2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
65 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
68 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
69 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
70 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
71 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
73 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
74 * (transition not allowed)
76 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
78 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
81 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
82 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
83 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
85 switch (st->hand_state) {
89 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
90 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
91 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
96 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
97 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
98 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
99 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
106 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
107 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
108 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
114 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
122 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
123 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
124 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
135 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
144 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
145 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
147 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
149 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
150 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
156 /* No valid transition found */
161 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
162 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
163 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
164 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
166 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
167 * (transition not allowed)
169 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
171 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
173 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
174 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
179 switch (st->hand_state) {
185 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
186 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
187 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
192 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
194 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
195 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
197 * 2) If we did request one then
198 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
200 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
201 * list if we requested a certificate)
203 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
204 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
205 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
206 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
207 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
209 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
210 * not going to accept it because we require a client
213 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
214 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
215 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
216 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
219 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
223 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
226 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
235 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
236 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
241 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
243 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
244 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
245 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
246 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
247 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
250 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
251 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
253 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
254 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
255 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
256 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
258 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
262 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
263 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
269 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
270 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
271 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
276 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
278 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
279 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
280 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
285 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
295 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
296 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
303 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
304 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
305 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
312 /* No valid transition found */
313 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
314 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
319 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
321 * Valid return values are:
325 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
327 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
330 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
331 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
332 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
333 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
334 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
337 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
339 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
343 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
344 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
345 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
346 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
347 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
350 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
351 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
361 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
363 * Valid return values are:
367 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
370 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
371 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
373 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
374 * during re-negotiation:
376 && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
377 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
379 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
380 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
383 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
385 * ... except when the application insists on
386 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
389 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
390 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
391 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
393 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
396 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
404 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
405 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
408 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
410 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
413 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
414 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
417 switch (st->hand_state) {
419 /* Shouldn't happen */
420 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
423 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
424 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
425 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
427 /* Try to read from the client instead */
428 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
430 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
431 if (s->hello_retry_request)
432 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
437 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
438 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
440 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
441 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
442 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
444 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
446 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
447 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
448 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
452 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
454 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
455 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
462 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
463 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
464 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
466 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
467 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
468 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
470 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
471 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
473 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
475 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
476 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
478 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
479 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
485 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
486 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
487 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
492 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
493 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
494 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
495 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
500 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
501 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
503 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
505 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
508 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
509 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
513 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
515 switch (st->hand_state) {
517 /* Shouldn't happen */
518 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
521 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
522 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
524 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
525 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
527 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
528 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
529 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
530 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
535 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
536 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
538 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
539 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
540 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
542 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
543 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
544 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
545 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
547 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
548 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
550 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
551 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
553 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
555 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
558 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
560 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
561 /* normal PSK or SRP */
562 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
563 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
564 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
565 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
567 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
573 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
576 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
583 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
584 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
589 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
590 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
592 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
596 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
597 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
598 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
600 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
601 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
603 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
606 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
607 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
612 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
614 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
616 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
618 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
619 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
620 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
622 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
624 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
626 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
627 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
632 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
633 * the server to the client.
635 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
637 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
639 switch (st->hand_state) {
641 /* No pre work to be done */
644 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
647 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
650 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
652 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
653 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
654 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
659 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
660 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
662 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
663 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
669 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
671 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
672 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
674 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
676 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
677 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
679 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
680 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
681 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
683 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
684 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
686 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
687 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
693 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
694 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
695 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
696 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
699 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
701 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
702 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
703 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
704 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
708 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
710 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
711 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING)
712 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
716 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
719 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
723 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
724 * server to the client.
726 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
728 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
732 switch (st->hand_state) {
734 /* No post work to be done */
737 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
738 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
742 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
743 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
745 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
746 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
751 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
752 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
754 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
755 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
756 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
760 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
761 * treat like it was the first packet
766 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
768 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
769 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
770 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
773 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
776 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
777 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
779 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
780 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
781 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
783 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
787 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
788 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
792 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
793 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
794 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
795 * something clever in the record layer for this.
