2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
249 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
250 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
254 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
256 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
261 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
263 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
264 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
265 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
266 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
268 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
269 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
272 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
273 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
277 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
278 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
279 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
280 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
281 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
282 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
283 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
286 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
287 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
288 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
295 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
296 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
299 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
301 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
302 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
303 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
305 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
308 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
310 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
313 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
315 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
319 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
321 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
325 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
327 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
329 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
331 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
333 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
335 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
337 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
339 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
341 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
343 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
345 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
347 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
349 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
351 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
353 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
355 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
357 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
359 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
361 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
363 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
365 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
367 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
373 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
376 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
377 const unsigned char **pcurves,
382 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
383 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
386 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
387 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
389 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
390 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
391 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
394 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
395 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
399 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
400 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
404 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
405 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
409 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
410 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
413 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
414 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
416 const unsigned char *curves;
418 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
419 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
421 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
424 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
427 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
429 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
432 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
434 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
437 else /* Should never happen */
440 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
441 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
443 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
449 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
450 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
454 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
456 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
457 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
459 /* Can't do anything on client side */
466 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
467 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
470 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
472 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
473 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
474 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
475 /* Should never happen */
478 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
481 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
483 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
488 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
490 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
491 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
493 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
497 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
498 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
509 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
510 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
512 unsigned char *clist, *p;
514 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
515 * while curve ids < 32
517 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
518 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
521 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
523 unsigned long idmask;
525 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
527 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
538 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
542 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
547 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
550 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
552 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
556 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
558 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
560 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
562 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
563 if (nid == NID_undef)
564 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
565 if (nid == NID_undef)
566 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
567 if (nid == NID_undef)
569 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
570 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
572 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
575 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
576 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
581 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
585 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
587 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
588 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
593 const EC_METHOD *meth;
596 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
597 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
600 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
603 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
607 /* Determine curve ID */
608 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
610 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
614 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
626 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
628 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
631 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
633 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
636 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
640 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
641 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
642 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
644 const unsigned char *p;
647 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
648 * is supported (see RFC4492).
650 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
652 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
653 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
654 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
664 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
665 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
667 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
668 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
670 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
675 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
682 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
685 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
687 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
689 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
694 *pformats = ecformats_default;
695 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
697 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
699 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
703 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
704 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
706 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
708 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
711 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
714 /* If not EC nothing to do */
715 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
720 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
724 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
725 * supported curves extension.
727 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
730 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
731 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
733 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
740 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
741 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
742 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
743 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
744 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
746 return 0; /* Should never happen */
747 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
748 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
750 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
754 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
755 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
757 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
762 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
763 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
765 unsigned char curve_id[2];
766 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
767 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
768 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
769 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
772 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
773 * no other curves permitted.
777 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
778 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
779 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
780 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
781 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
785 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
786 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
788 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
789 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
791 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
794 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
797 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
799 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
805 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
807 /* Need a shared curve */
808 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
814 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
819 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
821 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
825 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
831 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
836 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
840 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
841 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
850 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
851 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
853 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
856 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
857 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
859 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
862 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
863 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
864 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
865 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
867 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
869 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
870 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
873 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
877 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
881 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
882 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
883 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
886 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
888 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
892 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
894 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
895 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
896 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
907 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
908 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
910 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
911 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
913 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
915 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
916 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
920 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
921 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
924 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
925 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
927 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
928 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
930 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
931 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
932 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
933 /* Should never happen */
936 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
937 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
943 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
945 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
946 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
947 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
949 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
954 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
959 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
961 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
964 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
968 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
970 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
973 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
981 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
985 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
986 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
987 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
989 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
992 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
993 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
998 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1004 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1007 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1008 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1011 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1012 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1013 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1014 * session and not global settings.
1017 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1020 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1021 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1022 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1025 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1026 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1027 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1030 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1031 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1034 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1040 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1045 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1050 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1056 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1057 * signature algorithms.
