2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
145 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
159 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173 s->version = s->method->version;
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
178 static int nid_list[] =
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
208 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
215 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
246 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
247 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
250 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
252 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
253 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
254 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
256 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
259 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
261 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
264 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
266 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
268 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
270 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
272 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
274 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
276 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
278 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
280 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
286 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
288 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
290 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
292 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
294 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
296 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
298 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
300 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
302 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
306 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
308 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
310 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
312 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
318 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
321 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
322 const unsigned char **pcurves,
327 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
328 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
331 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
332 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
334 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
335 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
336 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
339 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
340 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
344 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
345 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
349 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
350 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
354 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
355 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
358 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
359 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
361 const unsigned char *curves;
363 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
364 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
366 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
369 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
372 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
374 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
377 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
379 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
382 else /* Should never happen */
385 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
386 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
388 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
394 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
395 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
399 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
401 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
402 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
404 /* Can't do anything on client side */
411 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
412 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
415 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
416 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
418 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
419 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
420 /* Should never happen */
423 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
426 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
433 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
435 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
436 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
438 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
442 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
443 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
454 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
455 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
457 unsigned char *clist, *p;
459 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
460 * while curve ids < 32
462 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
463 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
466 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
468 unsigned long idmask;
470 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
472 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
483 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
487 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
492 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
495 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
497 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
501 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
503 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
505 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
507 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
508 if (nid == NID_undef)
509 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
510 if (nid == NID_undef)
511 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
512 if (nid == NID_undef)
514 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
515 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
517 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
520 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
521 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
526 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
530 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
532 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
533 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
539 const EC_METHOD *meth;
542 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
543 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
544 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
547 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
550 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
554 /* Determine curve ID */
555 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
556 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
557 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
561 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
573 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
576 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
578 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
581 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
585 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
586 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
587 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
589 const unsigned char *p;
592 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
593 * is supported (see RFC4492).
595 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
597 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
598 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
599 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
609 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
610 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
612 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
613 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
615 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
620 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
627 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
630 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
632 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
634 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
635 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
639 *pformats = ecformats_default;
640 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
642 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
644 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
648 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
649 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
651 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
653 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
656 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
659 /* If not EC nothing to do */
660 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
665 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
669 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
670 * supported curves extension.
672 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
675 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
676 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
678 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
685 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
686 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
687 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
688 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
689 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
691 return 0; /* Should never happen */
692 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
693 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
695 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
699 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
700 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
702 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
707 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
708 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
710 unsigned char curve_id[2];
711 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
712 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
713 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
714 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
717 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
718 * no other curves permitted.
722 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
723 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
724 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
725 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
726 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
730 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
731 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
733 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
734 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
736 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
739 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
742 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
744 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
750 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
752 /* Need a shared curve */
753 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
759 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
764 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
766 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
770 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
776 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
781 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
785 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
786 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
789 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
790 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
792 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
795 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
796 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
798 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
801 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
802 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
804 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
807 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
808 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
809 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
810 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
812 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
814 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
815 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
818 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
819 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
821 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
822 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
825 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
829 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
830 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
831 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
834 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
836 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
839 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
840 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
842 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
843 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
844 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
846 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
847 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
850 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
851 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
855 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
856 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
858 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
859 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
861 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
863 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
864 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
868 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
870 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
872 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
875 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
878 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
879 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
881 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
882 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
884 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
885 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
886 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
887 /* Should never happen */
890 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
891 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
897 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
899 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
900 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
901 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
903 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
908 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
913 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
915 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
917 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
918 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
922 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
924 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
927 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
935 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
939 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
940 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
941 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
943 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
946 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
947 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
952 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
955 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
958 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
961 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
962 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
965 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
966 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
967 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
968 * session and not global settings.
971 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
974 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
975 size_t i, sigalgslen;
976 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
979 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
980 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
981 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
984 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
985 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
988 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
989 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
994 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
999 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1004 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1010 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1011 * signature algorithms.
1015 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1016 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1020 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1021 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1025 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1026 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1029 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1031 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1032 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1035 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1036 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1037 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1039 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1040 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1042 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1046 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1047 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1049 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1050 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1059 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1062 unsigned char *ret = p;
1063 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1064 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1066 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1069 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1070 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1072 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1074 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1076 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1077 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1078 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1079 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1088 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1089 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1090 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1095 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1097 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1099 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1100 unsigned long size_str;
1103 /* check for enough space.