797 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
798 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
799 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
800 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
803 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
804 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
805 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
810 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
812 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
814 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
817 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
821 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
822 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
824 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
829 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
832 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
833 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
837 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
838 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
841 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
843 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
846 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
850 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
851 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
852 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
853 &s->session->master_key_length)
854 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
855 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
860 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
861 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
863 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
867 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
868 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
873 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
877 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
880 * Valid return values are:
884 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
885 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
887 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
889 switch (st->hand_state) {
891 /* Shouldn't happen */
894 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
896 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
898 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
899 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
902 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
903 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
904 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
907 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
908 /* No construction function needed */
910 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
913 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
914 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
915 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
919 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
920 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
923 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
924 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
925 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
929 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
930 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
931 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
934 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
935 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
936 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
939 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
940 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
941 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
944 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
945 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
946 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
949 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
950 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
951 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
954 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
955 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
956 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
959 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
964 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
965 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
966 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
969 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
970 *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request;
971 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
974 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
975 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
976 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
984 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
985 * calculated as follows:
987 * 2 + # client_version
988 * 32 + # only valid length for random
989 * 1 + # length of session_id
990 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
991 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
992 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
993 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
994 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
995 * 2 + # length of extensions
996 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
998 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1000 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1001 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1004 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1005 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1007 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1009 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1011 switch (st->hand_state) {
1013 /* Shouldn't happen */
1016 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1017 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1019 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1020 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1022 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1023 return s->max_cert_list;
1025 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1026 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1028 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1029 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1031 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1032 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1033 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1036 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1037 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1039 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1040 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1042 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1043 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1048 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1050 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1052 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1054 switch (st->hand_state) {
1056 /* Shouldn't happen */
1057 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1059 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1060 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1062 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1063 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1065 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1066 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1068 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1069 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1071 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1072 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1075 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1076 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1079 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1080 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1082 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1083 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1085 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1086 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1092 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1095 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1097 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1099 switch (st->hand_state) {
1101 /* Shouldn't happen */
1104 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1105 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1107 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1108 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1110 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1114 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
1116 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
1118 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1120 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1121 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1122 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1124 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1127 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
1128 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
1130 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
1137 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1140 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1141 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1142 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1148 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1150 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1151 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1152 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1153 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1154 cookie_leni > 255) {
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1156 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1159 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1161 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1162 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1163 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1172 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1173 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1174 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1178 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1180 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1181 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1182 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1183 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1185 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1187 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1188 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1189 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1190 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1191 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1192 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1193 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1195 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1196 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1197 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1198 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1199 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1200 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1201 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1202 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1203 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1204 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1205 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1206 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1207 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1209 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1210 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1215 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1217 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1218 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1219 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1223 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1226 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1227 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1229 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1232 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1234 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1236 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1237 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1238 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1239 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1240 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello;
1242 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1243 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1247 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1248 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1254 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1256 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1257 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1259 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1262 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) {
1263 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1269 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1270 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1271 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1272 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1274 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1275 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1277 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1278 * 7-8 session_id_length
1279 * 9-10 challenge_length
1283 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1284 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1286 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1287 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1288 * in the first place
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1295 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1296 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1301 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1302 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1304 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1305 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1306 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1308 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1311 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1312 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1313 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1315 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1316 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1320 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1321 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1322 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1326 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1328 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1329 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1330 /* No extensions. */
1331 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1333 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1334 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1337 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1339 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1340 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1341 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1342 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1344 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1345 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1346 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1347 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1348 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1349 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1350 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1351 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1352 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1353 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1357 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1359 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1360 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1361 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1362 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1363 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1364 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1365 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1370 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1371 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1372 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1376 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1377 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1378 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1379 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1380 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1384 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1385 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1386 * So check cookie length...
1388 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1389 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1394 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1395 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1400 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1401 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1406 /* Could be empty. */
1407 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1408 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1410 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)) {
1411 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1418 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1419 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1420 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1421 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1426 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1427 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1428 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1429 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, &al,
1430 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1431 /* SSLerr already been called */
1434 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1436 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1438 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1440 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1442 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1443 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1445 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1448 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, int *pal)
1451 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1456 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1458 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1459 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1460 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1461 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1462 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1464 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1465 /* Give the early callback a crack at things */
1466 if (s->ctx->early_cb != NULL) {
1468 /* A failure in the early callback terminates the connection. */
1469 code = s->ctx->early_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->early_cb_arg);
1473 s->rwstate = SSL_EARLY_WORK;
1478 /* Set up the client_random */
1479 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1481 /* Choose the version */
1483 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1484 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1485 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1486 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1488 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1491 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1495 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1498 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1499 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1501 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1502 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1503 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1504 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1505 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1512 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1513 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1514 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1516 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1520 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1521 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1522 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1524 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1528 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1529 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1530 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1531 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1532 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1533 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1534 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1536 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1538 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1540 /* default verification */
1541 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1542 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1543 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1544 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1548 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1550 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1551 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1552 if (protverr != 0) {
1553 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1554 s->version = s->client_version;
1555 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1563 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1564 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1565 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1566 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1572 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1573 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1575 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1576 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1577 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1578 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1579 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1580 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1581 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1582 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1583 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1584 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1587 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1589 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1590 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1593 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello, &al);
1595 /* previous session */
1597 } else if (i == -1) {
1601 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1606 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1607 clienthello->isv2, &al) ||
1608 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1609 clienthello->isv2, &al)) {
1613 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1614 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1615 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1616 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1617 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1618 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1619 if (s->renegotiate) {
1620 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1622 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1623 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1626 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1627 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1628 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1630 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1631 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1632 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1633 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1634 * an insecure downgrade.