1061 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1066 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1067 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1071 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1075 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1077 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1078 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1082 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1083 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1085 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1086 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1088 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1092 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1093 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1095 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1096 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1105 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1108 unsigned char *ret = p;
1109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1110 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1112 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1115 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1116 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1118 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1120 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1122 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1123 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1124 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1125 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1134 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1135 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1136 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1141 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1143 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1145 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1146 unsigned long size_str;
1149 /* check for enough space.
1150 4 for the servername type and entension length
1151 2 for servernamelist length
1152 1 for the hostname type
1153 2 for hostname length
1157 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1158 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1161 /* extension type and length */
1162 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1163 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1165 /* length of servername list */
1166 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1168 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1169 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1171 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1175 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1180 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1186 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1188 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1191 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1193 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1201 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1202 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1203 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1205 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1206 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1212 /* check for enough space.
1213 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1214 1 for the srp user identity
1215 + srp user identity length
1217 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1219 /* fill in the extension */
1220 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1221 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1222 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1223 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1228 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1231 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1233 const unsigned char *plist;
1236 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1238 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1239 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1246 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1247 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1248 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1249 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1252 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1253 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1254 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1256 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1257 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1258 if (plistlen > 65532)
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1264 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1265 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1267 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1268 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1269 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1270 * resolves this to two bytes.
1273 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1276 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1278 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1281 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1282 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1283 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1284 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1286 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1287 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1288 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1290 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1291 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1293 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1297 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1298 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1300 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1303 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1304 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1308 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1314 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1317 const unsigned char *salg;
1318 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1319 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1321 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1322 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1324 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1328 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1329 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1331 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1333 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1335 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1338 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1341 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1346 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1349 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1353 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1355 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1356 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1362 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1364 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1371 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1372 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1373 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1375 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1376 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1378 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1380 /* save position of id len */
1381 unsigned char *q = ret;
1382 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1383 /* skip over id len */
1385 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1391 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1395 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1399 * 1: peer may send requests
1400 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1402 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1403 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1405 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1409 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1411 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1412 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1413 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1420 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1422 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1424 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1425 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1426 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1427 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1428 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1429 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1432 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1436 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1438 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1440 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1443 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1451 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1452 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1453 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1454 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1455 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1456 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1458 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1459 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1461 if (limit < ret + 6)
1464 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1465 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1467 *(ret++) = list_len;
1468 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1471 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1472 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1475 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1477 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1479 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1480 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1482 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1483 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1484 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1488 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1492 return NULL; /* error */
1493 if (cb_retval == -1)
1494 continue; /* skip this extension */
1496 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1498 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1500 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1505 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1512 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1515 unsigned char *ret = p;
1516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1517 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1520 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1521 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1522 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1523 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1525 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1526 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1530 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1532 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1534 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1536 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1540 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1544 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1550 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1552 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1555 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1567 const unsigned char *plist;
1569 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1572 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1574 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1575 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1582 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1583 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1584 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1585 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1589 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1590 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1592 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1593 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1595 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1596 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1600 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1602 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1603 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1607 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1608 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1610 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1612 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1614 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1617 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1620 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1629 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1631 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1633 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1636 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1644 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1645 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1646 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1647 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1648 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1649 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1650 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1651 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1652 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1653 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1654 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1660 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1661 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1663 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1666 * 1: peer may send requests
1667 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1669 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1670 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1672 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1678 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1679 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1680 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1682 const unsigned char *npa;
1683 unsigned int npalen;
1686 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1687 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1689 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1690 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1692 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1694 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1699 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1701 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1703 size_t authz_length;
1704 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1705 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1706 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1707 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1708 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1710 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1712 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1713 * uint8_t authz_type
1715 * uint8_t data[length]
1717 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1718 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1720 unsigned short length;
1724 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1726 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1730 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1738 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1739 * 2 bytes for extension type
1740 * 2 bytes for extension length
1741 * 1 byte for the list length
1742 * n bytes for the list */
1743 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1745 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1746 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1748 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1749 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1753 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1755 unsigned short length;
1760 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1762 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1765 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1772 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1773 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1777 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1780 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1782 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1784 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1785 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1787 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1788 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1791 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1794 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1798 return NULL; /* error */
