsigned int npalen;
1675 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1677 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1678 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1680 * check for enough space.
1681 * 4 bytes for the NPN type and extension length
1682 * + length of protocols list
1684 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4 + npalen, limit))
1686 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1688 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1690 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1694 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1696 if (s->tlsext_use_etm) {
1698 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1699 * for other cases too.
1701 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1702 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1703 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1704 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1705 s->tlsext_use_etm = 0;
1708 * check for enough space.
1709 * 4 bytes for the ETM type and extension length
1711 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1713 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1717 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1719 * check for enough space.
1720 * 4 bytes for the EMS type and extension length
1722 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 4, limit))
1724 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1728 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1729 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1730 size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1733 * check for enough space.
1734 * 4 bytes for the ALPN type and extension length
1735 * 2 bytes for ALPN data length
1736 * 1 byte for selected protocol length
1737 * + length of the selected protocol
1739 if (CHECKLEN(ret, 7 + len, limit))
1741 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1745 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1751 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1754 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1759 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1760 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1761 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1762 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1764 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1766 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1768 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1770 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1771 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1775 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1777 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1778 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1779 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1782 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1784 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1785 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1786 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1794 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1795 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1796 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1798 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1800 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1801 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1803 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1804 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1805 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1806 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1807 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1809 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1810 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1811 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1812 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1813 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1816 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1818 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1819 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1821 } else if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
1822 /* Behave as if no callback was present. */
1825 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1835 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1836 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1837 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1842 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1843 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1844 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1845 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1847 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1853 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1854 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1855 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1856 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1857 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1858 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1859 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1861 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1862 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1863 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1864 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1865 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1866 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1867 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1868 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1869 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1870 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1871 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1872 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1873 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1876 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1877 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1881 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1882 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1883 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1887 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1890 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1891 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1893 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1896 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1899 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1900 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1902 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1903 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1906 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1907 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1909 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1912 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1915 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1916 s->servername_done = 0;
1917 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1919 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1922 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1923 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1924 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1925 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1926 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1927 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1929 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1930 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1934 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1935 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1936 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1938 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1939 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1940 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1941 s->tlsext_use_etm = 0;
1943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1944 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1945 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1948 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1950 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1953 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1956 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1960 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1961 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1964 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1966 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1969 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1970 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1971 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1972 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1974 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1975 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1977 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1978 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1981 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1983 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1984 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1985 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1986 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1987 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1988 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1989 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1990 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1991 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1992 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1993 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1994 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1995 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1996 * the value of the Host: field.
1997 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1998 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1999 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2001 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2005 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2006 unsigned int servname_type;
2007 PACKET sni, hostname;
2009 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
2010 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
2011 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
2016 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
2017 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
2018 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
2020 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
2021 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
2022 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
2024 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
2025 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
2027 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
2028 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
2029 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2034 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2035 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2039 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2040 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2044 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2045 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2049 s->servername_done = 1;
2052 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2053 * fall back to a full handshake.
2055 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2056 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2057 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2060 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2061 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2064 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
2067 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2071 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2072 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2074 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2075 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2082 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2083 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
2085 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
2086 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2091 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2092 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2094 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2095 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2099 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2100 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
2102 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
2103 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
2104 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
2105 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
2110 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
2111 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2113 session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2114 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2119 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2120 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2121 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2122 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
2123 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
2124 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2126 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2129 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2130 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2132 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
2133 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2134 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2139 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2140 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2144 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2145 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2146 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2150 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2151 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2152 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2153 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2154 (&extension, &responder_id_list))
2158 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2159 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2161 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2163 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2164 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2165 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2166 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2170 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2173 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2175 PACKET responder_id;
2176 const unsigned char *id_data;
2178 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2180 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2184 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2185 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2186 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2190 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2191 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2195 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2196 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2197 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2202 /* Read in request_extensions */
2203 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2206 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2207 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2208 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2209 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2210 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2211 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2212 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2213 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2214 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2222 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2224 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2228 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2229 unsigned int hbtype;
2231 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2232 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2233 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2237 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2238 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2240 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2241 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2242 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2245 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2251 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2252 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2254 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2257 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2258 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2259 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2260 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2261 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2262 * anything like that, but this might change).