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1637 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1638 al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
1644 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1647 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1650 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1652 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1653 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1655 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1656 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1665 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1668 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1670 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1675 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1676 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1680 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1682 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1683 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1688 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1689 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1690 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1692 /* TLS extensions */
1693 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1694 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1700 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1701 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1702 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1703 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1707 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1708 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1713 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1714 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1716 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1717 * backwards compat reasons
1719 int master_key_length;
1721 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1722 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1723 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1725 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1726 && master_key_length > 0) {
1727 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1729 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1730 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1734 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1735 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1736 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1737 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1738 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1739 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1744 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1745 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1746 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1747 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1748 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1753 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1754 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1755 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1757 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1758 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1760 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1761 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1762 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1764 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1765 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1767 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1771 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1772 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1773 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1774 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1776 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1777 /* Can't disable compression */
1778 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1780 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1783 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1784 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1785 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1786 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1787 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1791 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1793 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1796 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1797 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1798 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1801 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1802 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1803 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1804 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1807 } else if (s->hit) {
1809 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1810 /* See if we have a match */
1811 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1814 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1815 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1816 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1818 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1819 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1828 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1834 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1835 * using compression.
1837 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1844 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1847 if (!s->hit || s->hello_retry_request) {
1848 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1849 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1850 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1851 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1852 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1859 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1860 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1862 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1864 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1870 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1871 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1872 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1873 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1874 s->clienthello = NULL;
1877 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1880 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1881 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1882 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1883 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1884 s->clienthello = NULL;
1890 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1891 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
1893 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al)
1895 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1898 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1899 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1900 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1901 * influence which certificate is sent
1903 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
1904 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
1907 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1908 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
1910 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1911 * et al can pick it up.
1913 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
1914 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
1916 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1917 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1918 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1920 /* status request response should be sent */
1921 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1922 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
1923 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1925 /* something bad happened */
1926 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1928 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1937 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1939 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1940 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1942 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1943 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s, &al);
1945 /* SSLErr() was already called */
1952 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1953 if (!s->hit || s->hello_retry_request) {
1954 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1955 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1956 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1958 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1960 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1964 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1967 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1970 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1972 if (cipher == NULL) {
1973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1974 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1977 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1978 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id) {
1980 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1981 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1983 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
1987 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1989 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, &al))
1991 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1992 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1993 s->session->not_resumable =
1994 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey
1995 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1997 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1998 /* do not send a session ticket */
1999 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2002 /* Session-id reuse */
2003 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2007 * we now have the following setup.
2009 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2010 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2011 * compression - basically ignored right now
2012 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2013 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2014 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2015 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2019 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2020 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2022 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) {
2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2024 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2031 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2033 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
2035 * callback indicates further work to be done
2037 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2040 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
2042 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
2043 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
2045 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2047 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2050 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2056 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2058 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2059 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2063 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2065 int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2069 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
2070 version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
2071 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2073 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2074 * tls_process_client_hello()
2076 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2077 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2082 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2083 * back in the server hello:
2084 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2085 * we send back the old session ID.