1104 4 for the servername type and entension length
1105 2 for servernamelist length
1106 1 for the hostname type
1107 2 for hostname length
1111 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1112 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1115 /* extension type and length */
1116 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1117 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1119 /* length of servername list */
1120 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1122 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1123 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1125 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1129 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1134 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1140 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1142 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1145 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1155 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1156 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1157 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1159 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1160 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1166 /* check for enough space.
1167 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1168 1 for the srp user identity
1169 + srp user identity length
1171 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1173 /* fill in the extension */
1174 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1175 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1176 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1177 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1185 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1187 const unsigned char *plist;
1190 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1192 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1193 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1200 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1201 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1202 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1203 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1206 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1207 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1208 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1210 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1211 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1212 if (plistlen > 65532)
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1218 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1219 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1221 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1222 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1223 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1224 * resolves this to two bytes.
1227 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1230 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1232 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1235 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1236 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1237 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1238 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1240 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1241 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1242 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1244 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1245 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1247 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1251 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1252 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1254 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1257 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1258 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1262 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1268 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1271 const unsigned char *salg;
1272 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1273 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1275 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1276 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1278 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1282 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1283 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1284 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1286 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1288 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1290 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1293 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1296 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1301 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1302 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1305 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1309 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1311 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1312 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1318 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1320 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1327 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1328 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1329 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1331 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1332 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1334 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1336 /* save position of id len */
1337 unsigned char *q = ret;
1338 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1339 /* skip over id len */
1341 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1347 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1351 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1352 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1355 * 1: peer may send requests
1356 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1358 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1359 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1361 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1365 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1367 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1368 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1369 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1371 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1376 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1380 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1382 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1384 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1387 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1395 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1396 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1397 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1398 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1399 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1400 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1402 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1403 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1405 if (limit < ret + 6)
1408 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1409 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1411 *(ret++) = list_len;
1412 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1415 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1416 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1419 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1421 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1423 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1424 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1426 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1427 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1428 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1432 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1436 return NULL; /* error */
1437 if (cb_retval == -1)
1438 continue; /* skip this extension */
1440 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1442 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1444 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1449 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1456 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1459 unsigned char *ret = p;
1460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1461 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1464 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1465 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1466 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1467 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1469 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1470 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1474 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1476 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1478 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1480 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1484 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1488 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1494 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1496 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1499 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1509 if (using_ecc && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1511 const unsigned char *plist;
1513 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1516 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1518 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1519 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1526 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1527 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1528 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1529 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1533 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1534 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1536 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1537 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1539 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1540 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1544 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1546 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1547 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1551 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1552 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1553 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1555 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1557 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1559 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1562 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1565 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1574 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1576 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1578 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1581 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1589 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1590 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1591 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1592 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1593 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1594 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1595 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1596 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1597 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1598 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1599 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1604 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1605 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1606 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1608 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1611 * 1: peer may send requests
1612 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1614 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1615 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1617 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1623 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1624 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1625 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1627 const unsigned char *npa;
1628 unsigned int npalen;
1631 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1632 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1634 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1635 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1637 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1639 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1644 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1646 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1648 size_t authz_length;
1649 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1650 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1651 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1652 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1653 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1655 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1657 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1658 * uint8_t authz_type
1660 * uint8_t data[length]
1662 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1663 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1665 unsigned short length;
1669 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1671 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1675 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1683 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1684 * 2 bytes for extension type
1685 * 2 bytes for extension length
1686 * 1 byte for the list length
1687 * n bytes for the list */
1688 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1690 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1691 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1693 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1694 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1698 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1700 unsigned short length;
1705 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1707 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1710 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1717 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1718 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1722 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1725 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1727 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1729 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1730 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1732 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1733 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1736 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1739 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1743 return NULL; /* error */
1744 if (cb_retval == -1)
1745 break; /* skip this extension */
1746 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1748 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1750 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1758 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1765 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1767 unsigned short type;
1768 unsigned short size;
1770 unsigned char *data = *p;
1771 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1774 s->servername_done = 0;
1775 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1777 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1780 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1781 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1782 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1784 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1785 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1787 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1788 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1790 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1791 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1793 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1794 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1796 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1797 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1799 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1800 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1803 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1807 if (data > (d+n-len))
1810 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1815 if (data+size > (d+n))
1818 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1820 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1821 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1822 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1823 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1825 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1826 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1827 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1828 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1829 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1830 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1831 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1832 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1833 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1834 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1835 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1836 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1837 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1838 the value of the Host: field.