1799 if (cb_retval == -1)
1800 break; /* skip this extension */
1801 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1803 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1805 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1813 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1815 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1816 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1818 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1820 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1824 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1828 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1835 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1836 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1837 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1838 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1843 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1844 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1845 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1846 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1848 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1849 unsigned short type, size;
1850 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1851 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1852 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1853 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1854 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1855 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1856 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1858 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1859 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1860 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1861 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1864 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1865 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1866 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1867 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1868 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1869 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1870 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1871 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1872 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1873 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1876 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1885 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1888 if (data+size > d+n)
1892 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1894 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1895 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1897 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1899 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1901 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1906 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1908 if (data + len != d+n)
1910 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1914 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1916 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1918 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1920 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1921 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1922 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1925 * returns: 0 on success. */
1926 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1927 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1931 const unsigned char *selected;
1932 unsigned char selected_len;
1935 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1941 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1942 * length-prefixed strings. */
1943 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1944 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1953 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1955 proto_len = data[i];
1961 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1967 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1968 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1969 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1970 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1971 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1972 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1973 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1975 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1978 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1979 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1984 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1988 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1990 unsigned short type;
1991 unsigned short size;
1993 unsigned char *data = *p;
1994 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1997 s->servername_done = 0;
1998 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2000 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2003 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
2004 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
2005 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
2007 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
2008 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
2011 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2013 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2014 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2017 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2018 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2019 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2023 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2024 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
2025 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2027 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2028 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2030 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
2031 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2033 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2034 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2036 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2037 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2039 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2040 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2042 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2043 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2046 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2050 if (data > (d+n-len))
2053 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2058 if (data+size > (d+n))
2061 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2063 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2064 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2065 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2066 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2068 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2069 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2070 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2071 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2072 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2073 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2074 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2075 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2076 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2077 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2078 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2079 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2080 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2081 the value of the Host: field.
2082 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2083 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2084 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2085 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2089 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2091 unsigned char *sdata;
2097 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2104 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2111 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2117 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2120 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2121 switch (servname_type)
2123 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2126 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2128 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2131 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2133 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2136 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2138 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2141 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2142 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2143 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2144 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2145 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2146 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2149 s->servername_done = 1;
2153 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2154 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2155 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2167 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2173 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2175 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2177 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2180 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2182 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2185 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2187 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2188 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2190 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2192 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2199 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2201 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2202 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2204 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2205 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2207 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2212 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2214 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2215 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2217 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2218 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2220 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2223 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2224 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2227 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2228 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2229 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2230 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2231 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2234 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2236 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2237 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2238 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2240 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2241 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2243 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2248 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2250 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2253 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2254 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2256 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2259 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2260 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2263 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2264 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2265 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2266 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2267 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2270 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2271 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2272 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2274 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2278 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2281 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2282 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2284 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2288 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2289 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2290 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2291 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2293 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2294 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2296 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2301 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2303 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2304 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2306 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2310 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2312 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2314 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2316 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2319 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2321 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2326 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2328 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2331 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2333 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2336 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2339 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2342 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2343 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2347 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request
2348 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2353 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2357 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2359 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2361 const unsigned char *sdata;
2363 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2368 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2377 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2381 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2385 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2390 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2394 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2399 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2400 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2403 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2404 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2405 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2407 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2408 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2411 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2412 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2414 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2415 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2420 /* Read in request_extensions */
2423 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2430 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2436 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2438 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2439 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2442 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2443 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2445 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2446 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2448 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2453 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2457 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2459 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2460 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2464 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2465 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2467 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2468 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2469 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2471 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2477 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2478 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2479 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2481 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2484 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2485 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2486 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2487 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2488 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2489 * anything like that, but this might change).