2086 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2087 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2088 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2089 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2091 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2092 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2093 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2094 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2097 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2098 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2100 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2102 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2103 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2108 /* set up the compression method */
2109 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2112 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2115 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2118 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2119 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl))
2120 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2121 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2122 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
2123 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2125 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2126 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
2128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2132 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2133 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2134 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2140 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2144 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2146 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2147 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2148 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2155 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2158 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2161 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2162 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2165 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2166 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
2169 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2170 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2171 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2173 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2174 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2178 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2179 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2183 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2185 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2187 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2188 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2190 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2191 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2192 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2193 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2195 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2198 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2199 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2200 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2201 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2203 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2204 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2207 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2210 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2212 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2213 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2214 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2216 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2217 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2222 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2223 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2224 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2225 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2228 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2229 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2230 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2232 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2235 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2237 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2241 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2243 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2248 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2250 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2253 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2254 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2258 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2261 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2263 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2267 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2268 nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2269 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
2270 if (curve_id == 0) {
2271 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2272 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2275 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
2276 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2277 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2282 /* Encode the public key. */
2283 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2285 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2286 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2291 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2292 * can set these to NULLs
2299 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2301 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2302 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2303 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2304 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2306 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2309 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2310 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2311 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2312 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2316 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2317 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2318 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2322 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2323 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2325 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2326 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2331 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2332 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2333 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2336 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2337 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2339 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2340 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2349 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2350 unsigned char *binval;
2353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2354 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2355 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2358 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2362 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2368 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2369 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2372 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2373 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2376 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2378 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2381 memset(binval, 0, len);
2385 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2386 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2388 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2392 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2396 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2398 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2399 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2400 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2403 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2404 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2405 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2406 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2408 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2411 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2412 encodedPoint = NULL;
2418 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2419 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
2420 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
2423 if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) {
2424 /* Should never happen */
2425 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2427 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2431 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2432 * points to the space at the end.
2435 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2436 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2438 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2441 /* send signature algorithm */
2442 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg))
2445 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2446 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2447 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2450 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2451 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2452 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2454 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2457 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2458 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2459 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2460 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2465 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2466 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2467 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2468 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2469 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx,
2470 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2472 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0
2473 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2474 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2476 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2481 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2484 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2487 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2490 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2492 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2496 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2498 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2500 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2501 /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */
2502 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2504 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2508 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2509 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2511 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2512 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2518 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2519 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2520 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2525 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2526 const uint16_t *psigs;
2527 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2529 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2530 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2531 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2532 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2533 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2534 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2539 if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2545 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2548 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2552 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2555 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2557 PACKET psk_identity;
2559 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2560 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2564 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2565 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2569 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2570 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2571 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2575 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2576 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2577 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2581 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2584 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2585 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2586 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2588 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2590 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2592 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2593 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2594 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2598 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2599 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2600 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2602 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2603 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2608 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2612 /* Should never happen */
2613 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2614 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2619 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2622 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2624 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2625 size_t j, padding_len;
2626 PACKET enc_premaster;
2628 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2631 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2633 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2634 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2638 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2639 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2640 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2642 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2643 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2644 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2651 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2652 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2653 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2654 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2656 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2657 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2662 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2663 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2664 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2665 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2670 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2671 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2672 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2673 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2674 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2677 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2681 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2682 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2684 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2685 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2686 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2687 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2688 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2691 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2694 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2695 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2696 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2698 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2699 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2704 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2705 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2706 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2707 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2708 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2710 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2713 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2714 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2715 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2716 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2717 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2718 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2721 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2722 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2724 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2725 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2728 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2729 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2730 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2731 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2732 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2733 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2736 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2737 unsigned char workaround_good;
2738 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2739 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2741 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2742 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2743 version_good |= workaround_good;
2747 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2748 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2750 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2753 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2754 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2755 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2756 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2758 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2759 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2760 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2761 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2762 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2765 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2766 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2767 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2774 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2777 /* Should never happen */
2778 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2784 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2786 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2787 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2791 const unsigned char *data;
2792 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2795 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2796 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2798 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2801 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2803 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2808 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2809 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2813 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2814 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2815 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2819 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2820 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2824 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2825 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2827 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2829 if (pub_key != NULL)
2834 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2835 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2841 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2842 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2844 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2847 /* Should never happen */
2848 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2854 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2857 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2858 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2861 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2862 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2863 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2868 const unsigned char *data;
2871 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2872 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2875 /* Get encoded point length */
2876 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2877 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2878 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2882 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2883 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2884 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2887 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2888 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2894 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2895 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2901 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2902 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2904 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2908 /* Should never happen */
2909 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2915 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2919 const unsigned char *data;
2921 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2922 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2923 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2927 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2931 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2932 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2936 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2937 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2938 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2943 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2950 /* Should never happen */
2951 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2957 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2960 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2961 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2962 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2963 const unsigned char *start;
2964 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2965 unsigned long alg_a;
2968 size_t sess_key_len;
2969 const unsigned char *data;
2972 /* Get our certificate private key */
2973 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2974 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2976 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2978 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2980 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2983 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2985 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2986 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2989 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2990 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2991 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2995 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2996 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3001 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3002 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3003 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3004 * client certificate for authorization only.