1839 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1840 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1841 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1842 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1846 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1848 unsigned char *sdata;
1854 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1861 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1868 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1874 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1877 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1878 switch (servname_type)
1880 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1883 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1885 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1888 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1890 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1893 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1895 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1898 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1899 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1900 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1901 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1902 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1903 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1906 s->servername_done = 1;
1910 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1911 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1912 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1924 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1930 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1932 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1934 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1937 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1939 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1942 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1944 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1945 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1947 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1949 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1956 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1957 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1959 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1960 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1962 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1963 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1965 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1970 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1972 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1973 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1975 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1976 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1978 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1981 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1982 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1985 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1986 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1987 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1988 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1989 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1992 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1993 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1995 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1996 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1997 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1999 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2000 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2002 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2007 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2009 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2012 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2013 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2015 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2018 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2019 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2022 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2023 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2024 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2025 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2026 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2029 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2030 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2031 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2032 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2034 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2038 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2041 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2042 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2044 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2048 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2049 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2050 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2051 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2053 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2054 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2056 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2061 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2063 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2064 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2066 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2070 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2072 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2074 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2076 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2079 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2081 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2086 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2088 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2091 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2093 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2096 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2099 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2102 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2103 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2107 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2108 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2113 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2117 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2119 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2121 const unsigned char *sdata;
2123 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2128 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2137 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2141 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2145 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2150 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2154 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2159 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2160 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2163 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2164 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2165 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2167 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2168 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2171 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2172 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2174 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2175 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2180 /* Read in request_extensions */
2183 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2190 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2196 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2198 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2199 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2202 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2203 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2205 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2206 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2208 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2213 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2217 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2220 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2224 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2225 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2227 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2228 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2229 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2231 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2237 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2238 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2240 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2243 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2244 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2245 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2246 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2247 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2248 * anything like that, but this might change).
2250 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2251 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2252 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2253 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2254 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2255 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2259 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2260 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2262 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2267 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2269 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2270 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2274 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2278 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2280 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2282 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2286 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2287 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2288 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2291 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2292 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2293 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2294 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2295 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2297 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2301 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2302 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2303 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2305 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2307 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2308 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2309 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2310 1 /* element size */,
2313 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2316 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2317 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2319 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2326 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2327 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2328 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2329 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2330 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2332 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2334 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2336 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2338 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2339 if (type == record->ext_type)
2343 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2344 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2346 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2348 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2353 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2354 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2357 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2358 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2359 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2360 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2361 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2362 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2364 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2365 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2368 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2369 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2381 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2383 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2384 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2386 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2388 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2391 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2392 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2393 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2398 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2401 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2403 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2407 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2416 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2417 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2418 * the length of the block. */
2419 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2421 unsigned int off = 0;
2435 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2437 unsigned short length;
2438 unsigned short type;
2439 unsigned short size;
2440 unsigned char *data = *p;
2441 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2442 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2445 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2449 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2450 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2453 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2457 if (data+length != d+n)
2459 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2463 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2468 if (data+size > (d+n))
2471 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2472 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2473 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2475 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2477 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2479 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2482 tlsext_servername = 1;
2485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2486 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2487 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2489 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2490 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2492 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2494 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2497 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2498 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2499 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2501 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2504 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2505 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2507 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2508 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2509 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2510 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2511 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2514 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2516 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2518 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2519 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2521 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2524 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2527 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2530 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2532 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2533 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2534 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2536 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2540 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2543 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2544 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2546 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2550 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2551 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2552 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2553 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2555 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2557 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2559 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2564 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2565 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2567 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2568 * a status request message.
2570 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2572 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2575 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2576 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2579 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2580 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2582 unsigned char *selected;
2583 unsigned char selected_len;
2585 /* We must have requested it. */
2586 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2588 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2591 /* The data must be valid */
2592 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2594 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2597 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2599 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2602 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2603 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2605 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2608 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2609 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2610 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2613 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2615 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2617 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2620 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2624 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2625 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2627 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2628 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2629 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2631 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2636 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2638 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2643 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2645 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2646 * an authz hello extension if the client
2647 * didn't request a proof. */
2648 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2649 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2651 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2653 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2659 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2663 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2664 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2666 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2670 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2671 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2672 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2673 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2675 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2679 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2682 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2683 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2685 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2688 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2690 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2692 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2693 if (record->ext_type == type)
2695 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2707 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2711 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2713 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2715 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2717 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2718 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2720 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2726 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2736 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2737 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2738 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2739 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2740 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2741 * absence on initial connect only.