2491 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2492 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2493 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2494 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2495 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2496 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2500 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2501 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2502 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2504 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2506 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2507 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2508 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2512 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2513 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2515 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2520 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2522 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2523 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2527 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2531 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2533 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2535 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2539 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2540 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2541 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2544 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2545 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2546 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2547 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2548 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2550 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2554 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2555 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2556 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2558 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2560 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2561 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2562 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2563 1 /* element size */,
2566 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2569 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2570 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2572 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2579 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2580 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2581 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2582 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2583 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2585 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2587 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2589 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2591 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2592 if (type == record->ext_type)
2596 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2597 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2599 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2601 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2606 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2607 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2610 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2611 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2612 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2613 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2614 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2615 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2617 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2618 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2621 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2622 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2634 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2636 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2637 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2639 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2641 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2644 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2645 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2646 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2651 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2654 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2656 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2660 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2662 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2669 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2670 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2671 * the length of the block. */
2672 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2674 unsigned int off = 0;
2688 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2690 unsigned short length;
2691 unsigned short type;
2692 unsigned short size;
2693 unsigned char *data = *p;
2694 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2695 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2698 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2701 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2703 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2704 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2708 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2709 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2712 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2716 if (data+length != d+n)
2718 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2722 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2727 if (data+size > (d+n))
2730 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2731 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2732 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2734 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2736 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2738 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2741 tlsext_servername = 1;
2744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2745 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2747 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2748 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2750 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2752 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2755 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2756 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2757 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2759 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2762 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2763 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2765 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2766 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2767 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2768 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2769 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2772 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2774 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2776 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2777 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2779 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2782 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2785 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2788 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2790 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2791 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2793 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2797 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2800 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2801 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2803 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2807 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2808 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2809 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2810 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2812 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2814 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2816 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2821 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2823 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2824 * a status request message.
2826 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2828 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2831 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2832 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2835 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2836 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2838 unsigned char *selected;
2839 unsigned char selected_len;
2841 /* We must have requested it. */
2842 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2844 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2847 /* The data must be valid */
2848 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2850 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2853 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2855 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2858 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2859 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2861 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2864 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2865 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2866 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2870 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2874 /* We must have requested it. */
2875 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2877 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2882 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2885 /* The extension data consists of:
2886 * uint16 list_length
2887 * uint8 proto_length;
2888 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2892 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2894 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2898 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2900 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2903 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2904 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2905 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2906 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2908 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2911 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2912 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2915 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2917 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2919 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2922 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2926 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2927 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2929 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2930 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2931 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2933 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2938 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2940 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2945 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2947 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2948 * an authz hello extension if the client
2949 * didn't request a proof. */
2950 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2951 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2953 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2955 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2961 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2965 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2966 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2968 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2972 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2973 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2974 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2975 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2977 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2981 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2984 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2985 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2987 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2990 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2992 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2994 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2995 if (record->ext_type == type)
2997 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
3009 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3013 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
3015 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
3017 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
3019 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
3020 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
3022 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3028 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3038 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
3039 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
3040 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
3041 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
3042 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
3043 * absence on initial connect only.
3045 if (!renegotiate_seen
3046 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
3047 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
3049 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3051 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
3059 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3062 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3066 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
3068 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
3073 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3075 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3076 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
3078 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3079 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3081 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3082 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3087 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3091 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
3092 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3099 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3104 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
3106 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3107 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3110 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
3111 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
3113 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
3114 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
3118 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3119 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3120 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3121 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3123 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3125 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
3126 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
3127 * so this has to happen here in
3128 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
3132 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
3134 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
3137 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3138 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3143 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3144 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3145 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3147 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3149 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3150 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3152 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3153 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3155 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3156 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3158 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3159 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3161 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3162 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3165 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3169 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3171 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3172 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3173 * abort the handshake.