3006 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3007 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3008 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3011 /* Decrypt session key */
3012 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3013 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
3014 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3015 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3018 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3019 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
3020 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
3021 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
3022 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3028 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
3029 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
3030 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3034 /* Generate master secret */
3035 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3036 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3037 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3038 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3041 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3042 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
3043 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
3044 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3048 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3051 /* Should never happen */
3052 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3058 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3061 unsigned long alg_k;
3063 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3065 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3066 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3069 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3070 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3071 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3072 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3074 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3077 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3078 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3079 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3083 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3084 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3086 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3087 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3089 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3090 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3092 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3093 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3095 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3096 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3099 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3101 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3105 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3108 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3110 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3111 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3113 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3114 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3117 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3120 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3121 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3122 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3123 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3125 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3128 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3129 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3131 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3132 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3133 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3135 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3139 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3140 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3145 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3147 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3148 * the handshake_buffer
3150 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3151 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3154 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3156 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3157 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3158 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3159 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3163 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3164 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3166 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3167 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3172 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3175 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3177 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3179 unsigned long l, llen;
3180 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3181 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3182 PACKET spkt, context;
3185 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3186 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3190 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3191 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
3192 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3193 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3194 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3195 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3196 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3200 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3201 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3202 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3203 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3205 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3209 certstart = certbytes;
3210 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3212 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3215 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3216 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3218 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3222 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3223 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3226 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3227 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3231 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3232 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3233 &al, NULL, chainidx == 0)
3234 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3235 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al,
3236 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3237 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3240 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3243 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3250 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3251 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3252 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3253 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3254 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3255 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3258 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3259 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3260 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3261 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3262 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3263 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED;
3266 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3267 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3272 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3274 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3276 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3281 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3284 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3286 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3288 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3293 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3294 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3295 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3297 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3298 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3301 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3304 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3305 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3311 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3312 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3316 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3318 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3319 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3320 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3321 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3322 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3326 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3330 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3331 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3334 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3338 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3340 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3341 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3344 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3349 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3350 * for the server Certificate message
3352 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3353 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) {
3354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3355 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3362 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3364 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3365 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3366 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3367 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3368 const unsigned char *const_p;
3369 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3372 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3373 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3374 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3375 int iv_len, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3376 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3378 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3382 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3383 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0)
3385 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3386 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
3387 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
3388 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
3389 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
3390 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
3391 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
3392 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3393 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3396 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
3398 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
3401 /* get session encoding length */
3402 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3404 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3407 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3411 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3417 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3418 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3419 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3420 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3425 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3429 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3432 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3435 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3437 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3438 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3439 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3443 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3444 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3447 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3450 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3451 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3453 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3454 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3455 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3460 /* Put timeout and length */
3461 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3462 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3464 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3468 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3469 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3474 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3476 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3478 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3479 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3481 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3482 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv))
3484 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
3485 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
3486 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3488 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3489 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3493 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3494 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3495 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3498 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3499 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3500 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3502 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add))
3503 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3504 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3505 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3506 /* Output key name */
3507 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3509 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3510 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3512 /* Encrypt session data */
3513 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3514 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3515 || encdata1 != encdata2
3516 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3517 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3518 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3519 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3520 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3521 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3522 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3523 macendoffset - macoffset)
3524 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3525 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3526 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3527 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3528 || macdata1 != macdata2
3529 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
3531 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3532 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3534 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3537 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3538 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3543 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3545 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3546 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3547 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3552 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3553 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3555 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3557 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3558 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3559 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3560 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3567 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3569 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3570 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3579 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3580 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3582 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3584 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3585 size_t next_proto_len;
3588 * The payload looks like:
3590 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3591 * uint8 padding_len;
3592 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3594 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3595 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3596 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3597 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3601 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
3606 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3608 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3610 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3611 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3615 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3619 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3621 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3622 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3623 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3630 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3632 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3636 * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
3637 * (should be s->version)
3639 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
3640 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
3641 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3642 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
3644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3648 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
3649 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3654 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
3655 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
3657 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s))
3662 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3666 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3668 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3670 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3671 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3673 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3674 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3677 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
3678 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
3679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3684 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
3685 * a record boundary.
3687 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
3688 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3690 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
3694 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
3695 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3696 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
3697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3701 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3703 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3704 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3705 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;