2264 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2265 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2266 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2267 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2268 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2270 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2274 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2275 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2276 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2280 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2282 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2283 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2284 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2288 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2289 s->tlsext_use_etm = 1;
2291 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2292 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2296 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2297 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2298 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2299 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2300 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2303 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2304 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2309 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2311 * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
2313 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2319 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2321 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2322 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2323 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2325 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2330 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2331 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2332 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2333 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2338 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2341 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2342 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2343 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2346 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2355 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2356 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2357 * fill the length of the block.
2359 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2361 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2363 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2364 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2365 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2373 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2375 unsigned int length, type, size;
2376 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2377 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2380 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2382 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2384 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2385 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2387 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2388 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2391 s->tlsext_use_etm = 0;
2393 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2395 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2398 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2399 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2403 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2404 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2408 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2409 const unsigned char *data;
2412 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2413 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2416 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2417 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2419 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2420 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2422 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2423 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2424 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2425 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2426 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2429 tlsext_servername = 1;
2431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2432 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2433 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2434 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2435 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2436 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2440 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2441 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2442 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2443 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2444 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2447 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2448 ecpointformatlist_length;
2449 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2450 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2451 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2452 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2458 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2460 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2461 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2462 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2463 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2465 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2468 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2469 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2472 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2473 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2475 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2478 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2479 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2482 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2483 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2487 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2488 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2489 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2491 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2492 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2493 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2494 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2495 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2496 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2498 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2500 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2501 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2502 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2505 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2509 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2510 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2511 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2512 unsigned char *selected;
2513 unsigned char selected_len;
2514 /* We must have requested it. */
2515 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2516 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2519 /* The data must be valid */
2520 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2521 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2524 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2527 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2528 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2529 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2533 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2534 * a single Serverhello
2536 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2537 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2538 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2539 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2542 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2543 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2544 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2548 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2550 /* We must have requested it. */
2551 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2552 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2556 * The extension data consists of:
2557 * uint16 list_length
2558 * uint8 proto_length;
2559 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2561 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2562 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2563 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2564 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2567 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2568 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2569 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2570 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2573 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2574 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2577 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2580 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2581 unsigned int hbtype;
2582 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2583 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2587 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2588 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2590 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2591 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2592 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2595 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2601 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2602 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2606 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2607 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2608 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2609 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2610 s->tlsext_use_etm = 1;
2611 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2612 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2614 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2617 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2618 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2620 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2624 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2625 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2629 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2630 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2631 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2632 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2633 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2634 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2635 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2639 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2648 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2649 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2650 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2651 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2652 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2654 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2655 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2656 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2658 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2664 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2667 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2668 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2669 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2678 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2680 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2684 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2689 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2691 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2692 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2696 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2697 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2700 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2701 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2705 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2707 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2708 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2709 else if (s->session_ctx != NULL
2710 && s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2712 s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2714 session_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2717 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2718 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2721 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2722 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2725 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2726 s->servername_done = 0;
2733 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2734 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2736 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2738 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2741 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2742 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2744 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2745 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2748 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2751 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2752 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2753 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2757 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2762 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2763 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2764 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2765 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2766 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2767 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2768 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2769 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2772 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2773 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2774 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2776 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2779 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2780 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2782 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2783 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2787 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2791 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2796 * Upon success, returns 1.
2797 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2799 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2801 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2804 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2805 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2806 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2807 * influence which certificate is sent
2809 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2811 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2812 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2813 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2814 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2816 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2817 * et al can pick it up.