2743 if (!renegotiate_seen
2744 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2745 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2747 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2749 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2757 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2760 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2764 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2766 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2771 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2773 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2774 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2776 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2777 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2779 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2780 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2782 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2785 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2789 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2790 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2797 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2802 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2804 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2805 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2808 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2809 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2811 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2812 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2816 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2817 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2818 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2819 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2821 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2823 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2824 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2825 * so this has to happen here in
2826 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2830 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2832 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2835 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2836 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2841 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2842 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2843 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2845 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2847 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2848 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2850 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2851 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2853 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2854 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2856 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2857 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2859 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2860 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2863 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2867 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2869 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2870 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2871 * abort the handshake.
2873 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2874 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2882 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2883 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2886 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2887 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2890 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2891 s->servername_done=0;
2897 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2899 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2902 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2903 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2904 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2905 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2907 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2910 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2911 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2912 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2913 if (certpkey == NULL)
2915 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2918 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2919 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2921 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2922 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2925 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2926 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2927 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2929 /* status request response should be sent */
2930 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2931 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2932 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2934 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2936 /* something bad happened */
2937 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2938 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2939 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2944 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2949 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2950 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2953 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2954 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2962 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2964 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2965 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2968 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2969 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2970 * it must contain uncompressed.
2972 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2973 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2974 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2975 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2976 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2978 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2980 unsigned char *list;
2981 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2982 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2983 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2985 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2987 found_uncompressed = 1;
2991 if (!found_uncompressed)
2993 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2997 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2998 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3000 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3001 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3002 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3003 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3005 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3006 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3008 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3009 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3011 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3013 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3014 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3017 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3018 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3019 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3020 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3022 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3023 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3028 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3031 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3032 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3035 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3036 * there is no response.
3038 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3040 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3041 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3043 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3044 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3047 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3048 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3052 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3053 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3059 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3060 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3063 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3064 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3067 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3068 s->servername_done=0;
3074 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3077 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3079 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3081 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3085 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3087 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3093 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3094 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3095 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3097 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3098 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3099 * extension, if any.
3100 * len: the length of the session ID.
3101 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3102 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3103 * point to the resulting session.
3105 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3106 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3107 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3110 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3111 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3112 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3113 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3114 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3115 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3116 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3119 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3120 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3121 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3122 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3123 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3124 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3126 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3127 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3129 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3130 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3134 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3136 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3137 * to permit stateful resumption.
3139 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3141 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3145 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3146 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
3153 /* Skip past cipher list */
3158 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3163 /* Now at start of extensions */
3164 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3167 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3169 unsigned short type, size;
3172 if (p + size > limit)
3174 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3179 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3180 * currently have one. */
3181 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3184 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3186 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3187 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3188 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3189 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3190 * calculate the master secret later. */
3193 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3196 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3197 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3199 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3201 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3202 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3204 default: /* fatal error */
3213 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3215 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3216 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3217 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3218 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3219 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3220 * point to the resulting session.
3223 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3224 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3225 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3226 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3228 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3229 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3230 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3233 unsigned char *sdec;
3234 const unsigned char *p;
3235 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3236 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3239 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3240 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3243 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3244 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3245 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3246 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3248 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3249 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3260 /* Check key name matches */
3261 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3263 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3264 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3265 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3266 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3268 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3269 * integrity checks on ticket.
3271 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3274 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3278 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3279 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3280 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3281 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3282 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3284 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3285 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3286 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3287 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3288 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3291 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3294 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3295 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3298 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3301 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3305 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3306 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3307 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3308 * as required by standard.