3175 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3176 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3184 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3185 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3188 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3189 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3192 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3193 s->servername_done=0;
3199 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3201 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3204 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3205 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3206 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3207 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3209 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3212 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3213 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3214 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3215 if (certpkey == NULL)
3217 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3220 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3221 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3223 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3224 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3227 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3228 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3229 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3231 /* status request response should be sent */
3232 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3233 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3234 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3236 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3238 /* something bad happened */
3239 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3240 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3241 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3246 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3251 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3252 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3255 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3256 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3264 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3266 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3267 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3270 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3271 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3272 * it must contain uncompressed.
3274 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3275 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3276 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3277 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3278 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3280 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3282 unsigned char *list;
3283 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3284 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3285 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3287 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3289 found_uncompressed = 1;
3293 if (!found_uncompressed)
3295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3299 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3300 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3302 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3303 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3304 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3305 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3307 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3308 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3310 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3311 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3313 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3315 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3316 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3319 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3320 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3321 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3322 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3324 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3325 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3330 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3333 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3334 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3337 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3338 * there is no response.
3340 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3342 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3343 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3345 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3346 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3349 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3350 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3354 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3355 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3361 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3362 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3365 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3366 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3369 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3370 s->servername_done=0;
3376 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3379 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3381 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3383 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3387 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3395 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3396 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3397 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3399 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3400 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3401 * extension, if any.
3402 * len: the length of the session ID.
3403 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3404 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3405 * point to the resulting session.
3407 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3408 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3409 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3412 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3413 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3414 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3415 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3416 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3417 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3418 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3421 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3422 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3423 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3424 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3425 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3426 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3428 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3429 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3431 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3432 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3436 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3438 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3439 * to permit stateful resumption.
3441 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3443 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3447 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3455 /* Skip past cipher list */
3460 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3465 /* Now at start of extensions */
3466 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3469 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3471 unsigned short type, size;
3474 if (p + size > limit)
3476 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3481 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3482 * currently have one. */
3483 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3486 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3488 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3489 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3490 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3491 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3492 * calculate the master secret later. */
3495 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3498 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3499 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3501 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3503 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3504 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3506 default: /* fatal error */
3515 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3517 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3518 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3519 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3520 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3521 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3522 * point to the resulting session.
3525 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3526 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3527 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3528 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3530 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3531 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3532 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3535 unsigned char *sdec;
3536 const unsigned char *p;
3537 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3538 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3541 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3542 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3545 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3546 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3547 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3548 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3550 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3551 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3562 /* Check key name matches */
3563 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3565 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3566 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3567 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3568 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3570 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3571 * integrity checks on ticket.
3573 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3576 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3580 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3581 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3582 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3583 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3584 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3586 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3587 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3588 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3589 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3590 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3593 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3596 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3597 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3600 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3603 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3607 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3608 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3609 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3610 * as required by standard.
3613 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3614 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3622 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3627 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3635 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3636 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3637 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3638 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3639 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3640 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3641 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3644 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3645 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3646 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3647 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3650 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3653 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3655 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3661 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3664 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3666 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3667 return table[i].nid;
3672 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3677 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3678 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3681 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3684 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3685 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3689 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3691 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3692 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3695 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3700 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3708 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3712 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3713 return EVP_sha224();
3715 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3716 return EVP_sha256();
3718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3719 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3720 return EVP_sha384();
3722 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3723 return EVP_sha512();
3731 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3736 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3737 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3740 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3741 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3744 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3745 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3751 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3752 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3753 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3755 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3756 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3758 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3760 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3761 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3763 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3765 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3767 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3768 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3770 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3774 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3775 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3776 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3778 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3781 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3782 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3783 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3784 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3786 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3787 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3788 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3790 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3791 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3793 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3795 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3797 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3802 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3803 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3804 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3806 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3817 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3818 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3820 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3821 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3823 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3825 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3826 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3827 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3829 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3830 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3832 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3834 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3835 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3838 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3839 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3843 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3844 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3850 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3851 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3853 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3856 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3859 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3860 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3861 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3866 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3868 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3874 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3875 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3876 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3878 /* Should never happen */
3882 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3883 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3885 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3886 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3888 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3890 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3891 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3893 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3894 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3896 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3898 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3900 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3903 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3904 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3905 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3906 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3907 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3909 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3910 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3916 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3917 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3919 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3920 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3922 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3923 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3924 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3925 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3927 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3928 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3933 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3934 * use the certificate for signing.