2819 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2820 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2822 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2823 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2824 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2826 /* status request response should be sent */
2827 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2828 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2829 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2831 /* something bad happened */
2832 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2834 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2840 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2847 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2849 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2850 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2854 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2855 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2856 * must contain uncompressed.
2858 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2859 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2860 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2861 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2862 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2863 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2864 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2865 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2867 unsigned char *list;
2868 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2869 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2870 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2871 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2872 found_uncompressed = 1;
2876 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2877 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2878 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2882 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2883 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2885 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2887 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2888 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2889 else if (s->session_ctx != NULL
2890 && s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2892 s->session_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2894 session_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2897 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2898 * that we don't receive a status message
2900 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2901 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2902 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2905 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2906 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2909 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2910 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2913 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2914 s->servername_done = 0;
2921 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2924 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2926 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2927 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2931 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2939 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2940 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2941 * need to be handled at the same time.
2943 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2946 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2947 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2948 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2949 * point to the resulting session.
2951 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2952 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2953 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2956 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2957 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2958 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2959 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2960 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2961 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2962 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2965 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2966 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2967 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2968 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2969 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2970 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2972 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2975 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2976 const PACKET *session_id,
2980 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2983 int have_ticket = 0;
2984 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2987 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2988 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2991 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2994 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2997 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
3001 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
3002 unsigned int type, size;
3004 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
3005 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
3006 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3010 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
3014 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
3016 const unsigned char *etick;
3018 /* Duplicate extension */
3019 if (have_ticket != 0) {
3027 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3030 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3034 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3036 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3037 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3038 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3039 * calculate the master secret later.
3044 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
3045 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3049 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
3050 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
3052 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3053 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3056 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3059 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3060 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3063 default: /* fatal error */
3069 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
3070 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3071 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3077 if (have_ticket == 0)
3084 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3086 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3087 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
3088 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3089 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3090 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3091 * point to the resulting session.
3094 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3095 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3096 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3097 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3098 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3100 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3101 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3102 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3105 unsigned char *sdec;
3106 const unsigned char *p;
3107 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
3108 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3109 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3110 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3111 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3113 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3114 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3117 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3122 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3123 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3124 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3135 /* Check key name matches */
3136 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3137 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3141 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3142 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3143 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3144 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3145 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3146 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3152 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3155 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3159 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3161 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3166 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3167 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3168 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3171 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3172 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3173 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3176 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3177 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3178 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3179 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3180 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3181 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3182 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3186 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3187 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3192 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3196 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3200 /* Some additional consistency checks */
3201 if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) {
3202 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3206 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3207 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3208 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3212 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3213 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3222 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3226 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3227 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3231 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3238 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3239 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3240 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3241 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3242 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3243 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3244 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3245 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3246 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3247 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3250 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3251 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3252 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3253 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3254 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3255 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3256 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3259 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3262 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3263 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3269 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3272 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3273 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3274 return table[i].nid;
3279 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3284 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3287 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3290 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3291 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3295 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3297 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3304 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3307 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3308 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3309 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3310 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3311 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3312 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3313 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3314 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3315 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3316 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3317 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3318 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3321 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3327 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3328 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3329 return tls12_md_info + i;
3335 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3337 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3338 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3340 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3343 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3346 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3350 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3351 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3354 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3355 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3358 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3359 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3362 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3363 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3365 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3366 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3368 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3369 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3375 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3376 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3377 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3379 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3380 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3382 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3383 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3385 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3387 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3388 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3390 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3392 if (psignhash_nid) {
3393 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3394 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3395 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3399 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3400 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3402 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3403 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3404 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3406 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3407 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3409 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3410 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3414 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3415 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3419 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3421 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3422 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3423 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3425 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3426 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3427 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3429 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
3430 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3431 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3432 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3433 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3434 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3439 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3440 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3445 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3446 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3453 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3455 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3457 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3460 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3461 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3463 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3465 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3466 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3467 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3468 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3471 return tmpout - out;
3474 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3475 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3476 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3477 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3479 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3480 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3481 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3482 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3483 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3485 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3486 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3489 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3490 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3491 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3493 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3503 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3504 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3506 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3507 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3509 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3511 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3513 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3514 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3515 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3516 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3517 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3518 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3519 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3520 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3521 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3522 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3524 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
3525 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3528 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3529 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3533 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3534 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3536 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3538 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3541 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3545 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3546 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3550 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3552 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3555 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3556 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3558 /* Should never happen */
3562 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3563 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3564 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3566 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3567 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3571 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3576 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3577 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3579 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3580 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3583 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3584 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3585 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3586 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3587 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3589 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3590 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3591 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3592 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3598 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3599 * the certificate for signing.