3311 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3312 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3320 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3325 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3333 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3334 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3335 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3336 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3337 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3338 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3339 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3342 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3343 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3344 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3345 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3348 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3351 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3353 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3359 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3362 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3364 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3365 return table[i].nid;
3370 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3375 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3376 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3379 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3382 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3383 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3387 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3389 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3390 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3393 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3398 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3405 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3406 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3410 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3411 return EVP_sha224();
3413 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3414 return EVP_sha256();
3416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3417 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3418 return EVP_sha384();
3420 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3421 return EVP_sha512();
3429 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3434 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3435 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3438 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3439 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3442 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3443 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3449 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3450 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3451 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3453 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3454 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3456 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3458 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3459 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3461 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3463 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3465 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3466 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3468 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3472 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3473 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3474 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3476 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3479 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3480 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3481 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3482 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3484 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3485 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3486 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3488 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3489 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3491 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3493 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3495 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3500 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3501 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3502 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3504 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3515 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3516 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3518 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3519 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3521 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3523 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3524 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3525 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3527 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3528 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3530 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3532 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3533 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3536 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3537 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3541 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3542 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3548 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3549 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3551 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3554 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3557 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3558 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3559 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3564 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3566 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3572 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3573 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
3574 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3576 /* Should never happen */
3580 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3581 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3583 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3584 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3586 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3588 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3589 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3591 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3592 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3594 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3596 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3598 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3601 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3602 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3603 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3604 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3605 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3607 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3608 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3614 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3615 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3617 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3618 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3620 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3621 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3622 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3623 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3625 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3626 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3631 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3632 * use the certificate for signing.
3634 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3636 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3637 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3640 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3641 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3644 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3646 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3647 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3650 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3651 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3652 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3659 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3660 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3661 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3663 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3669 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3676 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3678 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3681 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3682 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3683 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3685 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3686 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3690 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3692 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3694 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3696 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3698 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3699 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3703 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3705 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3707 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3708 unsigned short hbtype;
3709 unsigned int payload;
3710 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3712 /* Read type and payload length first */
3717 if (s->msg_callback)
3718 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3719 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3720 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3722 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3724 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3727 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3728 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3729 * payload, plus padding
3731 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3734 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3735 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3737 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3739 /* Random padding */
3740 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3742 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3744 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3745 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3746 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3747 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3749 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3754 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3758 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3759 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3760 * sequence number */
3763 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3766 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3774 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3776 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3778 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3779 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3781 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3782 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3783 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3785 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3789 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3790 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3792 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3796 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3797 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3799 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3803 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3804 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3806 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3808 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3809 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3810 * some random stuff.
3811 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3812 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3813 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3814 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3817 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3820 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3821 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3823 /* Sequence number */
3824 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3825 /* 16 random bytes */
3826 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3828 /* Random padding */
3829 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3831 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3834 if (s->msg_callback)
3835 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3836 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3837 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3839 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3848 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3853 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3856 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3858 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3861 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3862 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3864 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3866 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3868 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3876 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3877 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3878 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3879 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3880 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3881 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3884 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3885 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3886 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3887 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3890 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3892 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3893 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3896 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3897 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3901 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3902 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3903 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3907 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3911 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3914 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3916 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3921 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3922 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3924 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3926 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3927 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3928 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3929 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3931 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3939 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3940 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3941 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3942 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3946 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3947 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3948 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3949 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3955 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3959 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3963 if (default_nid == -1)
3965 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3967 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3968 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3969 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3973 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3974 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3978 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3979 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3981 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3987 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3988 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3989 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3990 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
3993 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3995 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3996 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3997 /* Strict mode flags */
3998 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3999 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4000 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4002 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4007 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4008 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4010 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4011 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4014 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4018 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4021 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4023 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4025 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4026 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4029 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4030 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4031 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4033 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4034 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4043 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4046 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4047 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4048 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4050 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4058 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4059 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4060 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4063 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4069 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4070 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4073 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4076 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4077 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4079 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4084 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4085 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4086 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4087 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4088 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4091 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4092 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4093 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4094 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4098 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4099 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4107 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4108 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4111 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4114 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4115 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4117 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4120 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4128 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4129 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4131 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4134 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4135 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4136 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4138 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4143 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4151 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4152 else if(check_flags)
4153 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4155 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4156 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4157 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4158 else if (!check_flags)
4161 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4162 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4163 else if (strict_mode)
4165 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4166 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4168 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4169 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4173 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4181 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4183 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4188 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4191 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4194 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4199 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4200 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4201 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4202 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4203 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4208 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4213 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4217 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4218 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4220 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4222 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4224 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4228 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4232 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4235 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4237 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4238 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4240 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4242 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4243 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4245 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4247 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4249 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4250 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4252 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4257 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4261 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4263 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4264 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4268 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4270 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4271 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4272 else if (cpk->digest)
4273 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4276 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4278 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4279 * if the chain is invalid.
4283 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4284 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4287 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4288 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4295 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4296 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4298 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4299 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4300 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4301 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4302 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4303 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4305 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4306 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4308 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);