3936 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3938 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3939 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3941 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3942 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3943 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3946 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3948 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3949 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3953 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3954 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3961 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3962 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3963 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3965 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3971 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3978 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3980 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3983 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3984 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3985 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3987 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3988 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3992 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3994 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3996 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3998 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
4000 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
4001 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
4005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
4007 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4009 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
4010 unsigned short hbtype;
4011 unsigned int payload;
4012 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4014 /* Read type and payload length first */
4019 if (s->msg_callback)
4020 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4021 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
4022 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4024 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
4026 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
4029 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
4030 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
4031 * payload, plus padding
4033 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4036 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4037 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4039 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4041 /* Random padding */
4042 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4044 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4046 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4047 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4048 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4049 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4051 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4056 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4060 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4061 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4062 * sequence number */
4065 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4068 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4076 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4078 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4080 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4081 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4083 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4084 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4085 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4091 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4092 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4098 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4099 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4105 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4106 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4108 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4110 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4111 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4112 * some random stuff.
4113 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4114 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4115 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4116 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4119 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4122 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4123 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4125 /* Sequence number */
4126 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4127 /* 16 random bytes */
4128 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4130 /* Random padding */
4131 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4133 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4136 if (s->msg_callback)
4137 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4138 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4139 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4141 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4150 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4155 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4158 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4160 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4163 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4164 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4166 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4168 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4170 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4178 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4179 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4180 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4181 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4182 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4183 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4186 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4187 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4188 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4189 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4192 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4194 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4195 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4198 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4199 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4203 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4204 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4205 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4209 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4213 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4216 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4218 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4223 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4224 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4226 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4228 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4229 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4230 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4231 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4233 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4241 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4242 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4243 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4244 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4248 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4249 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4250 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4251 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4257 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4261 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4265 if (default_nid == -1)
4267 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4269 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4270 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4271 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4275 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4276 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4280 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4281 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4283 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4289 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4290 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4291 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4292 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4295 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4297 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4298 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4299 /* Strict mode flags */
4300 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4301 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4302 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4304 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4309 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4310 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4312 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4313 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4316 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4320 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4323 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4325 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4327 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4328 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4331 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4332 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4333 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4335 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4336 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4345 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4348 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4349 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4350 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4352 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4360 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4361 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4362 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4365 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4371 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4372 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4375 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4378 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4379 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4381 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4386 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4387 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4388 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4389 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4390 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4393 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4394 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4395 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4396 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4400 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4401 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4409 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4410 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4413 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4416 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4417 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4419 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4422 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4430 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4431 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4433 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4436 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4437 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4438 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4440 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4445 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4453 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4454 else if(check_flags)
4455 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4457 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4458 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4459 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4460 else if (!check_flags)
4463 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4464 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4465 else if (strict_mode)
4467 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4468 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4470 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4471 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4475 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4483 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4485 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4490 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4493 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4496 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4501 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4502 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4503 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4504 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4505 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4510 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4515 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4519 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4520 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4522 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4524 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4526 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4530 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4534 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4537 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4539 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4540 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4542 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4544 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4545 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4547 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4549 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4551 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4552 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4554 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4559 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4563 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4565 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4566 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4570 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4572 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4573 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4574 else if (cpk->digest)
4575 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4578 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4580 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4581 * if the chain is invalid.
4585 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4586 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4589 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4590 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4597 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4598 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4600 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4601 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4602 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4603 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4604 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4605 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4607 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4608 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4610 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);