3601 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3603 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3604 * supported it stays as NULL.
3606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3607 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3608 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3611 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3612 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3613 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3617 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3618 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3621 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3622 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3623 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3624 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3625 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3626 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3627 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3628 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3634 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3635 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3636 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3638 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3643 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3650 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3652 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3655 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3656 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3657 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3659 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3660 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3664 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3666 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3668 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3670 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3672 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3673 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3676 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3680 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3683 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3685 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3686 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3687 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3688 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3689 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3690 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3692 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3693 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3694 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3698 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3700 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3703 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3706 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3708 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3710 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3712 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3720 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3721 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3723 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3726 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3727 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3730 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3731 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3736 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3737 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3739 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3743 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3747 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3750 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3752 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3757 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3758 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3760 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3761 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3762 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3764 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3771 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3772 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3773 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3775 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3776 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3777 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3783 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3787 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3791 if (default_nid == -1)
3793 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3795 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3796 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3797 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3802 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3803 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3807 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3808 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3809 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3816 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3817 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3818 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3819 * attempting to use them.
3822 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
3824 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3825 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3826 /* Strict mode flags */
3827 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3828 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3829 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3831 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3836 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3837 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3840 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3841 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3843 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3846 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3848 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3849 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3851 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3853 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3854 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3860 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3863 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3865 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3866 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3868 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3875 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3876 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3877 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3878 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3879 else if (!check_flags)
3884 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3885 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3887 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3889 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3890 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3892 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3895 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3896 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3897 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3898 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3901 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3902 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3903 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3907 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3908 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3911 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3912 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3913 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3916 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3917 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3918 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3921 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3922 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3923 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3932 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3933 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3935 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3937 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3938 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3939 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3942 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3949 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3950 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3954 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3955 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3956 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3957 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3959 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3966 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3967 else if (check_flags)
3968 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3970 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3971 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3972 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3973 else if (!check_flags)
3976 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3977 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3978 else if (strict_mode) {
3979 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3980 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3981 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3982 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3984 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3991 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3992 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3994 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3996 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3999 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4002 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4006 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4010 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4012 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4013 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4015 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4016 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4017 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4021 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4024 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4026 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4028 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4029 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4031 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4032 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4033 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4035 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4036 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4037 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4038 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4039 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4044 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4047 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4049 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4050 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4054 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4055 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4056 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4057 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4058 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4060 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4063 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4067 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4070 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4071 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4078 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4079 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4081 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4082 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4083 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4084 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4085 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4086 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4087 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4090 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
4091 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4093 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4097 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4099 int dh_secbits = 80;
4100 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4101 return DH_get_1024_160();
4102 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4103 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4108 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4109 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4112 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4120 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4121 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4123 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4124 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4132 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4133 return DH_get_2048_224();
4134 return DH_get_1024_160();
4138 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4141 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4144 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4145 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4146 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4147 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4149 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4152 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4154 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4157 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4159 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4160 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4161 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4162 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4164 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4165 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4167 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4168 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4171 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4173 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4176 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4179 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4181 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4182 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4184 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4185 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4187 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4188 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4193 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
4194 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4195 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4198 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4200 int rv, start_idx, i;
4202 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4207 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4211 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4212 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4213 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);